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Abstract
Plutarch of Chaeronea, an eminent figure among the Platonists of the early Roman Empire, built
his philosophy by continuously drawing frameworks and models from Plato’s dialogues, both in
his works dedicated solely to exegesis and his own lively philosophical dialogues. He both
interprets Plato and adapts various models from the Platonic dialogues. Each philosopher was
especially concerned with problems posed by myth, yet each also employed their own elaborate
and imagistic narratives. In this study, I argue two main points. First, Plutarch’s treatment of
mythic narratives, in their dangers and their potential uses, is carefully modelled after Plato. Both
are concerned not only about the educational ramifications of stories for the young, but also the
problem of how unreal images can lead the audience to reality. Plutarch nevertheless develops
his myths, especially in the dialogues De sera numinis vindicta and De facie in orbe lunae, to
fulfill similar functions as Plato’s, whether to emphasize a predominate ethical point in the rest
of the dialogue, such as in the myth of Er, or to provide a teleological sketch for how the
arrangement of the world might be good, such as in the Timaeus. Imagistic narratives such as
these, for Plutarch as for Plato, do not transcend the reach of rational discourse, as much of the
scholarship holds, however, but rather form likely accounts. Second, I argue that Plutarch
constructs his own Platonic mythmaking as a distinctive kind of discourse that acts in parallel to
dialectic interpretation. Whether interpreting traditional religious material, such as from the cults
of Delphi and Isis, or explaining the complicated meanings of Plato’s Timaeus through appeal to
the other dialogues, these dialectical discourses also yield likely accounts. Given the epistemic
difficulties posed by both theology and physics, for different reasons, Plutarch cannot transcend
beyond such accounts. The complementary use of these two modes of discourse, dialectical
exegesis and imagistic mythmaking, illuminates some central workings of Plutarch’s Platonism.
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Introduction. Plato’s treatments of the problems of myth
Plato is notorious in scholarship, both ancient and modern, for his proposal to banish
poets from the ideal city so that children will be raised without potential harm from the
traditional myths. Heraclitus the Allegorist, for example, aims his work against Plato and
Epicurus together as the most prominent detractors of Homer.1 Plato’s critique has shaped the
discourse of English criticism to such an extent that both Sir Philip Sidney’s 1595 “The Defense
of Poesy” and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 1821 “A Defense of Poetry” go to great lengths to
confront and incorporate Plato into their poetics.2 His real aim, however, is myth rather than
poetry.3 In the Respublica, Socrates is evidently prepared to coerce artisans and old women, the

“Toss out Plato, the flatterer and slanderer of Homer, sending him off as a famous exile from his private city
wreathed with white wool and dripping with costly oil from his brow. Nor let there be esteem for Epicurus among
us, that farmer of ignoble pleasure in his private gardens, purifying all poetry together as a baleful enticement of
myths” (ἐρρίφθω δὲ Πλάτων ὁ κόλαξ καὶ Ὁμήρου συκοφάντης, ἔνδοξον ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας πολιτείας τὸν φυγάδα
προπέμπων λευκοῖς ἐρίοις ἀνεστεμμένον καὶ πολυτελεῖ μύρῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν διάβροχον. οὐδ’ Ἐπικούρου φροντὶς
ἡμῖν, ὃς τῆς ἀσέμνου περὶ τοὺς ἰδίους κήπους ἡδονῆς γεωργός ἐστιν, ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν ὥσπερ ὀλέθριον
μύθων δέλεαρ ἀφοσιούμενος; §4.1-2). See further §4.3-5, and on just Plato, §17.4-8.1. This polemic is so central to
Heraclitus’ defense of Homer that he even concludes the work with further denunciations of Plato (§76.6-9.1) and
Epicurus (§79.2-13). Asmis (1995) compares a similar pairing of Epicurus and Plato in Athenaeus V.187c (16n4).
2
Sidney, as printed in Shepherd & Maslen (2002): “Plato found fault that the poets of his time filled the world with
wrong opinions of the gods, making light tales of that unspotted essence, and therefore would not have the youth
depraved with such opinions. Herein may much be said; let this suffice: the poets did not induce such opinions, but
imitate those opinions already induced… So as Plato, banishing the abuse, not the thing – not banishing it, but
giving due honor unto it – shall be our patron and not our adversary” (107; cf. 84-5); Shelley in Reiman & Fraistat
(2002): “The distinction between poets and prose writers is a vulgar error. The distinction between philosophers and
poets has been anticipated. Plato was essentially a poet—the truth and splendor of his imagery and the melody of his
language is the most intense that it is possible to conceive. He rejected the measure of the epic, dramatic, and lyrical
forms, because he sought to kindle a harmony in thoughts divested of shape and action…” (514). While Shelley is
dismissive of moral poetry (517-8), Sidney pokes at what he takes as the immorality of the Greek philosophers: “as
likewise one should do that should bid one read Phaedrus or Symposium in Plato, or the discourse of love of
Plutarch, and see whether any poet do authorize abominable filthiness, as they do” (106). Sidney is apparently
referring to Plutarch’s Amat., as he refers to various works of the Mor. (especially 107-8), while Shelley classes
Plutarch with Herodotus and Livy as “all of the great historians” (515). See also Else (1986): “In the Laws Plato
writes as a poet as well as a philosopher. Because he alone can claim to be both, he alone can claim to represent the
truth with sufficient clarity to supplant the traditional poetry of Greece” (64). Cf. Hegel in Knox (1975: 21-2). Cf.
Verdenius (1949), who hopes that Plato’s critique can help ward off “a superficial cult of formal beauty as well as…
an overstrained desire of originality” (36). Murray (2011) emphasizes Socrates’ objections to lamentation in
particular and suggests that it is motivated by a greater aversion to the feminine.
3
Cf. Socrates in Phd. 61b: “if someone is to be a poet, they ought to make myths and not speeches” (εἴπερ μέλλοι
ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγους).
1
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other traditional purveyors of tales, as well as poets, to produce the right kind of stories.4 His
motivation, particularly in the extended treatment of the early books, is the ethical problems
posed by education. Children particularly are young and liable to harm if myths depict impious
or otherwise disturbing things, such as the Hesiodic succession myth, even if it were true. Less
explicitly, however, he offers at least two potential justifications for the use of narratives in
education, despite his ethical concerns. For traditional myths, there is the possibility of
allegorical interpretation, since it allows for the right sort of reader to find a more substantial
truth behind the scandalous appearance of the story.5 Second, if myth has, for Plato, a great
potential for evil, perhaps it conversely has a great potential for good as well, hence why he
evidently elaborated his own form of myth from traditional material for many of his dialogues.6
In refashioning this traditional material, Plato fashions an alternative corpus of myth.7 He strips
myths of their disturbing content and repurposes them for philosophical education.8

4

Cf. Thrasymachus in I.350e.
The allegorical tradition stretches back to at least to Theagenes of Rhegium in the 6th century B.C.E. and
particularly Socrates’ contemporary Metrodorus of Lampsacus, as well as the author of the Derveni Papyrus. On the
history of allegory, see Tate (1929), Lamberton (1986), (Dawson 1991) Brisson (2004), and Struck (2004). On
etymology in particular, see Baxter (1992: 107-63). The allegories of the Dervini Papyrus are sometimes argued to
be Stoic, but cf. Edmonds (2019). The poetry of Parmenides and Empedocles were thought in antiquity to contain
intentional allegories, e.g. by [Menander Rhetor] I.337.5-7. See also the scholia to Eur. Phoen. 18: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ
φυσικὸς ἀλληγορῶν… Cf. Murray (1925): “We must not think of allegory as a late post-classical phenomenon in
Greece. It begins at least as early as Pythagoras and Heraclitus, perhaps as early as Hesiod; for Hesiod seems
sometimes to be turning allegory back into myth” (72).
6
Cf. Socrates in Pl. Cri.: “Would only that the people were capable of doing the greatest of evils, Crito, then they
would be able to do the greatest of goods as well!” (εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τ’ εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα
κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τ’ ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα; 44d).
7
Cf. Else (1986): “Plato’s radical condemnation of poetry… is rather a particular instance of his radical rejection of
Greek culture as a whole. No Greek ever took so much of his own civilization into his heart and soul as Plato did,
and none ever rejected it so completely” (3-4). See also Edmonds (2009: 169-71).
8
In line with the criticisms of traditional myth in Resp. II-III, Plato either deemphasizes or banishes entirely any
potential wrongdoing of the gods, such as in the concluding myth of the Grg. where the succession myth, the most
dangerous of all, is gracefully passed over: “as Homer says, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the reign when
they were taking it over from their father” (ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν
καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον; 523a). The Politicus myth goes even farther in removing divine
conflict: Cronus retreats to his watching place (περιωπὴν) sua sponte because an ordained number of births had been
completed, without any violence or coercion (272d-e).
5
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Plato’s Socrates formulates a second criticism, however, that the form of myth is
inherently fictive in that it must be conveyed through some sort of imitation (mimêsis), whether
depicted in painting or poem. Myths pose ontological problems as well as ethical ones. In the
second book of the Respublica, Socrates distinguishes two sorts of myths—“the one true and the
other false”9—and concludes that both must be used in the education of the young: “don’t you
understand that we begin by telling stories to children? It is on the whole false, I suppose, but in
one sense true as well.”10 Yet how can something with any falsity, such as a myth, lead to truth?
This is especially problematic in light of Plato’s arguments that imitations of true realities, the
eternal and unchanging forms, are categorically removed from truth, especially since he
considers all language to be imitation, as Socrates argues in the Cratylus, as well as anything in
the sense-perceptible world, as emerges in the Timaeus, where the entire physical world is held
to be the demiurge’s imitation of the world of the forms. The latter provides a model for how this
mode of discourse can serve an unique and positive function. Accord to Plato, it is impossible to
gain certain knowledge about the physical world because it has no stability. Myth, however, can
be used to form a “likely account,” which manages —the best that humans can hope for when
speculating about the world of change and becoming. As Timaeus, the Sicilian astronomer
charged with explaining the workings of the sense-perceptible world in the eponymous dialogue,
puts it after explaining this world’s changing nature, “it is fitting to accept a likely myth about
these sorts of things—seek nothing further!”11 The sort of myth provided by Timaeus, it seems, is
potentially less deceptive than an authoritative declaration, insofar as it emphasizes its

λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ᾽ ἕτερον; (376e).
οὐ μανθάνεις… ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ
ἀληθῆ (377a).
11
ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν (29d).
9

10
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hypothetical status and distances itself from claims of certainty; the presence of the Atlantis
narrative that proceeds it adds further complications still to the category of myth.
In this introduction, I examine Plato’s ethical and metaphysical critiques of myth, then
suggest how his own myths seem to meet these challenges. Following the ethical critique,
therefore, I suggest that the myth of Er functions as a protreptic to reinforce the exhortation to
philosophy in the rest of the dialogue; after the metaphysical critique of images as unreal, I
suggest that Timaeus’ story is framed as “likely” because it is an account that emphasizes its own
hypothetical status. But first, I survey the scholarship that addresses the function of these
philosophical myths. While Plato’s critique of poetry and mimesis have each attracted substantial
bodies of scholarship, his own use of myth has drawn another mass of criticism and
investigation. This starts on the basic level of how to define a Platonic myth. His own use of the
cognate term muthos is both helpful and yet insufficient. At several positions in the corpus,
characters distinguish between a logos and a muthos. Three examples will suffice to draw out
some similarities on how they are framed before briefly introducing the status quaestionis.12
Protagoras begins his “great speech” in the eponymous dialogue by offering the audience a
choice: “but first, should I explain it by telling a myth, as older men do to younger, or going
through it in an account?”13 The sophist opts to begin with a myth on the grounds that it will be
more pleasant (χαριέστερον), but he eventually gives an account as well.14 Plato has Socrates
12

See also Leg. I.644d-5c and X.903b-905b. On the latter, see Saunders (1973).
ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών; (320c). On the debate
over the authorship of the myth, whether to what extent it was Protagoras himself or Plato, see Van Riel (2012). See
also Stewart (1905): “The myth told in the Symposium by Aristophanes, being told by Aristophanes, has a comic
vein; similarly, the Myth put into the mouth of Protagoras is somewhat pompous and confused. None the less, these,
I would contend, and the other non-Socratic Myths are true Platonic Myths” (221-2).
14
“About this then, Socrates, I will no longer tell you a myth, but an account” (τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι
μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον; 324d). The last outwardly narrative part of the myth, however, Zeus’ proclamation that
all shall have a share in “reverence and justice” (αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην), ended a page earlier (322c-e), such that it is
difficult to determine what distinguishes the interceding argumentation from the speech that follows. As Most
(2012) notes that in any Platonic muthos, “by the laws of Greek grammar, what is involved is a form of logos
involving muthos” (23).
13
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present a similar dichotomy in the central speech of the Phaedrus, a dialogue laden with myth.15
After a tersely argued proof for the immortality of the soul on the basis of its capacity for selfmotion, Socrates proposes to change his mode of exposition:16 “the sort of thing it is, this seems
to be an entirely divine and long narrative, but that to which it is like, a human and a lesser one;
let us speak in this way: let it be like to the united power of a winged pair of horses and a
charioteer.”17 Socrates later deems the speech a “mythic hymn” to Eros and allows that it, “an
account not entirely implausible,” may have touched on the truth, although it was composed with
play (παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι). 18 Finally, in the Politicus, the Eleatic Stranger interrupts the initial
discussion to proceed down another road, one that will “I dare say mix in some play; we should
use a long part of a great myth in our discussion and then continue as before.”19 Young Socrates,
the interlocutor, must listen to the myth “as children do” (καθάπερ παῖδες).
Plato’s myths, then, share some characteristics. They are told by the older to the younger,
they are playful or pleasant, and they are shorter than discourses. They also at least touch on the
15

Phaedrus begins the discussion by asking Socrates if he believes the myth of Oreithyia (229b-30a). Besides the
central myth of the palinode, Socrates relates myths of the origins of cicadas (259b-d, cf. 230c) and the creation of
writing by the Egyptian god Theuth (274c-5b), which Phaedrus mocks—“you can make whatever Egyptian accounts
you want, Socrates” (ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς). The scholarship
on myth in the dialogue is fittingly immense. See generally Werner (2012). See also Ferrari (1990): “Platonic
myth… is not the only possible medium; I have here, after all, been trying to say the same thing in unmythical prose.
… Saying this in unmythical prose is not saying it better; only differently. And just this, I believe, Plato’s point in
‘doing’ philosophy in this dialogue through the two distinct and strikingly juxtaposed verbal paths of myth and
dialectic. He allows neither path to reach a satisfactory goal; rather, one leads to the other” (33).
16
245c-6a. He describes it as a “proof” (ἀποδείξεως; 245c). Analytically-minded scholars tend to identify the
argument as fallacious. Moore (2014) even argues that it is “deliberatively fallacious” (179-80). It was rather
influential, however, in antiquity. Cicero, for instance, has Scipio Africanus relate a Latin translation in the Somn.
(§27-8) and repeats it as Plato’s belief (ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis) in Tusc. I.22-3.53-4.
17
οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος· ταύτῃ
οὖν λέγωμεν. ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου (246a). See also the comparison of
duration in Socrates’ appeal to the gardens of Adonis (276b).
18
“Perhaps we touched on a certain truth, or perhaps we carried ourselves too far afield, mixing together an account
not entirely implausible, playing at a certain mythic hymn… (ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ᾽ ἂν καὶ
ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν…; 265bc). Cf. 264e-5a.
19
πάλιν τοίνυν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς δεῖ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν ὁδὸν πορευθῆναί τινα… σχεδὸν παιδιὰν ἐγκερασαμένους: συχνῷ
γὰρ μέρει δεῖ μεγάλου μύθου προσχρήσασθαι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν δή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν (268d-e). The Stranger
indicatively begins by appealing to names from traditional myth, Atreus and Thyestes (268e). Further on this myth,
see infra pg. 169.

10
truth: as Socrates puts it at the end of the eschatological narrative in the Phaedo, although he
cannot affirm it, we should believe the things of the myth or something like them, and chant
(ἐπᾴδειν) them to ourselves.20 Yet there are more difficult cases. In the Gorgias, Socrates insists
that the account of the soul’s fate after death is a logos, even if the petulant Callicles thinks it to
be a muthos.21 Plato’s famous allegory of the cave in the Respublica is called an image (eikôn)
and not a mythos; but myths are themselves a sort of image, or at least contain them, and the
allegory can surely be read as a narrative.22 The Timaeus presents particular difficulties because
its central speech is called both a likely myth (muthos) and a likely account (logos).
There is, nevertheless, some broad agreement about what counts as a Plaotnic myth. John
Alexander Stewart, a Neo-Kantian philosopher, published an edition entitled The Myths of Plato,
which includes narratives from the Phaedo, Gorgias, Respublica, Protagoras, Timaeus,
Phaedrus, Symposium, and Critias.23 Perceval Frutiger published a study twenty-five years later
that both laid out clearer criteria and broadened the list, while arguing against the inclusion of
passages proposed by others, such as the cave.24 During the 1970’s and 1980’s, a series of young
scholars began projects on Plato’s conception of myth, and particularly his use of muth-

20

See further infra pg. 256.
“Hear, then, a beautiful account, which you may consider a myth, I suspect, but I an account” (ἄκουε δή… μάλα
καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον; 523a). Towards the end of his speech, he
anticipates that it will be scoffed at as a “myth like an old woman’s” (μῦθός… ὥσπερ γραὸς; 527). For the
eschatological system of this myth, see infra pg. 243. Zaslavsky (1981), on the basis of Socrates’ distinction, denies
that this is, in fact, a myth (12-3 and 195-8). Most, however, do not take Socrates so strictly at his word.
22
“‘You describe a strange image and strange prisoners,’ he said. ‘Like us,’ I said (“ἄτοπον,” ἔφη, “λέγεις εἰκόνα
καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους.” “ὁμοίους ἡμῖν,” ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ; VII.515a). Socrates later refers to it again as an image (εἰκόνα;
517a). On the range of meanings of the word image (εἰκών) for Plato, see Pender (2000: 37-43).
23
1905. He distinguishes between myths that focus on “the Individual’s Ideals and Categories” (of Kant) and those
that relate to “Nations” rather than individuals—namely the myths of the metallic races in the Resp. and of Atlantis
in the Ti. and Criti. (451). For Stewart, the rest belong to the former category. The selection in Partenie (2004) is
similar, but the allegory of the cave is included (51-6) while the metallic races are not
24
“L’allégorie ist immobile comme un tableau” (101). Cf. Hack (1935): “M. Frutiger’s treatment of Plato’s myths…
is a refreshing contrast to the Kantian cloudiness of Stewart and to the total eclipse of sense in Reinhardt’s recent
work on the same subject” (270).
21
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terminology, some of which were eventually published as monographs.25 Luc Brisson, in Platon,
les mots et les mythes, translated into English with the more poetic title Plato the Myth Maker,
analyzed both Plato’s terminology for myths and his presentation of oral transmission.26 Glenn
Most proposes a structural schema, based on principles such that the speaker usually disclaims
authority, which excludes some narratives usually held to be myths, such as the birth of the
cicadas in the Phaedrus or the rendition of the myth of the metallic races in the Respublica.27
These accounts, nevertheless, provide a firmer basis for defining the corpus of Platonic myths.
The myths have attracted much broader attention, both positive and negative, from
various sorts of modern theorists and philosophers as well.28 Freidrich Hegel argues in
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie that myth inherently belongs to the childhood
of humanity and so muddies Plato’s thought.29 This tendency becomes widespread in Analytic
philosophy. The myths, and particularly the eschatological narrative that concludes the Gorgias,

25

E.g. Zaslavsky (1981), Brisson (1998 [1982]), and Moors (1982). Zaslavsky is detail-oriented but emphasizes
unexpected instances, such as the use of παρεμυθεῖτο in Ep. VII.329d and 345e (29-48). Cf. Stewart (1989): “instead
of trying to determine the criterion by which Plato demarcated myth, Zaslavsky attempts instead to acquire the
definition of myth by mere ostention, i.e. he attempts to define Platonic myth by merely pointing to its various
instances. But this is analogous to that method of definition that is repeatedly rejected by Plato…” (261).
26
1998 [1982].
27
2012: “Platonic myths go back to older, explicitly indicated or implied, real or fictional oral sources… And many
of the figures and narrative schemes in Plato’s myths, even the probably invented ones, are familiar from the
customary Greek repertoire of traditional legends and popular tales” (17). This is his third of eight principles.
28
Moors (1982: 1-33) and Elias (1984: 75-118) provide useful surveys of the scholarship on Platonic myth. See also
Pender (2000: 76-86).
29
As translated by Haldane & Simson (1894): “The myth is always a mode of representation which, as belonging to
an earlier stage, introduces sensuous images, which are directed to imagination, not to thought; in this, however, the
activity of thought is suspended, it cannot yet establish itself by its own power, and so is not yet free. The myth
belongs to the pedagogic stage of the human race, since it entices and allures men to occupy themselves with the
content; but as it takes away from the purity of thought through sensuous forms, it cannot express the meaning of
Thought. When the Notion attains its full development, it has no more need of the myth. Plato often says that it is
difficult to express one’s thoughts on such and such a subject, and he therefore will employ a myth; no doubt this is
easier” (20). Schopenhauer (1819), at one point Hegel’s colleague, was much more positive about the mythic aspect
of Plato’s thought: “Jenes non plus ultra mythischer Darstellung haben daher schon Pythagoras und Plato mit
Bewunderung aufgefaßt, von Indien, oder Aegypten, herübergenommen, verehrt, angewandt und, wir wissen nicht
wie weit, selbst geglaubt” (513). The Hegelianizing treatment by Friedländer (1969), however, finds the unfolding
of history shot throughout the myths, which he schematizes into three levels (207-10), culminating in the Atlantis
narrative (203).
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have haunted the “Socratic” scholarship which Gregory Vlastos initated, for instance.30 Among
political philosophers, the idea of a “noble lie” in the Respublica deeply inspired Leo Strauss
while provoking a comparable degree of disgust in Karl Popper.31 In a very different
philosophical realm, Plato looms large in Marcel Detienne’s deconstructionist monograph on
Greek mythology.32 In the past decade, the myths have gained broader attention from classicists,
as represented especially by two collected volumes.33
There is extensive debate about the function of Plato’s myths. There are three broad
trends.34 First, some argue that the myths allow the audience to grasp a transcendental truth that
is inaccessible to their reason. Stewart’s Neo-Kantian analysis appeals to “Transcendental
Feeling,” the objects of which “are not given in articulate language which the scientific

30

Vlastos most prominently took up a project of finding the historical Socrates, whom he paints as a sort of martyr
for rationalistic moralism. Only in some of the dialogues, such as the Apologia and the Euthyphro, “the early
dialogues,” are sufficiently elenchic, non-dogmatic, and strictly focused on ethics, as Vlastos saw it, to accurately
represent the “Socrates” that is more clearly apparent from the works of Xenophon and Aristotle. There argue two
“Socrates” in Plato, he argues: “They are so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one
another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotle’s” (46). It is only after Plato’s
metaphysical wings begin to sprout that he writes the “middle dialogues,” such as the Phd. and all the books of the
Resp. after the first, according to Vlastos (46-9). Myth emerges as a problem because Vlastos places the Gorgias,
which contains an eschatological narrative not dissimilar from the myth of Er and the others, in the category of
“early dialogues,” arguing that it is simply a morality tale, which does not imply the un-Socratic belief in the
immortality of the soul that would emerge in the “Platonic dialogues.” Another Socratic scholar, McPherran, accepts
the Gorgias as “Socratic,” but rejects the myth, with its strong implication that the soul is immortal, as a Platonic
interpolation. Smith and Woodruff, however, argue that not only is the conception of the soul in the Gorgias myth
“Socratic,” but that it even corresponds to that of the Apologia, that most quintessentially “Socratic” of all the
dialogues. These sorts of issues viviate much of the interest in the chronology of the dialogues. Kahn (1996) is on
sounder ground, however, by adhering rigorously to the stylometric studies of the 19 th century (42-8). Plutarch at
least considered the Criti. to be late given its unfinished state (Sol. 32.1-2). This sort of developmentalistic
argumentation, however, is prevalent in the scholarship on Plutarch’s philosophy as well, although this is less
convincing. See infra pg. 74. There is a prevalent assumption that the dialogues devoted to ethics are necessarily
“earlier,” but cf. Porph. Plot. §6 and Denyer (2001: 20-4).
31
See Resp. III.414-5d, Popper (2013 [1945]), and Strauss (1987 [1963]). On Strauss and the study of Plato, see
especially Ferrari (1997).
32
1986 [1981]. The book does not analyze much text besides that of Plato, although there is a sort of allegorization
of the odd use of muthietai in Anacreon: “Myth is a subversive word, a rebellious voice, seditious, but less in
content that is empty than in the form others bestow on it from the outside” (45-6). Brisson (1998 [1994]) criticizes
him at length (135-9). See also Derrida (1981 [1972]), which treats the myth of Theuth in the Phdr. (especially 6775).
33
Partenie (2009) and Destrée, Gonzalez, & Collobert (2012). Recent volumes on Plato and poetry—Destrée &
Herrmann (2011)—and images—Destrée & Edmonds (2017)—are also relevant, as is the volume on Hesiod and
Plato—Boys-Stones & Haubold (2000).
34
Cf. Latona (2004).
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understanding can interpret; they come as dreams, and must be received as dreams, without
thought of doctrinal interpretation.” Humans only reach this unity with “Universal Nature,”
Stewart argued, when they transcend reason, as they do when the irrational parts of their souls
hear myth or philosophical poetry, which scientific inquiry cannot comprehend.35 Some Christian
scholars have argued that the myths are meaningfully inspired, partaking in a sort of
foreshadowing of Christian revelation.36 While theologically motivated scholars tend to
emphasize the eschatological myths, a few Analytic philosophers have proposed another
category of myth. Julius Elias, for instance, proposes a “weak defense” and a “strong defense” of
poetry for Plato. The former is fulfilled as long as poetry is purified of unethical ideas, meaning
that it conveys ethically acceptable ideas that could also be communicated through in dialectic;
the latter needs to find a unique function for myth, namely providing the first principles for
deductive inquiry.37 Elias finds the latter in what he calls “methodological” myths.38 These
include the movement in the Respublica from the analogy of the sun to the allegory of the cave,
which are purported to provide the first principles for philosophical deduction that cannot be

35

1905: 21-2.
Cf. Shorey (1933): “… unwilling to forego any sanction of right conduct, Plato rises from the region of dialectic
demonstration to the world of faith, aspiration, and trust, and offers us in place of the rejected gross material
paradise of Hesiod and the Orphic poets one of those beautiful tales of the after-judgment and retribution in what
Martineau, their best interpreter, finds a genuine if somewhat melancholy and uncertain anticipation of triumphant
Christian hope” (251). For a more systematic and philosophical treatment in this vein, see Pieper (1965).
37
1984. Hence he at one point calls them “‘duplicates’ of dialectical arguments… [which] Plato is sometimes
disposed to repeat in poetic form” (119).
38
These are myths which do not deal with the “content” of Plato’s thought (i.e. most of what most everyone agrees
are myths), but rather with “the structure of knowledge” (185). Elias categorizes “the whole theory of forms” as a
myth (185), as well as passages on anamnesis (Phd. 72e-6e, Meno 85c-6b), the sun-line-cave movement, and
Diotima’s ladder (Symp. 210a-2a) under this heading. He has rhapsodic moments, however, such as in the
conclusion to his discussion of Findlay: “The whole book is a beautiful myth about Plato, written in a spirit close to
the original. But as little as I trust my mind, my heart I trust not at all” (118).
36
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derived from reason. Robert Stewart, extending Elias’ analysis, even argues that the only
meaningful myth for Plato is the analogy of the sun.39
Against this transcendentalist approach, however, there is the idea that myths are aimed
specifically at either the lower parts of the soul or unphilosophical audiences, under the
assumption that not everyone can become a philosopher. Ludwig Edelstein, for instance,
identifies seven Platonic myth and divides them into two categories, those about the early history
of the universe or humanity—Timaeus, Critias, Politicus—and those about the soul before and
after life—Phaedo, Gorigas, Phaedrus, Respublica. He argues that each serves a different
purpose and has different epistemic statuses, in that the former contain knowledge about the
world of becoming (in which no sure knowledge is possible); these are therefore essentially
extrinsic to philosophy.40 Luc Brisson argues that myths are, for Plato, most appropriate for
subjects which are unverifiable, particularly including the distant past, such as in the Atlantis
myth, or world of disembodied souls;41 he argues that the mythic form is aimed at either a
unphilosophical audience or the lower parts of our souls. Janet Smith stresses, however, the roles
that Platonic myths play for both sorts of audience.42
Finally, there is a more recent trend of treating Platonic myths as images that emphasize
their own status as images. This is particularly plausible with regard to the speeches of Critias in

1989. The only Platonic myth which fulfills what he believes to be of the more significant sort is the “allegory of
the cave,” which “because it is a full blown story, attains full status as a myth” (276). His reasoning is that it is
“Plato's most explicit - indeed only explicit - treatment of the nature of the Good itself” and therefore the only
candidate for a myth which could serve to provide first principles. Zaslavsky (1981) presents a Straussian take on
this idea, which he reveals with his mention of studying under Benardete (200n22).
40
1949: “The ethical myth, then, is an addition to rational knowledge; it does not take the place of rational
knowledge, as do the historical and scientific myths. … Is not the ethical myth even more superfluous than the
cosmological and historical tales, since ethical knowledge is self-sufficient?” (473). He does, however, stress
Platonic idea of paidia, “recreation from arguments concerning ideas,” (469), which, Edelstein argues, is just as
necessary to the philosopher as seriousness or zeal (470-471).
41
He particularly appeals to the idea of non-falsifiable discourse (91-111). Most's (2012) fourth criterion is similar
(17).
42
1986. See also Smith (1985).
39
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the Timaeus and Critias, which seem, as Katherine Morgan especially argues, to call attention to
the epistemic status of the rest of the former dialogue. In Critias’ two speeches, one of which
precedes Timaeus’ “likely myth” in the Timaeus while the other forms the bulk of the
eponymous dialogue that follows, he relates an encounter, passed down to him through his
ancestors, between Solon and an Egyptian priest at Saïs.43 The latter criticizes various parts of the
Greek mythic tradition, such as the flood narrative and Solon’s genealogy, which must be
rejected, while, according to Morgan, the Atlantis narrative represents a “noble lie” that the
audience seems to accept; completing a tripartite schema, Timaeus’ grand cosmological account
then seems to be a distinctively philosophical myth. As a whole, the “Timaeus and the Critias
present a series of nested levels of myth corresponding to varying levels of truth and usage.”44 I
suggest that Plutarch’s myths might similarly serve this function. They serve several significant
philosophical functions—such as reinforcing ethical points elsewhere in the dialogue and
allowing the construction of teleological accounts about the physical world—but they also call
attention to their own hypothetical status as images. The subsequent sections of this introduction
lay the foundation for the following chapters on Plutarch’s Platonic interpretations and his own
imitative mythmaking. The Chaeronean, I argue, shares both Plato’s critiques of myth, each part
of which he advances in hiw own analysis, and his conceptions of the function of philosophical
myths, both as ethical exhortations and teleological accounts. Plutarch, moreover, uses myth in
parallel with his dialectical arguments, just as Plato does. 45

43

Cf. Ti. 21d-3a.
2000: 278. See also Hooper (2010). On the Atlantis myth cf. Gill (2017).
45
Cf. Johansen (1998): “Some of the philosophical writings are intended for a wider public, others are more
technical. Most of them move subtly back and forth between a rational and a symbolic mythical level. To Plutarch
these two modes of expression are in fact two sides of the same issue” (533).
44
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Persuasion, deception, and education
The Greek mythic tradition, particularly embodied in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod,
reflects multiple coherent but competing ethical worldviews. Hesiod’s Opera et dies, for
example, presents Zeus’ reign as superlatively just, if in some respects harsh:46 the virtuous enjoy
peace, prosperity, and security, while thrice ten thousand daemones, “garbed in mist” (ἠέρα
ἑσσάμενοι), are said to watch over the earth to ensure none of the wicked escape punishment;47
some might think that they can overcome the maiden Dike and give wicked judgements, but in
the end they only bring about their own ruin.48 Hesiod’s Theogonia, which expounds the
formation of Zeus’ reign, however, attributes malevolent envy and brutal violence in the divine
family—most shockingly, between father and son. Uranus conspires to oppress his children, until
he is castrated by his son Cronus; the victorious Titan, in turn, attempts to suppress his children
by swallowing them, but he is undone by the trickery of his wife Rhea and the might of his son
Zeus, who victoriously enchains most of the previous generations in gloomy Tartarus.49 The
Hesiodic corpus provides both the fundaments for what would become traditional morality and

In a short fable (αἶνον), a hawk snatches a nightingale, berating it as it weeps (202-6): “only a fool wants to fight
against those that are stronger; he is both deprived victory and suffers pain in addition to shame” (ἄφρων δ’ ὃς κ’
ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν· / νίκης τε στέρεται πρός τ’ αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει; 210-1). While the poem
hymns justice at length, the fable seems to preempt the Athenian conceit in Thucydides’ Melian dialogue: “justice is
reckoned in human understanding when there is equal force, but the strong do what is in their power and the weak
suffer” (δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ
οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν; V.89).
47
Prosperity: 225-37; daemones: 248-55. The “eye of Zeus” (Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς) is also said to “see all” (πάντα ἰδὼν;
267).
48
“But there is the maiden Justice, daughter of Zeus, glorious and revered among the gods, and whenever anyone
should harm her or crookedly slander her, immediately she sits beside her father Zeus, son of Cronus, and divulges
the unjust mind of men…” (ἡ δε τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυία, / κυδρή τ’ αἰδοίη τε θεῶν, οἳ Ὄλυμπον
ἔχουσιν, / καί ῥ’ ὁπότ’ ἄν τίς μιν βλάπτῃ σκολιῶς ὀνοτάζων / αὐτίκα πὰρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίωνι / γηρύετ’
ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον…; 256-62). See further 220-4 and Plu. Quomodo adul. 36a-b. Cf. Socrates in Pl. Grg.: “it is
bad to suffer injustice, but worse to do injustice” (μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
509c).
49
Uranus and Cronus: 156-93; Cronus and Zeus: 459-506.
46

17
the source of the greatest shame for philosophers who wish to attribute nothing evil to the gods.50
Homer, in turn, presents further scandals amongst the gods, such as the adulterous tryst of
Aphrodite and Ares.51
These scandalous elements drew moral criticism as early as Xenophanes in the late 6th
century B.C.E., who laments, “everything Homer and Hesiod attribute to the gods is everything
that brings blame and shame among men—resorting to theft, adultery, and cheating one
another.”52 By the time of Socrates and the sweep of sophists through Athens, there seems to
have been an anxiety that these myths could provide justification for human wickedness. The
sophistic Unjust Argument in Aristophanes’ Nubae attempts to exploit exactly these stories in his
refutation of the naïve Just Argument: “How could there be Justice, if Zeus did not perish when
he chained his own father?”53 Socrates’ eponymous interlocutor in Plato’s Euthyphro, an
evidently serious man defending the prosecution of his own father as impious, similarly appeals
to the example of the succession myth: “these men consider Zeus to be the best and most just of
the gods, and they admit that he bound his own father in justice because he unjustly swallowed

Both Hesiodic poems, however, include the scandalous narrative of Prometheus’ theft of fire and attempt to
deceive Zeus (Op. 47-105 and Th. 510-616). Lloyd-Jones (1971), while distinguishing the divine justice of the Il.
and the Od., presents the Hesiodic epics as coherent on this issue (32-6). Plutarch considered Hesiod such a moral
authority that, according to Proclus’ commentary, apparent immorality in the Op. justifies “throwing out the lines”
(τούτους στίχους ἐκβάλλει) as “unworthy of Hesiod’s judgement concerning justice and injustice” (ὡς ἀναξίους τῆς
Ἡσιόδου περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων κρίσεως; ad 268).
51
Od. VIII.266-366. Cf. Resp. III.390c.
52
πάντα θεοῖσ’ ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε, / ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, / κλέπτειν
μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν (frg. B10 Diels). This is especially dangerous because, as Xenophanes quips,
“from the beginning all learned from Homer” (ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον, ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες; frg. B9). The list of
the most unholy of acts (ἀθεμίστια ἔργα) is repeated in B11. This sort of critique—and that of the physical absurdity
of anthropomorphism, see infra—was apparently prominent in his poetry. Diogenes Laertius characterizes his work
as “written in epic, elegy, and iambic against Hesiod and Homer, to criticize what they have said about the gods”
(γέγραφε δὲ ἐν ἔπεσι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἰάμβους καθ' Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ὁμήρου, ἐπικόπτων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρημένα;
IX.18). He also quotes a line of Timon that deems Xenophanes a “Homer-trampling satirist” (Ὁμηραπάτην
ἐπικόπτην).
53
πῶς δῆτα Δίκης οὔσης ὁ Ζεὺς / οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ’ αὑτοῦ / δήσας; (904-6). Aristophanes’ Unjust Argument
also appeals to sexual stories, presumably such as Hera’s seduction of Zeus in Il. XIV: “since it turns back to Zeus,
even he is bested by Eros and women. How are you, despite being a mere mortal, able to do better than a god?” (εἶτ’
εἰς τὸν Δί’ ἐπανενεγκεῖν, / κἀκεῖνος ὡς ἥττων ἔρωτός ἐστι καὶ γυναικῶν· / καίτοι σὺ θνητὸς ὢν θεοῦ πῶς μεῖζον ἂν
δύναιο; 1080-2).
50

18
his sons, and that he, in turn, castrated his own father on similar grounds.”54 Some contemporary
sophists take a contrary approach, and seem to use mythic frames to ground their discourses in a
sense of ethical rectitude—such as in Hippias’ dialogue between Nestor and Neoptolemus or
Prodicus’ fable of Hercules at the crossroads55—and so, it seems, set out to improve upon the
traditional myths. The scandalous stories, however, would continue to be a source of rebuke.
Dionysius of Hallicarnassus praises the Romans for lacking myths that contain such divine
outrages as the succession narrative, which Eusebius adapts to his own denouncement of
Hellenic tradition.56
Plato, however, presents the first extant, systematic ethical critique of the mythic
tradition. In the Alcibiades I, for instance, Socrates interprets both Homeric epics, at their core,
as discourses on justice and injustice.57 It is especially in the Respublica, however, where the

αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι
τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι ὅτι τοὺς ὑεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κἀκεῖνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι᾽ ἕτερα
τοιαῦτα (5e-6a). Free further 6b-c. Some scholars, such as Sikes (1931: 66-7) and Ledbetter (2003: 1), maintain a
developmentalistic distinction between the treatment of poetry in the “Socratic” dialogues and the later works, given
the treatment of inspiration. Cf. Else (1986: 8-9). This example of Euthyphro’s abuse of myths, suggests that there is
an ethical concern about myth even in the so-called “early” dialogues. Cf. Sikes (1931: 73). On the identity of
Euthyphro, in light of his treatment in Pl. Crat. especially, see Kahn (1997).
55
Pl. Hip. ma. 286a-c, Xen. Mem. II.1.21-34. Cf. Gorgias’ Encomium and Apologia. In Xenophon’s Symp.,
however, Niceratus’ Homeric education (III.6) is portrayed as practical rather than ethical—“wisest Homer wrote
about nearly everything in human affairs, so whoever among you wants to become versed in landowning, politics, or
generalship, or to become like Achilles, Ajax, Nestor, or Achilles, let him seek my favor!” (Ὅμηρος ὁ σοφώτατος
πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικὸς ἢ δημηγορικὸς ἢ
στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι ἢ ὅμοιος Ἀχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσσεῖ, ἐμὲ θεραπευέτω; 4.6)—which is met with
playful mockery (§6-9).
56
“For, among the Romans, Uranus is not castrated by his own children, nor does Cronus do away with his own
offspring out of fear lest they should attack him, nor does Zeus destroy the reign of Cronus and imprison his own
father in Tartarus; nor still is there war, violence, imprisonment, or servitude of the gods among men” (οὔτε γὰρ
Οὐρανὸς ἐκτεμνόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παίδων παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις λέγεται οὔτε Κρόνος ἀφανίζων τὰς ἑαυτοῦ γονὰς
φόβῳ τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπιθέσεως οὔτε Ζεὺς καταλύων τὴν Κρόνου δυναστείαν καὶ κατακλείων ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τοῦ
Ταρτάρου τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα οὐδέ γε πόλεμοι καὶ τραύματα καὶ δεσμοὶ καὶ θητεῖαι θεῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις; Ant.
Rom. II.19.1). Eusebius quotes the broader section that contains this passage as the conclusion to book II of Praep.
evang. (§7), which constitutes his main polemic against Greek and Egyptian mythology.
57
“Certainly, these poems are about the difference between the just and the unjust… and the battles and deaths that
came about from this difference to the Achaeans, and to the others, the Trojans, and to the suitors of Penelope and
Odysseus?” (οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; … καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι
διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ἐγένοντο, καὶ τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης
καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ; 112b). The authenticity of the dialogue has often been doubted since Schleiermacher (1836 [1809]:
54
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characters are concerned over education and the impact of stories on audiences too young to
employ sound interpretation, that Plato develops his ethical critique of myths, both those
conveyed in poetry and other media.58 He gives a variety of arguments, some of which are
practical—such as that the guardians-in-training must not hear stories about the underworld
would make them terrified of dying in battle59—but his initial two objections to traditional myths
are founded upon central theological assumptions.60 The very first, and perhaps weightiest, is that
the divine can only be the source of good for humans, never of evil, such that if stories contradict
this manifest and irrefutable truth, no one should be allowed to either speak or hear them.61 If the
328-36), but the tide has been changing recently. See e.g. Denyer (2001: 14-26) and Jirsa (2009). Cf. Smith (2004).
According to Diogenes Laertius, citing Favorinus, Anaxagoras preempted Plato in this ethical reading: “he seems to
be the first… to declare the opinion that the poetry of Homer is about virtue and justice”
(δοκεῖ δὲ πρῶτος… τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν ἀποφήνασθαι εἶναι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης; II.11 = frg. A1 Diels).
Hermias similarly draws attention to commonalities of the details of the myth of Er with his broader interpretation
(ἀνάπτυξιν, In Phdr. 77.14) of the Iliad as the story of rational souls, represented by the Greeks, descending from
the intelligible realm into materiality—some to return home because they prevail over matter, and others lost to it
(77.13-8.12). Particularly, he compares the prophet in the myth of Er that announces cycles of a thousand years with
Calchas pronouncing a return in ten years (78.5-9).
58
E.g. Adeimantus: “in addition to these things, Socrates, examine yet another form of discourses about justice and
injustice, spoken both in prose and by the poets” (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων περὶ
δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν; II.363e-4a). See also II.380c, III.392a (ποιηταὶ καὶ
λογοποιοὶ), 392d (πάντα ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται). On Plato’s citations of poetry in the dialogue, see
Halliwell (2000). The Athenian Stranger discusses the problem of poetry further in book VII of the Leg., which
fittingly sets out to describe the “rearing and education” of the young (τροφὴν μέν που καὶ παιδείαν; 788a). See e.g.
801a-3d; see further Meyer (2011).
59
“It seems, then, that we must exercise oversight over those who undertake to say myths such as these as well and
compel them absolutely not to slander the things in the house of Hades, but rather to praise them, so that they do not
say things that are both false and unbeneficial for those that are set to become warriors” (δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς
ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὴ λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγοντας οὔτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαίμοις ἔσεσθαι; III.386b-c). Cf. 387b.
60
After Socrates has concluded and summarized both arguments, Adeimantus gives the final words of book II with
the proclamation, “I entirely accept these models and I would use them as laws” (παντάπασιν… ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους
τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρῴμην; 383c). They seem to serve as an emphatic, discrete pairing.
61
“It must be opposed in every way that someone says these things in his own city—for someone to say that god,
being good, is responsible for evil—if it is to become a well-ordered city. Nor must anyone hear it, neither younger
nor older, neither in meter or mythologized without. This is because if they are said, they would not be said piously,
nor would they be beneficial to us nor consistent with themselves” (κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι
ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνομέσεσθαιμ μήτε
τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτ’ ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν
λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμιν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς; 380b-c). This argument reappears fittingly
following a discussion of Achilles (391d-e), whose image of two jars in Il. XXIV is a particularly famous example
of attributing evil to Zeus. See also Hes. Op. 663-8. Socrates’ second argument is that it is silly to imagine that a god
would change their form, such as in the myths of Proteus and Thetis (381d), because any such changes are unworthy
of the sempiternal stability of the divine: “do you think that god is a sorcerer and the sort to treacherously appear in
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traditional stories violate such central assumptions, there will be a need for new stories upon
which to rear the guardians, such as the myth of Er that concludes the Respublica. Socrates’
myth, furthermore, serves to reinforce the central ethical message of the dialogue that we must
become just—to have harmonious souls, in which each part fulfills its proper role, just as every
class in the just city fulfills its62—through philosophy. That is, it is not enough just to be just, but
one must become just for the right reasons, which must be grounded in metaphysical
understanding of what the just itself is.63
The problem of divine scandals in the traditional stories emerges particularly in the
second and third books, following Thrasymachus’ fierce contention in the first against Socrates
and the other interlocutors that justice is merely “acting for the benefit of the stronger.”64
Glaucon, Plato’s brother, is unsatisfied and asks whether justice is preferable in and of itself,

different forms at different times, that at one moment he appears in one form then charges it into many shapes, at
another he deceives us and makes things seem real about him? Or do you think that he is simple and least of all
things would depart from his own form?” (ἆρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἴει εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε
ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς
ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἣ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας
ἐκβαίνειν; 380c-d). He further argues that any change in god would necessarily (ἀνάγκη) be from the better to the
worse, because god is definitionally deficient in neither beauty nor virtue (ἐνδεᾶ… τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς;
381c). God, Socrates concludes, is necessarily free from all deception (οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο).
He combines this general critique with the specific critique of presenting a god as a goetic shapeshifer (μήτε αὐτοὺς
γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς; 383a).
62
“We are right to say, I think, Glaucon, that a man is just in the same way in which a city is just… But we have not
somehow forgotten this, that the city is just when each of its three classes attends to its own affairs… Is it not fitting
for the rational part to rule, since it is wise and consideration for the entire soul, and is it not fitting for the passionate
part to be a subservient ally to it?” (καὶ δίκαιον δή, ὦ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ᾦπερ
καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία… ἀλλ’ οὔ πῃ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν
τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δικαία ἦν… οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης
τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου; IV.441d-e). See further 442a-e and
Socrates’ summary in Ti. 17c-d. For a very different approach, cf. Altman (2012), who extensively attacks Leo
Strauss on political grounds throughout his scholarship—especially (2010)—yet employs a style of selective
interpretation reminiscent of Strauss to argue away much of the explicit political argumentation of the Resp.
63
Plato is still the locus classicus for moral realism. See especially Rist (2002) and (2012). See also Carone (2005).
Cf. Kant (1785), as translated by Wood (2002): “For as to what is to be morally good, it is not enough that it
conform to the moral law, but it must also happen for the sake of this law; otherwise, that conformity is only
contingent and precarious, because the unmoral ground will now and then produce lawful actions, but more often
actions contrary to the law” (6).
64
φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον (I.338c); see further 341a and 344c. He
is initially described as “tensing himself up as if a beast and leaping as if he meant to tear us apart” (συστρέψας
ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἧκεν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος; 336b).
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because it leads to good things such as reputation and rewards, or for both reasons. Adeimantus,
Glaucon’s other brother, responds by questioning how one could not think of rewards and
punishments, given the prevalence of each in myths. Particularly, he draws attention to how they
impact their audience, a problem that becomes central for the subsequent discussion:
My dear Socrates… all these sorts of things that are said about virtue and wickedness,
how gods and men honor them, what do we think they do to the souls of the young that
hear them? What should the young infer, those that are well-disposed and capable,
conclude from these things when they flit about, so to speak, towards everything they
hear about what sort of person to be and the path by which someone could conduct life in
the best way possible?65
Educated by stories of unjust rewards, Adeimantus worries, the young are wrongly convinced
that it is more important to seem just than to actually be just.
After some intervening discussion of the nature of the city, Socrates returns to education
in his discussion of the guardians and reintroduces the problem of poetry.66 He treats the issue
more broadly than Adeimantus and argues that the earliest education consists in myths, even
before children are ready to learn music and gymnastics, “for it is then that it is molded best and
the impression sets in best.”67 As a result, Socrates argues, the utmost care must be taken:
First of all, at it seems likely, we must have oversight of the makers of myths
(μυθοποιοῖς); we must judge and include what they make that is beautiful and exclude
what is not. Conversely, we will persuade both nurses and mothers to tell the children the
myths that are selected for inclusion and so to shape their souls with myths even more

ταῦτα πάντα… ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ
περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα
ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; (365a-b).
See also III.392a-b. Plato depicts how such stories, “myths that are said about the things in the house of Hades,
where it is necessary to pay the penalty for unjust deeds” (οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν
ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην; I.330d-e), have started to impact Cephalus as he advances into old age.
66
After concluding that the ideal “guardian” (φύλαξ) will be “philosophical, brave, quick, and strong” (φιλόσοφον
δὴ καὶ φιλομαθῆ καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς; 376c), Socrates connects the topic of education back to the initial discussion
of justice: “how should be rear and educate them? Perhaps this is a sort of preliminary question to the main topic we
are examining, on the sake of which we examine everything now: in what way does justice and injustice come about
in a city?” (θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἆρά τι προὔργον ἡμῖν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ
σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὗπερ ἕνεκα πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει
γίγνεται; 376c-d). He emphasizes the mythical character (ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές) of the following discussion.
67
μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος (377b).
65
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than they shape their bodies with their hands but most of the myths that they tell now will
have to be thrown out.68
Because the stakes are highest in early childhood, when children are most impressionable,
Socrates’ regime would regulate not only the myths of the poets, but all stories that mothers and
nurses tell the children they rear. In book X, he particularly emphasizes the myths of the poets,
but in books II to III, compulsion is broadly proposed for all conveyers of myth, artisans as well
as mothers and nurses, lest the guardians-in-training should hear or see anything baleful for the
soul.69 He is particularly emphatic that the myth of the succession of the gods must not be
depicted, or, if it is, only on the rarest and most prohibitively expensive of occasions.70 The
conversation turns, however, to cover the acceptable way to mythologize about “gods and
daemones and heroes and the things in the house of Hades,” and finally humans, recalling

πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ’
ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον· τοὺς δ’ ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παιςὶ καὶ πλάττειν τὰς
ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητεόν (377bc).
69
“Must we oversee and compel only the poet to either engrave the image of good character in his poems or not
write them at all among us, or must we also oversee the other craftsmen and hinder them for engraving bad
character—unrestrained, servile, ugly character—in their works, whether in pictures of animals or house paintings or
in any other kind of crafting, … lest our guardians should be reared among images of evil” (ἆρ’ οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς
ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ’
ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπιστατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακόηθες τοῦτο καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ
ἀνελεύθερρον καὶ αἴσχημον μήτε ἐν εἰκόσι ζώων μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ ἐμποιεῖν, … ἵνα μὴ κακίας
εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες…; 401b). Rather, only beautiful works should reach their vision or hearing (ἢ
πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν; 401c).
70
“First then, there is the greatest lie about the most important matters, what Hesiod ignobly lied about what Uranus
had done, as well as what Cronus did in vengeance. I think that, even if the deeds of Cronus and his sufferings at the
hands of his son are true, I think that they should not be easily spoken to either fools or children. Rather, it must be
with the greatest silence, and, if it is necessary somehow to speak it, it must be heard during a rare and secret ritual,
only after a sacrifice, not of a pig but something exotic and prohibitively difficult to procure, so that as few as
possible might happen to hear it” (πρῶτον μέν… τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς
ἐψεύσατο ὡς Οὐρανός τε ἠργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ
τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑέος, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ ᾤμην δεῖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτως λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε
καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους,
θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι; 377e-8a). The myth is
best known from Hesiod. It features in Classical art as well: although the extant artistic depictions of Cronus are
relatively few, the swallowing of his children or the stone make up the entirety of depictions that contain
mythological scenes (nos. 21-25, cf. 26-7) surveyed by Serbeti (1992).
68
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Adeimantus’ concern that some myths perversely depict the prospering of the unjust and so
dangerously delude their audience.71
In the last book of the Respublica, criticism again returns to myth, but more specifically
poetic imitation, which the next section examines further. Socrates mingles this, however, with
his ethical criticism. Poets—especially tragic poets and Homer, “their commander”72—are
objectionable because they aim at the lowest levels of the soul. Rather than seeking to make the
young better, they inevitably make them worse.73 For this, Socrates notoriously proposes to
banish Homer and other poets from the city, although he allows that the lovers of poetry could
secure their return, if they can prevail as champions in prose and show that poetry is beneficial as
well as pleasurable.74 Plato’s Socrates himself, however, seems to present two such defenses of
myth in the Respublica: the possibility of allegorical interpretation and the recasting of
traditional material into ethically beneficial myths to play a role in philosophical education.
Socrates briefly discusses allegorical interpretation as a possible defense of myth in book II,
περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου (392a). Socrates points
out the connection to the earlier discussion and considers the matter concluded (τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος;
392c).
72
ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον (598d).
73
“And for this reason, we would be acting justly by not allowing him into the city, if it is to be run well, because he
rouses and nurtues and strengthens that part of the soul while destorying the rational part, just as in the city
whenever someone empowers malefactors and betrays the city, but destroys the nobler men.” (καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν
δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν
ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖ ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ
χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ; 605a-b). He continues, “shall we affirm that the imitative poet too does the same thing? That
they implant an evil constitution in the soul of each person, but, by imagining phantasms that are far removed from
truth, gratify the irrational part that cannot even distinguish between greater and lesser things? Or worse, the part
that thinks something is greater at one point, then lesser at another?” (ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν
κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω
διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ γὲ σμικρά, εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς
πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα (605b-c). See further 604c-6d and Grg. 502b-d. Cf. Proclus on the parts of the myths and the
parts of the soul, discussed infra pg. 207.
74
“Let us grant, then, to her champions, who are not poets but lovers of poetry, to speak unmetered speech on her
behalf, that she is not only pleasurable but also beneficial to the citizens and human life generally; let us listen
charitably” (δοῖμεν δέ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον
ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν· καὶ
εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα; 607d). Cf. Naddaff's (2002) characterization of Plato—given the tensions between the
critiques of poetry in the last and the earlier books, as well as the poetic myth of Er—as a “self-subverting thinker”
(3).
71
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although he ultimately rejects it. Scandalous passages of Homer, such as Zeus’ threat to hurl
Hephaestus to the ground at the end of the first book of the Iliad, must not be allowed into the
city, Socrates argues, “either embedded in allegories or without allegories.”75 The idea behind
this sort of interpretation is that a myth is conveying its meaning in a puzzling manner, which
only appears to be objectionable, while the hidden meaning is profoundly insightful or
beneficial.
Plato provides examples of this sort of interpretation in the Cratylus, a dialogue that
centers around the argument that “a name is not just what some people happen to come together
and call it… but that there is by nature a certain rightness of names for everything, both among
Greeks and non-Greeks.”76 Particularly in the case of the names of the gods, Socrates shows how
many have a specifically intellectual significance, even in the superlatively scandalous Hesiodic
succession myth:
It might seem entirely outrageous at first to hear that Zeus is the son of Cronus, but it
would be well said that he is the offspring of some great intellect. For koros signifies not
a child (paida [cf. kouros]), but his absolute purity (koros) of mind (nous). He is the son
of Uranus, as the account goes. In turn, sight turned upward would be well called by the
name “the heavens” (ourania), because looking upwards, which is how the astrologers
say one obtains a pure mind, Hermogenes, is rightly given the name Uranus.77
… οὔτ’ ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν (378d). Socrates uses the terminology of “underlying
significance” (ὑπονοία), while the terminology would expand by Plutarch’s time to also include allegory, the literal
meaning of which is something like “indicating something else” (ἀλληγορία): e.g. … ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις
ἀλληγορίαις δὲ … (Quomodo adul. 19e-f). See also the conclusion to De Pyth. or. 409c-d. To Cicero, the latter term
seems to refer to obscure (Att. II.20.3) or flexible (Orat. 27.94) language.
76
καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν τινες ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, … ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι
καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν (383a-b). Linguistic differences, both within Greece and beyond, is a
central contention for Hermogenes’ critique this thesis (385d-e), but Socrates introduces the figure of the name-giver
(ὀνοματουργοῦ) as a sort of law-giver (νομοθέτης; 388e-9a), who “looks toward the true name itself” (βλέποντα
πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄναμα) and makes an imitation in syllables (συλλαβὰς) that might differ from those of
other name-givers, just as smiths instantiate the same idea with different iron (389d-9a). It does not matter, Socrates
concludes, whether the man is Greek or not. Cf. 409d-e. Much of the scholarship on the etymologies of the Crat. has
been philosophically negative, but cf. Sedley (1998b) and Barney (2001). Baxter (1992) argues strongly against the
tendency in seeking an individual source for the etymologies (86-106).
77
τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου ὑὸν ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἄν τις δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης, εὔλογον δὲ μεγάλης τινὸς
διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία· κόρον γὰρ σημαίνει οὐ παῖδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ. ἔστι
δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ ὑός, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι, “οὐρανία,” ὁρῶσα
τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι, καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὀρθῶς
75
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Although the name Cronus implies the violent story that so scandalized Plato, these two
intellectualizing etymologies make the names of Zeus’ progenitors appropriate for the god.
Perhaps this sort of interpretation might be beneficial for the right sort of audience, although this
part of the Cratylus emphasizes its irony by attributing Socrates’ solutions to either divine
inspiration or the influence of Euthyphro;78 toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates concludes
that it is “better by far to learn and things through themselves, rather than through names.”79
These etymological interpretations are ingenious, however, and it would be irresponsible to
expect the young, as they are being educated, to understand them: “this is because a young
person is not able to judge what is an allegory and what is not, but rather are at that age where
whatever opinions they grasp become ineradicable and unchangeable.”80 For Socrates’ purposes
in the Respublica, the possibility of allegorical interpretation does not mitigate the likely harm of
such stories in education, since the young will not yet be able to guard themselves from such
ruinous damage.81

τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι (396b-d). This interpretation, which Hermogenes attributes to divine inspiration and Socrates to
Euthyphro (396d-e), is one of the most emphatic in the dialogue, and it becomes one of the most influential in
Neoplatonism (cf. 400d, 401e). See also the etymologies of daemones (Crat. 398b-c) and Athena (406d-7c).
78
Hermogenes remarks that Socrates seems “to suddenly proclaim oracles, just as inspired men do” (ὥσπερ οἱ
ἐνθουσιώντες ἐξαίφνης χρησμῳδεῖν; 396d), while Socrates claims that the “inspiration” came to him from
Euthyphro, “an inspired man… of daemonic wisdom” (ἐνθουσιῶν… δαιμονίας σοφίας; 396d).
79
οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων (439b). He
had offered Cratylus a dichotomy: “which is the nobler or cleared way to learn? To learn from the image whether
whether it has been likened well itself as well as the truth of which it is an image, or to learn from the truth the truth
itself as well as whether the image of it has been fittingly likened?” (ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἡ
μάθησις; ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνος μανθάνειν αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν εἰ καλῶς εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἧς ἦν εἰκών, ἢ ἐκ τῆς
ἀληθείας αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆς εἰ πρεπόντως εἴργασται; 439b-c). Cratylus affirms the latter.
80
ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ’ ἃ τε ἃν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις,
δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι (378d).
81
This objection does not stem the popularity of such interpretations, however, among the Platonists of the Empire,
including Plutarch. On the Neoplatonic commentary on the dialogue, evidently largely excerpted from Proclus, see
Duvick (2007: 1-4).
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The Myth of Er
Recasting the myths into educationally acceptable forms constitutes another means of
surmounting Socrates’ challenge. He does not discuss this possibility explicitly, but implicitly
provides examples even in the Respublica.82 While the myths of tradition pose danger to the
ethical development of the young, the figures and images can be rearranged into a prose narrative
that serves a philosophical purpose as an ethical exhortation.83 In Socrates’ conclusion to the
dialogue, the myth of Er reinforces a central theme in such a way that complements the
argumentation, the incommensurate preferability of practicing justice and, relatedly but even
more importantly, living philosophically.84 The myth has, however, had a mixed reception among
recent scholars. Julia Annas, for instance, found it to be incongruous with the rest of the dialogue
because it provides consequentialist reasons for being just, which are categorically avoided
elsewhere in the dialogue.85 Ronald Johnson argued to the contrary that the myth does, in fact,

82

See especially Van Riel (2017) on Resp. 378e-9a (119).
Socrates emphasizes the exhortative nature of the myth of Er both immediately before relating it—“it is necessary
to hear [about the rewards] so that each person might fully receive what is beneficial to hear from the argument”
(χρὴ δ’ αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι; 614a)—and
immediately after—“the myth might save us, if we believe it” (μῦθος … ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ;
621c).
84
See e.g. Resp. V.475b-6b. See also e.g. Phdr. 256a-b.
85
Annas is particularly negative in her introduction to the Resp. (1981): “The Myth of Er is a painful shock; its
vulgarity seems to pull us right down to the level of Cephalus, where you take justice seriously when you start
thinking about hell-fire. It is not only that the childishness of the myth jars; if we take it seriously, it seems to offer
us an entirely consequentialist reason for being just, thus undermining Plato's sustained effort to show that justice is
worth having for the agent in a non-consequentialist way. Your present life determines how you fare after death, so
it is unwise to be unjust, because short enjoyment on earth will be followed by tenfold torment in hell (615a-b). How
can this be squared with the Republic's sustained attempt to show us that justice is worth having for itself and for the
rewards its nature brings about?” (349-50). Annas also refers to earlier claims that book X, as a whole, is an
“appendix” or an “excrescence” (335). She later (1982) softens her position: “Although we find reincarnation
implausible, and even grotesque, the Myth of Er has more serious moral appeal than the last judgement myth. For
we find it plausible that we choose to be good, or not, against the background of a cosmos that is indifferent to
individuals’ concerns and does not necessarily guarantee rewards for our being just. It is not seriously open to us to
espouse the moral optimism expressed in the Gorgias and Phaedo myths. Nobody but an exceptionally naive or
ignorant theist could believe that just individuals will always be rewarded in the end” (138). See also Malabou
(2017: 42-3).
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reinforce the main arguments of the dialogue.86 Stephen Halliwell more recently surveys
“incongruities” within the myth and suggests a “this-wordly” reading, although he notes that the
argument for the immortality of the soul leaves “a dilemma that the myth creates but cannot
resolve itself.”87 It seems, nevertheless, to form an ethical exhortation to Glaucon and the other
interlocutors, no less than Socrates in the conclusion to the Phaedo that bids its audience to
believe his myth there or something like it until a better conception is found.88 After the further
critique of poetry in book X, the subject returns again to the question of “the rewards and prizes
for virtue.”89 Socrates continues to hold that the soul should choose justice for its own sake, even
if there is no reward—“did we not discover that justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself,
and that it must act justly, whether or not it has the ring of Gyges, or even the helmet of Hades to
go along with the ring?”90—but he allows, in addition, that the gods will reward the just after
death, just as men reward justice in life; these are specifically those who “become just, practice
virtue, and become as like to god as possible for a human” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν), as
Plato formulates the ideal aim of philosophy in the Theaetetus and Respublica, as he does
elsewhere throughout the corpus.91

1999. He criticizes Annas in particular (1-5) then argues that the myth “completes the argument by showing that
the just life is worth living in this world and in whatever world may lie beyond it. Far from being ‘scrappy’ and
‘unsatisfactory,’ the Myth of Er completes the work by way of a symbolic summary that embodies the Republic's
main images and even puts its own ironic twist on the Homeric myths” (12).
87
“a this-worldly reading of the myth of Er supports the cumulative moral case made by the entire Republic for the
identification of a good and happy life with a just life” (470). See also Thayer (1988: esp. 377-9). On the
immortality of the soul in Resp. X, see Robinson (1967).
88
114c-d. See infra pg. 256.
89
… ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἆθλα … (608c).
90
οὐκοῦν… αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον ηὕρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάντ’ ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου
δακτύλιον, ἐάντε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Ἄιδος κυνῆν; (612b). Gyges’ ring refers to Glaucon’s thought
experiment in book II (359a-60d), while Hades’ helmet of invisibility goes back to Homer (Il. V.844-5).
91
… δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ (613a-b). See infra pg.
94.
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The myth describes the soul of a soldier named Er, who seemed to fall in battle but rose
again on his funeral pyre to recount its journey after it left the body.92 He came to a sort of
meeting place of souls, both of souls arriving from earth and those returning from thousand-year
periods of punishment or reward, based on how they conducted their previous life.93 They travel
to another place and behold the mechanism that governs the broadest stretches of the physical
world in the image of the “spindle of Necessity” (Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον), which guides the motion
of the eight planets, described as its colorful whorls; a Siren stands upon each of the circles as
they revolve and utter one voice with one tone, which all come together to make a harmonious
music.94 The daughters of Necessity, the three Fates, “garbed in white and wearing garlands upon
their heads, Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos,” sing together in harmony with the Sirens.95 The
names of the fates are familiar from the Hesiodic Theogonia, but while the poet describes them
as “they who grant it to mortals from the time of their birth to have both the good and the bad,”
the philosopher does away with the implication that goddesses could be responsible for evil,
instead dividing their roles temporally:96 Lachesis sings of what was, Clotho sings of what has

“‘I will indeed not tell you,’ I said, ‘a speech for Alcinous, but of a brave (alkimou) man—Er, son of Armenius,
Pamphylian in race. Long ago, he died in war, and when all the corpses were laid out and already rotting after ten
days, he was taken for burial still healthy. He was taken homeward to be buried on the day, but came back to life.
Once he came back, he described what he had seen there. He said that when he departed from there, his soul
travelled in the company of many, and they arrived into some wonderous place, …’” (ἀλλ’ οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ,
Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ’ ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός Ἠρος τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ
τελευτήσας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρμένων, ὑγιὴς μὲν ἀνῃρέθη, κοσμισθεὶς δ’ οἴκαδε
μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖς ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δ’ ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι; X.614a-b).
93
614b-5c.
94
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα
τόνον ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν (617b). See Halliwell (2007: 456-7). On Necessity, cf.
Emped. frg. B115 Diels.
95
ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας πέριξ δι’ ἴσου τρῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ ἑκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνάγκης Μοίρας λευχειμονούσας,
στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐχούσας, Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Κλωθὼ καὶ Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν
(617b-c). Plutarch dedicates a symposiastic vignette to discussion of the Sirens in the myth. See infra 222.
96
αἵτε βροτοῖσι / γεινομένοισι διδοῦσιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε (218-9). They appear as daughters of grim Night:
“she bore Fates and brutally punishing Dooms, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos” (καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο
νηλεοποίνους, / Κλωθώ τε Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον; 217-8). They are said, presumably to Plato’s horror, to punish
the transgressions (παραιβασίας) of gods as well as humans (220).
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come to be, and Atropos sings of what will be.97 The governance of Necessity and her daughters
stretches throughout all time and all of the visible world.
These names taken from traditional myth, and others—namely Lethe and those of the
earlier generations of heroes such as Orpheus—are arranged as parts of a harmoniously governed
world.98 The Fates ensure that human choice is properly punished or rewarded no less than they
ensure the continued motion of the spheres. After Er and the souls behold the spindle and the
Fates, they are told to go to Lachesis’ throne, where they will pick their next lives in an order
determined by lot. Her priest (προφήτην) gives a proclamation explaining the significance of
their choice:
This is the account of Lachesis, daughter of Necessity. Souls, alive for but a day, this is
the beginning of another period of mortal life, a sort that will inevitably bring death. No
daemon has chosen you by lot, but rather you all will choose the daemon for this life,
which will accompany you out of necessity. Virtue has no master, but rather, each that
honors it more and dishonors it less shall have it. The responsibility belongs to the
chooser: god is blameless.99
Each human, according to the myth, has an element of choice in their fate, even though the world
is governed according to necessity. Part of this governance is ethical: good decisions, made with
philosophical moderation and care, are necessarily rewarded, while evil ones are punished—
brutally, in the case of incurable tyrants, whom Plato depicts as tortured and flayed as a warning
to other souls at the beginning of the myth.100

Λάχεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα (617c). They each also play a role in the
rotation of the heavenly sphere (617c-d).
98
Lethe: 621a-b; Orpheus: 620a. Plato’s parade of traditional figures includes, among others, Ajax, Atalanta, and
Thersites (620b-c). On this passage, see especially Moors (1988).
99
Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου.
οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσθω βίον, ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν
καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἕξει. αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος (617d-e).
100
615e-6a. Plato’s depiction of eternal torment for incurable tyrants proved to provoke great controversy, especially
among Epicureans, such as Colotes, who claimed, among other things, that he contradicted himself by disallowing
poetic depictions of fearful things in the underworld from the education of the guardians yet included such
descriptions in his own myths. See infra pg. 196.
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Yet the ethical machinery described embedded in the narrative is complicated by the final
sequence, the picking of lots and choosing of fates. Socrates—after giving an extensive
exhortation directed to Glaucon that the most important thing for us is to be able to distinguish
the good from the bad101—has Lachesis’ priest announce that the lots are not determinative of the
souls’ fates, since the first choosers could choose poorly and receive horrible fates, while the last
will still have good opportunities.102 The subsequent narrative depicts various souls choosing
fates, with playful recastings of traditional characters from the generations of heroes, but the first
and last especially illustrate Socrates’ underlying point that the most important thing for humans
is to learn how to choose well—that is, philosophically.103 The first soul to choose misses the
priest’s point entirely and condemns himself to misery:
[Er] said that the first to choose and approach picked the greatest of tyrannies, because
out of gluttounous folly he did not examine all it contained sufficiently before he choose
and did not realize that the life was fated to eat his own children and various other evils.
After he examined it at greater length, he mourned and bewailed his choise, but he did
not abide by the proclamations of the priest: he did not blame himself for these evils, but
rather fate and the daemones and everything except himself.104
The soul, Er explains, was one of those who had been rewarded for living justly, but, because he
had been living in a well-ordered city, he “practiced virtue out of habit, rather than through
philosophy.”105

Each of us, Socrates exhorts (ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων; 618b), must take care (ἐπιμελητέον) to learn how to distinguish
good and bad lives (βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα; 618c). Plato characteristically reveals that the
better life is the philosophical one.
102
“Even to the one coming last, if he chooses with attention and lives earnestly, a desirable life lies in store, not a
bad one. Let neither the first to choose lack attention, not let the last be discouraged” (καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, ξὺν νῷ
ἑλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. μήτε ὁ ἄρχων αἱρέσεως ἀμελείτω μήτε ὁ τελευτῶν
ἀθυμείτω; 619b). Cf. Halliwell's (2007) discussion of 619d (465-6).
103
On this section, see Moors (1988).
104
τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἑλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας
οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς ἀνασκεψάμενον ἑλέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἱμαρμένην παίδων αὑτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα
κακά· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαί τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς
προρρηθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα
μᾶλλον ἀνθ’ ἑαυτοῦ (619b-c).
105
… ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα (619d).
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This might seem to introduce an element of what we could call moral luck into the
Respublica’s eschatological sketch.106 The soul suffers because its circumstances were only
conducive to a sort of surface-level virtue. Nothing required it to become virtuous for the right
reasons, which is to say for philosophical reasons. Souls, moreover, require other virtues, which
the myth especially depicts with a refashioned image of Lethe:107 “then, at evening, they camped
on the banks of the river Carelessness, where no container can hold the water; it is necessary for
all to drink a measure of water, but there are those who are not saved by their prudence from
drinking more than the measure.”108 To the extent that we can learn from the past and remember
it, the myth suggests, the better we will fare. The soul that picked the last lot, that of Odysseus,
represents this aspect of the ethical exhortation most clearly. It evidently remembers its lessons
from suffering, thus managing to make a better choice:109
By chance, Odysseus’ soul was lotted to be the last of all to choose, but because it
remembered its previous sufferings, it abated from ambition and looked around for a long
time, looking for the life of a private man sheltered from politics. He found it lying
somewhere, neglected by the others. When he saw it, he remarked that he would have
chosen the same even if he had gotten the first lot and chose gladly.110

106

The myth of Er thus raises a serious ethical problem, although the only solution it seems to offer is an exhortation
to live philosophically. I discuss the problem of moral luck further, in light of Plutarch’s related myth in De sera,
infra pg. 229.
107
“Then the others came and all were conveyed into the plain of Lethe through stifling heat, because it is barren of
trees and whatever else the earth grows” (ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον
διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δένδρων τε καὶ ὅσα γῆ φύει; 621a). On the traditional
name, see Ar. Ran. 186; cf. Hes. Th. 227.
108
σκηνᾶσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἤδη ἑσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν.
μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σῳζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ
μέτρου (621a). Socrates ends his speech, in part, with an exhortation to believe the myth so as that “we might cross
the river of Lethe well” (τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα; 621c).
109
Cf. Sen. Prov.: “god has a fatherly mind towards good men and loves them forcefully; ‘let them be roused,’ he
says, ‘by toils and sorrows and losses, so that they might gain true strength’” (patrium deus habet aduersus bonos
uiros animum et illos fortiter amat et “operibus” inquit “doloribus damnis exagitentur, ut uerum colligant robur;”
2.5). Suffering, for Seneca, is not an occasion to learn, as in the myth of Er, but an opportunity to showcase virtue
and to please father Jupiter, should he be watching, as Cato did while the Republic fell to ruin around him (II.9-10).
110
κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην αἱρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων
φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὑρεῖν
κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα,
καὶ ἁσμένην ἑλέσθαι (620c-d). Cf. Malabou (2017).
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The myth of Er punctuates the discussion of justice in the Respublica, which has been a thread
throughout the dialogue, from Socrates’ debate with the would-be tyrant, Thrasymachus, to the
examination of constitutions towards the end. It reinforces a lesson that was inherent in the most
philosophically salient parts, such as the allegory of the cave and the image of the divided line:
the good must be pursued beyond the physical world and our souls ordered harmiously in
imitation of the perfect order of the eternal and unchanging idea. Plato’s recasting of traditional
mythology, stripped of the notorious impieties of the epic poets and other purveyors of tales, can
serve as powerful exhortations that reinforce a dialogue’s central ideas.111 The form of a
philosophical myth, although it is fundamentally imitative, as the next section discusses, allows
Plato an avenue to usurp the prestige of the traditional myths through constructing mythic “likely
accounts,” such as Timaeus’ lengthy speech in the dialogue named after him.

Imitation, likeness, and unreality
While traditional myths, such as the ones conveyed in the Hesiodic poems, were attacked
by philosophers for what was taken to be ethical absurdity they attracted criticisms for physical
absurdity just as early.112 Xenophanes mocks anthropomorphic depictions of the gods by
imagining how horses and cows would depict the gods if they could paint and followed a similar
logic of self-projection to that of Greek anthropomorphism.113 Heraclitus criticizes the many for

“The myth was saved and did not perish,” Socrates concludes to Glaucon, “and it might save us if we believe it”
(… ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ; 621b-c). Ferrari (2009)
argues that the myth is particularly directed at Glaucon, who remains a lover of honor rather than wisdom.
112
The Hesiodic account of Chaos as the first entity (116-7), however, could be a spur to natural philosophy, as is
said of Epicurus (τοῦτό φασιν ἔνιοι αἴτιον γεγονέναι Ἐπικούρῳ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ὁρμῆς; Sext. Emp. Math.
X.18, see also Diog. Laert. X.2). Cf. Plut. De Is. 374c and Damascius De principiis 319.16-320.5.
113
“But if cows and horses and bulls had hands, and they painted with their hands to make the sorts of works that
men do, horses would depict the gods with bodies of similar forms to horses and cows with cows…” (ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας
ἔχον βόες <ἵπποι τ’> ἠὲ λέοντες / ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, / ἵπποι μέν θ’ ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε
βουσὶν ὁμοίας / καί <κε> θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ’ ἐποίουν…; frg. B15 Diels). See also frg. 16: “Ethiopians
111
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believing Hesiod, for instance, when he says that Day is the child of Night—“for they are one.”114
Rationalizers, such as Hecataeus, Palaephatus, or the sort of man mocked by Socrates in the
beginning of the Phaedrus as having too much time to hunt for the origins of the notion of
centaurs, object that if beasts of legend came about in the past, they would still be happen among
us now.115 The problem of falsehood in myth, however, is especially weighty for Plato because
he seems to hold that it can, nevertheless, somehow lead to truth—truth in the strong sense of
apprehension of eternal and unchanging things, like the good itself or the form of the good.116 If
the poets, for instance, are to some extent divinely inspired—as he holds with some irony in the
Apologia and the Ion, but far less so in the Phaedrus and Leges—how can part or all of their
myths be false?117 How can we then move from images to truth? The problem is further

say that their gods are snub-nosed and black-skinned, while Thracians say theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired”
(Αἰθίοπές τε <θεοὺς σφετέρους> σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε / Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς <φασι πέλεσθαι>). He
criticizes anthropomorphism more generally in B14.
114
διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον / ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρό/νην οὐκ
ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν (frg. B57 Diels). Cf. Hes. Th. 124-5. Heraclitus is critical of both traditional and
contemporary authorities—Homer (especially B56), Archilochus (B42), Pythagoras (B129), and Xenophanes as
well as Hecataeus (B40)—on grounds that seem more to do with general absurdity rather than moral: “For what
knowledge or sense do they have? They trust the singers of the peoples and use the throng as teacher, unaware that
most are bad, but a few are good” (τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν / νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ διδασκά/λωι
χρείωνται ὁμίλωι οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι “οἱ πολλοὶ / κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί;” B104).
115
Palaephatus, whom Stern (1996) argues was a contemporary of Aristotle (1-4), expresses this principle most
clearly: “whatever forms and shapes are said to have arisen once, but which are not still present, these never existed
at all” (ὅσα δὲ εἴδη καὶ μορφαί εἰσι λεγόμεναι καὶ γενόμεναι τότε, αἳ νῦν οὐκ εἰσί, τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἐγένοντο; pref. 911). The fifth century historian Hecataeus, however, may be the earliest of this sort of rationalizer: “Hecataeus
declares it thus. These things I write, as they seem to truly be to me, since there are many laughable accounts among
the Greeks, as is obvious to me” (Ἑκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ
Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν; frg. 1 Jacoby). Some of his particular gripes are
preserved, such as what Pausanias calls a “likely account” (λόγον εὗρεν εἰκότα): because it is ridiculous for
Hercules to drag a hound up from the underworld, the story refers to a dangerous snake (ὄφιν… δεινόν) which
earned the metaphorical name on account of its venom (III.25.4 = frg. 27). See also Palaephatus XXXIX. On
Hecataeus’ rationalization of myth, see Herren (2017: 87-91). In the Phdr. Socrates characterizes this sort of man,
who “corrects the shape of centaurs” (τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι), as “extremely clever and
laborious but not fortunate” (λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός) because “if someone should
disbelieve and reduce each of these things according to what is likely… he will need much leisure” (αἷς εἴ τις
ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει; 229e)
Socrates dismisses the task in favor of the pursuit of self-knowledge (σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτόν; 230a). For a
proposal of the significance of the passage for the dialogue as a whole, see Griswold (1986: 36-44).
116
This is perhaps most clearly laid out in the analogy of the sun in the Resp. (VI.507b-9c).
117
Poetic inspiration, the possibility that divine truth is conveyed through the poet, although he might not understand
the truth of his verses, occurs more broadly throughout the corpus, such as in the short dialogue, the Ion, that is
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complicated, however, in light of the expansiveness of the category of image in the corpus, both
in the Respublica as well as the Cratylus and Timaeus: all words and all physical objects are
meaningfully images for Plato. He sees, moreover, a strong correlation between stability and
knowability, such that images categorically cannot be as well known as their models. In this
section, I examine the status of images in Platonic philosophy, which bears on artistic imitation,
the signifying power of words, and the relation of the entire physical world to the changeless
reality beyond. In the next section, I suggest that Plato employs a certain kind of mythic
narrative, seems to identify specific narratives—especially exemplified by Timaeus’ “likely
myth” or “account”—as appropriate to philosophy. Rather than striving to deceive the reader, as
with the kind of myths Socrates rejects in Respublica II, III, and X, Timaeus’ teleological tale
emphasizes its own fictionality—its status as an image, a hypothetical account that might be
worthy of belief, but is certainly not equivalent to the truth itself. Plato thus both criticizes the
deceptive power of imitative myths, while also providing a model for how a certain sort of myth
can serve a valuable philosophical function.
The distinction between images and models is thus crucial for Plato’s metaphysics.118
Images, the category that includes myths and stories, are particularly ambiguous in the
Respublica, however, in light of the broader ambiguity of the broader critique of imitation
(mimêsis) in the last book.119 Socrates introduces the issue through the metaphor of

dedicated to the topic. It contains, for example, a famous image of a magnetized chain (533c-4a), such that the truth
is transmitted from the gods to the poet to the rhapsode and finally to the audience, although each of the lower rings
may well fail to apprehend it. The topic also appears in the Ap. (22a-d) and, more sympathetically, in the Phdr.
(245a-b). See further Tigerstedt (1969). This question of inspiration reaches its height with Proclus, who is spurred
to a three-fold distinction in types of poetry to explain how inspired and non-inspired—ethical or mimetic—poetry
could coexist in figures such as Homer (In Remp. VI).
118
E.g. Porter (2010): “Plato’s thought, from his metaphysics to his poetics, is unthinkable apart from his theory of
the image… Platonic metaphysics rests on the assumption of an image that is copied in successive stages, each
suffering a derogation from the original Form or idea” (75).
119
The book opens by confirming (ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομεν) what was said earlier about poetry (περὶ ποιήσεως) and
imitation (595a).
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craftsmanship, resting on “our customary procedure” of speculating one idea (εἶδος) from many
instances. 120 There are many tables, but only one idea of table. The former are made only in
reference to the latter: “surely, are we also accustomed to say that the craftsman of any artifact
thus creates looking to the idea, whether he makes couches or tables or any of this sort of thing
which we use? No craftsman somehow crafts the idea itself—how would that work?”121 The
individual tables would not exist without the idea of the table, whereas the idea of the table could
exist without any given individual table. The former is, according to Plato, categorically more
real than the latter.122 Socrates playfully proposes carrying around a mirror and producing images
of visual things, such as the sun and artifacts, which prompts Glaucon to summarize the
fundamental ontological distinction:123 “surely these are things that appear and not things that
really exist in truth.”124 Through the course of the conversation, Socrates extends the argument to
first painters, whom he had also criticized on ethical grounds in the earlier books, and then to
poets. Both, he argues, do not imitate realities, but rather images.125 A depiction of the
ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου (596a). Whether Plato thinks that there actually is an idea or form of the table, an
artifact contingent on human invention rather than a universal, or whether this is simply an example, is unclear. On
Aristotle’s difficult treatment of the problem for Plato in Metaph. I, see esp. Fine (1977: 81-8). Other physical
entities present other sorts of problems. In the Prm., for instance, Socrates and Parmenides doubt whether there are
forms of things such as “hair, mud, and filth” (θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος; 130c). Cf. Resp. X.597b-c, on which see
especially Cherniss (1932).
121
οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν
τάς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας, αἷς ἡμεῖς χρώμεθα, καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ ταὐτά; οὐ γάρ που τήν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ
οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν· πῶς γάρ; (596b).
122
The key concept seems to be contingency: the image could not exist without the model, because the image is
contingent upon the model, while as the model could easily exist without the image, because it is not contingent.
123
“If you should want to carry around a mirror everywhere, it will not be difficult to quickly create things
everywhere. You will quickly make the sun and the things of the heavens, the earth, and yourself and all of the other
animals, as well as artifacts and plants and everything which now exists” (οὐ χαλεπός… ἀλλὰ πολλαχῇ καὶ ταχὺ
δημιουργούμενος, τάχιστα δέ που, εἰ ‘θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ· ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ
ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ σκεύη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο;
596d-e). Some scholars, such as Capra (2017: 82-3), consider this a reference to Agathon’s mirror in Ar. Thesm.
124
ναί… φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (596e).
125
“It is necessary to investigate whether they have come across imitators and been deceived when they saw their
works, which they did not realize are twice removed from reality, and easy to create for one with no knowledge of
the truth” (δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὗτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες
οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥᾴδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν; 598e-9a); “then would you call
the craftsman of a product twice removed from nature the imitator?” (εἶεν… τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς
φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς; 597e). See also Naddaff (2002: 83-91).
120
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manufactured table, by this logic, is yet another step removed from reality, an image of an image,
because it is made with reference only to the imitation, and not to the reality.
Much of the critique of poetry in book X, however, is rooted in the ethical criticism that
the last section examined. Socrates is concerned that the young are especially susceptible to
mimetic deception.126 This is all the worse in the case of poetry, such as tragedy, because it seeks
to influence the lowest parts of the soul in detrimental ways.127 It nevertheless seems that the
criticism in book X is directed at mimetic poetry for its quality of being mimetic and not just the
deleterious ethical effects of certain kinds of mimesis such as tragedy. Towards the beginning of
the book, Socrates introduces the topic by affirming that he thinks they were correct in the earlier
discussion “to prohibit entirely as much of poetry as is imitative.”128 Poetry, moreover, is held to
be persuasive because of its adornments—its aesthetic qualities such as metre and harmony that
give the image the appearance of reality, its “bewitching” effect, rather than any knowledge on
the part of the imitative poet.129 Socrates banishes not just Homer from the city, however, but “all

Socrates worries that listeners will be misled by imitative (μιμητική) poetry if they do not “possess a cure, the
knowledge of what these very things actually are” (μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα; 595b).
He later argues that a convincing painting of a carpenter may deceive “children and fools” (παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας
ἀνθρώπους; 598c).
127
Any mimetic art, Socrates earlier claimed, necessarily aims at the part of the soul that is furthest from the
intelligence (πόρρω δ’ αὖ φρονήσεως; 603a).
128
τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική (595a). His subsequent statement, however, already seems to
anticipate the argument that bad sorts of imitation such as tragedy aim at the lowest parts of the soul: “It seems even
clearer now that it is not to be accepted, since the different parts of the soul have been distinguished” (παντὸς γὰρ
μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
εἴδη; 595a). Cf. Gould (1964: 85-7).
129
“We will say that the poetic man renders the affairs of each of the arts through the color of words and phrases,
ignorant of anything but imitation, such that he seems to the comparably ignorant to know about them through his
words, whether he should speak about cobbling or generalship or anything else in metre, rhythm, and harmony, he
will seem to speak very well. Thus is the nature of these things to bear some great bewitchment” (τὸν ποιητικὸν
φήσομεν χρώματα ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαίοντα ἀλλ’ ἢ
μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάντε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ
ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐάντε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάντε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ
ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν; 601a-b). He continues the metaphor of witchcraft (γοητείας; 602d) and
distinguishes the knowledge of those who use, those who make, and those who imitate things (χρησομένην,
ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; 601d), the latter being the least.
126
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poetry and imitation directed at pleasure.”130 There seems to be something inherently dangerous
about imitation itself in Plato’s eyes, at least when wielded by the wrong sorts.
Scholars have argued, however, that there are tensions between this critique of imitation
and other parts of the Respublica.131 Elsewhere in book X, Socrates allows two sorts of poetry:
“the only poetry that must be allowed into the city are hymns to the gods and praises of good
men.”132 These sorts of poems are still mimetic, even if Plato would not consider them as
ethically dangerous, if executed fittingly.133 Scholars as early as J. Tate also point to tensions
with the discussion of imitation in book III, which distinguishes different sorts of imitation.134
The dialogue is, moreover, replete with images, such as the analogy of the sun, the image of the
divided line, and the allegory of the cave.135 Plato often describes his myths, moreover, with the
language of imagery, such as in the Phaedrus. Within the Respublica, the divided line in
particular is an image that bears on the nature of images, and arguably it depicts a positive

ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις (607c); “depiction, and all imitation, produces a distinctive product that is
far from truth” (ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὂν αὑτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται; 603a).
131
The scholarship on imitation in the Resp. is vast. There are at least two relevant Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy articles, for instance: Griswold (2016 [2003]) and Pappas (2016 [2008]). Gould (1964) distinguishes
Aristotle’s aesthetics from Plato’s. See also Partenie (2004): “This contradiction, however, could hardly fail to make
us wonder; and Plato, like Aristotle, believed that wonder is what triggers the very act of philosophizing” (xxvi,
citing Tht. 155d). On the metaphysical significance of the distinction between models and images in Plato, see
especially Patterson (1985).
132
ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν (607a).
133
Cf. Tate (1928: 16).
134
392c-400a. See also 388b and 401b-2a. Tate (1928) distinguishes three “styles” of imitation in book III: the “nonimitative style,which is the style of the virtuous man,” which the guardians must practice by imitating good people
like themselves; the “imitative style, which is natural to the an of opposite character,” which poets practice by
likening their characters to every sort of person and not just the virtuous; and a “style compounded” of the two (18).
Tate argues that only the first is acceptable to Plato. He later (1932) expands his argument from the Resp. to the
entire Platonic corpus. Cf. Nehamas (1982: 47-54). See also Moss (2007: 415-7). Belfiore (1984), however,
convincingly argues that the treatment of imitation in the two books is coherent. Capra (2017) identifies the real
contradiction as Resp. X and the depiction of Socrates composing poetry in Phd. 61b (84-5).
135
The analogy of sun preceeds the divided line in book VI (507b-9c). Plutarch draws on this image in De fac., as I
argue infra pg. 323. The allegory of the cave takes place in the book following the divided line (VII.514a-20a).
Glaucon introduces the story of Gyges (ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ; II.359d) to use his magic ring (δακτύλιον),
which can turn the wearer invisible, for a thought experiment (359c-160b). Next, he compares two hypothetical
men. Socrates playfully responds by comparing the men (τοῖν ἀνδροῖν) with statues (ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα; 361d). See
also Socrates’ utilization of the image of the sea-god Glaucus to represent the soul (X.611d-e).
130
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philosophical role for a certain kind of image.136 Socrates introduces the image of a “line cut in
twain with unequal cuts,” such that there are two sides of different lengths.137 The main division
in the line is between the sense-perceptible world and the intellectual world, the latter being
“clearer” and more real than the former, and each side is further subdivided.138 On the senseperceptible side of the line, the two parts are physical things and images (εἰκόνες) of them, which
Socrates exemplifies with shadows and reflections (φαντάσματα).139 In the intellectual portion,
one side, represents inquiry that must “use images” (εἰκόσιν χρωμένη) and move “from
hypotheses” (ἐξ ὑποθέσεων), while the other represents apprehension of the intellectual form
“without images” (ἄνευ… εἰκόνων).140 As he further clarifies with the example of the practioners
of geometry, it is possible to use images in pursuit of intellectual reality, although they are
presumably categorically different from the kinds of images on the sense-perceptible side of the
line.141 Perhaps there are kinds of images that differ not in their ethical impacts, but in their

136

The highest and clearest part of reality, the intelligible form, which the preceding part of the dialogue had
described as the form of the good through analogy with the sun, is only intelligible by the mind itself, with no part of
sense perception, but also with no part of the images and hypotheses that apparently characterize the next highest
part of reality. Socrates assigns a certain faculty to each level of reality or unreality reflected by a part of the line.
The highest human faculty, intelligence (νόησιν), does not seem to have any use for images, but it is unclear that the
understanding (διάνοιαν), the next highest, can move away from images. The other faculties are belief (πίστιν) and
imagination (εἰκασίαν). Cf. Ep. VII.342a-d.
137
γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην… ἄνισα τμήματα (VI.509d). See Kahn (1996: 294-6). Foley (2008) argues that the
middle portions of the line will turn out equal if a reader constructs a diagram of the line according to Socrates’
instructions, which he argues is meant to spur the reader to transcend the text. Plutarch dedicates the third of his
Quaest. Plat. to the question of which side of the divided line is longer: see infra pg. 149.
138
νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ
δ᾽ αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν,
νοητόν; (509d).
139
509e-10a.
140
… ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ… τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος (511a).
141
“I think that you know that those who concern themselves with geometry, calculation, and things of this sort, who
assume the even, odd, shapes, the three angels, and similar things through this method; they treat them as known and
as hypotheses. They do not make any further account of them, neither to themselves nor to others, but rather think
that they proceed entirely from clear thinks, and begin to explain everything else from them…” (οἶμαι γάρ σε
εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ
τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ’ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς
εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς
παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ’ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν…; 510c-d). The allegory of the cave
could similarly present a positive role for images, insofar as the eyes of the freed prisoner cannot withstand light of
the sun at first, such that he must look in reflections in water at first. See also Resp. X.595e-6a.
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relation to the reality that they signify, but if so, Plato is not explicit about such a division in the
Respublica. In the Sophista, the Eleatic stranger does suggest such a dichotomy of “forms of
imagemaking,” between the arts of likenesses and illusions, although it is not clear how, or
whether, this could help to explain the positive philosophical uses of images in the Respublica.142
The concepts of imitation and images, however, are treated much more expansively in the
broader Platonic corpus, although they cohere in their essential metaphysical details. 143 He
expands the category of image to make it clear that any earthly inquiry requires grappling with
imitation. In the Cratylus, Socrates analyzes names as images of things, imitations which are like
the object that they imitate.144 Hermogenes asks what sort of imitation (μίμησις) a name is and
Socrates begins by distinguishing the quality of its imitation from music and painting: “is it true
that all things have sound and shape, and many have color as well? … It does not seem to me
that someone imitates these things, nor that the art of naming is to be found in these imitations;
for those arts are music and painting.”145 Socrates instead asks, “if someone might be able to
imitate the thing itself of each thing, the essense (οὐσίαν), in letters and syllables, would he not

τὼ δύο ἔλεγον εἴδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν (236c). The Eleatic stranger at one point
suggests that the sophist is a “some sort of sorcerer, an imitator of real things,” (… τῶν γοήτων ἐστί τις, μιμητὴς ὢν
τῶν ὄντων; 235a), which eventually prompts him to “divide the art of imagemaking” (διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν
τέχνην; 235b). A likeness is said to be made when someone follows “the symmetries of the model in length, breadth,
and depth; in addition to these, they give them fitting colors for each” (κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις
ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις; 235d-e). An
Illusion (φάντασμα), in contrast to an image (εἰκόνα), are made when “someone should abandon the true symmetry
of beautiful things” (εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν) to create proportions that look more
realistic from a single angle 235e-6c). On this passage, see Gill (2012: 147-8, 170-1) and especially Van Riel (2017)
143
On this issue, I follow the Unitarian school of Platonic interpretation, which is perhaps still best represented by
Shorey (1903). On imitation in particular, cf. Halliwell (2002): “To deny that Plato ever offers us a wholly fixed, let
alone monolithic, doctrine of mimesis is not to deny that some recurrent, underlying anxieties are traceable beneath
the surface of relevant passages in his text” (39).
144
Cf. Socrates in the Resp.: “A lie, then, is not unmixed, since it is an image in words and a later after-image of
some state of the soul” (ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς
εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος; II.382b-c).
145
ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς; … ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται,
οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι. αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσική, ἡ δὲ γραφική (423d).
The comparison with painting recurs throughout the discussions of imitation (424d-e, 425a-b, 430b, 434a-b).
142
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show what each thing is?”146 Socrates’ examples extend to both nouns and verbs, the main parts
of speech discussed in the dialogue, which shows that all language is fundamentally imitative.147
Words represent things by representing some quality of them through likenesses.148 Poems are
composed, therefore, of many images and imitations, but so is any discourse composed in human
language, including philosophical dialogues.
In the Timaeus, the category of image is expanded to include everything in the senseperceptible world. Critias beckons Timaeus to “first speak beginning from the birth of the
universe, concluding with human nature.”149 He begins by making a few critical—and
quintessentially Platonic—assumptions: there is a difference between something “existing” (τι τὸ
ὂν ἀεί) which means to be “always existing uniformly,” and for something to be in a state of
“becoming” (τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί); the former is apprehensible to the mind (νοήσει) with the
use of reason, because it is always existing in the same way, while as the latter is apprehensible
to opinion (δόξῃ) through irrational perception because it suffers generation and degeneration,
and therefore without ever truly existing.150 Only things in “becoming” have causes because they
are necessarily contingent on things that have “being,” whereas things that have “being” are
definitionally never contingent on anything. After this tightly argued proof, Timaeus introduces

τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ
ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; (423e). Socrates considers several possibilities for how names were originally chosen but does not
commit himself to any (425d-6b).
147
The terms “to flow” (τῷ ῥεῖν) and “stream” (ῥοῇ), for instance, “imitate the motion through the letter” (διὰ
τούτου τοῦ γράμματος τὴν φορὰν μιμεῖται) presumably through the liquid, gliding quality of rho (426d). Cf. 434c.
On Plato’s theory of “names,” see Fine (1977). For Plutarch’s exposition of (Platonic) linguistic theory, see infra pg.
164 on Quaest. Plat. X.
148
Socrates later insists to Cratylus that words cannot be equivalent to what they represent—cf. the “two Cratyluses”
argument (432a-c)—or else they would cease to be images (432c-d). See also 434a-b.
149
πρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν (27a). Critias
describes him as “the most astronomical of us and one who makes it his work to most of all know about the nature
of the world” (ἀστρονομικώτατον ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ φύσεως τοῦ παντὸς εἰδέναι μάλιστα ἔργον πεποιημένον). Betegh
(2009) argues that this makes him a better candidate to be able to construct such an account than Socrates (100).
150
ἐστιν οὖν δὴ κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν
ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως
ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν (27e-8a).
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the figure of a creator (δημιουργὸς) of a physical object, who looks to a model: if the model has
“being,” the object will be beautiful, while as if the object is in “becoming,” it will not.151
Concluding that the world is in “becoming” because it is sense-perceptible, he sets out to identify
the model:
In reference to what sort of model (παραδειγμάτων) did the demiurge craft and construct
the world? To that which exists in the same way and is always self-same, or to that which
is generated? If, then, this world is beautiful, and its creator is good, it is clear that he
looked toward the eternal. But if it is as is impermissible to speak, then to the generated.
It is clear to everyone, therefore, that it was toward the eternal: for this world is the most
beautiful of generated things and this creator the best of causes. Having come about in
this way, it has been crafted by that which is apprehensible by reason and mind and
existing in the same ways.152
Although Timaeus feigns to suppose that the creator might not actually be the best of causes, the
possibility is dismissed as impious.153 This introduces the assumption of teleological
arrangement: Timaeus must answer not only how things are arranged, but how it serves the best
of causes and the eternal model. The world is, then, an image (εἰκόνα) of this paradigm, an
imperfect imitation but nevertheless one that is made after the model of the good. Lacking envy,
“the god wants everything to be good and nothing evil, insofar as is possible.”154 This is why
only opinions and not knowledge, Timaeus concludes, can be formed about the physical world.155
The relationship between image and model is thus central to the dialogue, as well as Plato’s
thought more broadly; but the Timaeus shows how images can crucially serve philosophical

πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν.
ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν
ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν· οὗ δ’ ἂν εἰς γεγονός, γεννητῷ
παραδείγματι προσχρώμενος, οὐ καλόν (29a-b).
152
πρὸς πότερον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὁ τεκταινόμενος αὐτον ἀπειργάζετο, πότερον πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ
ὡσαυτως ἔχον ἢ πρὸς τὸ γεγονός. εἰ μὲν δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ
ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν· εἰ δὲ ὃ μηδ’ εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις, πρὸς γεγονός. παντὶ δὴ σαφὲς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος
τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ’ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ
ταὐτὰ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται (29a). On the figure of the demiurge, see O’Brien (2015: 18-35).
153
The exchange between Socrates and Protarchus in Phlb. 28d-e is similar.
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βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρονδὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν… (30a).
155
See further supra pg. 7 and infra pg. 44.
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education by emphasizing its own status as an image. The Sicilian astronomer even concludes
his speech by describing, almost hymning, “the sense-perceptible god, image of the
intellectual.”156

Timaeus’ likely story
According to Timaeus’ preface, anything that occurs in the physical world occurs within
an image, which bears a relationship to its model but is not itself unqualifiedly real. A Platonic
dialogue, like a poem, is several removes from reality: it is an image, in words, of a conversation
that occurs through human language within the physical world, which is itself an image.157 It is
quite natural that Critias, the main speaker of the eponymous dialogue that continues the
Timaeus, remarks, “it is necessary that whatever is said by all of us be imitation and
representation.”158 The pair of dialogues particularly emphasize the status of images, both in the
frame of the Timaeus as well as in the metaphysically dense discussion of the demiurge. The
earlier dialogue even begins with Socrates recounting the discussion of the Respublica and
lamenting the staticity of its depiction of the ideal city:159
Suppose that some passion fell upon me—as if someone beheld beautiful animals,
whether depicted by an artist or truly living but at rest—and became to desire to see them
move and engage in some contest that befits the appearance of their bodies. I have
suffered exactly this with regard to the city which we discussed. I would pleasurably hear
someone expound on the contests which the city fights against other cities, how fittingly
it arrives into war, how it renders what pertains to war in a manner befitting its education

εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός (92c). On the coherency of the presentation of images in the Ti. with the other
dialogues, see especially Cherniss (1957b).
157
Cf. Mason's (2010) discussion of “the paradox of Plato” (199-200). Plato, moreover, problematizes the value of
writing in the Phdr. (274b-7a). On the relevance of the critique of writing to myth, see Hooper (2010: 845-7, 850).
158
μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπεικασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ῥηθέντα χρεών που γενέσθαι (107b). He asks for
forebearance (συγγνώμης; 108a) on the grounds that humans are more critical about representations of humans, with
whom they are more familiar, than gods, with whose representations they are pleased if there is even a bit of
likeness (βραχὺ πρὸς ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν ἀπομιμεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἦ; 107c).
159
On the philosophical significance of Socrates’ initial speech, see especially Slaveva-Griffin (2005).
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and upbringing both in the deeds of these affairs and in negotiations in words with those
of the cities.160
Socrates consciously requests an image from his interlocutors, but a better sort of image than a
static painting of an animal. He wishes for an account, as a historian might render, of the deeds
of the ideal city postulated in the Respublica. He even compares two sorts of members of the
“imitative clan” (μιμητικὸν ἔθνος) that he criticizes in other dialogues: the poets and the sophists.
While he claims not to “despise” (ἀτιμάζων) the former, perhaps with some irony, he denies that
they are fit for the task because “things in which they have been reared will be imitated
excellently and easily, while what is outside their upbringing will be imitated with difficulty—it
is difficult to imitate well in deeds, but even harder still in words.”161 Rather, Socrates has need
of better imitators, such as Timaeus, who will give the account of the demiurge’s creation, and
Critias, who will recount the story of Atlantis.162
Timaeus himself emphasizes the status of his cosmological exposition as an image by
stressing its quality of being “likely.” After his argument that the creator of the world must have
had a perfect and unchanging model, he attempts to preemptively lower Socrates’ expectations:
If then, Socrates, we should not be able render everything about the gods and the
generation of the world with much accuracy and self-consistency, do not be surprised.
But if we should offer anything that is at all likely, it is necessary to greet it with

προσέοικεν δὲ δή τινί μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις ζῷα καλά που θεασάμενος, εἴτε ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα
εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀληθινῶς ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καί τι τῶν τοῖς
σώμασιν δοκούντων προσήκειν κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα· ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν.
ἡδέως γὰρ ἄν του λόγῳ διεξιόντος ἀκούσαιμ᾽ ἂν ἄθλους οὓς πόλις ἀθλεῖ, τούτους αὐτὴν ἀγωνιζομένην πρὸς πόλεις
ἄλλας, πρεπόντως εἴς τε πόλεμον ἀφικομένην καὶ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδιδοῦσαν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ
κατά τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις πρὸς ἑκάστας τῶν πόλεων (19b-c).
161
… οἷς ἂν ἐντραφῇ, ταῦτα μιμήσεται ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκτὸς τῆς τροφῆς ἑκάστοις γιγνόμενον χαλεπὸν μὲν
ἔργοις, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον λόγοις εὖ μιμεῖσθαι (19d-e). He similarly praises the sophists (τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν
γένος) for “many beautiful other speeches” (πολλῶν μὲν λόγων καὶ καλῶν ἄλλων) but cites their itinerant lifestyle as
the source of their insufficiency for the task at hand (19e). See also Phdr. 247c.
162
The grounds for their qualifications are both political and philosophical (20a).
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affection, because we remember that you and I, as the one speaking, are judges with a
human nature, such that we should accept the likely myth and seek nothing further.163
Timaeus reiterates the difficulty of giving a precise account of the physical world at various
points of his speech, but he deems it a “likely account” (eikos logos) as well as a “likely myth”
(eikos muthos).164 The exact meaning of each of these terms, “likely,” “account,” and “myth,” has
stirred a great deal of scholarly controversy. Gregory Vlastos, for instance, objects “the Timaios
is unique among Plato’s myths” because it is entirely “scientific” and therefor probable—there
are no troublesome names of gods;165 Leonardo Tarán, to the contrary, argues that only part of
the dialogue is meaningfully mythic, namely the demiurgic creation.166 Given that the physical
world is merely an image, according to Timaeus’ account, however, and that Plato holds that
firm knowledge is only possible about unchanging realities such as the demiurge’s model, it is
perhaps unsurprising that all Timaeus can offer is a likely account. This epistemological problem
actually makes myth a fitting medium for an account of something as changing and uncertain as
Plato’s conception of the sense-perceptible world, especially when its fictional status is stressed
such as by Timaeus’ stress on the limits of his own speech. The narrative allows him to depict
the demiurge’s composition of the world from underlying matter into a harmoniously ordered
world, complete with gods and a living world soul. While in the myth of Er Plato exemplifies a

ἐὰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ πολλῶν πέρι, θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, μὴ δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντῃ
πάντως αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἄρα
μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα εἰκότας, ἀγαπᾶν χρή, μεμνημένους ὡς ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην
ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν (29c-d).
164
Timaeus emphasizes this before introducing the difficult idea (χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἶδος) of the receptacle
(ὑποδοχὴν), which a speech can only represent in images (νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν εἰσαναγκάζειν; 49a): “abiding by
what was said from the beginning, the capability of likely accounts, I will try to express anything that is likely, but
moreso…” (τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ῥηθὲν διαφυλάττων, τὴν τῶν εἰκότων λόγων δύναμιν, πειράσομαι μηδενὸς ἧττον
εἰκότα, μᾶλλον δέ…; 48d). See also 69a-b. On the problem, see especially Brisson (2012).
165
1939: “It is a mistake to put it on a level with the eschatological myths of the Gorgias, Phaidon, Republic X, and
Phaidros. The Timaios offers no gentle disavowal of the scientific scrupulousness of the account by the literary
devices employed in every one of these others” (71).
166
1966. Some aspects of Timaeus’ speech might seem more immediately mythic, such as the demiurge’s speech to
the created gods (41a-d). Regali (2000), for instance, detects reminiscences of Hesiod.
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narrative that is better fit for education than those of tragedy, in the Timaeus he provides the
example of a teleological account of the physical world that stresses its status as merely likely.167
While Critias’ narrative, which constitutes the Atlantis myth, has received less seriously
scholarly attention than Timaeus’ myth, its epistemological ramifications have attracted an
increasing body of engagement, particularly in the last few decades. 168 There are many reasons to
believe that the account is meant to be unbelievable, such as the objections Sarah Broadie has
made, yet Critias refers to it as an “account” and Socrates calls it “true history.”169 Luc Brisson
largely bases his examination of the transmission of traditional stories on the transmission of the
Atlantis myth through the Egyptian priest, Solon, and Critias’ ancestors.170 Thomas Johansen
argues that Critias’ tale serves a critical epistemological role in the former in setting the stage for
Timaeus’ own exposition.171 Svetla Slaveva-Griffin argues that Timaeus offers an image of being
while Critias an image of becoming, such that the two must be viewed together.172 Both of the
speeches of the Timaeus, it seems, may bear on the epistemological status of myths: they are
only images that can only bear some likeness to the truth; yet we cannot hope for a better account
about the physical world. Because they emphasize their own hypothetical status, as Katherine
Morgan has shown, they are fitting instruments for Plato’s philosophy.173

Conclusion
Myth, perhaps to a surprising degree, proves to be a critically important issue for Plato.
He criticizes it both for the ethical and metaphysical issues posed by traditional myth and its
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The fourth chapter examines the Ti. myth as a teleological account.
Elias (1984), for instance, is particularly dismissive of “the intolerably long-winded Critias” (181).
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Esp. 2013. See also Gill (2017: 7).
170
1998 (1994): 17-39.
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2004.
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2005: 324-5.
173
2000. See further supra pg. 15.
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methods of transmission, while also adapting the form to his own sort of philosophically-aimed
ethical exhortations and teleological accounts, such as the myth of Er and Timaeus’ likely myth,
respectively. Plutarch of Chaeronea grapples deeply and broadly with the Platonic dialogue but,
more than any other any other Middle Platonist extant in the evidence, he grapples both with
Plato’s critique of myth and with his philosophizing adaptations. He considers and echoes both
aspects of Plato’s critiques, as well as formulating Platonistic responses to the challenges raised,
particularly in the Respublica. He also composed his own imagstic myths, especially in the
dialogues De sera numinis vindicta and De facie in orbe lunae.174 To conclude this introduction, I
survey both aspects of Plutarch’s Platonist approach to myth, before summarizing the subsequent
chapters.
Despite the prominence of the critique of myth in Plato’s corpus, discussions of Plato’s
myths are surprisingly sparse among most ancient philosophers, and debate over the form of
Platonic myth is even rarer than denigration and rebuttal of the literal content. Aristotle, for
instance, presents a series of physical arguments against the notion of underworld rivers as
imagined in the myth of the Phaedo.175 Yet he has less to say on the form of Plato’s mythic
discourse itself, and he is ambivalent on the potential philosophical role of myth generally: on
the one hand he stresses in the Metaphysica that the lover is myth is somehow equivalent to the
lover of philosophy, while in a later book he cautions that the proponents of myth, as opposed to

174

His myths even attracted some high praise from Julian the Apostate (Ep. VII.227a-b).
“But what is written in the Phaedo about both the rivers and the sea is impossible” (τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι
γεγραμμένον περί τε τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν; Meteor. II.355b). Aristotle describes this
aspect of the myth at length (355b-6a), then gives three arguments to show the physical impossibility (356a). Gertz
(2011) compares Neoplatonic responses: “Olympiodorus… is quite prepared to defend the passage against
Aristotle’s attacks in the Meteorology, claiming that it contains both physical and ethical truths. In fact, however,
most of the interpretations of the passage seem to be allegories of one kind or another,” further contrasting Proclus’
physical allegory (each river representing an element) and Damascius’ “theological” one (184).
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philosophers such as Empedocles, should not be addressed seriously.176 Plutarch, however,
engages on both main points of Plato’s polemic against myth and poetry. He similarly addresses
the problem of harm coming to the young through traditional tales. He dedicates the treatise
Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat to this issue and justifies myth—whether in prose or
poetry177—as a sort of pleasurable preliminary instruction, before young students can begin
studying philosophy proper. They must be reminded, he warns, that when base or wicked things
are portrayed—whether in poetry or visual art—what is pleasurable is artistry of the imitation,
not the thing being imitated.178 Imitation relies on its semblance to truth, he argues, for its
pleasurability, such that imitations are not purely falsehoods. 179
Plutarch is more disparaging in the treatise entitled De gloria Atheniensium, which sets
out to answer whether the city is more glorious because of its deeds of war or of peace, including

“For through wondering, men both now and in the beginning started to philosophize… He is at a loss and
marvels and recognizes that he is ignorant (which is why a lover of myths is also in some respect a lover of
wisdom). Therefore, if men philosophized to escape ignorance, it is clear that they were pursuing knowing for the
sake of thinking, and not on account of some gain” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον
ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, … ὁ δ’ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν· ὁ
γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)· ὥστ’ εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ
εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον, καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν; Α.982b); “but about those speculating mythically, a
serious investigation is inappropriate” (ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζουμένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν;
III.1000a). Cf. Dörrie (1972): “Die Art und Weise, wie sich philosophische Aussage seit nun weit über 2000 Jahren
dem Leser anbietet, ist tiefgreifend durch Aristoteles gesprägt wordern. Seit und durch Aristoteles gilt das Axiom,
daß philosophische Forschung auf geradlinigem Weg zu eindeutigen Ergebnissen führen müsse” (5). He goes onto
argue that Aristotle came to this position “gegen die Mitte seines Lebens,” and that this position predominated
subsequent philosophy from Chrysippus to Kant. On Aristotle’s approach to myth, see Callahan (1977: 76-80) and
Heath (2013: 120-1).
177
“It is neither meter nor style nor dignity of phrasing nor appropriateness of metaphor nor harmony and
composition that brings persuasion and charm, but rather the exquisitely plaited arrangement of mythology” (οὔτε
γὰρ μέτρον οὔτε τρόπος οὔτε λέξεως ὄγκος οὔτ᾽ εὐκαιρία μεταφορᾶς οὔθ᾽ ἁρμονία καὶ σύνθεσις ἔχει τοσοῦτον
αἱμυλίας καὶ χάριτος ὅσον εὖ πεπλεγμένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας; 16c).
178
ἐν οἷς μάλιστα δεῖ τὸν νέον ἐθίζεσθαι, διδασκόμενον ὅτι τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἧς γέγονεν ἡ μίμησις, ἀλλὰ
τὴν τέχνην εἰ μεμίμηται προσηκόντως τὸ ὑποκείμενον (18b). Plutarch gives examples of occasions for concerns:
“some paint even strange deeds, such as when Timomachus depicts the slaughter of Medea’s children…” (γράφουσι
δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἀτόπους ἔνιοι, καθάπερ Τιμόμαχος τὴν Μηδείας τεκνοκτονίαν…; 18a).
179
“… poetry, because it has an imitative basis, uses adornment and grace when it deals with underlying actions and
characters, but it does not abandon its similarity to the truth entirely, since this is imitation’s guide in plausibility”
(…μιμητικὴν ἡ ποίησις ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσα κόσμῳ μὲν καὶ λαμπρότητι χρῆται περὶ τὰς ὑποκειμένας πράξεις καὶ τὰ
ἤθη, τὴν δ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς οὐ προλείπει, τῆς μιμήσεως ἐν τῷ πιθανῷ τὸ ἀγωγὸν ἐχούσης; 25b-c). For a
lengthy survey of the ambiguity “inherited from Plato by Plutarch,” see Mossman (1991: 108n30).
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visual art and poetry. In a set of passages that scandalize some English poetry critics, Plutarch
confirms that images are inferior to their referents and mocks the idea that someone could take
more pleasure in a depiction of glorious deeds than in the deeds themselves. 180 At several points
in the corpus, he even has characters echo the characteristically Platonic concern that people
might think the sun is, at most, just an image of god or the good and not the reality itself.181 Yet
he allows a particular philosophical role for such imitations towards the end of Quomodo.
Drawing on Plato’s allegory of the cave, he suggests that some people might be unable to bear
the light of truth at first, although they are capable at seeing a reflection:
Joining together and harmonizing poems with ideas thus lifts poems above myth and
portrayal, lending some seriousness to things that are usefully said. It, moreover, opens
and stirs the soul of the young for philosophical discourses. For he comes to philosophy
with at least a bit of a foretaste because he has heard at least a bit, nor is he uncritically
filled with what he always hears from his mother and nurse and—god help him—his
father and tutor, these who deem rich men blessed and at in awe of them, they shudder at
pain and toil, they consider virtue without wealth and reputation as paltry. Yet when the
young first hear the philosophers speak against these things, they are gripped by
perplexity, terror, and astonishment; they are unable to believe them, except if they are
like those that are accustomed to being in deep darkness but are about to see the sun, that
is to see the soft beam of truth hidden in a reflected light through myths without harm,
rather than fleeing them entirely.182

“I do not think you would judge the contest for the painter over the general, nor would you agree with those who
prefer painted tablets over the trophy and the imitation over the truth” (ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι τῷ ζωγράφῳ κρίσιν
προθείητε πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀνάσχοισθε τῶν προτιμώντων τὸν πίνακα τοῦ τροπαίου καὶ τὸ μίμημα τῆς
ἀληθείας; 346f). Painters and writers differ in their methods of imitation and their material (ὕλῃ καὶ τρόποις
μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι) but the end is still the same (347a). He broadens the critique to historians as well (347c). Cf.
Sikes (1931: e.g. 201) and Johnson (1972: 39). See also Auden (1979 [1939]): “For poetry makes nothing happen.”
181
See infra pg. 88.
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τὸ γὰρ οὕτω συνάπτειν καὶ συνοικειοῦν τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐξάγει τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ μύθου καὶ τοῦ προσωπείου, καὶ
σπουδὴν περιτίθησιν αὐτοῖς χρησίμως λεγομένοις: ἔτι δὲ προανοίγει: καὶ προκινεῖ τὴν τοῦ νέου ψυχὴν τοῖς ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοις. ἔρχεται γὰρ οὐκ ἄγευστος αὐτῶν παντάπασιν οὐδ᾽ ἀνήκοος, οὐδ᾽ ἀκρίτως ἀνάπλεως ὧν ἤκουε
τῆς μητρὸς ἀεὶ καὶ τίτθης καὶ νὴ Δία τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ, τοὺς πλουσίους εὐδαιμονιζόντων καὶ
σεβομένων, φριττόντων δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὸν πόνον, ἄζηλον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄνευ χρημάτων καὶ
δόξης ἀγόντων. οἷς ἀντίφωνα τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς τὸ πρῶτον ἔκπληξις ἴσχει καὶ ταραχὴ καὶ
θάμβος, οὐ προσιεμένους οὐδ᾽ ὑπομένοντας, ἂν μὴ καθάπερ ἐκ σκότους πολλοῦ μέλλοντες ἥλιον ὁρᾶν ἐθισθῶσιν
οἷον ἐν νόθῳ φωτὶ κεκραμένης μύθοις ἀληθείας αὐγὴν ἔχοντι μαλακὴν ἀλύπως διαβλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μὴ
φεύγειν (36d-e). Cf. Pl. Resp. VII.515c-d.
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Plutarch echoes and broadens Plato’s concern over what children hear from their caretakers
growing up and suggests poetry, at least if read correctly, can serve as an intermediary aid to
philosophy. These considerations of poetry, education, and imitation are elaborations of Plato’s
critiques—that is, prose defense of mythic verse.
Plutarch’s dialogues, moreover, present implicit interpretations of Plato through their
imitations of him.183 I argue that Plutarch’s characters use philosophical myths, in imitation of
Plato’s, as a distinctive sort of discourse. These two modes of argument are presented as parallel
paths to the same sort of truth. Plutarch signals this epistemic status of his myths through very
specific imitation of the framing aspects the myths, including in the presentation of myths as
something that might touch on the truth or be worthy of belief or testing. In De genio Socratis,
for example, Simmias, a character familiar from the Phaedo, attempts to demur from relating
what he “heard Timarchus of Chaeronea say” because they might seem “more like mythoi than
logoi,” but the Pythagorean Theanor bids him to go on: “there is some way in which the mythic
too touches on the truth, even if there is not much accuracy.”184 Myths and accounts, by this
logic, aim at the same truth, but drive towards it in different manners. This way of characterizing
the myth serves a weighty philosophical function by calling attention to the myth’s status, lest
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Brenk (1994) argues for other sorts of broader eschatological differences (3) but emphasizes the idea of vision
and Plutarch’s use of light (especially 19). Cf. Jones (1916): “The main thoughts of the myths are those which are
found in Plato: the fall of the soul from a more blessed condition to birth upon the earth; sojourn of the soul after
death in a place of reward or punishment; subsequent rebirth in the form of man or animal, and final restoration to
previous state. The principal non-Platonic elements are the connection with demonology, the different mythical
treatment of the νοῦς and ψυχή, and the speculations concerning the part played by the sun and the moon” (42).
184
ἃ δὲ Τιμάρχου τοῦ Χαιρωνέως ἠκούσαμεν ὑπὲρ τούτων διεξιόντος, οὐκ οἶδα μὴ μύθοις <ὁμοιότερ’ ἢ> λόγοις
ὄντα σιωπᾶν ἄμεινον.’ ‘μηδαμῶς’ εἶπεν ὁ Θεόκριτος, ‘ἀλλὰ δίελθ’ αὐτά· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ λίαν ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπη
ψαύει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ μυθῶδες. πρότερον δὲ τίς ἦν οὗτος ὁ Τίμαρχος φράσον· οὐ γὰρ ἔγνων τὸν ἄνθρωπον’
(589f-90a). He continues: “indeed it was plausible” (εἰκότως γ’). Cf. Hardie (1992): “Platonic echoes are especially
obvious when Plutarch discusses the status of his own large-scale exercises in writing myths” (4744). Plutarch
includes a similar statement, but about traditional rather than philosophical myth, in the Amat.: “not, I suppose, that I
believe the myths, but I surely do not disbelieve them entirely” (οὔτι τοῖς μύθοις πειθόμενος οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀπιστῶν
παντάπασιν; 762a). Cf. De def. or. 438d. The De fac. myth ends a sort of “formules conclusive,” as Lernould (2013)
puts it (87n470), that seems to play a complementary role: “but it is for you all, Lamprias, to use the logos in what
way you choose” (ὑμῖν δ’, ὦ Λαμπρία, χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ πάρεστιν ᾗ βούλεσθε; 945e).
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the audience should mistake a “likely account” for an unquestionable revelation or a
pronouncement of doctrine.185 Myth may make up for its lack of precision, however, in its more
immediate pleasurability and fitness for certain audiences. Plutarch’s praise for Diotima’s speech
in Plato’s Symposium in the programmatic preface to the first book of the Quaestiones
convivales, a collection of short sympostiastic vignettes, characterizes the role of Platonic myth:
For you see that even Plato in the Symposium discusses the telos and the first good and
everything of theology, he does not strain through a proof nor kick up a cloud of dust and
make a vigorous and inescapable hold as he was accustomed; rather, he won over men
through softer premises and examples and mythic tales.186
Philosophical myths such as Diotima’s in the Symposium compensate, in Plutarch’s eyes, for
their potential lack of precision by their charming elements, which allow him to attract different
sorts of audiences than, for example, the dry and intricate exegesis of complicated dialogues such
as the Timaeus.187 The truth that myths touch upon is the same exact aim as dialectical
argumentation, but the former is insufficient in itself for belief.188
Plutarch engages not just with Plato’s critique of traditional myth, but also his
creative adaptation of such imagistic narratives as philosophical myths. Plutarch composed
imagistic myths in imitation of Plato for at least three dialogues: De genio Socratis, De sera

On Plutarch’s attitude to certainty and uncertainty about the physical world, see infra pg. 117. Plutarch often
maintains some skepticism, especially in theological matters, but perennially hard questions require multiple paths
to reach after the truth.
186
ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ περὶ τέλους διαλεγόμενος καὶ τοῦ πρῶτου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὅλως θεολογῶν
οὐκ ἐντείνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ’ ὑποκονίεται, τὴν λαβὴν ὥσπερ εἴωθεν εὔτονον ποιῶν καὶ ἄφυκτον, ἀλλ’ ὑγροτέροις
λήμμασι καὶ παραδείγμασι καὶ μυθολογίαις προσάγεται τοὺς ἄνδρας (614c-d). Cf. Klotz (2014: 211-2).
187
Cf. Lucretius’ famous image of the honeyed rim on the cup of wormwood (I.936-42 and IV.13-7).
188
Cf. Theon in Non posse: “… not even a lie is without a share in truth, but even in fabrications and fictions, which
are not able to be believe, there is nevertheless something persuasive. Just consider how moved we are when we
read Plato’s book on Atlantis and the end of the Iliad, how we long for what has been left from the myth as if a
shrine or a theater has closed” (οὐδὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀμοιρεῖ χάριτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλάσμασι καὶ ποιήμασι τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι
μὴ προσόντος ἔνεστιν ὅμως τὸ πεῖθον. ἐννόει γάρ, ὡς δακνόμενοι τὸν Πλάτωνος ἀναγινώσκομεν Ἀτλαντικὸν καὶ τὰ
τελευταῖα τῆς Ἰλιάδος, οἷον ἱερῶν κλειομένων ἢ θεάτρων ἐπιποθοῦντες τοῦ μύθου τὸ λειπόμενον; 1092f-3a).
Epicurean critique emerges as the greatest attack on the form of Platonic myth. See further infra pg. 196.
185
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numinis vindicta, and De facie in orbe lunae.189 Despite the prominence of myth in Plato’s
corpus, there is not much evidence of philosophical myths in the later Hellenistic era. His
immediate successor, Speusippus, for instance, reportedly composed dialogues but there is no
indication whether he included mythic narratives.190 Aristotle, his contemporary and fellowstudent, however, seems to have included both fables, such as the story that Midas bound Silenus
and coerced him to answer the question, “what is best in life for a human,” to which the captive
satyr eventually responds, “not being born at all is the best thing of all… but second, to die as
quickly as soon as they are born.”191 Aristotle also seems to have incorporated the figure of a
dreaming Cronus into one of his dialogues, which may have been a part of a more elaborate
myth, such as Plutarch’s incorporation of an apparently similar in the myth of De facie. The early
Peripatetic Clearchus of Soli, however, takes the other sort of approach, and apparently had
characters invoke exotic religious authorities: according to Proclus, for instance, he had the
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It seems that Plutarch also included an extended eschatological myth in his lost dialogue De anima, taking the
form of a near-death vision experienced by a certain Antyllus, which Eusebius compares to Plato’s myth of Er
(Praep. ev. 11.36.1 = frg. 176 Sandbach; similarly: Origen. C. Cel. V.57 = frg. 173). A passage in Stobaeus
(IV.52.49 = frg. 178), although attributed to Themestius, is generally thought to belong to Plutarch because the
characters—namely Timon and Patrocleas, relatives of Plutarch—appear elsewhere in Plutarch, such as De sera. It
describes the experience of coming to an underworld with reference to the mysteries, punning on the similarity
(προσέοικε) of dying (τελευτᾶν) and being initiated (τελεῖσθαι). These two parts of the dialogue, if both are indeed
from Plutarch, are plausibly connected. Other passages from Stobaeus (frgs. 203-6) and Damascius In Phd. (215-7)
have been suggested but are more tenuous: Bonazzi (2011: 75-7). Philip’s mythic narrative in De def. or. (419a-e) is
simpler but masterly as a work of literature. An Egyptian helmsman named Thaumus (a pun?) is instructed by a
mysterious voice to “announce that the great pan has died” (ἀπάγγειλον ὅτι Πὰν ὁ μέγας τέθνηκε) further on in his
journey, which brings the unseen daemones to lament and wonder (στεναγμὸν ἅμα θαυμασμῷ μεμιγμένον).
Plutarch’s anti-Epicurean treatise De lat. viv. also has a conclusion that describes a mythic underworld (1130c-e), on
which see Hilton (2019).
190
Diogenes Laertius relates that Speusippus “left behind very many notes and many dialogues” (καταλέλοιπε δὲ
πάμπλειστα ὑπομνήματα καὶ διαλόγους πλείονας; IV.1.4), but no fragments remain. Dillon (1977) suggests, from
the titles, that Xenocrates’ Arkas and Archedemus may have been dialogues (39).
191
… πάμπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον… δεύτερον δέ, τὸ γενομένους ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα (frg. 44
Rose = Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. 115c). Davies (2004) analyzes the myth as a folk tale but echoes the conclusion of
Jaeger that “the point of the story in this early dialogue the Eudemus relates to the Platonic doctrine of form” (692).
Plutarch also cites the early Academic Crantor (115b) and acknowledges the commonality of the sentiment (e.g.
Soph. OC 1225): “someone could add heaps upon heaps of similar things on this topic” (μυρία δ’ ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἄν τις
ἔχοι τοιαῦτα παρατίθεσθαι πρὸς ταὐτὸ κεφάλαιον; 115e). The Silenus story has a long Nachleben in the concept of
“Greek pessimism” due to Nietzsche (1886: 28), following the lead of Schopenhauer (1819): Beiser (2016: 45-7).
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character of Aristotle invoke a Jewish sage in one of his dialogues.192 The concluding episode of
Cicero’s De Respublica, known as the Somnium Scipionis, famously reimagines Plato’s myth of
Er, which remains, unlike the now-shadowy earlier works, comes down to us almost entirely
extant.193 In it, Scipio Aemilianus describes his encounter with his patronymic ancestors in a
dream where his soul travels out from the body and through the heavens. Cicero’s myth,
however, is firmly grounded in a specifically Roman historical setting, rather unlike Plato’s Er
from Everytribe.194 Nor do any of Cicero’s many other extant dialogues, moreover, include any
mythic narratives such as this. Perhaps this is one part of why he tends to describe his dialogues
after the earlier cluster—De respublica, De legibus, and De oratore—as following in the style of
one of the early Peripatetics, rather than Plato.195 There are very few suggestions of other
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Apparently in the same dialogue, Proclus claims that Clearchus depicts a magus proving the separability of the
soul to Aristotle by a surprising sort of empirical demonstration: “Just as Clearchus says in De somno, regarding the
soul, how it is separated from the body, how it enters into it, and how it (the soul) uses the same thing (the body) as
if a vehicle: by striking a boy with a rod, he draws out the soul and, as if leading it away from the body with the rod,
he reveals that the body, preserved unmoved and unharmed, lacks perception … and when the rod leads it back near
to the body, the soul announces everything after its reentry. From this evidence, then, [he says] that Aristotle, among
other viewers of such an investigation, believes that the soul is separable from the body” (καθάπερ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἐν
τοῖς περὶ ὕπνου φησίν, περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἄρα χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὡς εἴσεισιν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὡς χρῆται
αὐτῷ οἷον καταγωγίῳ· τῇ γὰρ ῥάβδῳ πλήξας τὸν παῖδα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξείλκυσεν καὶ οἷον ἄγων δι' αὐτῆς πόρρω τοῦ
σώματος ἀκίνητον ἐνέδειξε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀβλαβὲς σῳζόμενον ἀναισθητεῖν … τοῦ σώματος ἐγγύθεν αὐτῆς ἀγομένης
πάλιν τῆς ῥάβδου μετὰ τὴν εἴσοδον ἀπαγγέλλειν ἕκαστα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ τούτων πιστεῦσαι τούς τε ἄλλους τῆς
τοιαύτης ἱστορίας θεατὰς καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην χωριστὴν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν; frg. 7 Tsitsiridis = Procl. In
Remp. II.122-3). Cf. Dicaearchus’ choice of a descendant of Deucalion as the main speaker of the dialogue entitled
Corinthi (frg. 19 Wehrli = Cic. Tusc. I.10.21).
193
Even here, however, Cicero’s framing for the myth is lost, because the version in the manuscript tradition of
Macrobius’ commentary only begins with Scipio recounting the story: “When I went to Africa…” (cum in Africam
uenissem…; VI.9).
194
On the difference between universalizing and historicizing, see Armisen-Marchetti (2001: XXIX-XXX).
Macrobius argues that Cicero, although believing Plato’s story to be true (ueri conscius), preferred to turn the neardeath experience into a vision of the dead in sleep to avoid the censure of idiots (stolidae reprehensionis uitans;
I.1.8).
195
Cicero compares his Resp., where he himself is the narrator but “mute” (κωφὸν πρόσωπον, a style he associates
with Heracleides), with his later works such as Fin. where he follows the “Aristotelian manner” in which the
dialogue is given to a single main speaker (quae autem his temporibus scripsi Ἀριστοτέλειον morem habent in quo
ita sermo inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus; XIII.19.4). Cicero also mentions writing in more
Dicaearchi (Att. XIII.30.2; cf. Tusc. I.10.21). Numenius composed at least De bono (Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ) as a dialogue
(e.g. frgs. 3, 4a Des Places), although it seems rather stripped down, like Cicero’s Tusc. At some point before
Augustine (cf. De civ. D. VIII.23-6), works claiming the authority of Hermes Tristmegistus were sometimes written
as dialogues, of which the Latin Asclepius seems the most complex in its dialogic framing: in a certain sanctuary
(adytum), Hermes Tristmegistus instructs Asclepius to summon Tat, and allows him to bring in Hammon as well,
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philosophical myths composed between Plato’s death and the onset of the early Roman
Empire—or even of philosophical dialogues in general.196
In contrast to all of these figures, Plutarch stands out as a broad and imaginative
mythmaker. He imitates Plato extensively, such as through the positioning of myths in the
dialogues: in De genio, it is placed in the center—like the Phaedrus and Politicus—while in De
facie and De sera, it is placed at the end—like the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Respublica. Even the
authorizations of Plutarch’s myth—the exotic framing of the narratives that mark them out as
myths—reflect the two basic sorts of mythic authorization in Plato. Plato not only blends
traditional names and images into his myths, but characteristically has his characters disclaim
their own authority and appeal to ancient or exotic sources. 197 These sources seem broadly
divided into two categories, based on the source of their greater claim to knowledge. Plato’s Er,
for example, is far from extraordinary in and of himself, but he experiences something strange
and unusual that allows them a mythic vision outside the usual experience of embodied life.
More often, the source’s authority is derived from some sort of religious status, such as Diotima
in the Symposium, a woman from the Arcadian town of Mantineia whose sacrifices, Socrates

but no others, lest the most sacred of discourses (religiosissimus sermo), most replete with the majesty of the divine
(tota numinis maiestate plenissimum), should be profaned by a large crowd (1a-b). Scott (1982) analyzes the Latin
translation as a composition of three separate Greek works (51-61).
196
Plutarch’s friend Sarapion, the addressee of De E (384d) is praised elsewhere, however, for writing poetry
“philosophically and austerely” (φιλοσόφως καὶ αὐστηρῶς; De Pyth. or. 396f); cf. Bowie (2014: 182). Bremmer
(2002) describes testimonies of two slightly later figures, Naumachius of Epirus and Cornelius Labeo, who describe
journeys of the soul out of bodies (94-5). The evidence for other philosophical dialogues, with or without myths, is
also scanty, which leads to grand dismissals such as Whittaker's (1923): “By the ancients Plato was of course
admired, just as he is by the moderns, not only as a philosopher but as a supreme literary artist. In antiquity,
however, no deep-going influence from him on imaginative literature, or on the modes of feeling expressed in it, had
yet begun” (2).
197
Most (2012) detects eight distinguishing features of Platonic myth: monological form, older age of the speaker,
attribution of “older, explicitly indicated or implied, real or fictional oral source,” lack of verifiability, authority
based on traditionality, explicit psychagogic purpose, non-dialectic form, and position at the beginning or end of “an
extended dialectical exposition” (24).
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attests, delayed the Athenian plague for ten years.198 The frame of the Atlantis in the Timaeus and
Critias is perhaps too complex for this simple dichotomy, but it bears some affinities with both
categories: Critias receives the story from his grandfather who heard it from his father who heard
it from the great Solon, who learned it on a voyage to exotic Egypt.199 But his source is a priest of
Saïs, who claims to know the history of ancient Athens and Atlantis because of the longevity of
his tradition—Egypt alone is free from periodic cataclysms, he claims, both watery and fiery—
which allows his temple to possess written records; he proceeds to tell the story from memory, it
seems, but claims that they can read the writings themselves together later.200
Plutarch thus deals extensively and seriously with both Plato’s criticisms of traditional
myth and the with models he left for constructing imagistic myths more straightforwardly
suitable for philosophical ends. In this study, therefore I focus on two aspects of Plutarch’s
Platonism, both of which relate to myth. First, he continuously builds his philosophy upon
Platonic “models” and “frameworks.” These are particularly obvious in the myths he weaves into
his own dialogues, which are clear imitations of various Platonic myths; but different aspects of

“But the account of Eros, which I once heard from the Mantinean woman Diotima, a woman wise in these things
and many others—and for the Athenians she delayed disease for ten years before the plague by sacrificing, she that
taught me erotics—and she spoke this speech indeed” (τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, ὅν ποτ᾽ ἤκουσα γυναικὸς
Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταῦτά τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά—καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὲ θυσαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα
ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν—ὃν οὖν ἐκείνη ἔλεγε λόγον; 201d). She is
exotic in several respects, and this evidently justifies her authority for the story of the conception of Eros in the
garden of Zeus (203a-4a). The appeal in the Meno to “priests and priestesses” (τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν) and
“Pindar and other inspired poets” (ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί) for the immortality of the soul is perhaps
similar (81a-b). Cf. Gorg. 493a.
199
“Go on and hear, Socrates, a very strange account, but entirely true, as the wisest of the Seven, Solon, once
spoke” (ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, ὡς ὁ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφώτατοω
Σόλων ποτ’ ἔφη; Ti. 20d-e). The older Critias related the story on the occasion of a festival when the speaker in
Plato’s dialogue was a young boy (21a-b), at the behest of a character that emphatically asks, “what Solon said, and
how, and from whom did he hear it was true” (τί τε καὶ πῶς καὶ παρὰ τίνων ὡς ἀληθῆ διακηκοὼς ἔλεγεν ὁ Σόλων;
21d). Critias describes the Egyptian setting, claiming they call Athena by the name Neith (21e-2a) and that their
priests knew vastly more about the past (22a-b).
200
“We go through the precise and ordered account about these things later, in leisure, and read the writings
themselves” (τὸ δ’ ἀκριβὲς περὶ πάντων ἐφεξῆς εἰσαῦθις κατὰ σχολήν, αὐτὰ τὰ γράμματα λαβόντες, διέξιμεν; 24a).
Further on the writings: 22b-3a. The priest later attributes his knowledge of the Athenian victory over Atlantis to
these writings (λέγει γὰρ τὰ γεγραμμένα…; 24e).
198
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his thought are based upon Platonic models as well, such as the method of allegorically
interpreting the names of the gods in the Cratylus and the formulation of teleological
argumentation in the Phaedo and Timaeus. Plato’s myths, moreover, are particularly prominent
models for Plutarch, both in mythic and dialectical passages. Second, Plutarch treats Platonic
interpretation as a distinctive discourse, and appeals to it, either in prima persona or through
characters in dialogues, in parallel to the discourses of mythmaking and interpretation of
religious traditions. Interpretation of Plato, and especially the Timaeus, allows Plutarch and the
characters of his dialogues to construct “likely accounts;” imagistic mythmaking is treated as
another avenue to present “likely accounts,” which are presented in parallel to those of Platonic
interpretation.201
This study is divided into two parts. The first examines two aspects of Plutarch’s
philosophical method, particularly his attitude towards Plato and his principles of interpretation.
Scholars such as Harold Cherniss have explained certain aspects of Plutarch’s philosophy as the
projection of his own religious or philosophical preconceptions back onto the founder of the
Academy. I argue, to the contrary, that Plutarch’s philosophical project is meaningfully based
upon the interpretation of Plato. His attitude towards religion or theology is framed through the
sort of piety Plato articulates, especially in book X of the Leges, while he draws his formulation
of the highest end (telos) of ethics from the idea of the imitation of god insofar as possible for a
human, which is discussed especially prominently in the Theaetetus. Plutarch is continuously
returning to the Platonic dialogues and constantly interpreting Plato’s myths, from the enigmatic
cycles of cosmic disorder in the Politicus narrative to the vast “likely myth” of the world’s nature
and composition in the Timaeus. This exegesis is based on consistent principles, such as that

201

See also Smith (1985).
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Plato is always consistent and best interpreted through other passages in Plato. These related
principles enable to construct a coherent, dialectical discourse of Platonic interpretation, which
he depicts as central to the life of his intellectual circle.
The second part takes Plutarch’s own myths, made in imitation of various Platonic tales,
as case studies. In the eschatological conclusion to De sera numinis vindicta, he presents a
system of eschatological punishment with elements from the Gorgias and the Respublica but
adapts them to the treatment of the incurably wicked from the Phaedo, which is rather unlike
both. The myth strengthens arguments that were made in the rest of the dialogue about the nature
of divine punishment. In the myth that concludes De facie in orbe lunae, Plutarch fashions a
teleological account along lines described and demonstrated in the final portion of the Phaedo,
while incorporating systems of thought from other Platonic dialogues, such as the idea of the
human as a microcosm of the world in the “likely myth” of the Timaeus as well as the role of
intermediates between the divine and the mortal in Diotima’s speech in the Symposium. Rather
than imitating a single Platonic myth in a single dialogue, as scholars from Rudolf Hirzel to
Yvonne Vernière have understood Plutarch’s mythmaking, he brilliantly weaves various
concepts and images from across the Platonic corpus into each.202 The over-determined exoticism
of this myth’s frame, I suggest, is meant to emphasize the hypothetical nature of its central
speeches, which concern the nature of the physical world, about which certainty, for a Platonist,
is impossible—the interlocutors have no choice but to be satisfied with the likely account.
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Vernière (1977) aligns De sera with the myth of Er, De fac. with the Ti., and De gen. with the Phd., in no small
part based on the appearance of Simmias in both (99-100), as does Hamilton (1934: 26). Vernière qualifies,
however, “Ces sources sont loin d’etre les seules, mais elles seront vraisemblablement les lignes de force de notre
analyse” (101). Hirzel (1895) compares the two dialogues more broadly (149-51) but argues on the myths in
particular: “Der attische wie der böotische Sokrates krönen ihr Reden mit einem Mythos und ziehen der
wissenschaftlichen Geltung desselben wohl nicht zufällig die gleichen Grenzen” (150); he compares Phd. 108d with
De gen. 589f (150n1), although Grg. 523a is much closer to Simmias’ disclaimer in De gen.
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Chapter one. Plutarch of Chaeronea: philosopher, theologian, Platonist
The world reflected in Plutarch of Chaeronea’s corpus is one replete with both scholarly
erudition and philosophical zeal. It gleams with the enthusiasm of the blooming phenomenon
traditionally called Middle Platonism.1 Both characters and the author in prima persona discuss
poets, traditional myths, ritual practices, and philosophers from various persuasions, but above
all Plato and the Academy. While Socrates in the Phaedo remarks, “many are the thyrsusbearers, few the true initiates,” the character of Plutarch praises a companion as “one of those
from the Academy, not a thyrsus-bearer but the most inspired celebrant of Plato.”2 In De sera, he
depicts himself beginning a theological speech with an almost hymnic appeal: “but first,
beginning from the caution of the philosophers of the Academy towards the divine as if from an
ancestral hearth, let us acquit ourselves of saying something about these things as if we surely
know it.”3 Plutarch presents himself and many of his characters as Platonists—although he still
uses the language of the Academy rather than the slightly later term “Platonist” 4—in the sense

Although the term “Middle Platonism” serves as a useful shorthand for the period, it has recently attracted
criticism. Gerson (2013), for instance, deems it “basically vacuous” (5), in that he considers philosophers from
Aristotle to Plotinus to all be essentially “Platonists.” It has been deemed misleadingly developmentalistic by BoysStones (2017), but it is still a useful shorthand for ‘a broad sort of Platonic philosophy that arose sometimes during
the life of Cicero and ended sometime after Plotinus.’ Moreschini (2015) provides a useful and broad survey on the
scholarship on Middle Platonism, described as a series of “revolutions” (15-25). A standard account of the broader
issue—e.g. in Merlan (1967)—is that Plutarch, as a Middle Platonist, reflects a stepping away from the skepticism
of Arcesilaus and Carneades and toward Neoplatonic dogmatism. Whittaker (1987) describes a “renaissance of
dogmatic Platonism which undoubtedly took place in the first century B.C.” (81). Similarly, Lakmann (2017): “…
wird die von Arkesilaos begründete skeptizistische Interpretation der Lehren Platons immer mehr in Frage gestellt”
(3). Conversely, the (overly) strong case for Plutarch’s skepticism was made by Schröter (1911). Diogenes Laertius
deems skepticism and dogmatism a major source of disagreement in the interpretation of Plato: “Since there is much
conflict, both those who say he held dogma, and those who say he did not, come on and let us examine the question”
(ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὴ στάσις ἐστὶ καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸν δογματίζειν, οἱ δ᾽ οὔ, φέρε καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν; III.51).
2
οἶσθα γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας οὐ ναρθηκοφόρον ἀλλ’ ἐμμανέστατον ὀργιαστὴν Πλάτωνος (Adv. Col.
1107e-f). Cf. Phd. 69a-b.
3
πρῶτον οὖν ὥσπερ ἀφ’ ἑστίας ἀρχόμενοι πατρῴας τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐλαβείας τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ φιλοσόφων τὸ
μὲν ὡς εἰδότες τι περὶ τούτων λέγειν ἀφοσιωσόμεθα (549e-f). Plutarch characterizes his mode of argument as
“pursuing according to the likely through opinion and hypothesis” (ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ ὑπονοίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς μετιόντας;
549f). See further 549f-50c.
4
Plutarch speaks for example of a “Platonic phrase” (Πλατωνικῆς φωνῆς; Numa XX.6) and a “Platonic character”
(Πλατωνικοῦ χαρακτῆρός; Quaest. conviv. VIII.2.718c), but only describes people as “Academics.” Galen (e.g. In
1
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that they treat Plato as the superlative authority. Plutarch’s approach to Plato—and the approach
he depicts of his intellectual community at large5—is extremely textual. In contrast, the Imperial
Stoics tend to disclaim textual authority from the founders of their school.6 Seneca, for instance,
proudly proclaims his disdain for those who stick to only a single or few favorite philosophers.7
Musonius Rufus, a philosopher who nearly joined Seneca as a Stoic martyr at the hands of Nero,
recommends a simple education, without the use of too many proofs and emphasizing how the
lessons are lived out in daily life.8 Epictetus, his student, mocks those who think that erudition is
the point of education, such as an adulterer who pleas, “but I am a scholar and I know the work
of Archdemus.”9 Plutarch is concerned with deeds as well, but also with the text of Plato in
particular, as reflected by his dialogues, treatises, and particularly the two works dedicated solely

Tim. frg. 6) and Lucian (e.g. Nigr. §2), not long after Plutarch, do speak of people as Platonists, as does whoever
composed the epitome of Plut. De an. proc. (1030d). The significance of the Academy during the Imperial period is
a source of scholarly controversy. See infra pg. 114.
5
The corpus seems to reflect what some Medievalists have dubbed a “textual community,” particularly surrounding
the Ti. See infra pg. 130. Cf. Charalabopoulos (2012).
6
Cornutus could be an exception given his grammatical writings, although he does not cite much in Theol. Graec.,
where he refers to myths, not writers. Cf. Boys-Stones' (2018a) characterization of Roman Stoics as a “textual
community” (9-12). Contrast Numenius’ description of the Epicureans (frg. 24 des Places = Euseb. Praep. evan.
IV.5.3) and Sedley (1998) on Lucretius (62-92), as well as Sextus Empiricus (92-3). See also Cicero on the
authoritativenesss of Pythagoras’ words among the Pythagoreans (Nat. D. I.5.10).
7
“I will show that this was approved by the Stoics as well, not because I affirmed a law for myself to commit to
nothing against the word of Zeno or Chrysippus—because if anyone always follows one person, he is not senator but
a rebellious factionary—but because the matter itself allows me to go into their opinions” (hoc Stoicis quoque
placere ostendam, non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis Chrysippiue committere, sed quia res
ipsa patitur me ire in illorum sentiam, quoniam si quis semper unius sequitur, non in curia sed in factione est; De
otio III.1). Cf. Arr. Epict. diss. II.9.19-20.
8
This is the topic of the first extant Dissertatio, perhaps compiled by a certain Lucius (cf. 19.15 Hense), that
describes him. He concludes: “I say that it is necessary for the teacher, if he is a true philosopher, not to seek to go
through a magnitude of discourses and proofs with students… and to follow them in life. This is the only way that
someone will be improved by philosophy, if harmonious deeds are added to the healthy notions” (φημὶ δεῖν τὸν
διδάσκαλον τὸν φιλόσοφον μὴ λόγων πλῆθος μηδ’ ἀποδείξεων ζητεῖν διεξιέναι πρὸς τοὺς μανθάνοντας… τούτοις
ἐπακολουθεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἔσται τις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὠφελημένος, ἂν οἷς παραδέδεκται λόγοις οὖσιν
ὑγιέσι τὰ ἔργα παρέχηται συνῳδά; 5.3-6.3). Musonius—whom Tacitus describes as studium philosophiae et placita
Stoicorum aemulatus (Hist. III.81.1), although cf. Inwood (2017)—is mentioned twice with praise by Plutarch (frgs.
36-7 Hense), who never mentions Epictetus. On Musonius’ conflict with Nero, see e.g. Philostr. VA IV.46.
9
ἀλλὰ φιλόλογός εἰμι καὶ Ἀρχέδημον νοῶ (II.4.11). In a tract on progress in virtue (περὶ προκοπῆς), he mocks
(ἐμπαίζεις; I.4.10) someone who thinks that virtue is gained by reading a lot of works by Chrysippus (ὁ πολλὰς
Χρυσίππου συντάξεις ἀνεγνωκώς; §6). Cf. §28-9. On Epictetus generally, see especially Long (2002), who
emphasizes the “Socratic” element in his thought.
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to exegesis—a treatise entitled De procreatione animae in Timaeo and the collection of ten
Quaestiones Platonicae, both of which the next chapter examines further.10
Plutarch appeals not only to Plato, however, but also to traditional beliefs about the gods
and their cults.11 The dialogue Amatorius presents his approach as, to at least some serious
extent, dogmatic.12 The occasion of the dialogue, recounted by Plutarch’s son Autobulus, is a
Thespian festival for Eros that Plutarch evidently attended with his newly married wife.13 The
topic eventually turns to the godhood of Eros, whom Pemptides considers an affliction (πάθος)
rather than a god.14 The character of Plutarch berates him for impiety, for disputing “our ancestral
and traditional belief” (ἡ πάτριος καὶ παλαιὰ πίστις).15 Once Pemptides has impeached the
traditionality of one god, he has subjected every god to the same scrutiny, such that there can be

10

The former is divided between two parts: the first concentrates on how the temporal or sequential description of
the composition is to be understood, and what the elements and order of the composition represent; the second is a
series of three examinations, more in the style of the Quaest. Plat., of the mathematical or harmonic section of the
Ti. that follows. Cf. Hartman (1916: 589). The first portion extends through 1012b-27a, but all editors now,
following Müller (1873), accept that 1017c-22e has been transposed in the manuscripts, and belongs after 1027e-f
but before 1027f -30c, the final pages of the manuscript. Dörrie & Baltes (1993) include the relevant Quaest. Plat.
alongside De an. proc. as “Kommentare zum Timaos,” but with the qualification “z. T. in kommentarartiger Form”
(212-3). Cf. Tuominen's (2009) monograph on ancient commentators on Plato and Aristotle: “Plutarch of Athens is
to be distinguished from another, better known Plutarch from Chaeronea, a Platonist in the late first and early second
centuries CE, the author of the lives of eminent men, moral treatises and many smaller philosophical works, some of
which were critical of Stoic philosophy” (33). No mention is made of Plutarch’s exegesis, yet even as minute of an
issue in the Ti as the lack of void, and explication of physical processes that would seem to rely on void such as
various sorts of suction, forms the topic for Quaest. Plat. VII, although the topic might seem to better suit the
Quaest. nat. The Ti. is the second most cited Platonic dialogues in the Plutarchean corpus, as catalogued in
Helmbold & O’Neil (1959: 62-3), behind the Resp. (60-1). Cf. Brouilette & Giavatto (2011) for a list of Platonic
quotations sorted by Plutarchan works. I discuss these works in greater depth in the next chapter.
11
On Plutarch’s theology, see especially Ferrari (1995).
12
See also De Is. 359f-60a.
13
Cf. 748f-9c. The dialogue playfully begins with an allusion to the famous setting of the Phdr. (749a). On the
festival of Eros, the Erotidea, see Graf (2006). Autobulus emerges as a major figure in other works as well. See infra
pg. 135 on his position as an addressee of De an. procr.
14
755e. Pemptides later argues that the gods are to be understood allegorically—Ares, for example, as “he who
orders the passionate and courageous part of us” (ἀποκριναμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεμπτίδου θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν Ἄρην
κοσμοῦντα τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἡμῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶδες; 757c).
15
756b. There is some scholarly debate on what exactly Plutarch means by “belief” (πίστις). Moreschini (1996)
understands it as “fede” which “possiede un ruolo fondamentale” in his thought (46). Kooten (2012), however,
argues that it is fundamentally “non-fideistic” in this passage, as elsewhere. Frazier (2008) characterizes it
somewhere in between, as a “foi philosophique… indémontrés et indémontrables,” which is meant to justify all
belief in the divine (60).
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no secure belief about the gods.16 The subject of Plutarch’s contention is not the general belief in
the gods, their care for humans, or the worth of rituals in general, but rather the reliability of the
Hellenic tradition on the specific content of religion, not the framework in which he understands
it.17 He claims that all knowledge of the gods comes from three sources—the poets, the
philosophers, and the lawgivers18—and appeals to the best (κράτιστοι) of each for the eminence
of Eros—Hesiod, Plato and Solon.19
When Plutarch can marshal copious examples from all three sources—such as he can
with Eros, rising from his cosmological role in the Hesiodic Theogonia to the erotic “madness”
of Plato’s Phaedrus20—he weaves each into a coherent praise of the god, in this case befitting the
occasion and topic of the dialogue. Yet what happens when the sources contradict, as Plutarch
admits they often do?21 Plutarch advises readers of poetry to be selective, taking to heart what
coheres with his ethical and theological assumptions while rejecting what contradicts them.22 The
principles of discernment that allow him to construct a concordant system are, I argue in this

16

756d.
He defends Eros at one point on the grounds that he is “not now requesting his first altar and sacrifice, nor is he a
foreigner from some barbaric superstition, such as some so-called Attises and Adonises” (οὐ γὰρ νῦν αἰτεῖ πρῶτον
βωμὸν ὁ Ἔρως καὶ θυσίαν οὐδ’ ἔπηλυς ἔκ τινος βαρβαρικῆς δεισιδαιμονίας, ὥσπερ Ἄτται τινὲς καὶ Ἀδώνιοι
λεγόμενοι; 756c). He also mentions hermaphroditic celebrants in these non-Greek cults (δι’ ἀνδρογύνων). See also
763c-d on Xenophanes and Egyptian rituals.
18
“Perhaps, friend, of everything we believe, except what comes into our thought through sense perception, derives
its trust from myth, law, and reason. We have as leaders and teachers for the opinion about the gods, then, the poets,
the lawgivers, and third the philosophers: they all hold in common that the gods exists, but they differ greatly with
one another about their hierarchical arrangement, their nature, and their power” (ἴσως μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ὅσα μὴ δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἡμῖν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἥκει, τὰ μὲν μύθῳ τὰ δὲ νόμῳ τὰ δὲ λόγῳ πίστιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ἔσχηκε· τῆς δ’ οὖν περὶ θεῶν δόξης καὶ παντάπασιν ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν ἡμῖν οἵ τε ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ
νομοθέται καὶ τρίτον οἱ φιλόσοφοι, τὸ μὲν [οὖν] εἶναι θεοὺς ὁμοίως τιθέμενοι, πλήθους δὲ πέρι καὶ τάξεως αὐτῶν
οὐσίας τε καὶ δυνάμεως μεγάλα διαφερόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους; 763b-c).
19
763e. See also De Is. 369b.
20
Hesiod: 756f; Plato: 758d-f. He summarizes the movement with an image: “Eros… is crowned, adorned, and
conducted from Helicon into the Academy” (ὁ Ἔρως… ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδήμειαν ἐστεφανωμένος
κατάγεται καὶ κεκοσμημένος; 763e-f).
21
“The three factions thus hold different opinions about the gods. One votes one way, and the others do not easily
accept the vote from the other” (οὕτως αἱ τρεῖς στάσεις αἱ περὶ θεῶν διχοφρονοῦσαι καὶ ψῆφον ἄλλην ἄλλη
φέρουσαι καὶ μὴ δεχόμεναι ῥᾳδίως τὸν ἐξ ἑτέρας…; 763e). He compares the three factions of ancient Athens (τρεῖς
στάσεις Ἀθήνησι, Παράλων Ἐπακρίων Πεδιέων; 763d). On Solon, cf. 769a-b.
22
Plutarch demonstrates this tendency here too in rejecting Eur. frg. 595 Nauck (763f).
17
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chapter, are fundamentally philosophical, rationalistic, and Platonic. In particular, it is based
upon Platonic models, including the strictures of piety outlined in Leges X, the etymological
allegories of the Cratylus, and the idea of the aim of virtue as the imitation of god insofar as is
possible for a human, a concept that appears in several dialogues but especially the Theaetetus
and Timaeus. While Plutarch does turn to traditional myths and rituals, namely the cult of Delphi
and Egyptian religion, he interprets their images and symbols through philosophical
hermeneutics to serve philosophical ends. He might prefer to abide the rituals set by the
lawmakers, perhaps in a similar vein as Cicero’s Cotta, but, should conflict arise, one faction will
ultimately prevail in Plutarch’s thought: the philosophers.23
A massive strain of scholarship, however, stretching from 19th century Quellenforschung
to more recent standard accounts such as John Dillon’s, seek to explain Plutarch’s philosophical
positions through the influence of “Eastern” religions. 24 In particular, Persian or Zoroastrian
influence is often held to be Plutarch’s impetus for a certain cosmological “dualism.”25 Philip
Cotta affirms that he “accepts the opinions about the gods which we received from the ancestors; I will defend the
rites, celebrations, and obligations” (… opiniones quas a maioribus accepimus de dis inmortalibus, sacra
caerimonias religionesque defenderem; III.2.5). From Balbus, since he is a philosopher, on the other hand, he
requires an account (a te enim philosopho rationem accipere debeo religionis; III.2.6).
24
This approach is particularly prominent in the scholarship on Plut. De fac. See infra pg. 316.
25
Dillon (1977): “Plutarch, as in all probability Ammonius before him, seems to have been stimulated in his
interpretation of Plato (as perhaps was Plato himself in making the suggestion) by a study of Persian religion. At De
Is. 396E, he bestows high praise on Zoroastrian theology, referring to it as the ‘opinion of the majority of the wisest
men’” (203). De an. proc., moreover, includes a brief survey of names for dual principles, namely Empedocles’ love
and strife, Heraclitus’ harmony, Parmenides’ light and dark, Anaxagoras’ mind and the unlimited, and “Zoroaster
god and daemon, calling the former Oromasda and the latter Areiman” (1026b; cf. “Zaratas” in 1012e, and the list in
De Iside 369d-71a). Cf. Zaehner (1961: 123-5). Most of the scholarly claims concern, as Alt (1993) labels it a
“dualismus in der Deutung des Kosmos.” Thévenaz (1938), for instance, deems Plutarch a Manichean: “passionraison, il va défendre une sorte de dualisme manichéen pour lequel, avec un éclectisme assez facile, il cherchera
appui à la fois dans la tradition philosophique et mythologique et dans les œuvres littéraires” (85). See also
Froidefond (1987: 215-24), Dillon (2011), O’Brien (2015: 97-105), and Cacciatore (2016: 66-8). Chlup (2000),
however, argues that it cannot, at least, be a dualism of two equal gods. Roig Lanzillotta (2011) discusses the issue
in terms of Gnosticism and surveys the scholarship for that identification but concludes “for most of Plutarch’s socalled Gnosticizing views there is always a precedent in Greek philosophy, mainly in Plato and Aristotle, and that
Plutarch’s interpretation has often parallels [sic] in the context of Middle Platonism” (416). Cf. Nilsson (1948):
“Iranian dualism moves in this world, Greek dualism between this world and the supersensuous one… The origin of
Greek dualism is not in the doctrine of Zarathustra concerning the contest between good and evil in the world, but in
Plato’s doctrine of the antithesis between the perishable and changeful world of phenomena and the eternal and
higher world of the Forms” (137).
23
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Hardie, in what is still the standard account of Plutarch’s interpretation of myth, recognizes the
coerciveness of his attitude to traditional stories, “which, an inevitable and central feature of
Greek culture, nevertheless must adapt itself to the prior claims of religion in the field of piety
and of philosophy in the field of rational inquiry.”26 He takes religion, however, to be “eventually
more important for Plutarch” based on a description of Cleombrotus’ aims in De defectu
oraculorum—“he composed a history to serve as the material for a philosophy that aims toward
theology, as he called its end.”27 This line culminates in the only book-length study on Plutarch’s
myths, Yvonne Vernière’s 1977 Symboles et mythes dans la pensée de Plutarque.28 She
particularly emphasizes the role of the mysteries, which she thinks shapes Plutarch’s approach to
myth, including Platonic myth.29 I argue, however, that Roger Miller Jones, who presented the
first systematic investigation of Plutarch’s approach to Plato with his 1916 dissertation book,
indicatively entitled The Platonism of Plutarch, presented a fundamentally sounder approach. He
concludes, after surveying other possible influences, “we find the point of view in Plutarch’s
philosophical works uniformly that of a Platonist, and whatever elements have been added from
other sources, are not incompatible with his interpretation of Plato.”30 The nature of Platonism, of

1992: 4743-4. He bases his interpretation of Plutarch’s conception of myth by comparison with the mysteries, not
just in their obscurity and requirement of interpretation: “A particular link is forged in the case of myths yielding a
spiritual, eschatological interpretation that coincides with instruction in the mysteries concerning the afterlife”
(4745). Cf. Heath (2013): “In Plutarch’s view, therefore, the myth of Isis and Osiris and its associated religious
rituals are symbolic expressions of the deepest truths of religion, which are also the most advanced truths of
philosophy. It is clear why this dimension of Plutarch’s thinking is not in evidence in How to Read Poetry: these
deep truths are not appropriate for young people who have not yet begun their philosophical studies” (126).
27
… συνῆγεν ἱστορίαν οἷον ὕλην φιλοσοφίας θεολογίαν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκάλει τέλος ἐχούσης (410b).
28
Vernière is the standard account of Plutarch’s use of philosophical myth, and hence the only citation in Hardie
(1992), the standard account of his interpretation of myth.
29
Cf. De tran. an. 477d: ὧν τὸν βίον μύησιν ὄντα καὶ τελετὴν τελειοτάτην.
30
1916: 9. Jones studied with the seminal Plato scholar Paul Shorey at the University of Chicago and spent most of
his career at the University of California at Berkeley, where he taught Harold Cherniss, who in turn published
prominently on Plato and Plutarch. See Tarán (2001: 668-9).
26
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course, is increasingly contested31—does it mean inheriting part of the Neo-Pythagorean tradition
from Alexandria? or the Stoics, or any of a number of religious traditions? Against these sorts of
interpretations, I hold, George Boys-Stones offers a crucial correction: it is a return to the
authority of Plato specific to the intellectual culture of the early Roman Empire.32
For Plutarch, moreover, religion is fundamentally rationalistic and based on consistent
principles about the goodness of the divine, rather than broken into rational philosophy and
faithful revelation. As Robert Flacelière argues, Plutarch refers to “la véritable théologie, celle
qui est conforme à la raison.”33 Rather than bending philosophy to religion, traditional religious
materials such as myth provide the material to further support the assumptions of Platonic
metaphysics, the highest part of philosophy. Although Plutarch betrays a sense of pious
deference concerning specific aspects of religion, such as the names of the gods and the
traditional form of rituals, the models he draws from Plato’s approach to religion and tradition
allow him to maintain a broader framework of pious skepticism. He finds truth in mysterious or
scandalous things and anchors tradition, as understood through philosophy, to his conception of
the highest ethical ends.
In the first section, I argue that Plutarch develops a sense of philosophical piety as an
intermediate stage between superstition and atheism, which is modeled especially after the

31

Much of the scholarship traces the emergence of Platonism to either the Stoic Posidonius, the Academic
Antiochus, or the Neopythagorean Eudorus, all in the first century B.C.E., but Boys-Stones (2001) persuasively
argues that it is a distinctively Imperial phenomenon. Some general surveys have begun to recently treat Plutarch as
the earliest figure, such as Kenny (2004: 111-2). On Antiochus and Eudorus, see the survey in the first chapter; on
Posidonius, the fourth.
32
Especially (2001).
33
1974a: 280. He compares De Is. 355c and concludes, “On revient ainsi à ἱστορία, qui fait connaître les traditions
religieuses des différents peuples, et à la φιλοσοφία, qui les interprète sainement pour conduire à la véritable
θεολογία.” Goldschmidt (1950) considers whether θεολογία might mean simply represent “le sens de mythologie” in
line with “que j’ai appelé ailleurs le platonisme populaire,” or, following Dodds, “le sens (aristotélicien) de
métaphysique” (22n5). Cf. Flacelière (1974a: passim; 1974b: 101n2). Cleombrotus, as he points out, expresses
contempt for the Δελφῶν θεολόγοι that literally interpret myths, such as the battle with Pytho, in De def. or. 417f-8a.
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Athenian Stranger’s theodicy in book X of the Leges.34 Superstition, as Plutarch depicts it,
conosists in improper attitudes towards the divine, such as fear that evil can come from the
divine or the belief in a mechanistic universe devoid of providential care, such as the Epicurean
worldview. Many scholars, however, detect a tension in Plutarch’s attitude towards religion,
particularly in regard to fear of divine punishment, which he criticizes in De superstitione yet
employs in his own myths such as that of De sera.35 To resolve this apparent disparity, Frederick
Brenk in particular constructs a many-parted developmentalist schema that distinguishes
Plutarch’s skeptical youth from his progressively more pious maturity. Plutarch’s fundamental
assumptions about religion, however, are ultimately rationalistic and Platonic. Even in De
superstitione, the source of much of the controversy, he maintains a pious skepticism. Although
he disclaims the possibility of certainty about what form every aspect of the providential care of
the universe might take, he, like the Athenian Stranger in the tenth book of Plato’s Leges, has no
doubt that the gods exist, care about us, and are not won over through superstitious bribes.
Next, I argue that Plutarch, rather than changing his philosophy to fit religious
preconceptions as some scholars argue, endeavors to show how traditional religious ideas

Cf. Campbell (1898): “A kindred notion had been expressed by Plato himself in ‘Laws’ x.897” (372).
The tension between rationality and irrationality in Plutarch’s thought is central to Beck (1953). Russell (1972)
characterizes Plutarch’s attitude more persuasively: “he belongs to the continuous tradition of Hellenic piety and
Hellenic skepticism…” (83). Barrow (1967), however, goes even farther in characterizing Plutarch’s thought as
sentimental: “Nor must a systematic account of Plutarch’s philosophy be expected, because he was not a systematic
thinker. … Nor can we say that, since he was a Platonist, we can fill in the gaps for him from our knowledge of
Platonism; for he was indeed an admirer of some aspects of Platonism, but he did not adopt the whole of it. … What
he borrowed he used together in the crucible not of thought but of feeling. If we put to him a problem of religion or
ethics, he could tell us what views on it the philosophers had held, and he would give us his own judgment; his
judgment would be informed and enlightened by his knowledge of philosophy, but it would spring ultimately from
his own right feeling in the matter; it would not be derived from any closely articulated ethical theory which he had
worked out for himself” (72-3). Russell’s idea of Plutarch’s unity of skepticism and piety is more sensible. Cf.
Barrow (1967): “he meant that Reason, working on the accumulated knowledge and experience of men, will conduct
a seeker up the steps towards and understanding of God and his Goodness; from that point Reason can take him no
further; direct knowledge of God and communion with his spirit is for God and the soul” (76). See also Goldhill
(2002): “Firmly avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of religious and philosophical error, the reader’s synkritic
judgement, guided by reading Plutarch, leads to the grail of an educated, cultural self-control – the achievement of
being Greek, with Plutarch” (280).
34
35
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corroborate the insights of Plato. Although he uses several methods of interpretation,
etymological allegory is a particularly prominent feature, which is used to show how ancient
traditions signify intellectual or ontological truths. Isis, for example, “is a Greek word,” which
Plutarch derives from εἰδέναι, to know—“as the name indicates, nothing is more appropriate to
her than knowing and knowledge.”36 This allows him to hymn the intellective qualities of the
goddess and to present philosophy as a life of searching out such knowledge. Gwyn Griffiths
compares Plutarch’s etymological interpretations with nearly contemporary Stoic allegorists such
as Cornutus and it is possible that Plutarch is at least in part spurred to allegory by competition
with the Stoics.37 The Platonist, however, treats Stoic interpretations as narrowly physical.
Plutarch does present possible interpretations of the physical world in De Iside, but he ultimately
rejects them in favor of intellective or ontological understandings. Plato’s Cratylus, I argue,
provides both a broader model for both cross-linguistic etymological inquiry and many examples
of such derivations, which more closely resemble the examples that Plutarch emphasizes most
authoritatively.38 He particularly investigates elements of the cult of Apollo at Delphi and
Egyptian religion in this way.39 Plutarch presents the puzzles of ancient institutions and rituals as
spurs to speculation, while subordinating myths, either Greek or foreign, to corroborate Plato.

ὡς τοὔνομά γε φράζειν ἔοικε, παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτῇ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσήκουσαν. Ἑλληνικὸν γὰρ ἡ
Ἶσίς ἐστι καὶ ὁ Τυφών… (351f). He explains Typhon as being hostile (πολέμιος) because he has been “puffed up”
(τετυφωμένος), recalling Plato’s etymological pun in the Phdr. (Τυφῶνος… μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον; 230a). On the
claim of a Greek origin for the name Isis, see Brenk (1999: 230-2) and Richter (2001).
37
1967: 82-3. He especially emphasizes “etymology, a favourite arm of the Stoics” (85), which he holds “Plato
made light of in the Cratylus” (86). Heath (2013) also detects similarities with Stoics such as Cornutus: “But like the
Stoics, Plutarch makes a distinction in principle between the ‘outrageous myths and empty fictions’ of poets and
religious myths and rituals (especially mystery cults) that express deep truths in a symbolic or riddling way” (126).
He sees another similarity in both Cornutus’ and Plutarch’s interest in non-Greek myths (127). Boys-stone (2001)
argues for the influence of Stoic allegory in this period of Platonism generally, but cf. Tarrant's review (2002).
38
See further supra pg. 24.
39
These two traditions evidently had particular significance for Plutarch, perhaps in part for personal reasons. He
discusses his priesthood at Delphi in An seni. 792f and Quaest. conv. VII.2.700e. On the date and evidence for
Plutarch’s priesthood, see Ziegler (1949: 23-6). On the epigraphic evidence for his priesthood, see Casanova (2012).
Stadter (2005) compares the oracle in practice in the Vit. and in theory in the Mor. Plutarch discusses travelling to
36
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Building upon this sketch of Plutarch’s theology, I proceed to characterize his ethical
philosophy, and particularly his prominent appeals to the characteristic Middle Platonic
definition of the aim of virtue as the imitation of god insofar as possible for a human. This
concept, drawn explicitly from Plato, has a particularly expansive significance for Plutarch: in
studying the order visible in the sky, the most manifest physical example of the demiurge’s
ordering of the world, we straighten the motion in our souls; in contemplating and studying, we
imitate the action of the divine intellect; and in seeking after causes we aim after the demiurgic
act itself, insofar as possible for a human. Although Plutarch describes “theology” as the highest
part of philosophy at certain points, the divine is shot through the entirety of his philosophy,
from ethics and physics to the heights of ontology.
I then survey the scholarship on Middle Platonism and its relationship with the other
philosophical schools. Plutarch denounces the Epicureans as pernicious “atheists,” dedicating
three treatises explicitly to polemic as well as centering De sera against them.40 He dedicates

Egypt in De Is. 354d-e and Quaest. conv. V.5.678c. Plutarch’s direct knowledge of Egypt is often estimated to be
low—e.g. by Griffiths (1970)—but cf. Meeusen (2017). Egypt is particularly prominent for Platonism given the
ancient debate over its influence on Plato. The Early Academic Crantor, according to Proclus, claims that Plato was
motivated to write the former by criticisms that he stole his model of government from the Egyptians: “There are
those who say the whole speech about the Atlantians is bare history, such as the first interpreter of Plato, Crantor: he
indeed says that Plato was mocked by men of the time for not inventing his own constitution, but instead taking over
Egyptian things: so much care was taken of the mockers that he transferred the history of the Athenians and
Atlantians over to the Egyptians, and that the Athenians were living then according to that constitution. And he says
that the prophets of the Egyptians bear witness and say that these things are written on Egyptian steles, which as still
preserved” (τὸν περὶ τῶν Ἀτλαντίνων σύμπαντα τοῦτον λόγον οἳ μὲν ἱστορίαν εἶναι ψιλήν φασιν, ὥσπερ ὁ πρῶτος
τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητὴς Κράντωρ· ὃς δὴ καὶ σκώπτεσθαι μέν φησιν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τότε, ὡς οὐκ αὐτὸν ὄντα τῆς
πολιτείας εὑρετήν, ἀλλὰ μεταγράψαντα τὰ Αἰγυπτίων· τὸν δὲ τοσοῦτον ποιήσασθαι <τὸν> τῶν σκωπτόντων λόγον,
ὥστε ἐπὶ Αἰγυπτίους ἀναπέμψαι τὴν περὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀτλαντίνων ταύτην ἱστορίαν, ὡς τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ
ταύτην ζησάντων ποτὲ τὴν πολιτείαν· μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ προφῆταί φησι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἐν στήλαις ταῖς ἔτι
σῳζομέναις ταῦτα γεγράφθαι λέγοντες; In Tim. I.75.30-6.10). On Proclus’ possible sources for Crantor, see Tarrant
(2007: 168n307). Cf. Plut. Amat. 764a-b. Colotes, also according to Proclus, claims that Plato stole the myth from a
work he attributes to Zoroaster, entitled On Nature (περὶ φύσεως), apparently with an introduction (προοίμιόν) is
reminiscent of the myth of Er (II.109.14-16). Wiener (2004) takes this criticism to motivate the character Plutarch’s
choice of Protogenes as his intermediary for the De Sera myth: “die Gewährsleute sind vertrauenerweckend und
gehören zu Plutarchs Bekanntenkreis” (59), citing Amat. 763d. Stausberg (2007), on the other hand, discusses
Colotes’ attribution of the myth of Er to Zoroaster and Proclus’ response (188), and usefully compares Clement’s
testimony (187).
40
I discuss Plutarch’s polemics against the Epicureans, and Colotes in particular, in the third chapter.
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three works to explicit refutation of the early Stoics, argues against their physics in De facie, and
takes various opportunities to swipe at central parts of the philosophy.41 Particularly, he objects
that Stoics end up attributing everything, including evil, to providence.42 He is usually less
overtly hostile to Aristotle, but distinguishes his concepts from Plato’s rather than adopting these
concepts and terminology as some Middle Platonists do.43 Many scholars characterize various of
Plutarch’s positions, however, as being shaped by interactions and polemic with Stoics,
Aristotelians, or Neopythagoreans, such that his positions are determined to whatever extent by
these schools. Although these schools might have some saliency in Plutarch’s motivations, little
in what results is un-Platonic. I suggest, rather, that he is consciously returning to Plato, as well
as, to a lesser extent, the Academic Xenocrates, as he sometimes portrays himself.44 Plutarch
emerges as an engaged defender, interpreter, and imitator of Plato, willing to draw on subsequent
Academics but always returning to the dialogues.

41

De Stoicorum repugnantiis, Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere, De communibus notitiis aduersus Stoicos; on De
facie, see further infra pg. 316, especially on Posidonius.
42
“Introducing evil from non-existence without cause and without generation…” (τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος
ἀναιτίως καὶ ἀγενήτως ἐπεισάγοντας; De an. proc. 1015b). Similarly, he argues that “if it is natural for nothing to
come about without cause, and if the good could not provide a cause of evil, then it is necessary for nature to bear
the proper origin and source of evil, as of good” (εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τἀγαθὸν
οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίον καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν; De Is. 369d). See also 369a
and Cicero’s conclusion for Cotta’s refutation of the Stoics (Nat. D. III.39.92-3).
43
Cf. particularly Alcinous and Apuleius, on whom see further infra pg. 104. Plutarch’s approach to
Neopythagoreans is perhaps similar.
44
He presents Xenocrates as developing the Ti. in important ways which he follows, such as in the role of
intermediate objects in the cosmology of the De fac. myth. See infra pg. 306. On hermeneutics, however, Plutarch
criticizes the Academic’s interpretation of the composition of the world soul in the Ti. at length in De proc. an. See
infra pg. 136. See also Brenk (2017: 46-8, 55). Plutarch cites Xenocrates rather often and provides many testimonies
(nos. 6-7, 18, 28, 32-5, 37-41, 47, 60-3, 68, 71, 73-4, 79 Dorandi), and his influence is detected further in Plutarch’s
metaphysics, such as by Krämer (1964: 93-101). Dillon (1999) draws attention to Plutarch’s lack of concern with the
other prominent Early Academics, Speusippus and Polemon, as well as later Academics (305, cf. Cic. IV.1-3).
Dillon suggests this is partly because Xenocrates was “the true systematiser of Platonic doctrine” but more
importantly his “concern with the harmony of the cosmos as a structure put together from diametrical opposites, and
with the various agencies that preside over this harmony” (305-6). Cf. Heinze (1892): “denn er legt, offenbar seinem
Autor folgend, den ganzen Mythus den Dämonen des Kronos in den Mund, schreibt diesen aber hervorragende
litterarische Bildung zu, indem er sie Platon und Xenokrates citieren lässt” (126).
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Finally, I return to the issue of Plutarch’s assessment of the relationship between dialectic
and myth, which will be a recurrent theme throughout the rest of the study. There is a substantial
line of scholarship that holds, however, that Plutarch’s philosophical myths somehow transcend
the limits of logical or dialectical discourse, which is rooted in the idea of the mysteries. 45 Rainer
Hirsch-Luipold, in a companion article dedicated to Plutarch and religion, for instance, argues
that the “original creations of Plutarch lead the reader in a visionary way into a realm that is
impenetrable to descriptive discourse: the world of the divine and the hereafter.” While logical
discourse cannot reach “the realm of pure truth,” Hirsch-Luipold argues, mythic narratives
uniquely allow Plutarch a way of “transcending the realm of the corporeal.”46 Logos and mythos
differ for Plutarch in important respects, as they do for Plato—for example, myth tends to be told
by the old to the young, it is noted for its pleasurability, but also lesser precision47—yet both can,
at best, only constitute a “likely account.”48 Plutarch’s conception of a parallel relationship
between imagistic mythmaking and dialectical interpretation, itself drawn from Plato, is
especially apparent in the debate on many worlds in De defectu. His continuous return to Plato
for models and frameworks, however, is evident throughout his thought, whether in theology,
hermeneutics, or ethics.

One motivation is probably the similar line of scholarship in the scholarship on Plato’s myths. See supra pg. 12.
2014: 172-3. He cites, for instance, De sera 563b, yet the passage does not present the myth as certain. Rather,
Olympichus smiles (διαμεδιάσας) and playfully jeers the character of Plutarch, “we do not praise you, lest we seem
to let you pass by the myth, on the grounds that the speech is sufficient for the explanation. Rather, we will give our
decision whenever we hear these things also” (οὐκ ἐπαινουμέν σε... ὅπως μὴ δόξωμεν ἀφιέναι τὸν μῦθον, ὡς τοῦ
λόγου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλὰ τότε δώσομεν τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὅταν κἀκεῖνον ἀκούσωμεν). See also De
def. or. 418c: “but if something should partake in truth…” (εἰ δ’ ἀληθείας τι μετέχει…).
47
Smith (1986) elucidates a list, “probably not exhaustive,” of distinct philosophical functions that myth might play
for Plato, including helping to “keep the dialogues ‘undogmatic,’” “shifting one’s attention from the World of
Becoming to ‘worlds beyond,’” and drawing “together many of the concerns and images of the dialogue as a whole”
(21). See also Kahn (1996: 67).
48
There is little indication that Plato believes transcendental certainty is attainable for humans, at least in this
embodied life. Cf. Phdr. 273e-4a.
45
46
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Atheism, superstition, and philosophical piety
Many have approached Plutarch’s philosophy as a religious philosophy in particular,
sometimes rendering it a sort of mirror for different dispositions over time.49 The Byzantine
scholar John Mauropous, the teacher of Michael Psellus, composed an epigram in prayer for
Plato and Plutarch, whom he seems to consider the pagans to have come closest to the Christian
truth.50 Ralph Waldo Emerson confesses in the introduction to Goodwin’s multi-volume
translation of Plutarch that he found “a more sweet and reassuring argument on the immortality
than in the Phaedo of Plato; for Plutarch always addresses the question on the human side, and
not on the metaphysical.”51 Charles William King, eighteen years after a study of Gnostic
occultism and the history of its influence up to contemporary Freemasons, published selected
dialogues of Plutarch as “Theosophical Essays.”52 E. R. Dodds, however, contrasts the decadent
and superstitious “new religious attitude” of the second century C.E. with Plutarch’s adherence
to “the traditional Greek belief in a rational world-order, wherein men and gods have each their
appointed stations.”53

E.g. Hani (1976): “… c’est comme philosophe, comme penseur religieux et come théologien que Plutarque retient
l’attention” (7). On the reception of Plutarch more generally, see Goldhill (2002: 246-93).
50
“An epigram for Plato and Plutarch. If you want some of the others to spared from what you threaten, my dear
Christ, would that you spare for me Plato and Plutarch. For both were by nature most fit for your laws, both in word
and character” (Ἐπίγραμμα εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Πλούταρχον. εἴπερ τινὰς βούλοιο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων / τῆς σῆς ἀπειλῆς
ἐξελέσθαι, Χριστέ μου, / Πλάτωνα καὶ Πλούταρχον ἐξελοίο μοι· ἄμφω γὰρ εἰσι καὶ λόγον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον / τοῖς
σοῖς νόμοις ἔγγιστα προσπεφυκότες; XLII.987-91, PG 120.1150 Minge). See further Whittaker (1981: 61) and
Mossman (2014) on Dryden (592-3). Cf. Dillon (1977): “His views on the origin of the world became a notorious
heresy for the Neoplatonists, all the worse for its resemblance to the doctrine of the Christians…” (230).
51
1878: ix-x, specifically citing Con ad uxor. and Non posse. He compares Plutarch’s religiosity to Montaigne (xii)
and Geothe (xi). Emerson’s friend, the poet and scholar Arthur Clough, lavished much attention on the Moralia as
well in his introduction to the Vitae (1859: e.g. xxii-viii) to characterize his philosophical outlook: “His mind in his
biographic memoirs is continually running on the Aristotelian Ethics and the high Platonic theories, which formed
the religion of the educated population of his time” (xxvii). According to Richard (2014), however, Emerson’s
knowledge of and preference for the Moralia is unparalleled in early America (607-8).
52
1864, 1882. His next work (1888) was a collection surrounding Julian’s “theosophical essays.” Plutarch’s De Is. is
a key source for the foundational theosophic text, Blavatsky (1877: e.g. 65-7).
53
1933: 102. Dodds’ conception of the history of Greek religion is influenced by Murray’s (1925) postulation of a
Hellenistic “failure of nerve.” See also Smith's (1978) categories of “locative” and “utopian” religion (e.g. 185-9). In
his youth, Dodds wrote poetry in a more mystic vein, such as “The Moon-Worshippers” (1919).
49
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Some scholars, however, detect a tension in Plutarch’s work, especially between his
mythic dialogues, which, like some of Plato’s, imagistically depict the journeys of the soul after
death, including sights of the punishments of the wicked, and the treatise De superstitione.54 The
latter laments, among other things, that the superstitious fear absurd punishments after death. The
contradiction, however, is only ostensible: Plutarch grounds his depictions of afterlife
punishment in his view of the goodness of divine providence, which would only carry out just
punishments; the superstitious, in contrast, fear morally arbitrary punishments, which the
goodness of the world would not allow. Plutarch develops his conception of pious philosophy as
a sort of middle ground, as he puts it, between atheism and superstition. Although some scholars
detect changes in his attitude toward religion over time, I argue that this he is broadly consistent
in how he understands providence, religion, and leading life in accordance to the
characteristically Middle Platonic idea of the imitation of god. This reflects a conception of piety
that is best understood through Plato’s own attacks on atheism and superstition, which is
reflected in Adeimantus’ critique of poetic education in book II of the Respublica, but
systematically deployed in the Athenian Stranger’s denouncements in book X of the Leges.
In De superstitione, Plutarch similarly takes aim at two vices: irrational fear of the divine
and atheistic materialism. He contrasts “someone who thinks that atoms and void are the
elements” (ἀρχὰς)—that is to say, an Epicurean, who has a “false belief” but one that does not
necessarily entail wild and disordered passions—with the self-inflicted miseries of a

I refer to De superst. as a treatise, but there is a trend in the scholarship of reading it as a “diatribe,” usually
related to a “Cynico-Stoic” tradition, such as Moellering (1962: 21-6) and Smith (1975: 7-8). More generally,
Russell (1968) lists generic characteristics—“Analogies, direct speech, asyndeton, quotations”—but suggests that
Plutarch added “the play of allusion and comparison, the wide and well-chosen vocabulary, the mastery of the
periodic style” (140). The generic distinction in De Superst. is not relevant for this discussion, but another way of
resolving the apparent tension in Plutarch’s ideas was to suppose that one set of ideas, not sincerely held by
Plutarch, were taken over from his sources, as e.g. Erbse (1952) argues: “Dem Kern der Abhandlung liegt aber eine
kynische Diatribe zugrunde” (299).
54
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superstitious man (δεισιδαίμων).55 The latter is so miserable that he finds sleep, which is so
soothing for most, to be completely miserable because superstition fills his dreams with ghosts,
apparitions, and tormenting punishments.56 While others are able to dismiss these dreams of
undeserved punishments through mockery and reason, the superstitious man seeks out exotic and
ecstatic ritual experts and does anything they say57—not unlike Theophrastus’ portrait of “the
superstitious man.”58 We must escape superstition, Plutarch concludes, but take caution: “some
thus flee superstition but fall into equally savage atheism, leaping over the piety that lies in
between.”59 Atheism is clearly treated as a formidable risk in the treatise, which perhaps explains
why the Lamprias catalogue, an ancient list of Plutarch’s works, lists the title “On Superstition
Against Epicurus.”60
ἀτόμους τις οἴεται καὶ κενὸν ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων· ψευδὴς ἡ ὑπόληψις, ἀλλ’ ἕλκος οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδὲ σφυγμὸν οὐδ’
ὀδύνην ταράττουσαν (164e-f).
56
“Slaves forget their masters when they sleep, sleep lightens the chains of prisoners, and the inflammations around
wounds and brutal ulcers of flesh and excessive pains of sleepers are removed: ‘dear charm of sleep, helper against
sickness, how sweetly you come to me in need.’ Superstition does not allow one to say this (for it alone does not
make peace with sleep, nor does it allow the soul to regain breath and courage and to thrust away the bitter and
heavy opinions about the divine), but it rouses the horrible phantoms and monstrous apparitions and some
punishments in the sleep of the superstitious as if in a place of the unholy, and it distresses the unhappy soul and
banishes the dreams from sleep, whipped and flogged by itself as if by another, and receives strange and portentous
ordinances” (οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπιλανθάνονται καθεύδοντες, τοῖς πεδήταις ἐπελαφρύνει τὸν δεσμὸν ὁ ὕπνος,
φλεγμοναὶ περὶ τραύματα καὶ νομαὶ σαρκὸς θηριώδεις καὶ περιωδυνίαι κοιμωμένων ἀφίστανται· “ὦ φίλον ὕπνου
θέλγητρον ἐπίκουρον νόσου, / ὡς ἡδύ μοι προσῆλθες ἐν δέοντί γε” [Eur. Or. 211-2]. τοῦτ’ οὐ δίδωσιν εἰπεῖν ἡ
δεισιδαιμονία (μόνη γὰρ οὐ σπένδεται πρὸς τὸν ὕπνον, οὐδὲ τῇ ψυχῇ ποτε γοῦν δίδωσιν ἀναπνεῦσαι καὶ
ἀναθαρρῆσαι τὰς πικρὰς καὶ βαρείας περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας ἀπωσαμένῃ), ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀσεβῶν χώρῳ τῷ ὕπνῳ τῶν
δεισιδαιμόνων εἴδωλα φρικώδη καὶ τεράστια φάσματα καὶ ποινάς τινας ἐγείρουσα καὶ στροβοῦσα τὴν ἀθλίαν ψυχὴν
ἐκδιώκει τοῖς ὀνείροις ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, μαστιζομένην καὶ κολαζομένην αὐτὴν ὑφ’ αὑτῆς ὡς ὑφ’ ἑτέρου, καὶ δεινὰ
προστάγματα καὶ ἀλλόκοτα λαμβάνουσαν; 165e-f).
57
“When they rise and do not dismiss or mock it, nor realize that not one of the rousing things was true, but cannot
flee any evil shadow of deceit that bears a dream, and trick and waste time and consume themselves, finding
begging priests and witches…” (εἶτ’ ἐξαναστάντες οὐ κατεφρόνησαν οὐδὲ κατεγέλασαν, οὐδ’ ᾔσθοντο ὅτι τῶν
ταραξάντων οὐδὲν ἦν ἀληθινόν, ἀλλὰ σκιὰν φεύγοντες ἀπάτης οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐχούσης ὕπαρ ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ
δαπανῶσι καὶ ταράττουσιν, εἰς ἀγύρτας καὶ γόητας ἐμπεσόντες…; 165f-6a).
58
δεισιδαίμων (Char. XVI). It begins, “superstition would certainly seem to be cowardice in the face of the divine”
(ἀμέλει ἡ δεισιδαιμονία δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι δειλία πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον; §1). See also Adeimantus in Pl. Resp. II.364b5a.
59
οὕτω γὰρ ἔνιοι φεύγοντες τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς ἀθεότητα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπηδήσαντες
ἐν μέσῳ κειμένην τὴν εὐσέβειαν (171f). He compares people fleeing from danger heedless tumbling down a pit or a
cliff (171e-f).
60
Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον (no. 155). On the Catalogue, see Ziegler (1951: 696-702) or, more
summarily, Lamberton (2001: 22). Allegations of secret atheism are common against Epicurus, such as Cotta’s in
55
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Superstition, however, leads to irrational fear of what we should feel the most love
towards—the gods. The superstitious man, Plutarch argues, especially fears punishment after
death, which can even extend to eternal torment:
Why is it necessary to speak at length? “Death is the limit of life for humans”—but not
limit of superstition, which extends the boundaries beyond life, making fear longer than
life and attaching thought of undying evils to death—even when things begin to cease,
superstition makes it seem that the ones that do not cease are beginning. The high gates
of Hades lie open, and rivers of fire are mixed together with branches of Styx, the
darkness is filled with some phantoms of much fantasy, which inflict hard sights and
pitiable sounds, and there are judges and punishers and chasms and nooks full of a
million evils. Ill-fated superstition does not realize it subjects itself to awful things of
every sort by its excessive caution about everything that seems awful.61
Plutarch uses traditional images of the underworld to emphasize how fearsome everything and
every place is to the truly superstitious, but his argument is not against all kinds of fear of
afterlife punishment. He specifies fears of eternal torments for scrutiny.62 Plutarch’s idea of
divine vengeance is based on a curative conception of punishment, which is beneficial for the
person suffering the punishment, with some distinct end. The sort of punishment the
superstitious fear, however, is purely retributive and not at all curative: this implies that the gods
could act amorally or even unjustly, which is an unacceptable and disastrous premise in
Plutarch’s eyes.63 Grievous superstition, he argues, completely undoes this deeply held

Cic. Nat. D.: “This is because your Epicurus does not seem to put up a good fight concerning the immortal gods. He
surely does not dare to deny that the gods exist, lest he stumble into hatred and punishment” (quia mihi uidetur
Epicurus uester de dis inmortalibus non magnopere pugnare: tantum modo negare deos esse non audet ne quid
inuidiae subeat aut criminis; III.1.3).
61
τί δεῖ μακρὰ λέγειν; “πέρας ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάνατος” (Dem. XVIII.97), τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας
οὐδ’ οὗτος, ἀλλ’ ὑπερβάλλει τοὺς ὅρους ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ζῆν, μακρότερον τοῦ βίου ποιοῦσα τὸν φόβον καὶ
συνάπτουσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀθανάτων, καὶ ὅτε παύεται πραγμάτων, ἄρχεσθαι δοκοῦσα μὴ παυομένων.
Ἅιδου τινὲς ἀνοίγονται πύλαι βαθεῖαι, καὶ ποταμοὶ πυρὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ Στυγὸς ἀπορρῶγες ἀνακεράννυνται, καὶ σκότος
ἐμπίπλαται πολυφαντάστων εἰδώλων τινῶν χαλεπὰς μὲν ὄψεις οἰκτρὰς δὲ φωνὰς ἐπιφερόντων, δικασταὶ δὲ καὶ
κολασταὶ καὶ χάσματα καὶ μυχοὶ μυρίων κακῶν γέμοντες. οὕτως ἡ κακοδαίμων δεισιδαιμονία τῇ περιττῇ πρὸς ἅπαν
τὸ δοκοῦν δεινὸν εὐλαβείᾳ λανθάνει ἑαυτὴν ὑποβάλλουσα παντοίοις δεινοῖς (166f-7a).
62
See infra pg. 225.
63
Dale (2009) similarly argues that Plutarch insists “that fear of gods and daimons is impious because it attributes
shameful behavior and emotions to divine beings, who because they are superior to human beings cannot be inferior
morally” (97). He also discusses the foreignness Plutarch stresses on excessive ritual throughout the treatise (94-97).
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assumption and makes people “believe that the good is evil.”64 These punishments have no
ethical benefit, and the sort of exotic ritual solutions the superstitious seek do nothing to improve
their moral character or address the real concern of punishment and reward.
Many, however, find the treatise incongruous with the religiosity of the rest of the corpus.
Scholars particularly object that Plutarch ostensibly contradicts himself by dismissing the
punishments that the superstitious fear after death in this treatise yet depicting afterlife
punishments in the Platonizing myths. This led Jacobus Hartman to doubt its authenticity,
although he detected some kindred elements with Plutarch’s thought.65 Morton Smith revives and
strengthens the argument against the treatise’s authenticity, partly on philological grounds, but
largely because it contradicts a number of “his particular beliefs—in divine admonitions, rewards
and punishments, the allegorical significance of myths, and so on.”66 Smith even goes so far as to

ἡ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία πολυπάθεια κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν ὑπονοοῦσα (167e). The superstitious are anxious even where
they should feel the safest: “Do not drag the superstitious man from the shrines: for it is there that he is chastised and
punished” (μὴ ἀπόσπα τὸν δεισιδαίμονα τῶν ἱερῶν· ἐνταῦθα κολάζεται καὶ τιμωρεῖται; 166e-f). In the conclusion to
De tran. an., he contrasts what he takes to be the correct demeanor for every festival, “full of delight and joy”
(εὐθυμίας δεῖ μεστὸν εἶναι καὶ γήθους) with the laments and so on of the many (ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ; 477d).
65
Hartman (1916): “Quisquis fuit qui Plutarchi scripta collegit, hic certe eius mentem bene cognitam habuit. Nihil
enim Plutarcho magis fuit persuasum quam certissimum ire qui medio eat” (112); “… superstitiosum magis etiam
impium esse quam τὸν ἄθεον (169F). Si usquam, ibi Plutarchi vivam audis vocem” (113). Moellering (1962)
strenuously argues for the authenticity of the treatise (particularly contra Hartman in 17n6), and defends against
various charges, such as the “startling preference of atheism” given the vehemence against atheism in De Is. (10614), which he explains as rhetorical exaggeration. On eschatological punishment, he argues that Plutarch accepts it
as a means of moral correction: “One can see why Plutarch, the believer, dare not disperse the supernatural,
including the fear of hell… At the same time it is distressing to suspect that he may be engaged in pious
dissimulation with his myth of Thespesius” (149).
66
The philological arguments (1) largely concern the manuscript and an unusual use of the third person “Plutarch”
in an illustrative argument (170a). Smith’s most weighty philosophical objection is that Plutarch does not distinguish
between benevolent and harmful daemones (3). Dale (2009) argues that the only salient contradiction in the treatise
is between “the things he said about daimons” (93; see further 98-107). Cf. Brenk (2017): “Though M. Smith
recently has had doubts about its authenticity, and his observations should not be dismissed lightly, the ideas and
thought patterns in it are reflected again and again” (22). Russell (1972) rightly rejects this sort of argumentation:
“The… commoner view is that Plutarch changed his mind and became more pious as he grew older, and that
Superstition is an unusually early work. There is no independent argument of this, and it is circular to deduce
difference of date from difference of doctrine. The most probable solution is that we must try to reconcile the two
points of view. Nor is this so difficult after all. The prospect of rewards after death is only a hope; but what is
certain, and removes all cause for panic, is the fairness and goodness of God” (80-1).
64
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characterize the “piety” of the treatise as “Epicurean,” contending that it would better fit
Lucretius than the Plutarch of the rest of the corpus. 67
Developmentalist approaches to the apparent tension, however, are more common. De
superstitione, both because of its content and its rhetorical style, is held to be an “early” work.
Rudolf Hirzel, for instance, presents a narrative of a young, skeptical Plutarch who develops a
sense of piety as he ages.68 Others, such as Konrat Ziegler, deem its rhetorical style and intensity
a marker of early composition.69 Frederick Brenk, although initially arguing that the differences
between the periods were not as stark as many scholars hold, has more recently constructed a
complex, eight-part account of Plutarch’s development. He places the De superstitione—
“puzzling for its criticism of the superstitious practices later tolerated by the author, but meant to
represent a balance between atheism and superstition”—in the second phase, after a youthful
fascination with all things “Pythagorean,” such as vegetarianism and numerology.70 There is

1975: “the gods exist, and men should believe in them, but they are indifferent to human opinion and harm no
one, so the unbeliever is afflicted only by his own blindness” (6). He further compares Lucretius’ “extended,
systematic attack on all forms of the fear of the gods, including fear of retribution after death.” See also Dodds
(1933: 101-2); cf. Boulogne (2003: 18). The attitude toward the good of religion in human life in De superst. is
decidedly un-Epicurean. Compare Lucretius’ description of the rites of the Magna Mater (II.610-60) with De
superst. 169d: “but the pleasantest things for humans are festivals and feasts in the presence of the divine, and
mysteries and rites, and prayers and adoration of the gods (ἥδιστα δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑορταὶ καὶ εἰλαπίναι πρὸς
ἱεροῖς καὶ μυήσεις καὶ ὀργιασμοὶ καὶ κατευχαὶ θεῶν καὶ προσκυνήσεις). Plutarch further laments that the
superstitious are fearful in temples, the last place anyone should be afraid (169e). In Quomodo adul., Plutarch
similarly compares people who fear what is immoral in poetry too much to those that feel dread because of
superstition (ὑπὸ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐν ἱερῷ) in a holy place (26b).
68
1912: “Am stärksten äußert sich diese Skepsis dem höchsten Problem gegenüber, der Frage nach der Natur der
Gottheit; hier wird sie im Gefühl menschlicher Schwäche zur Demut und schlägt in eine der Frömmigkeit nahe
verwandte Stimmung um. Nicht umsonst wird von Plutarch die skeptische Behutsamkeit in der Behandlung
göttlicher Dinge mit demselben Wort bezeichnet (εὐλάβεια), das in der späteren Gräzität ganz allgemein, in der
christlichen wie der heidnischen, die Frömmigkeit bezeichnet;” thus “Plutarch ein frommer Mann geworden” (9).
See also Fox (1987: 95-6); cf. Nikolaidis (1994: 216).
69
1951: “Aber Form und Inhalt erweisen sie als in die Jungendperiode P.s gehörig. Die form ist ausgeprägt
rhetorsich” (826). Cf. van der Stockt (1992): “The chronology of Plutarch’s writings, both absolute and relative, is
another serious problem. For although some clearly bear the stamp of a young and rhetorical author, and others can
be dated to a later stage of his life, the problem is nevertheless so far from a satisfactory solution that it is virtually
impossible to sketch the evolution of Plutarch’s opinions with a sure hand” (11).
70
Tsekourakis (1986) surveys some earlier positions (129). Cf. Harrison (1992): “… the leading middle Stoic
(Seneca) and the middle Platonist (Plutarch), both seminal for the later development and transmission of their
schools of philosophy, avowed neo-Pythagorean doctrines when young, even to the extent that both became
67
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some warrant for the latter. In one rare autobiographical explanation, in the dialogue De E apud
Delphos, Plutarch has Eustrophus urge the young Plutarch to give a numerological argument for
the identity of the letter as “five,” which he, as the older narrator, explains as seriously meant (οὐ
παίζων), because “I was, at the time, obsessively disposed to mathematics, although I would
soon come to honor the ‘nothing in excess’ when I came into the Academy.” 71 Brenk connects
this phase with the vegetarianism of several of Plutarch’s tracts to form the earliest phase before
De superstitione, then places “dialogues with strong eschatological overtones”—such as De sera
and De facie—in the eighth and last phase.72 There is, however, no way to verify any
developmentalistic schema for Plutarch: as Christopher Jones has shown, almost none of the
datable works were composed before 96 C.E., the last twenty-five years or so of his life.73
The tensions that these proposals are meant to ameliorate, however, are only ostensible.
They fail to distinguish between punishments for moral harms, which have a curative effect, and
superstitious punishments that serve no moral purpose, even if they might involve a ritual

vegetarians. There is a palpable, although so-far uncharted, subliminal influence of neo-Pythagoreanism on their
thinking” (4662).
71
ἐπεὶ τηνικαῦτα προσεκείμην τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμπαθῶς, τάχα δὴ μέλλων εἰς πάντα τιμήσειν τὸ “μηδὲν ἄγαν” ἐν
Ἀκαδημείᾳ γενόμενος (387f). Plutarch indeed relates the distinctively Pythagorean identification of male with
oddness and female with evenness (387f-8b), which he claims lead them to call five “marriage” (γάμον οἱ
Πυθαγόρειοι προσεῖπον) because it is the first combination of an even and an odd number (388c). He similarly
describes Ammonius as “holding not the least part of philosophy in mathematics” (οὐ τὸ φαυλότατον ἐν μαθηματικῇ
φιλοσοφίας τιθέμενος; 391e). From this, Whittaker (1969) claims Ammonius “had Pythagorean interests,” bolstered
by the argument that he is Egyptian (188n5-6). Dillon (1977) is more specific: “a fascination with number
symbolism, presumably of a Pythagorean nature, is a part of the intellectual background of the young Plutarch”
(341).
72
2017: 15. Brenk usefully summarizes earlier scholarship (17-24). Boulogne (2003), however, argues against
developmentalist readings that see Plutarch’s De superst. as a young work: “À aucun moment de son existence il n’a
été séduit par leurs thèses. Jamais il ne s’est senti obligé par certains de leurs arguments de remettre en question ses
propres conceptions” (19). Cf. Brenk (1977): “There is, therefore, good reason to maintain that De superstitione is
an early work of Plutarch, but it is probably not as important for the development of his thought as sometimes
believed. At least many sentiments in his later writings which reflect those in De superstitione, suggest that there is
often as much continuity as discontinuity between the later writings and De superstitione. At least, the skeptical,
‘atheistic’ side of the essay has been exaggerated” (14).
73
1966. See also Russell (1968: 134-5). Evidently his biographies of the Caesars, however, were as early as
Vespasian’s reign, as Stadter (2015) argues from their dedication to Florus (67-9).
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oversight or mistake.74 The latter goes against Plutarch’s conception of providence, even as
presented in De superstitione, which seems rooted in the theodicy of Leges X.75 There, although
the rustic interlocutors agree with the Athenian Stranger that atheism should be unthinkable in
the new city, three contentions are laid out to be defended further: the gods exist, the gods care
about us, and the gods cannot be won over (εὐπαραμύθητοι) by sacrifices and prayers as if
bribes.76 Plato describes this three-part theodicy particularly systematically in the Leges, but
these same concerns feature more broadly into his critique of the Greek tradition, such as in
Adeimantus’ criticism of the effect of poetry on education in Respublica II.77 His most
immediate concern is “what the souls of the young should make of it when they hear” traditional
tales of punishment and reward78—whether “spoken by the poets or in ordinary
conversation”79—which culminates in the fear lest they conclude that even the most unjust
should be able to stave off divine punishment by offering some of their ill-gotten gains to
“beggar-priests and seers” who “go to the doors of the rich and persuade them that the retribution
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Moellering (1962) hints at such a distinction but does not develop it further or examine its philosophical impact:
“in De Superstitione we see that the persons terrified by fear are pitiable wretches rather than the criminally inclined
who might profitably be restrained by dread of punishments to come” (151n203). Vernière (1977), in contrast,
distinguishes what she takes to be Plutarch’s late works from “De superstitione, le De audiendis poetis ni le De
latenter vivendo, qui stigmatisaient sans nuances les aspects terrifiants de la mythologie…” (40).
75
Clinias tells the stranger how he would appeal to atheists to desist their disbelief: “first then the earth and the sun
and stars and everything and the careful orderings of the seasons: and that all, both Greeks and non-Greeks, believe
the gods exist” (πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος ἄστρα τε τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα· καὶ ὅτι πάντες
Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς; 886a). This book forms something of a self-contained episode, if
not a “preface” or even “prefatory hymn” (προοίμιον) to the rest of the long work, in that the characters claim that
the laws will be impotent unless the citizenry believes the gods exist, care about humans, and are unpersuaded by
bribes (887a-c). Cf. Mayhew (2010): “The opening word of the Laws is ‘god’ (theos). The existence and nature of
the gods is of central importance in this dialogue, and the focus of attention is Book 10… arguably the most
philosophically challenging of the dialogue’s twelve books” (197). On the significance of the Leg. for Plato’s
religious thought, see Campbell (1898: 354-60), Kenny (2004: 294-6), and especially Van Riel (2013). Cf. Vernière
(1977: 18-21).
76
888b-c. See also 885b, Eythphr. 14e-5a, and Resp. III.390e. Cf. Meijer (2007: 122-6).
77
See further supra pg. 18.
78
… τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν … (365a).
79
… ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν … (364a).

77
decreed by the gods can be circumvented through pleasurable feasts…”80 He concludes with a
dichotomy:
Surely if there are no gods, or if they do not care about human affairs, then there is no
need for anxiety over eluding their notice. But if they do exist, and they care, we know of
them only through either what we have heard or from those discourses and genealogies of
the poets. They themselves, however, say that we are able to appease and persuade them
with sacrifices and gentle prayers and dedications. We must believe one or the other. If it
is to be believed, we must act unjustly and sacrifice from the unjust profits.81
Adeimantus grounds this argument in an appeal to the authority of traditional myths and argues
that, whatever should turn out to be the truth, it is better to be unjust. The premise that both or
neither must be true, however, is a false dichotomy, as Plato shows by separating the
assumptions in the theodicy of Leges X. That the gods exist, care for us, yet are not susceptible
to bribes are treated as a coherent set of theological precepts. The source for this claim, however,
is not an appeal to the authority of tradition, but philosophy, as represented by the Athenian
Stranger’s complicated cosmological arguments apparently meant to solve the problem of evil.82
Plutarch refers several times, with approval, to the Athenian Stranger’s tripartite set of
requirements for piety.83 The Athenian Stranger rejects superstition, atheism, and deism. Plutarch
reinforces both parts of these contentions in De superstitione. His framing of the atheist is firmly

ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη
θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ’ ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν (364bc).
81
οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τί καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε
καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων
ποιητῶν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν καὶ ἀναθήμασιν παράγεσθαι
ἀναπειθόμενοι, οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. εἰ δ’ οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων
(365e).
82
893b-8c. See Mohr (1978).
83
Plutarch tends to reference Plato’s old age while writing the dialogue, such as before introducing the idea of the
adverse soul in De Is. (370f) and as when he compares his position on the center of the world to that of the
Pythagoreans in the Num. (ταῦτα δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνά φασι πρεσβύτην γενόμενον διανενοῆσθαι…; XI.2). Plutarch is
perhaps spurred by the tradition preserved in Diogenes Laertius that the Leg. were transcribed by Phillip of Opus
and “left on the wax” (ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ; III.37), which would make them Plato’s last dialogue, or by the Stranger’s
explanation that the tirade against atheists was given “youngly” and “most zealously because of my desire to
conquer evil men” (καὶ μὴν εἴρηνταί γέ πως σφοδρότερον διὰ φιλονικίαν τῶν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων… προθυμία μὲν δὴ
διὰ ταῦτα νεωτέρως εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν γέγονεν; X.907b-c).
80
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rooted with Epicureans in mind, who either fall into the category of those who deny the gods or,
more charitably, just deny that they care about humanity.84 Plutarch’s treatment of superstition,
conversely, reflects Plato’s concern over the belief that the gods could be won over by bribes,
even by unjust men. The actions of the divine are based on its providential care, not the ritual
actions of humans. As Plutarch has Solon put it in the Convivium septem sapientium, “the
abstention from eating flesh, as they attribute to the Orpheus of old, is a sophistry rather than an
escape from the unjust things of food; there is only one escape and purification, to come
completely into independent and self-sufficient righteousness.”85 In the Amatorius, Plutarch
depicts his younger self similarly remarking, “it is a good thing indeed, friend, to partake in the
rite at Eleusis; but I see that the fate is better for their celebrants and initiates of Eros.”86 This is
depicted as the life spent in pursuit of wisdom and virtue, conversing and pursuing the beautiful
together—what Plato describes in the Phaedrus as the best sort of pederasty, which Plutarch
warmly extends to the best sort of marriage in the Amatorius.87
84

Cf. Apul. De deo Soc. III.122-3. In later polemic, the Platonist Atticus (frg. 3 = Euseb. Praep. Evang. XV.5)
accuses Aristotle of being as much an atheist as Epicurus, concerning his position on providence stopping at the
moon (§7-8). At least Epicurus was open about his atheism, he concludes (§13-4). On this fragment, see further
Boys-Stones (2016). For Stoic arguments, see Cic. Nat.d. II.1.3 and Meijer (2007) on Cleanthes (59-65).
85
τὸ δ’ ἀπέχεσθαι σαρκῶν ἐδωδῆς, ὥσπερ Ὀρφέα τὸν παλαιὸν ἱστοροῦσι, σόφισμα μᾶλλον ἢ φυγὴ τῶν περὶ τὴν
τροφὴν ἀδικημάτων ἐστί. φυγὴ δὲ μία καὶ καθαρμὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην τέλειος αὐτάρκη καὶ ἀπροσδεᾶ γενέσθαι
(159c).
86
ὅθεν ἀγαθὸν μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τῆς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τελετῆς μετασχεῖν· ἐγὼ δ’ ὁρῶ τοῖς Ἔρωτος μοῖραν οὖσαν
ὀργιασταῖς καὶ μύσταις… (761f-2a). He later develops a metaphor between marital intimacy and initiation further
(ὥσπερ ἱερῶν μεγάλων κοινωνήματα; 769a).
87
Marriage is central to the dialogue. The drama concerns one particularly beautiful young man, the desire of many
men, as well as a wealthy widow that fell in love with him and proposed marriage. The festival becomes a sort of
court between the advocates of pederasty and those of marriage (750a-4e), although in the end the widow succeeds
(754e-5a) and the outraged men comically set out like a war band to assault the door (755a-c, 771d-e). Plutarch was
evidently one of the advocates of marriage (cf. 770c), which he defends by articulating a certain kind of moderate
sexual love as a unifying and integral part of marriage, while Plato, in the Phdr. especially, principally defends a
purely chaste kind of erotic attraction (256a-d). On the latter, cf. Nussbaum (1999: 310-21) and Kraut (2011). Cf.
Resp. III.403b-c. Plutarch, however, integrates erotic love centrally in marriage, although in a distinctively Platonic
way. See Rist (2001). Plato himself, however, was at times extremely critical of traditional marriage. In the Resp.,
Socrates suggests, for the guardian class, that “sacred marriages” (γάμους… ἱεροὺς) be undertaken (apparently
temporarily) at festivals, ostensibly by lot but secretly plotted by the rulers (V.458d-60a), lest jealousy arise. Cf.
Plut. Conj. prae. 141d-f, 767d-e (modifying Plato’s position but still using the distinctive term συντήκειν from Pl.
Symp. 192e). See Grube (1927) on the summary in Ti. 18c-e. In the Leg., the Athenian Stranger declares that “each
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Plutarch does, however, assume that there are good reasons behind religious taboos and
rituals which would match his own sense of Platonic piety, just as he does with much the poetry
of Greek tradition.88 Towards the beginning of De Iside et Osiride—Plutarch’s extensive
exegesis of Egyptian myth and ritual, addressed to Clea, evidently a priestess at Delphi and at
least an initiate in Egyptian cults89—he explains the abstentions of priests as nothing so
surprising or mysterious as some evidently think: “the true cause for all of these things is to be
found in the writing of Plato: ‘it is impermissible for the impure to touch the pure.’” 90 All of the
strangeness of the cult of Isis, shaved heads and all, is rationally comprehensible as different
means to avoid as much contact with corrupting materiality, an idea clear to us as distinctively
Greek and distinctively drawn from the Phaedo, but to Plutarch, universal and manifest to
anyone, Greek or non-Greek, who considers the issue carefully. He assumes that the founders of
pious, non-superstitious rituals similarly instituted their rules for rationally comprehensible
reasons, as the next section argues further.

must seek a marriage that is beneficial to the state, not the most pleasing to himself” (τὸν γὰρ τῇ πόλει δεῖ
συμφέροντα μνηστεύειν γάμον ἕκαστον, οὐ τὸν ἥδιστον αὑτῷ; VI.773b), which means marrying someone of
opposite qualities rather than for wealth or power (773a-e). Punishments are, moreover, set for bachelors past the
age of thirty-five (774a-b). The Stranger praises the principle of legislating private as well as public affairs (778e9c) and indeed lays out a system of public shame and punishment for either having children for too long or failing to
have children, as well as adultery (783d-5b). Erotic desire is thus framed as a potentially disruptive sickness
(νοσήματα) that must be controlled for the public good rather than for personal pleasure (782d-3b, cf. Resp. V.461bc). In the Symp., however, Diotima thematizes procreation as a desire for immortality (208b; cf. 179b-c, 206e-7a,
Leg. VI.773e). Plato’s lack of concern for marriage may have motivated the extremely positive depiction of it at the
end of Xenophon’s Symp. (9.2-7)—a pantomime of the marriage of Dionysus, so moving that “the unmarried swear
to wed” (οἱ μὲν ἄγαμοι γαμεῖν ἐπώμνυσαν) and the married hurry home (§6)—as Thesleff (1978) suggests. The
early Peripatetic Dicaearchus more explicitly and vehemently criticized the Phdr. for sexual vulgarity (ἐπιμέμφεται
ὡς φορτικόν; frg. 42 Wehrli = DL III.38).
88
On his treatment of Homer, see infra pg. 216.
89
364d-e, 351e. See further Griffiths (1970: 253-4 and 430-1). Bowerstock (1965) examines the epigraphic and
prosopographic evidence for Clea in greater detail (267-8). Hani (1976) collects epigraphic evidence for the cult’s
spread to Chaeronea (11n3).
90
ἡ δ’ ἀληθὴς αἰτία μία πάντων ἐστί· “καθαροῦ γάρ,” ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, “οὐ θεμιτὸν ἅπτεσθαι μὴ καθαρῷ” (352d,
quoting Phd. 67b).
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Plutarch is consistently firm, nevertheless, in rejecting both atheism and superstition. In
De Iside, often considered a late work, he formulates piety as a means between these extremes no
less than in De superstitione:91
Hear things about the gods in this way, accepting the myth from pious and philosophical
interpreters, always doing and safeguarding the traditions of the temples, but do not think
that there is any sacrifice nor any pleasing offering you could make than to bear true
opinion about the gods—may you flee superstition, no less an evil than atheism!92
Although Plutarch enjoins the priestess Clea to still perform the traditional rites of the gods, he
has formulated philosophical piety as the highest form of religious dedication. Since the truth is
to be found both in Plato and in tradition, interpretation becomes a crucial form of philosophical
inquiry. As the next section examines, however, the interpretation of traditional religion, when
conducted with this sort of pious skepticism, amounts to reading ancient myths and rituals
through Platonism.

Interpretation and truth shrouded in tradition
Inquiry into the myths and rituals of the past appears throughout Plutarch’s corpus, both
in collections of potential solutions to Platonic quandries and in complex dialogues.93 This
interest often has a philosophical significance because he assumes that the founders of the

In sharp contrast to De superstit., the De Is. is usually considered a late, or even “very late” work, partly based on
prosopographical grounds. Jones (1966) assigns the work to circa 115 (73), one of his latest suggestions.
92
οὕτω δὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν ἀκούσασα καὶ δεχομένη παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγουμένων τὸν μῦθον ὁσίως καὶ φιλοσόφος, καὶ
δρῶσα μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ διαφυλάττουσα τῶν ἱερῶν τὰ νενομισμένα, τοῦ δ’ ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἔχειν περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν οἰομένη
μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς μήτε θύσειν μήτε ποιήσειν κεχαρισμένον, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔλλατον ἀποφεύγοιο κακὸν ἀθεότητος
δεισιδαιμονίαν (355c-d); “there is nothing irrational nor mythic, as some people think, induced into their rights by
superstition, but they bear ethical and practical causes…” (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλογον οὐδὲ μυθῶδες οὐδ’ ὑπὸ
δεισιδαιμονίας, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι νομίζουσιν, ἐγκατεστοιχειοῦντο ταῖς ἱερουργίαις, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰς ἔχοντα καὶ
χρειώδεις αἰτίας…; 353e). See also 378a, cf. 379b-80a. On this idea in both De superst. and De Is., see further
Gasparro (2009: 119-40).
93
The extensive Quaestiones Graecae and Quaestiones Romanae are still extant, but according to the Lamprias
catalogue, he also composed a lost Quaestiones barbaracae (no. 207). There is some allegorical interpretation in
these works—e.g. Quaest. Rom. 52 (277a-c)—but far less than in Plutarch’s Delphic or Egyptian inquiries.
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ancient rituals had good—Platonic—reasons for what they did.94 His interpretations evidently
endeavor to show how the ancient religious founders preempted Plato’s ideas in the rituals and
symbols they instituted.95 Antiquarian research and interpretation provides him a way of both
corroborating Plato and proving the coherence of traditional wisdom, as he is formulating it—an
impulse shared with the middle Platonist Numenius, then Porphyry and subsequent
Neoplatonists, who would elaborate yet more complex systems of exegesis.96 Plato’s Cratylus, it
seems, provides a productive tool for interpretation, although Plutarch does not rely on it
exclusively, in the form of etymological allegories.97 The model of explaining the nature of the
gods by their names has a particular significance.98 In a symposiastic vignette, the character of
Plutarch gives the concluding speech on nature of the Muses, following Ammonius, by invoking
such a passage: “even Plato himself thinks that he discovers the powers of the gods through their
names, as if tracks; let us similarly set the first of the Muses in the heavens (ouranos), concerned

94

In De an. proc., for instance, Plutarch argues that statues of the gods were intended to be understood through
philosophical symbolism: “and the theologians of old, truly the oldest of philosophers, were placing musical
instruments into the hands of statues, not because they thought the gods would somehow play the lyre or flute, but
because they thought there to be no instrument of the gods beyond harmony and concord” (οἵ τε πάλαι θεολόγοι,
πρεσβύτατοι φιλοσόφων ὄντες, ὄργανα μουσικὰ θεῶν ἐνεχείριζον ἀγάλμασιν, οὐχ ὡς λύραν που καὶ αὐλοῦσιν ἀλλ’
οὐδὲν ἔργον οἰόμενοι θεῶν οἷον ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ συμφωνίαν; 1030a-b). See also e.g. Cons. ad uxor. 612a-b and
frg. 157 Sandbach; on the latter, van Nuffelen (2011: 50-5). Hardie (1992) lists more examples (4757n60).
95
In De E, young Plutarch remarks, “it appears that someone earlier than Plato realized this and therefore
established five for the god, an indication and symbol of the number of everything” (ἔφθη δή τις ταῦτα πρότερος
συνιδὼν Πλάτωνος, διὸ εἶ καθιέρωσε τῷ θεῷ, δήλωμα καὶ σύμβολον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν πάντων; 391c). In the same
dialogue, Ammonius refers to these founders as simply “the wise men” (τοὺς σοφοὺς… ἄνδρας; 391f).
96
Porphyry’s De antr. nymph., a work that crucially preserves much of what we know of Numenius’ exegesis,
develops this idea more explicitly: “whether [Homer] described it as it really is or whether he added something of
his own, the inquiry nevertheless remains: to track down the intention of those who established it that of the poet
making an addition, because the ancients did not establish sacred things without mystic symbols, nor does Homer
haphazardly describe things of this sort” (εἴτε δ’ οὕτως ἔχον ἀφηγήσατο εἴτε καὶ αὐτός τινα προσέθηκεν, οὐδὲν
ἧττον μένει τὰ ζητήματα τὴν βούλησιν ἢ τῶν καθιδρυσαμένων ἢ τοῦ προσθέντος ποιητοῦ ἀνιχνεύοντι, ὡς ἂν μήτε
τῶν παλαιῶν ἄνευ συμβόλων μυστικῶν τὰ ἱερὰ καθιδρυσαμένων μήτε Ὁμήρου ὡς ἔτυχε τὰ περὶ τούτων
ἀφηγουμένου; §4). See also Abst. II.28 on “the founders” (τοῖς ἱδρυσαμένοις) of the bloodless “altar of the pious”
(εὐσεβῶν κέκληται βωμός) on Delos, comparing the Pythagoreans.
97
See supra pg. 24.
98
Nicostratus in Quaest. conv. VII.10, for instance, quotes the derivation of (οἶνος) from Crat. 406c (οἴεσθαι νοῦν
ἔχειν; 715a). See also De superst. 171e, De Is. 362d. Cf. Plutarch in De E (391a-b).
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with heavenly things (ourania).”99 These sorts of distinctively Platonic interpretations argue that
divine names signify intellectual qualities, such as with Zeus’ forebearers, as well as ontological
ones, such as in Socrates’ interpretation of Hestia, which Plutarch modifies in De Iside et
Osiride, rather than physical elements.100 The procedure allows Plutarch to show how bits of lore,
familiar and exotic, reinforce important points of Platonic metaphysics when understood
correctly.101 In this section, I examine his interpretations of the cult of Apollo in De E apud
Delphos and his exegesis of Egyptian religion, especially in De Iside and Osiride, after
introducing the relatively simple treatment in the Amatorius.102 In each case, he uses

καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς ὥσπερ ἴχνεσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῶν θεῶν ἀνευρίσκειν οἴεται τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμοίως μὲν
τιθῶμεν ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ περὶ τὰ οὐράνια μίαν τῶν Μουσῶν (Quaest. conv. IX.746b). He goes onto explain the rest,
still utilizing etymologies, through the psychological distinction in Phdr. 237d. Plutarch’s etymologies, like Plato’s,
are often lamented by scholars, such as by Babbitt (1936): “One matter which will seem very unscientific to the
modern reader is Plutarch’s attempts to explain the derivation of various words… but in this respect he sins no more
than Plato” (4).
100
Crat. 401c-d in De Is. 375d. Plato does, however, discuss the popular derivation of Hera from aer: “perhaps the
name-giver was doing natural science when he hid the word air and named her Hera, placing the beginning at the
end. You wwould understand if you say the name Hera over and over again” (ἴσως δὲ μετεωρολογῶν ὁ νομοθέτης
τὸν ἀέρα ‘Ἥραν’ ὠνόμασεν ἐπικρυπτόμενος, θεὶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τελευτήν: γνοίης δ᾽ ἄν, εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς
Ἥρας ὄνομα; 404c).
101
There is a disagreement among scholars of Plato about whether the name-givers in the Crat. are meant to be
historical figures, as Sedley argues, or whether they are more of a metaphor, as Barney argues. This is related to the
larger argument of the seriousness of the dialogue as a whole. As for Plutarch, given his interpretations of the
intentions of cult founders, it seems more likely that he assumes the historicity of such figures. This is similar to the
Stoic conception of the development of language—e.g. Cornutus §35—and opposed to the Epicurean—e.g. Lucr.
V.1028-58.
102
Cf. Roskam (2015b): “it was the enigmatic aspect of the Egyptian religion that made it so interesting for Plutarch,
and that he therefound many fascinating starting points for further philosophical thinking. In this respect, the
mysterious E on the Apollo temple at Delphi and the enigmatic Egyptian religious tradition were not so different
after all” (231). The prestige of Egyptian lore, however, appears extensively in the corpus. De gen. presents a
strange example: Pheidolaus knows that the Spartan king Agesilaus had discovered Egyptian texts in the grave of
Alcmena and sent them to Egypt for translation (577f-8a). He did not know the results, but it just so happened that
another character, Simmias, was in Egypt with Plato, engaged in philosophical conversation (συμφιλοσοφοῦντες
διετρίβομεν) with the priest to whom the texts were entrusted (578e-f). The text, dated to the time of “king” Proteus
and Hercules based on the script, instructs men to avoid conflict (perhaps surprisingly, given the bloody conclusion
to Plutarch’s dialogue) and worship the muses (579a). A mishap involving the ignorance of certain Delians in
geometry (also described by Theon in De E 386e) leads Plato to conclude that the god was rebuking the Greeks for
their utter lack of education (ἔφη τὸν θεὸν Ἕλλησιν ὀλιγωροῦσι παιδείας; 579b-c). For a derisive account of the
latter, see Parker (2010). That this subplot in the early part of the dialogue might deepen the Pythagorean flavor
brought on by Theanor is possible, but the setting at Memphis with a distinctively Egyptian priest (Χόνουφιν τὸν
προφήτην) suggests a blending of multiple threads. See also Phaedimus in De soll. an.: “I will introduce neither
opinions of philosophers nor Egyptians myths or unattested stories of Indians” (οὔτε δόξας φιλοσόφων οὔτ’
Αἰγυπτίων μύθους οὔτ’ ἀμαρτύρους Ἰνδῶν ἐπαγόμενος ἢ Λιβύων διηγήσεις; 975d).
99

83
interpretation, whether through allegory or dialectical argument, to construct Platonic expositions
on the qualities of the divine, which, as I argue in the next section, plays a fundamental ethical
role in the conception of virtue as the imitation of god.
Plutarch clarifies the relationship between traditional myth and philosophy particularly in
the Amatorius, when he contrasts two paths to truth, both of which evidently extend beyond the
unnamed ancients who founded the Greek rituals:103
I do not believe the myths, no indeed, nor do I disbelieve them entirely. They speak well
and by some divine luck touch on the truth when they say that lovers possess a path
upwards from Hades into the light. They do not know the path, since they missed the
straight path which Plato, first of men, discovered through philosophy. There are,
however, certain subtle and murky effluences of the truth scattered in the mythology of
the Egyptians, but they require a clever hunter to draw substantial things from tiny
ones.104
Plutarch emphasizes his preference for Plato, who first discovered the truth with clarity through
his philosophy, but, unlike Lucretius’ Euhemeristic praise for Epicurus in the proem to book V,
he allows for an alternative sort of second path to the same truth as the master’s:105 some
Egyptian mythology, although it requires clever interpretation, hints at the same truth, although
in a murkier manner.106 He begins by attributing a distinction familiar from Plato’s Symposium

Egypt recurs elsewhere in the dialogue, for instance in Pemptides’ anecdote about a conflict over an omen (755e).
… οὔτι τοῖς μύθοις πειθόμενος οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀπιστῶν παντάπασιν· εὖ γὰρ δὴ λέγουσι, καὶ θείᾳ τινὶ τυχῃ ψαύουσι
τοῦ <ἀληθοῦς> οἱ λέγοντες κἀξ Ἅιδου τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς ἄνοδον εἰς φῶς ὑπάρχειν, ὅπη δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὥσπερ
ἀτραποῦ διαμαρτόντες ἣν πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων διὰ φιλοσοφίας Πλάτων κατεῖδε. καίτοι λεπταί τινες ἀπορροαὶ καὶ
ἀμυδραὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔνεισι ταῖς Αἰγυπτίωυν ἐνδιεσπαρμέναι μυθολογίαις, ἀλλ’ ἰχνηλάτου δεινοῦ δέονται καὶ
μεγάλα μικροῖς ἑλεῖν δυναμένου (762a).
105
“He was a god, famed Memmius, a god, who first discovered this method of life that is called wisdom, who
through his art raised life from such storms, such shadows, and placed it in so much calming, clear light ” (… deus
ille fuit, deus, inclyte Memmi, / qui princeps uitae rationem invenit eam quae / nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per
artem / fluctibus et tantis vitam tantisque tenebris / in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locauit; 8-12).
106
Plutarch also introduces a trichotomy for Greek sources of traditional authority: poets, lawgivers, and
philosophers. Soclarus calls Plutarch back to the comparison between Plato and Egyptian mythology (764a-b).
Slightly later, Plutarch allows two potential sources of knowledge for the poets: “For the most part, poets write and
sing of the god in such a way that they seem to be mocking him or indulging in drunken revelry, but a few things
have been said seriously by them that touch on the truth, whether because they write with reason and consideration
or because they have the help of the god” (τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ ποιηταὶ προσπαίζοντες ἐοίκασι τῷ θεῷ γράφειν περὶ
αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾄδειν ἐπικωμάζοντες, ὀλίγα δ’ εἴρηται μετὰ σπουδῆς αὐτοῖς, εἴτε κατὰ νοῦν καὶ λογισμὸν εἴτε σὺν θεῷ
τῆς ἀληθείας ἁψαμένοις; 765d-e).
103
104
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between “vulgar and heavenly Eros” to the Egyptians, as well as a “third Eros”—“the sun.”107
This relationship ought not be understood literally, Plutarch cautions, but through analogies,
because the sun has the potential to “turn our judgement from intelligible to visible things by the
charm and light of vision.”108 The sun is visible and influences bodies, while Eros is intelligible
and attracts souls. Recalling the analogy of the sun in the Respublica, Plutarch argues that mortal
eyes, unless they are habituated over time, cannot stare at the star without suffering damage, just
as neither can “the character of an uneducated soul bear Eros without harm;”109 conversely, “the
radiance of the sun carries nourishment, light, and growth to bodies, that from Eros to souls.”110
Both parts of Egyptian mythologia are significant. There is the mythos, the identification of Eros
and the sun, and the logos, the proportionate or analogical relationship necessary to understand
the metaphorical connection between the qualities of each. Plutarch treats Egyptian mythology as
a source for philosophical speculation, but only when read in a distinctive sort of way.
The intentions of the founders of the cult of Apollo at Delphi provides the topic for De E
apud Delphos, a dialogue which Plutarch addresses to the poet Sarapion as the first of several
Pythikoi logoi.111 The work centers around puzzlement over the significance of an epsilon that
δεομένων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔφη ὁ <πατήρ>, ὡς Αἰγύπτιοι δύο μὲν Ἕλλησι παραπλησίως Ἔρωτας, τόν τε
πάνδημον καὶ τὸν οὐράνιον, ἴσασι, τρίτον δὲ νομίζουσιν Ἔρωτα τὸν ἥλιον (764b-c). Cf. Pl. Symp. 209c-e.
108
ἀποστρέφει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, χάριτι καὶ λαμπρότητι τῆς ὄψεως γοητεύων
(764e). In De Pyth. or., the sun is similarly described as an image that has the danger of being mistaken for the god
himself (400d). See infa 323.
109
καὶ μὴν οὔτε σώματος ἀγύμναστος ἕξις ἥλιον, οὔτ’ Ἔρωτα δύναται φέρειν ἀλύπως τρόπος ἀπαιδεύτου ψυχῆς
(764c). As a result, “each similarly suffers and ails, blaming the power of the god and not its own weakness”
(ἐξίσταται δ’ ὁμοίως ἑκάτερον καὶ νοσεῖ, τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν οὐ τὴν αὑτοῦ μεμφόμενον ἀσθένειαν).
110
… αὐγὴ … ἡ μὲν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου φερομένη σώματι παρέχει τροφὴν καὶ φῶς καὶ αὔξησιν, ἡ δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου ψυχαῖς
(764b). Cf. Resp. 509b.
111
“Dear Sarapion, I am sending to you, through your friends there, some of our Pythian discourses as if first-fruits;
I confess that I expect discourses in turn from you, which will be greater and better, because you have the advantage
of both a great city and a greater abundance of leisure among many books and all sorts of lectures” (ὦ φίλε
Σαραπίων… ἐγὼ γοῦν πρὸς σὲ καὶ διὰ σοῦ δὲ τοῖς αὐτόθι φίλοις τῶν Πυθικῶν λόγων ἐνίους ὥσπερ ἀπαρχὰς
ἀποστέλλων, ὁμολογῶ προσδοκᾶν ἑτέρους καὶ πλείονας καὶ βελτίονας παρ’ ὑμῶν, ἅτε δὴ καὶ πόλει χρωμένων
μεγάλῃ καὶ σχολῆς μᾶλλον ἐν βιβλίοις πολλοῖς καὶ παντοδαπαῖς διατριβαῖς εὐπορούντων; 384d-e, cf. Dem. 2.2). On
the text of De E, see Obsieger (2013). Sarapion, a significant character in De Pyth. or., is evidently an Athenian,
related to Plutarch through the latter’s honorary membership in the same phyle (Quaest. conv. I.10.628a-b). De E is
107
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had apparently been carved on the temple alongside the more famous “know thineself” (γνῶθι
σεαυτόν) and “nothing in excess” (μηδὲν ἄγαν). The character of Plutarch is reluctant to answer,
but he is sure that whatever the reason is it is good:
It is likely that this letter alone came to this position of honor by the god not by chance or
lot… rather, it is likely that those who philosophized about the god in the beginning used
the symbol because they realized some singular or extraordinary power in it, and so put it
forward.112
Spurred on by wonder over the intentions of the founders of Delphi, the dialogue recounts an
earlier discussion at Delphi between Plutarch, his brother Lamprias, their teacher Ammonius,
and others, who propose a total of seven potential solutions to the mystery of the epsilon. The
last two, however, are each longer than the previous answers combined and far more complex.
The penultimate is the younger Plutarch’s own mathematical explanation, from the identification
of epsilon and five. He begins by expounding numerological qualities—five is the sum of the
first even number and the first odd number, for instance, not counting one113—but then appeals to
its significance in Plato: there are the five worlds and geometrical solids of the Timaeus, the five
kinds of the Sophista, and the five causes and categories of the Politicus.114 Ammonius then takes

often grouped together with De Pyth. or. and De def. or., such as by Flacelière (1974), as “Dialogues pythiques.”
Other dialogues, such as De sera, have been suggested as further candidates. See infra pg. 227.
112
τοῦτο γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐ κατὰ τύχην οὐδ’ οἷον ἀπὸ κλήρου τῶν γραμμάτων μόνον ἐν προεδρίᾳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ
γενέσθαι… ἀλλ’ ἢ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ κατιδόντας ἰδίαν καὶ περιττὴν ἢ συμβόλῳ χρωμένους πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν ἀξίων
σπουδῆς τοὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ περὶ τὸν θεὸν φιλοσοφήσαντας οὕτω προθέσθαι (384f-5a).
113
387f-8c. He also appeals to its quality of its products ending in five or ten (389c-d), “its own number or a perfect
one” (τουτέστιν ἢ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἢ τὸ τέλειον; 388e); five, moreover, “by being multiplied to itself it ends in itself” (τῷ
πολλαπλασιασμῷ πάλιν εἰς ἑαυτὸν περαίνων), the unique property of its exponential products ending in five (388cd). He also discusses harmonics (389d-f). Plutarch seems to break the “arithmetical and mathematical encomia of
epsilon” (ὁ τῶν ἀριθμητικῶν καὶ ὁ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐγκωμίων τοῦ εἶ λόγος; 391e) to compare the epithets of
Dionysus (388e-9c).
114
389f-90a, 391b, 391b-d; cf. 391a-b, Obsieger (2013): “Schon die unplatonische Bezeichnung der μέγιστα γένη
des Σοφιστής als κυριώταται ἀρχαί geht wohl absichtlich darüber hinweg, daß mit mehr Recht die Idee des Guten
und die unbestimmte Zweiheit als wichtigste platonische Prinzipien zu gelted haben” (28). Plutarch also cites Homer
(390c), Euripides (390c), and a line of Orphica (391d), but ends on a skeptical note after Nicander demures from
revealing the cause behind a point of ritual: “I smiled and said, ‘until, then, when the god allows us, becoming holy
men, to know the truth, it is fitting for this too to be said on behalf of the five’” (“οὐκοῦν,” ἔφην ἐγὼ μειδιάσας,
“ἄρχι οὗ τἀληθὲς ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς ἱεροῖς γενομένοις γνῶναι παράσχῃ, προσκείσεται καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς πεμπάδος
λεγομένοις;” 391e). On the evidence for the specific point of Delphic realia in question, cf. Obsieger (2013: 298).
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up the next speech and gives an ontological interpretation by taking the single letter to represent
the diphthong εἶ, the second-person of εἶναι, “you are:”
The god bids “know thyself” to each of us as we approach here, as if welcoming us, for it
is no worse perhaps than “greetings;” we respond to the god in turn by saying “you are,”
because we return the only really true appellation for him, the fitting for him alone, of
being.115
This, he argues, brings worshippers to contemplate the strong Platonic sense of true “being” that
belongs to the divine, the sort of stable and unchanging existence which is unlike embodied life
or anything else subject to change in the world of becoming. 116 This conception of purely
unchanging “being,” reminiscent especially of the Timaeus, allows Ammonius to hymn qualities
of the god through etymologizing the traditional names of Apollo: “for he is Not-many (Apollon), because he rejects the many and denies multitude, he is Singular (Ieius) because he is
one and unique, and he is Bright (Phoebus) because the men of old used to call everything pure
and undefiled by this name.”117 Ammonius uses these etymologies to reinforce, rather than
transcend, the dialectical arguments he makes at length about unity and being.
Although De E does not explicitly endorse any speech, the finale attributed to Ammonius
seems more likely to be the culmination of the dialogue.118 Although he is delighted by Plutarch’s
mathematical display, the teacher cautions against the central premise on the grounds that mature
philosophers should be wary of youthful enthusiasm for numerology because any number can

ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα προσιόντων οἷον ἀσπαζόμενος προσαγορεύει τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὂ τοῦ
χαῖρε δήπουθεν οὐδὲν μεῖόν ἐστιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν ἀμειβόμενοι τὸν θεόν “εἶ” φαμέν, ὡς ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀψευδῆ καὶ
μόνην μόνῳ προσήκουσαν τὴν τοῦ εἷναι προσαγόρευσιν ἀποδιδόντες (392a).
116
393b; more extensively: 392c-3a. Brenk (1977) detects a discrepancy in Ammonius’ treatment of daemones
between De def. or. and De E, which reflect, in his view, different stages in Plutarch’s development (104).
117
Ἀπόλλων μὲν γὰρ οἷον ἀρνούμενος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποφάσκων ἐστίν, Ἰήιος δ’ ὡς εἷς καὶ μόνος· Φοῖβον
δὲ δήπου τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἁγνὸν οἱ παλαιοὶ πᾶν ὠνόμαζον (393c). Ammonius also deems the god “complete in
itself” (αὐτοτελὴς).
118
For Ammonius’ speech as authoritative, see e.g. Brenk (2012): “Plutarch appears in the dialogue as a brilliant but
confused young man—as students often are—who has to be corrected by his teacher” (81). See also Moreschini
(1997: 63). Obsieger (2013) surveys this line of scholarship further (38-9). Flacelière (1974), however, considers the
question to ultimately be “un problème insoluble” (8).
115
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provide these sorts of potentially coincidental parallels.119 Ammonius also seems to correct
Plutarch’s formulation of the relationship between deities:120 while the student treated Dionysus
as a parallel to Apollo, Ammonius argues that the god, or daemon, responsible for generation and
decay must be distinct from Apollo, as the Delphic letter hymns the unchanging nature of this
god.121 He again uses etymology, reminiscent of Plato’s Cratylus, to distinguish bright Apollo
from shadowy Hades.122 The most recent commenters, Hendrick Obsieger and Tobias Thum,
however, both argue that the dialogue is ultimately aporetic, whether because Ammonius’ speech
is more playful than it might seem or the earlier speeches more serious. 123 Some answers,
nevertheless, are explicitly marked as less plausible than others. An unnamed Delphic
interlocutor relates the theory of a “babbling Chaldean stranger” (Χαλδαῖος ἐφλυάρει ξένος),
“Ammonius delighted in the speech, because he also set not the least part of philosophy in mathematics, and said,
‘It is not fitting to speak too strictly against young men on this issue, except that each of the numbers provides much
to praise and hymn to whoever desires it. What else must be said about the other numbers? The sacred seven of
Apollo will eat up the day before we can fully describe all of its powers in a speech’” (ὁ δ’ ᾿Αμμώνιος, ἅτε δὴ καὶ
αὐτὸς οὐ τὸ φαυλότατον ἐν μαθηματικῇ φιλοσοφίας τιθέμενος, ἥσθη τε τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ εἷπεν “οὐκ ἄξιον πρὸς
ταῦτα λίαν ἀκριβῶς ἀντιλέγειν τοῖς νέοις, πλὴν ὅτι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ ὀλίγα βουλομένοις ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ὑμνεῖν
παρέξει. καὶ τί δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγειν; ἡ γὰρ ἱερὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἑβδομὰς ἀναλώσει τὴν ἡμέραν πρότερον ἢ
λόγῳ τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτῆς ἁπάσας ἐπεξελθεῖν;” 391e-f). Ammonius is similarly amused (ἐπιμειδιάσας) but skeptical
of explaining the number of muses by the qualities of the number nine in Quaest. conv. IX.14 (744b).
120
Ammonius also doubles down on the earlier speech’s authorities, such as when he invokes Heraclitus twice
(392c-d), while Plutarch cited him once (388e).
121
“It seems especially right to me to address the god with the phrase ‘you are,’ which testifies against this account,
because there is nothing of becoming or differentiation or change in the god, but rather, to act and change in the
operation of the decay and generation in nature belongs to another god or daemon” (καί μοι δοκεῖ μάλιστα πρὸς
τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀντιταττόμενον τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ μαρτυρόμενον “εἶ” φάναι πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ὡς οὐδέποτε γινομένης περὶ
αὐτὸν ἐκστάσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρῳ τινὶ θεῷ μᾶλλον δὲ δαίμονι τεταγμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει
φύσιν τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν προσῆκον; 393f-4a). Plutarch had earlier attributed changes (μεταβολαῖς ἑαυτοῦ
χρώμενος) to the god (388e-f).
122
“… as their names make clear, as they are directly contradictory” (ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθὺς οἷον
ἐναντίων ὄντων καὶ ἀντιφώνων; 393f-4a). The contradictory epithets include Apollo (not many) and Pluto
(abounding), Delius (clear) and Aidoneus (hidden), and Phoebus (bright) and Scotius (dark).
123
Obsieger (2013): “Der Gewinn, den der Leser an unserer Schrift haben kann, besteht nicht in einer
philosophischen Erkenntnis, auch nicht in einem Verstehen, was es mit dem delpischen Epsilon auf sich habe,
sondern in der Freude, dabei zuzusehen, wie zunächst jugendliche Sprecher sich mit Humor und Bezug auf die
ganze philosophische Tradition an einer Deutung des Epsilon versuchen, und schließlich Ammonios mit allen in der
gegebenen Situation zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln eine Epsilon vorträgt, wobei es möglich ist, in allen Reden
Scheinargumente und logische Unsauberkeiten aufzudecken. Daran braucht der Leser nicht Anstoß zu nehmen,
sondern im Gegenteil, er soll sich darüber amüsieren. So handelt es sich bei unserer Schrift um einen heiteren
literrarischen Gruß nach Athen” (46). Thum (2013): “die Mehrstimmigkeit und Multiperspektivität einer
philosophischen Betätigung, für die eine Beschäftigung mit dem delphischen E exemplarisch zu stehen scheint,
ausdrücklich thematisiert” (363).
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who argued that epsilon is the second of seven vowels, which means that it corresponds to the
second planet, the sun: “and all Greeks, so to speak, consider Apollo to be one and the same as
the sun.”124 As Ammonius later cautions, while there are good reasons to praise the sun and
analogically compare it to the god, such a direct identification is mistaking the thing itself for
something like to it; the physical sun is, at most, a physical “image” of the divinity that can only
be grasped intellectually:
It is right to feel affection for those who consider Apollo and the sun the same because of
their goodness in disposition, that they place their conception of the god in what they
honor most of all they know and desire. But let us rouse them now, as if they are dimly
dreaming of the god in the most beautiful of dreams, and let us beckon them to carry on
upward and to gaze upon the true form and essence of him—to honor the image and
revere the generative power of it, insofar as it is possible for what is stable and
intellectual to appear to what is sense perceptible and in flux, however it happens, with
the image shining through impressions and likenesses of the favor and blessedness of the
god.125
Ultimately the Delphic symbol does not constrain philosophical thought, but spurs the
interlocutors to seek multiple solutions—the longest two of which are both firmly rooted in
Platonism.126 Before the rounds of speeches, Ammonius claims that the sort of wonder these

ἡλίῳ δ’ Ἀπόλλωνα τὸν αὐτὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντας Ἕλληνας νομίζειν (386b). The unnamed character relating
the story (ἕτερος δί τις ἔφη τῶν παρόντων) deems this entirely foolish (παντάπασιν ἐκ πίνακος καὶ πυλαίας; 386a-b).
Cf. Thum (2013: 109-13).
125
τοὺς δ’ Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ ἥλιον ἡγουμένους τὸν αὐτὸν ἀσπάζεσθαι μὲν ἄξιόν ἐστι καὶ φιλεῖν δι’ εὐφυίαν, ὃ μάλιστα
τιμῶσιν ὧν ἴσασι καὶ ποθοῦσιν, εἰς τοῦτο τιθέντας τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν· ὡς δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν ἐνυπνίων
τὸν θεὸν ὀνειροπολοῦντας ἐγείρωμεν καὶ παρακαλῶμεν ἀνωτέρω προάγειν καὶ θεάσασθαι τὸ ὕπαρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν, τιμᾶν δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τήνδε καὶ σέβεσθαι τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν γόνιμον ὡς ἀνυστόν ἐστιν αἰσθητῷ νοητοῦ καὶ
φερομένῳ μένοντος ἐμφάσεις τινὰς καὶ εἴδωλα διαλάμπουσαν ἁμωσγέπως τῆς περὶ ἐκεῖνον εὐμενείας καὶ
μακαριότητος (393c-d). In De def. or., Lamprias similarly distinguishes those that identify Apollo and the sun from
those that “honor the analogy” (τιμῶντες ἀναλογίαν) between sight and intellection (433d-e). On the status of
images in Plato, see supra pg. 34. Imitation is also central to Numenius’ metaphysics, especially in his explanation
of the relationship between the highest god, the demiurge, and the world: “the first god is good-itself, while the good
demiurge is an imitation of it. … the beautiful universe is an imitation of him, having been made beautiful by
participation in the beautiful” (ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου μιμητὴς δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός… ἧς
μίμημα ὁ καλὸς κόσμος, κεκαλλωπισμένος μετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ; 16.14-17). In other fragments, he explains the
relationship between the first two through participation (e.g. 19.8-11 and 20.10-2).
126
Thum (2013) identifies Plato as the primary inspiration for the speeches of both Ammonius and Plutarch
(especially 207-42 and 274-347). Obsieger (2013), however, identifies Plutarch’s speech, based largely on the
explicitly Pythagorean identification with five and γάμος (388c)—“eine These pythagoreischen Stils” (23).
Whittaker (1969) argues that Eudorus is the main influence in Ammonius’ speech (189-92). Cf. Donini (1986).
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traditional symbols provoke is the beginning of philosophy proves to be programmatic, even if
no final answer is firmly endorsed.127
Some older studies, such as Rudolf Hirzel’s monograph on Plutarch, take Delphi to be
central to Plutarch’s thought.128 Egyptian religion especially, however, also attracted his interest,
although his attitude is complex.129 Some, such as Erich Gruen, find Plutarch to be sincerely
sympathetic to and curious about the foreign culture;130 others, such as Simon Goldhill, see it as a
sort of Hellenizing cultural imperialism.131 He is interested in subordinating Egyptian culture, I
would agree, but more specifically to Platonism rather than general Hellenism—no less than the
quintessentially Greek cult of Delphi is interpreted to accord with this philosophy.132 Plutarch

“Since to inquire is the start of philosophy and wondering and puzzling is that of seeking, it is fitting that many of
the things about the god appear to be hidden in riddles, requiring some account of why and some elucidation of its
origin” (ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν… τὸ ζητεῖν <ἀρχή, τοῦ δὲ ζητεῖν> τὸ θαυμάζειν καὶ ἀπορεῖν, εἰκότως τὰ πολλὰ τῶν
περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔοικεν αἰνίγμασι κατακεκρύφθαι [καὶ] λόγον τινὰ ποθοῦντα διὰ τί καὶ διδασκαλίαν τῆς αἰτίας; 385c).
Cf. Pl. Tht.155d; Thum (2013: 87-96).
128
1912: “Delphi und Athen waren von früh auf die beiden Brennpunkte, zwischen denen sich das geistige Leben
Plutarchs bewegt” (9).
129
He is wary of arguments that Egypt is the origin of Greek religion (377c-8a), which seems to be his salient
complaint about Herodotus’ second book in De malignitante Herodoti, where the Chaeronean engages the “lover of
barbarians” (φιλοβάρβαρός; 857a) to defend the glory of Greece and particularly his native Boeotia (854e-f). The
second example is a survey of Herodotus’ praise for “all religiosity and justice among the Egyptians” (πᾶσιν
Αἰγυπτίοις θειότητα πολλὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην…; 857a-b), leading him to survey the claims in book II that Greek
gods were originally Egyptian and conclude, “he upturns the most sacred and most holy things of Greek religion for
Egyptian nonsense and fable-weaving” (ταῖς Αἰγυπτίων ἀλαζομείαις καὶ μυθολογίαις τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ ἁγνότατα
τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν ἀνατρέπων; 857d). Cf. Froidefond (1988: 93-4). Many, such as Emerson (1878: xv), find the
essay embarrassing.
130
2011: “Plutarch sought comprehension, not condemnation, of Egyptian religion—at least comprehension in his
own terms. The scholar and philosopher endeavored to find ins his subject rational underpinnings” (112).
131
2002: “And far from allowing the antiquity, knowledge, or exoticism of Egypt to ruffle his Greekness, Plutarch –
firmly resisting the sly manipulations of Herodotus – evaluates, dismisses and organizes this Egyptian other from a
perspective centered on Delphi. Plutarch suggests that the divine in all its manifestations is open to the same (Greek)
understanding, and plays the same role in men’s lives” (278). Plutarch depicts one character, however, being
mocked for his chauvinism in the discussion of whether one should deliberate serious matters at a symposium: “He
said that earlier he did not care very much when it seemed to be a Persian custom, but now since it has been
discovered to be Greek, there must be an account to defend it against the immediately obvious strangeness” (ἔφη
πρότερον οὐ πάνυ μέλειν αὐτῷ Περσικοῦ τοῦ πράγματος εἶναι δοκοῦντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ νῦν Ἑλληνικὸν ὂν πεφώραται,
δεῖσθαι λόγου βοηθοῦντος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν αὐτόθεν φαινομένην ἀτοπίαν; Quaest. conv. VII.10.714d). Lamprias’
caustic but humorful mockery follows (715a-6c).
132
See also Meeusen (2017: 216). There is a fraught historical question about the salient influences in the culture of
Hellenistic Egypt: what part is Greek, what part Egyptian? See e.g. Bull (2018) on the history of scholarship on the
Hermetica (4-11). For Plutarch, however, the truth contained in the collected tradition is ancient yet confirms his
own thought.
127
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presupposes the universality of religion and argues that the gods are the same objects of worship
throughout the world, even where they have different names, rituals, and associated taboos:133
And it is nothing strange if they keep gods in common with us and do not make them the
property of the Egyptians alone, nor the Nile and that land which the Nile irrigates with
those names alone. Nor do they take the marshes nor the lotuses as god-made things,
saying this to turn the rest of mankind from the great gods, to whom there is no Nile nor
Botus nor Memphis. Rather, they all know Isis and the the other gods that they bear,
some of whom they have learned to call by names of the recent Egyptians, the power of
each that they knew and honored from the beginning.134
Plutarch accordingly sets out to interpret the Egyptian cult of Isis through the traditional methods
of interpretation. He rejects certain “Egyptian” interpretations, in a critique reminiscent of
Plato’s in the Respublica, for literally attributing evil to the divine. He introduces Greek
interpretations, however, both in the form of Euhemeristic rationalization—the idea that the
names of the gods were were originally those of prominent mortals, such as great monarchs or
inventors of things135—and Stoic physical allegorization—understanding Osiris as the Nile and
Isis as the earth, for example, “just as the Greeks that allegorically call Cronus time and Hera
air”136—but these are both eventually rejected.137 Plutarch claims that the interpretations of the

133

See also e.g. De Is. 362a-b and Parker (2017: 58).
καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν, ἂν πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῖν τοὺς θεοὺς φυλάττωσι κοινοὺς καὶ μὴ ποιῶσιν Αἰγυπτίων ἰδίους μηδὲ
Νεῖλον ἥν τε Νεῖλος ἄρδει μόνην χώραν τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις καταλαμβάνοντες μηδ’ ἕλη μηδὲ λωτοὺς † μὴ
θεοποιίαν λέγοντες ἀποστερῶσι μεγάλων θεῶν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, οἷς Νεῖλος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ Βοῦτος οὐδὲ
Μέμφις, Ἶσιν δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὴν θεοὺς ἔχουσι καὶ γιγνώσκουσιν ἅπαντες, ἐνίους μὲν οὐ πάλαι τοῖς παρ’
Αἰγυπτίων ὀνόμασι καλεῖν μεμαθηκότες, ἑκάστου δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες (377c-d).
Babbitt's (1936) Loeb prints μόνην for † μὴ in Sieveking's (1935) Teubner. See also 364d-e on Osiris and Dionysus.
135
“There are those that think that the many things and immense sufferings that are related and depicted belong to
the many sorts of kings and tyrants on account of their overwhelming virtue, power or reputation, who are
remembered with the belief of godhood… and they transfer these things from the gods to humans” (πολλῶν δὲ
τοιούτων λεγομένων καὶ δεικνυμένων οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι βασιλέων ταῦτα καὶ τυράννων δι’ ἀρετὴν ὑπερφέρουσαν ἢ
δύναμιν ἢ ἀξίωμα δόξαν θεότητος… ἔργα καὶ πάθη δεινὰ καὶ μεγάλα διαμνημονεύεσθαι… ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐπ’
ἀνθρώπους μεταφέρουσι…; 359d-e). On Euhemerus, see further infra pg. 273.
136
ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες Κρόνον ἀλληγοροῦσι τὸν χρόνον, Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, γένεσιν δὲ Ἡφαίστου τὴν εἰς πῦρ ἀέρος
μεταβολήν, οὕτω παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις Νεῖλον εἶναι τὸν Ὄσιριν Ἴσιδι συνόντα τῇ γῇ… (363d). The wiser priests
(σοφώτεροι τῶν ἱερέων), he claims, generally call Osiris “the entire principle and force that produces moisture”
(ἅπασαν τὴν ὑγροποιὸν ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν; 364a). He also describes those that “mix” (μιγνύντες) physical
explanations with astronomical ones (τῶν ἀπ’ ἀστρολογίας μαθηματικῶν; 367c).
137
Plutarch denies the Euhemeristic theory, for instance, on the grounds that “I shrink from the moving of what is
immovable” (ὀκνῶ δέ, μὴ τοῦτ’ ᾖ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινεῖν; 359e-f). He introduces the Stoic comparison with an
134
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Egyptian gods as daemones is “better” than Euhemerism, because he finds it absurd to attribute
suffering to the gods.138 Yet the last sort of interpretation that Plutarch introduces, the
metaphysical, seems to be the most promising to him.139 Towards the end of the treatise, Plutarch
interprets the name Isis differently than his earlier derivation from the εἰδέναι root: she
represents “ensouled and intelligent motion” when understood through the Greek etymologies—
“for the name is not barbaric”—from “to hasten (ἴεσθαι) with knowledge” and “being” (οὐσίαν),
citing the etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus.140 Properly understood through Platonic
etymologizing, the traditional names of the gods symbolically represent ontological or
intellectual aspects of reality, as Plutarch’s interpretations of the De Iside et Osiride affirm.141
While Plutarch maintains some pious deference towards religious tradition, it is
intrinsically tied to his philosophy and must be understood through it. The symbols of the cult of
Delphi provoke wonder and lead the right sort of observers to understand the intent behind them
philosophically, while the scandalous violence of the myth of Isis and Osiris requires
interpretation to find the concealed truth beneath the shadowy surface. In a fragment attributed
by some to Plutarch, preserved by Eusebius under the title “On the statues in Plataean Festivals,”
the author groups various strands of tradition together and treats each as constituting a certain

adversative (ἀλλὰ) and later objects to their conception of providence for attributing evil to god (369a). He also
objects to “dragging Jewish things into the myth” (τὰ Ἰουδαικὰ παρέλκοντες εἰς τὸν μῦθος; 363d).
138
“Those who think that the things sufferings that are said about Typhon, Isis, and Osiris do not belong to gods but
great daemones, then, are better” (βέλτιον οὖν οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὄσιριν καὶ Ἶσιν ἱστορούμενα μήτε θεῶν
παθήματα μήτ’ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ δαιμόνων μεγάλων εἶναι νομίζοντες; 360d). He appeals to a variety of Greek
philosophers for the concept of daemones, but especially Plato and Xenocrates (361a-c).
139
Cf. Roskam's (2015b) discussion of this part of the dialogue as an instance of Plutarch’s use of the “genre of
ζητήματα” (224-5).
140
διὸ τὸ μὲν Ἴσιν καλοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἴεσθαι μετ’ ἐπιστήμης καὶ φέρεσθαι, κίνησιν οὖσαν ἔμψυχον καὶ φρόνιμον· οὐ
γὰρ ἐστι τοὔνομα βαρβαρικόν, … οὕτω Πλάτων φησὶ (Crat. 401c) τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῦν[τος] τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἰσίαν
καλοῦντας (375c). Cf. the citation of Crat. 403a-4a in De Is. 362d.
141
In other passages, he distinguishes the gods by their level of being. He associates Isis with the “receptacle” in Pl.
Ti. (τιθήνη καὶ πανδεχὴς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; 372e). Cf. O’Brien (2015): “Plutarch’s interpretation of the Timaeus
shapes his reaction to the Isis myth. Despite the fluidity of the allegory, Plutarch distinguishes the Platonic triad of
First Principles: Matter (Isis), Forms (transcendent Osiris) and a sort of World-Soul (immanent Osiris)” (105).
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mode of ancient encoding, which requires physical allegory to yield a comprehensible
interpretation:142
Ancient natural science, both among Greeks and non-Greeks, was a physical account
hidden in myths, concealed in most cases through riddles and allegories, as well as
theology like that of the mysteries, in which what is said is less clear to the many than
what is kept silent and what is kept silent is more suggestive than what is said. Clearly it
is the same in the Orphic poems and the accounts of the Egyptians and the Phrygians. Yet
the rituals of initiation and the things done symbolically in rites reveal the intention of the
ancients more than anything.143
Certain types of myth, namely that of Orphic poetry and exotic ancient Egypt, are explained as
using an encoding similar to the symbolic signification of the mysteries. This passage is Yvonne
Vernière’s best evidence for the claim that Plutarch understands all myth, including Platonic
myth, through the mysteries. Even this fragment, however, never attributes this sort of
intentional obscurantism to Plato, or even Delphic symbolism. That comparison only seems to
gain expression and prominence with the later Platonist Numenius, who was very influential over
the Neoplatonists, particularly on mythic signification.144 Scholars have, however, questioned
where this fragment occurred in the work since Plutarch elsewhere disclaims the kind of
physical—distinctively Stoic—allegorizations that follow. If it is part of a dialogue, which is
possible given that the fragment refers to Euboea as “here” (ἐνταῦθα), there is no reason to

Περὶ τῶν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς Δαιδάλων (Praep. evang. III.pref.5 = Lamprias catalogue no. 201); cf. Vernière (1977:
45). The second book of Eusebius’ work is centered around refutation of Egyptian and Hellenic mythology, while
the third attacks the practice of allegorical interpretation. Plutarch’s De Is. is a source for the latter (3.11-7),
although Porphyry is the most prominent (e.g. the long summary of Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας that begins in
14.4). Wallace-Hadrill (1960) surveys Eusebius’ attitude to Greek philosophy, especially Plato—for “Eusebius was
a disciple of Origen, and no man could claim to be such without being in some degree beholden to Platonism”
(139)—and Carriker (2003) includes Plutarch in his survey of Eusebius’ quotations (112-4). Wallace-Hadrill detects
more engagement with Plutarch (149-53) but concludes, “There was probably a more intimate kinship between
Plutarch and Origen, but … Eusebius adopted less of pagan thought, following his master as far as he dared” (153).
143
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παλαιὰ φυσιολογία καὶ παρ’ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις λόγος ἦν φυσικὸς ἐγκεκαλυμμένος μύθοις, τὰ
πολλὰ δι’ αἰνιγμάτων καὶ ὑπονοιῶν ἐπίκρυφος, καὶ μυστηριώδης θεολογία τά τε λαλούμενα τῶν σιγωμένων
<ἀ>σαφέστερα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ σιγώμενα τῶν λαλουμένων ὑποπτότερα, κατάδηλόν ἐστι τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς
ἔπεσι καὶ τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς καὶ Φρυγίοις λόγοις· μάλιστα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς ὀργιασμοὶ καὶ τὰ δρώμενα
συμβολικῶς ἐν ταῖς ἱερουργίαις τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἐμφαίνει διάνοιαν (III.1.1 = frg. 157.1 Sandbach).
144
See infra pg. 206. See also Hani (1976: 476).
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assume that the speaker is authoritative.145 Plutarch would not disagree, in either case, that these
kind of myths and symbols from traditional religion can be usefully interpreted in a certain
manner, as he exemplifies in De Iside especially. As the next section argues, through the idea of
virtue as the imitation of god, these sorts of theological exegeses help, along with the text of
Plato, to orient every other part of Plutarch’s philosophy, from physics to ethics.

Virtue as imitation of the Platonic god
Plutarch’s conception of the philosophical life is indelibly tied to his conception of
Platonic theology, which is, for him, the highest part of metaphysics. This god is transcendent,
unmired in matter and beyond the world. As he puts it in Ad principem ineruditum, taking aim at
Stoic materialism in even a political treatise:
It is neither likely nor fitting, as some philosophers say, for god to be mixed in matter,
which is passive and subject to a multitude of necessity and fortune and change. But god
is somehow above, connected to that nature which is always the same according to the
same principles, seated upon sacred pedestals, as Plato says: he proceeds with a straight
course by nature.146
Plutarch uses language from Plato’s Phaedrus and Leges to describe god as always consistent
and self-same, in contrast to the world of sense-perceptible matter, which is definitionally subject
to change.147 The unchanging course is even reflected, he continues, in the course of the sun in
the heavens, “an entirely beautiful image of him through a mirror,” which he established so that
humans could become blessed and wise by forming themselves in imitation “of the most

145

§3. This was postulated first by Dechame (1898). See also van Nuffelen (2011: 54-5). Cf. Boys-Stones (2018: 312) and especially Scannapieco (2012). I would add that Eusebius, in selecting this passage, as with the Stoic
passages of De Is. which Plutarch ultimately rejects, is not motivated by fidelity to the pagan Platonists, but by his
interest in overturning physical allegorization in particular.
146
οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πρέπον, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι, τὸν θεὸν ἐν ὕλῃ πάντα πασχούσῃ καὶ πράγμασι
μυρίας δεχομένοις ἀνάγκας καὶ τύχας καὶ μεταβολὰς ὑπάρχειν ἀναμεμιγμένον· ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἄνω που περὶ τὴν ἀεὶ
κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως φύσιν ἔχουσαν ἱδρυμένος ἐν βάθροις ἁγίοις ᾗ φησι Πλάτων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν
περιπορευόμενος (781f). Cf. 780a. See also Brenk (1977: 29). Catanzaro (2017) compares Dio Chrys. Or. III.
147
ἐν ἁγνῷ βάθρῳ (Phdr. 254b); εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος (Leg. IV.716a).
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beautiful of things” through philosophy.148 Although this god transcends matter, Plutarch argues
that “the god established the exceedingly beautiful sun and moon as an image of himself in the
heavens.”149 Human rulers, through aiming well at justice and orienting themselves towards
god’s virtue, similarly serve as “an image of the god that orders the world.”150
While Ad principem ineruditum focuses narrowly on rulers, Plutarch expands it in De
sera numinis vindicta to all humans as the ideal for a philosophical life. He again appeals to this
concept of becoming like to god as the aim (telos) of philosophy, which Plato formulated in
several prominent passages throughout the corpus. In the Theaetetus, Socrates claims that the
only potential escape from the evils of the world is becoming like to god or the divine insofar as
possible for a human.151 Towards the end of the Timaeus, likeness to the divine mind is said to be
the ethical aim of human life and the process to attain it is said to be ordering oneself by

οἷον δ’ ἥλιος ἐν οὐρανῷ μίμημα τὸ περικαλλὲς αὐτοῦ δι’ ἐσόπτρου εἴδωλον ἀναφαίνεται τοῖς ἐκεῖνον ἐνορᾶν δι'
αὐτοῦ δυνατοῖς, οὕτω τὸ ἐν πόλεσι φέγγος εὐδικίας καὶ λόγου τοῦ περὶ αὑτὸν ὥσπερ εἰκόνα κατέστησεν, ἣν οἱ
μακάριοι καὶ σώφρονες ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀπογράφονται πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν πραγμάτων πλάττοντες ἑαυτούς (781f2a).
149
οἷον δ’ ἥλιον ἐν οὐρανῷ περικαλλὲς εἴδωλον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ σελήνην ὁ θεὸς ἐνίδρυσε (780f).
150
δίκη μὲν οὖν νόμου τέλος ἐστί, νόμος δ’ ἄρχοντος ἔργον, ἄρχων δ’ εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος (780e). He
further compares the “ruler, such an image and light in the cities” (τοιοῦτον ἐν πόλεσι μίμημα καὶ φέγγος ἄρχων)
with the heavenly bodies (780f). The wrong way to imitate god, however, is either with the symbols from art (οὐ
σκῆπτρον οὐδὲ κεραυνὸν οὐδὲ τρίαιναν), or power over nature (βροντὰς καὶ κεραυνοὺς καὶ ἀκτινοβολίας): “god is
pleased with those who emulate his virtue and make themselves like to his nobility and love of humanity; he raises
them up and gives them a share of his orderliness and justice and truth and gentleness, than which nothing is more
divine, not fire nor light nor the course of the sun…” (τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ζηλοῦντας αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ
φιλάνθρωπον ἀφομοιοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἡδόμενος αὔξει καὶ μεταδίδωσι τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης καὶ
ἀληθείας καὶ πραότητος· ὧν θειότερον οὐ πῦρ ἐστιν οὐ φῶς οὐχ ἡλίου δρόμος; 780f-1a).
151
φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι (176b). Sedley
(2010) discusses the import of the “[d]igression which stands at the dialogue’s exact center” (69) for an ethical
reading of the broader dialogue, with a novel definition of “sōphrosunē” as the intellectual virtue of self-knowledge
rather than constancy or temperance (71-2). Carone (2005) concludes her monograph on Platonic metaphysics by
invoking this formulation of the telos: “If this ideal is what it is to be god, then there may be much of value, even
(and perhaps especially) from a practical perspective, in Plato’s suggestion that we should endeavour to ‘be like god
insofar as it is possible’” (195). Van Riel (2013) compares passages from the Eythphr., Leg., and Phdr. (19-23) and
concludes that “the Platonic assimilation to god preserves an irreducible difference between gods and humans, based
on the recognition that god, rather than humankind, is the measure of all things,” which he contrasts from the
“Aristotelian” idea of “to think god’s thoughts” (23). Dillon (1977) contrasts this idea, which “became the general
definition among Middle Platonists” for the telos, with Antiochus’ “formula ‘Concordance with Nature:’” “not
properly a doctrine of Plato, but was developed in the Old Academy, particularly by its last head, Polemon, and then
taken up by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism” (9-10).
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observing the harmony of the world.152 Socrates in the Respublica suggests that one who is
“eager and willing to become just and practice virtue is made like to god to such an extent as it is
possible for a human.”153 Finally, in the Leges, Clinias claims that “everyone should have it in
mind to become as one of those following god,” which the Athenian stranger explains as the
process of being like to god by developing the virtues.154
The dialogues present other formulations of the relationship between the telos of human
life and the divine, such as the idea of following god, which is explicitly appealed to in the
Timaeus and imagistically depicted in the Phaedrus.155 This conception of virtue as becoming
like to god, however, proved particularly influential. As Harold Tarrant puts it, it proved to be
the “standard goal of Middle Platonism,” the characteristic ethical position.156 It is certainly

“It is necessary for each to follow these (cycles), straightening the cycles in our heads that were confounded at
birth, through learning the harmonies and the cycles of the world, for that which thinks to become like that which is
thought in accordance with its ancient nature; for becoming like it attains the aim of what has been appointed as the
best life by god, for the present and for subsequent time (ταύταις δὴ συνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν
ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ
περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ
προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον; 90d).
153
… ὅς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι
θεῷ (X.613a-b).
154
ὡς τῶν ξυνακολουθησόντων ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα (IV.716b). The Athenian Stranger
claims that “like is dear to like when it is truly moderate” (τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον; cf. Hom. Od.
XVII.218) and argues that someone possessing each of the virtues, such as a temperance, is “dear and like to god” (ὁ
μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ; 716c-d).
155
ξυνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ (Ti. 90d); τῷ δ᾽ ἕπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων (Phdr. 246e).
156
2007: 419. See also Hatzimichali (2011: 90-4) and Boys-Stones (2016: 333-6). Cf. Annas (1999): “This theme
displays the greatest distance between ancient and modern readers of Plato. For the ancient Platonists it was one of
the most important and stressed features of Platonic ethics. For modern readers it is invisible” (6). Many studies of
Plato’s ethics indeed skip over this idea entirely, such as Gould (1955). Annas’ chapter focuses on the tension
between Plato’s practicality and otherwordliness, as well as the Middle Platonic reception (52-71); Russell (2004) is
similarly focused on otherworldliness, but with an eye toward Stoicism. Reydams-Schils (2017) argues that all
Platonists of the period are participating in a debate with various Stoics, although only the Tht. commentator is
explicit. Some of these links are tendentious, such as the Stoic preference for the ‘active life’ (152-154), which is
certainly not unique to that school, or presented in a distinctively Stoic manner. In the case of Plutarch (in this
section of the De sera), her argument hinges upon an identification of “assimilation to god” and the providential care
of the entire world, which she however points out is already an element of the divine in Leg. X (148-149). Cf.
Silverman (2010) on the motif in Plato and Aristotle, Erler (2009) on Epicureans. Tarrant (2007) argues that, for the
author of Stobaeus Ecl. 2.7.3f, “Plato wants us to divinize ourselves through wisdom (phronêsis), Aristotle through
intelligence (nous), Zeno through virtue and reason, with all insisting on the central role of virtue. So the three great
founders of Greek philosophical schools are differing in terminology rather than in substance” (423).
152
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prevalent in the scattered remains.157 The Middle Platonic Didaskalikos, now usually attributed to
an otherwise unknown Alcinous, describes “the soul contemplating the divine and the thoughts
of god” as nothing other than “becoming like to the divine;”158 the anonymous Commentarius in
Platonis Theaetetum contrasts likeness to god as Plato’s basis of justice against the Stoic natural
affinity.159 Even Cicero tersely argues in his Leges that “truly virtue is common to man and god,
present in no other sort beyond this; virtue is nothing other than nature perfected and brought to
its heights; therefore it is, for a human, likeness with god.”160 The prominence of this concept
persists among the Neoplatonists, as well as the Neronian Stoics Seneca and Musonius Rufus.161
This idea could, however, be understood in multiple ways.162 A complex but intriguing
example appears in part of a doxography quoted by Stobaeus, attributed to the enigmatic
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See also Apul. De dog. Plat. II.23 and Diog, Laert. III.78.
ἡ ψυχὴ δὴ θεωροῦσα μὲν τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὰς νοήσεις τοῦ θείου… τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοιώσεως (II.2). Later, in the
markedly ethical portion (XXVII.1), an entire section is dedicated to likeness to god as Plato’s proposal as the telos
of humanity (τέλος ἐξέθετο ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν), comparing the various places in the Platonic corpus the
idea is explicated (XXVIII.1-4). The daemones too, according to Alcinous, imitate the demiurge (XV.2).
159
ὅθεν οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκειώσεως εἰσάγει ὁ Πλάτων τὴν δι[κα]ι̣οσύνην, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῆς πρ̣[ὸ]ς τὸν θεὸν ὁμοιό[τητο]ς
δείξομεν (7.14-20). The commentary also describes Socrates as likening himself to god (εἰκάζει ἑαυτὸν θεῷ) by
disabusing people of false ideas (58.39-49, ad Tht. 151c-d).
160
iam uero uirtus eadem in homine ac deo est neque alio ullo in genere praeterea; est autem uirtus nihil aliud nisi
perfecta et ad summum perducta natura; est igitur homini cum deo similitude (I.8.25). On the Platonic context, see
Tarrant (2007: 421-3).
161
This idea becomes authoritative for later Platonists, and even appears as a gloss for philosophy itself in a
marginal note in a manuscript of the Byzantine Neoplatonist Michael Psellus (φιλοσοφία ἐστὶν ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ
δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῷ; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, suppl. gr. 655, fol. 72v). Similarly, Hermias, a fellow-student of
Syrianus along with Proclus, identifies it with happiness (εὐδαιμονία δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ· ὁμοιούμεθα δὲ θεῷ τῶν
αὐτων ἐφαπτόμενοι· τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ ἐφαπτόμεθα τὸ νοητὸν κάλλος θεασάμενοι; 44.101). On its role in Plotinus’
thought, see Song (2009). More proximately to Plutarch, it also appears in the Imperial Stoicism, although reflecting
a different—exclusively immanentistic—view of the divine. Seneca, for instance, emphasizes Stoic determinism:
“An unalterable course draws human and divine affairs equally. He himself, the creator and master of everything,
although he set the fates, he follows them; he always obeys, but once issued them” (irreuocabilis humana pariter ac
diuina cursus uehit. ille ipse conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur; semper paret, semel iussit; Prov.
V.8). Musonius Rufus (e.g. Diss. 17.13-33 Hense, frg. 38, and apud Arr. Epic. II.14.11-13) and Seneca (e.g. Prov.
I.5-6, Ep. 92.29-31, and NQ I.pref.17) both adapt Plato’s idea and language, while glossing over the κατὰ δυνατὸν
element, perhaps because divine and human virtues and knowledge are equivalent rather than similar, an idea for
which Proclus chides earlier Stoics (in Tim. I.106f = SVF III.252). Justin Martyr, however, presents the Platonic end
very differently in his description of the end of his pre-conversion education: “and out of idiocy, I was hoping to
look upon god immediately—for this is the aim of the philosophy of Plato” (καὶ ὑπὸ βλακείας ἤλπιζον αὐτίκα
κατόψεσθαι τὸν θεόν· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας; Dial. ΙΙ.6). Cf. Edwards (1991).
162
In De Is., the crocodile is said to be “an imitation of god, being the only tongue-less creature: for the divine
reason has no need for voice…” (κροκόδειλος… μίμημα θεοῦ λέγεται γεγονέναι μόνος μὲν ἄγλωσσος ὦν· φωνῆς
γὰρ ὁ θεῖος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι…; 381b).
158

97
“Didymus.” The source is sometimes held to be the 1st century B.C.E. Neopythagorean Eudorus
of Alexandria, although this is based solely on a comparison between Plato and Pythagoras, as
there is no explicit evidence for the authorship.163 It begins summarily: “Socrates and Plato, the
same things as Pythagoras, the aim is likeness to god.”164 Pythagoras, the text argues, had
formulated the idea already with the simpler exhortation, “follow god,” but Plato added the
qualification “insofar as possible” (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) to indicate that this process is only a
theoretical one, possible only through the faculty of wisdom.165 This leads the author to argue that
Plato formulates the imitation of good as tripartite to correspond to a common Hellenistic
division of philosophy:
It is formulated by Plato according to the tripartite division of philosophy: in the
Timaeus, he says it in a physical manner (and I will add also a Pythagorean manner),
plentifully signifying his previous observation; in the Respublica, in an ethical manner;
and in the Theaetetus, in a logical manner. He expresses the following of god both clearly
and plentifully in the fourth book of the Leges. This is because Plato has many voices,
<not many opinions>.166
163

Dillon (1977) ascribes the text thus to trace a neat line from Eudorus to Philo and subsequent Platonists such as
Plutarch, e.g.: “When we turn to later Alexandrian Platonism, however, in the person of Eudorus, we find that the
Stoic-Antiochian definition has been abandoned in favour of a more spiritual, and perhaps more truly Platonic, ideal
of ‘Likeness to God…’ and this formula remained the distinctive Platonic definition of the telos ever afterward”
(44). See further 122-3 and 192-3. Stobaeus’ passage does not appear, however, in Mazzarelli's (1985) collection of
certain (“A”) fragments of Eudorus. Bonazzi (2007: 366-7) argues that the appeal to Pythagoreas is insufficient to
identify the text as Eudorean. See also Hatzimichali (2017: 90-1). Tarrant was once confident of the attribution
(2000: 72-4), but has since become more skeptical: “going back to perhaps Eudorus… though we should not feel
certain of this” (2007: 419). On the scholarly pursuit of this shadowy figure, see further infra pg. 104.
164
Σωκράτης, Πλάτων ταὐτὰ τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ, τέλος ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ (II.7.3f.49.8-9 Wachsmuth). The provenance of
this doxography much disputed. From the citations of Philo of Larissa and Eudorus elsewhere, Hatzimichali (2017)
dates it “plausibly, but admittedly without full certainty” to “the two centuries roughly between 100 BCE and 100
CE” (86). She emphasizes the central topic of ethics and the juxtaposition of Platonism and Stoicism (90-1, 98-9).
165
“Plato articulated it most clearly by applying the phrase ‘insofar as possible,’ since it is only possible with
wisdom, which is living according to virtue. For in god there is the property of making the world and governing the
world, while in the wise man there is the settling and carrying through of life. This is what Homer riddlingly relates
when he says, ‘he goes through the tracks of god.’ Pythagoras, following him, says to ‘follow god.’ Clearly this does
not mean to follow the visible and the obvious, but rather the intellective and the harmony of the good order of the
world” (σαφέστερον δ’ αὐτὸ διήρθρωσε Πλάτων προσθεὶς τὸ “κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν,” φρονήσει δ’ ἐστὶ μόνως δυνατόν,
τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ θεῷ τὸ κοσμοποιὸν καὶ κοσμοδιοικητικόν· ἐν δὲ τῷ σοφῷ βίου
κατάστασις καὶ ζωῆς διαγωγή· ὅπερ αἰνίξασθαι μὲν Ὅμηρον εἰπόντα [Od. V.193] “κατ’ ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο·”
Πυθαγόραν δὲ παρ’ αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· ἕπου θεῷ· δῆλον ὡς οὐχ ὁρατῷ καὶ προηγουμένῳ, νοητῷ δὲ καὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς
εὐταξίας ἁρμονικῷ). On the image of following god, cf. Pl. Phdr. 247a-8c, 266b.
166
εἴρηται δὲ παρὰ Πλάτωνι κατὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τριμερές, ἐν Τιμαίῳ μὲν φυσικῶς (προσθήσω δὲ καὶ
Πυθαγορικῶς), σημαίνοντος ἀφθόνως τὴν ἐκείνου προεπίνοιαν· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἠθικῶς· ἐν δὲ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ
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Stobaeus’ source defends the unity of Plato while attributing different expositions of the idea of
likeness to god to different parts of philosophy. In each connection between an instance of the
adage and a sphere of inquiry, its interpretation is thoroughly theoretical.
This emphatically conceptual vision of becoming like to god, however, contrasts sharply
with Plutarch’s main treatment, which characteristically evokes becoming like to god as both
theoretical and practical.167 Early on in De sera, the character of Plutarch describes one form of
this process as observing the order of the visible divine in the harmonious motions of the
heavens, and straightening out the defects in one’s own soul accordingly:
But see first that, according to Plato, the god sets himself everywhere as the example of
everything noble, and he gives human virtue—that is, the likening to himself in some
way or other, to those capable of following god. For the nature of the world, being
disorderly before, bears the source of change and coming into being as an ordered world
(kosmos), by some likening of and participation in the form and excellence of the divine.
And the man himself says that our nature enkindles vision also, in order that the soul,
accustomed by the sight of things borne in the heavens and by wonder to welcome and
embrace the elegant and the orderly, to hate the unharmonious and the wandering
passions, and to flee the random and arbitrary as the source of all evil and disharmony.
For there is nothing greater for a man than to have enjoyment of god, to imitate and
pursue the good and noble things about him and to be established into virtue.168
λογικῶς· περιπέφρασται δὲ κἀν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Νόμων ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ θεοῦ σαφῶς ἅμα καὶ πλουσίως. τὸ
δέ γε πολύφωνον τοῦ Πλάτωνος <οὐ πολύδοξον>. The source further argues, “there things about the aim have been
said by him in many ways, since he has a diversity of expression because of his eloquence and lofty speech, which
comes together into a coherency and harmony of thought. This is living according to virtue. In turn, this is the
attainment and employment of perfect virtue. And he considers this the ‘aim,’ calling it by that name in the
Timaeus” (εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ τέλους αὐτῷ πολλαχῶς. καὶ τὴν μὲν ποικιλίαν τῆς φράσεως ἔχει διὰ τὸ λόγιον
καὶ μεγαλήγορον, εἰς δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ σύμφωνον τοῦ δόγματος συντελεῖ. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. τοῦτο δ’ αὖ
κτῆσις ἅμα καὶ χρῆσις τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς. ὅτι δὲ “τέλος” αὐτὴν ἡγεῖται, τέταχεν ἐν Τιμαίῳ <εἰπὼν> καὶ τοὔνομα).
167
Cf. Bonazzi (2012): “Only the gods can ensure true salvation: the philosopher has no option but to turn his gaze
towards them and endeavor to help others do the same, being the full-fledged model—inasmuch as possible—of the
virtuous union between theoria and praxis” (161); Hatzimichali (2017): “What the reportage does offer us is
indications of the key debates that would be taken forward by more partisan authors: Galen on passions and parts of
the soul, Platonists such as Plutarch on the ‘practical’ side of ‘becoming like god’ and on the metaphysical role of
Platonic Forms as principles etc.” (98).
168
ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖτε πρῶτον ὅτι κατὰ Πλάτωνα πάντων καλῶν ὁ θεὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἐν μέσῳ παράδειγμα θέμενος τὴν
ἀνθωπίνην ἀρετήν, ἐξομοίωσιν οὖσαν ἁμωσγέπως πρὸς αὑτόν, ἐνδίδωσιν τοῖς ἕπεσθαι θεῷ δυναμένοις. καὶ γὰρ ἡ
πάντων φύσις, ἄτακτος οὖσα, ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ γενέσθαι κόσμος, ὁμοιότητι καὶ μεθέξει
τινὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἰδέας καὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὑτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἀνάψαι φησὶν τὴν φύσιν ἐν ἡμῖν ὅπως ὑπὸ
θέας τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ φερομένων καὶ θαύματος ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ ἀγαπᾶν ἐθιζομένη τὸ εὔσχημον ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ
τεταγμένον ἀπεχθάνηται τοῖς ἀναρμόστοις καὶ πλανητοῖς πάθεσι καὶ φεύγῃ τὸ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ὡς κακίας καὶ
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Plutarch explains likening to god, also described as following god, as a process of imitating the
order of the divine and rendering one’s own soul more orderly and harmonious by active
imitation of the divine. The emphasis on the visible order in the motions of the stars harkens
back to Plato’s conception of the role of sight and astrology in the Timaeus and the allusion to
the primordial, unordered world soul—a controversial but central element of Plutarch’s
interpretation of the Timaeus169—draws further attention to the specific figure of the demiurge,
the architect of the world and of human virtue as well.170 In De tranquilitate animae, Plutarch
describes the world as a “superlatively holy and marvelous temple,” which each “human enters
through birth as a spectator, not of things wrought by human hand but unalterable images, as
many as the divine intellect made as visible imitations of intellectual objects, as Plato says,”
referring to the sun, moon, stars, and so on.171 The orderliness of the intellectual world, being
unchanging and eternal, is clearly imitated, for Plutarch, in the motion of the celestial objects,
which allow human spectators in this divine temple to study that world through the material one.

πλημμελείας ἁπάσης γένεσιν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ τι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπος απολαύειν θεοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ τὸ μιμήσει καὶ διώξει
τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι (550d-e). Tarrant (2007) finds skeptical significance in the
modifier ἁμωσγέπως: “Being less keen on the Stoics at least, and influenced by traditional Academic caution in
matters of interpretation, Plutarch will only declare that Plato made human virtue ‘in some way or other’ an
assimilation to god… This seems to show awareness of current disputes about the Platonic doctrine” (423n11).
169
See infra pg. 160.
170
Cf. Ad princ. inerud. 781a. Another locus classicus for the former idea is the line of conversation that Glaucon
starts in Resp. VII.529a: “for it seems entirely clear to me that it (astronomy) forces the soul to look toward the
above and leads it there, away from the things here” (παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον ὅτι αὕτη [ἀστρονομία] γε ἀναγκάζει
ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει). See also Leg. X.886a, [Pl.] Epin. 981e-3c, and Alcinous
VII.3-4. Seneca also emphasizes the role of contemplation of the astral motions in causing the mind wonder about
the divine, until it “breaks forth the walls of the sky, not content any longer to know what remains spread out before
it” (cogitatio nostra caeli munimenta perrumpit nec contenta est id, quod ostenditu, scire; Otio V.6, cf. Lucr. I.7274, III.14-7). Boethius, early on in the Cons. (and therefore early in the character’s philosophical journey, so to
speak), recalls his earlier relationship with Philosophia as “when you were forming our customs and the method of
all life to fit the example of the order of the heavens” (cum mores nostros totiusque uitae rationem ad caelestis
ordinis exempla formares?; I.p.4). Epicureans, on the other hand, tend to distinguish competing sorts of motion,
which deprives Platonic or Stoic cosmology of its upward turn (e.g. Epicurus Ep. Pyth. §91-7, Lucr. V.509-33).
171
ἱερὸν μὲν γὰρ ἁγιώτατον ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον· εἰς δὲ τοῦτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰσάγεται διὰ τῆς
γενέσεως ο0ὐ χειροκμήτων οὐδ’ ἀκινήτων ἀγαλμάτων θεστής, ἀλλ’ οἷα νοῦς θεῖος αἰσθητὰ μιμήματα νοητῶν,
φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, … ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ποταμοὺς (477c-d).
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It is that intellectual order, it seems, that he bids readers to imitate in their own souls, through the
intermediacy of the visible divine in the heavens.
The meaning of this imitation is based on based on his understanding of the Timaeus as
presenting a macrocosm—i.e. the soul of the world—and microcosm—the human soul.172 Just as
the world soul has two parts, so does the human soul—the rational and orderly part, and an
irrational part. Plutarch interprets Plato’s conception of the soul as entailing both motion and
cognition.173 In De animae procreatione, he initially characterizes the soul as lacking “magnitude
in units and points and lengths and breadths, which befit bodies, and are characteristic of bodies
rather than souls;” rather, it “is the cause and source of motion, but mind of the ordering and
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See further infra pg. 294.
Plutarch thus combines two threads of ancient thought on the soul, both of which appear in Plato. Aristotle, in the
doxographical portion of De anima, however, distinguishes two useful aspects for considering the potential function
of the soul: “ensouled things seem to differ from soulless things in two respects most of all: in motion and
perceiving” (τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι; 403b25-7).
He claims to have nearly (σχεδὸν) adopted (παρειλήφαμεν) this distinction exactly from philosophical forbearers
(403b27-8). Some of Aristotle’s predecessors, he claims, saw capacity for motion—and particularly the unique
capacity for self-motion—as the “primary” characteristic of soul: “For they say primarily and fundamentally, soul is
the moving thing; and they think that what does not move itself is not able to move anything else, they supposed
soul to be something of those things that move themselves” (φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ
κινοῦν, οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον
εἶναι, 403b28-32; reiterated: 404b8-9). Others saw soul as primarily intellectual and cognitive, particularly through
the explanation that it is an archê of everything, and so it alone can understand everything, by the principle of “like
understands like;” (ὅσοι δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς,
οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, …;404b9-11, cf. Pl. Ti. 45c, Alcinous XIV.2). Others still took both
elements, the capacity for movement and particularly self-motion along with the epistemic capacity, to be essential
to soul (ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν, οὕτως ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν,
ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ’ ἑαυτον; 404b28-30). Both elements can be found in Plato’s Timaeus,
although Aristotle associates that dialogue with the ‘like understands like’ sort of theory (404b16-18). Iamblichus’
De an. begins with an explicit appeal to Aristotle’s categories, but adds a third: “subtlety of essence” (λεπτότητα
οὐσίας; §1).
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harmony concerning the motion.”174 Plutarch thus interprets Plato’s soul as fundamentally
bipartite, based on the discussion of the composition of the world soul in the Timaeus.175
Plutarch interprets the embodied human, however, as essentially tripartite. The soul gives
all motion, whether chaotic or orderly, to the body, while the mind, at least when there is
harmony between all of the human parts, exerts an ordering influence upon the soul’s motions.
Matters of cogitation, which include both practical virtue and theoretical wisdom, are described
through their kinetic effects on the soul.176 While Plutarch identifies the human soul as a
microcosm of the cosmic soul, as described in Leges X and the Timaeus, the human intellect, it
seems, is a microcosm of the divine intelligence in the world. This part of a human, the immortal

… οὔτε πλῆθος ἐν μονάσι καὶ στιγμαῖς οὔτε μήκη καὶ πλάτη λέγεσθαι νομιστέον, ἃ σώμασι προσήκει καὶ
σωμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν… ψυχὴ γὰρ αἰτία κινήσεως καὶ ἀρχή, νοῦς δὲ τάξεως καὶ συμφωνίας περὶ
κίνησιν (1014d, 1015e). On the former, the context is the Ti.’s concept of περὶ τὰ σώματα… μεριστὴν (35a, cf.
1023b-d). Cf. Johansen (2004): “the soul material may stretch inside and outside the spherical world body without
itself being ‘thick’. Similarly, one might imagine an infinitesimally thin layer of paint spread across the surface of
the world body and the bodies with in it” (141).
175
Babut (1969): “On remarquera que c’est sur le Timée que P. s’appuie… pour attribuer à Platon une division
binaire de l’ȃme plus fondamentale que la tripartition adoptée dans la République” (136-7). Lanzillotta (2012) takes
Plutarch’s criticism of Aristotle in De virt. mor. 442b-c to mean “Plutarch more closely followed Aristotle’s
philosophy in allotting the two latter parts to an irrational part that resulted in the bipartition into rational and
irrational halves” (8), without noting that Plutarch is distinguishing Aristotle’s own tripartition of the irrational part
into the “perceiving or nurturing and vegetative part of the soul” (τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ φυτικὸν τῆς
ψυχῆς μέρος). See also Sandbach (1982: 221).
176
De virt. mor., for instance, further describes the faculty of practical reason (phronêsis) as managing matters
caught up in erraticness (πλάνης… ταραχῆς), and its response is described in equally kinetic terms: it needs an
impulse (ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται), uses the motions (κινήσεσι χρῆται) of passion when proper, and limits this sort of
motion when excessive (ὁρίζων τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν; 444a-c). The capacity for practical virtue, as opposed to that
of sophia, or theoretical virtue, is distinguished in 443e-f. Cf. 443d, 449c. Plutarch argues that, whether or not it is
possible to remove passion entirely, such a removal would regardless be detrimental for a human (ἡ δ’ ἀναγκαία διὰ
τὸ σῶμα καὶ δεομένη τῆς παθητικῆς ὥσπερ ὀργανικῆς ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, οὐκ οὖσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς
ψυχῆς οὐδ’ ἀναίρεσις ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ
μεσότης γίνεται τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον, 444d). Cf. 445c, which qualifies the details of the
Phaedrus myth as a simile (ἐξεικονίζει)—there is no such qualification of the kinetic language earlier, which seems
to be meant literally. The myth in De gen. vividly describes the ordered motion of some daemones—“and the voice
said, those bearing straight and arranged motion use souls obedient to the rein” (λέγειν δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοὺς μὲν
εὐθεῖαν καὶ τεταγμένην κίνησιν ἔχοντας εὐηνίοις ψυχαῖς χρῆσθαι, 592a; cf. Phaedrus myth)—and the opposite
(592a-c). See also Alcinous XIII.3, XIV.4, and especially XIV.50; cf. Anon. In Tht. X.22-XI.2. Plutarch attributes
“some causal motion in the ruling part” (ἐπελευστικήν τινα κίνησιν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ) to “some philosophers” (ἔνιοι
τῶν φιλοσόφων) in one of his polemical tracts against the Stoics (De Stoic. repug., 1045b) as a mechanism for how
someone can choose between different indistinguishable alternatives; Caballero (2012) identifies the referent as
Arcesilaus and his disciples.
174
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mind, is identified as the true person.177 In De animae procreatione in Timaeo, Plutarch calls for
us to hymn the demiurge of the Timaeus by contemplating him.178 His descriptions of the
contemplative aspect of the divine in De Iside further suggest that philosophical inquiry itself is a
sort of imitation of the divine. After approvingly quoting a line of Homer, he argues:179
He shows that the reign of Zeus is more blessed because it is older in knowledge and
wisdom; I think this is the happiness of this eternal life, which the god obtained by lot,
that what happens does not escape his knowledge. If knowing and contemplating realities
were taken away from him, his immortality would not be life but merely time.180
Although our contemplation would differ in form from that of a god, one would suspect, our
philosophy is an imitation of its characteristic mode of existence. Plutarch concludes, “for this
reason, the search for truth, and especially about the gods, is a longing for the divine.”181
Although the imitation of god has theological and metaphysical ramifications, as the De sera
passage emphasizes, Plutarch is nevertheless deeply concerned with the ethical ramifications of
philosophy. To study physics is to study the divine ordering of the world; to practice ethics is to
imitate that order in your own soul. While the passage preserved by Stobaeus divides up

On the depiction of mind in Plutarch’s myths, see infra pg. 253.
“It is better to trust Plato and to say that the world came into being at the hands of god, as well as to say and sing
that it is the most beautiful of things that has come to be and he is the best of causes… and he brought it into
arrangement and order to provide likening to it as much as possible” (βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν
κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν “ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων ὁ δ’ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων” [Ti
29a]… εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὑτὴν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν ἐμπαρασχεῖν; 1014a-b). Plutarch
tends to use this strengthened term ἐξομοίωσις, although in a fragment of De nobilitate, he defines the quality of
good breeding at the “assimilation of justice” (καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἡ ὄντως εὐγένεια, ὁμοίωσις δικαιοσύνης; frg. 139
Sandbach = Stob. IV.29.21).
179
“And of all the things which Homer said about the gods, this was the most beautiful that he proclaimed: ‘truly
they share the same race and fatherland, but Zeus is older and knows more.’ He makes it clear that the reign of Zeus
is more august in knowledge and wisdom because it is older’” (καὶ τοῦτο κάλλιστα πάντων Ὅμηρος ὧν εἴρηκε περὶ
θεῶν ἀναφθεγξάμενος [Il. XIII.354-5] “ἦ μὰν ἀμφοτέροισιν ὁμὸν γένος ἠδ' ἴα πάτρη, / ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γεγόνει
καὶ πλείονα ᾔδει.” σεμνοτέραν ἀπέφηνε τὴν τοῦ Διὸς ἡγεμονίαν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ σοφίᾳ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν; 351d-e).
The same couplet of Homer appears in Quomodo adul. 32a.
180
σεμνοτέραν ἀπέφηνε τὴν τοῦ Διὸς ἡγεμονίαν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ σοφίᾳ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῆς αἰωνίου
ζωῆς, ἣν ὁ θεὸς εἴληχεν, εὔδαιμον εἶναι τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ προαπολείπειν τὰ γινόμενα (351e). See also Ammonius’
etymologies in De E 385b-c.
181
διὸ θειότητος ὄρεξίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας μάλιστα δὲ τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἔφεσις (351e). On the introduction to De Is.,
see especially Roskam (2015b).
177
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philosophy into parts, for the Chaeronean they are all related. Even when adapting a
characteristic idea of Middle Platonism, such as the ethical telos as likeness to god, Plutarch
intimately integrates it with the other aspects of his Platonizing philosophy.

Middle Platonism and the Hellenistic schools
Plutarch continuously interprets and evokes Plato for the proper orientation of ethical life,
the method to find truth hidden in traditional myths and practices, and fundamental assumptions
about the divine. Much of the scholarship of this period of philosophy, however, is mired in the
historiographical question of development, which often seems to entail the quest for “sources.”
The period of philosophy between Cicero’s youth in the early first century B.C.E. and the
flourishing of Plotinus’ school in the mid-third century C.E. is usually referred to as “Middle
Platonism.” Plutarch, writing between the late first and early second centuries C.E., evidently
falls in the middle of this period, such that scholarly debates on the development and nature of
Middle Platonism can often shape the conception of Plutarch. The only earlier figures are rather
shadowy, although Cicero presents some of the epistemological debate between the Academics
he studied with in Athens. While Philo of Larissa seems to have adopted a modified skepticism,
his student Antiochus seems to have adopted much of the positivistic Stoic epistemology,
founded on “comprehension” or “cognitive impression” (κατάληψις).182 As a result of this
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Cf. Cic. Acad. II.16-39 and Long (1974: 224). There is disagreement on the reliability of hostile sources such as
Cicero and Plutarch, but Brittain (2001) argues that Antiochus adopted all of Stoic epistemology. Cf. Bonazzi
(2012a): “… such a recasting of Platonist doctrine in Stoic terms has to be properly regarded not so much as a
historically detached reconstruction, but as an attempt at appropriating Stoic terms and doctrines in order to
subordinate Stoicism to Platonism. It is within this context that the issue of Antiochus’ possible influence on later
Platonism becomes important” (331); “In the battlefield of Platonism, Antiochus advanced so far beyond the Stoic
lines that he was viewed as a defector, an ally of the school he had tried to resourcefully to conquer” (333).

104
dispute, Antiochus claimed to be the true heir of the Academy, arguing for a unified system of
thought drawn from Plato and his followers, broadly defined to include Aristotle and Zeno.183
Evidently Cicero followed Philo in developing a skeptical, but thoroughly practical,
philosophical stance based on Plato.184 Yet Antiochus looms large in the scholarship as the
“founder” of dogmatic Platonism: older scholarship even held that Antiochus’ diplomatic travels
to Alexandria led to the establishment of a “school,” which eventually included Eudorus of
Alexandria. Although John Glucker sensibly notes that the diplomatic trip was far too brief to
meaningfully establish anything, the idea of Antiochean Platonism spreading to Alexandria
proves an appealing narrative.185 Heinrich Dörrie, however, emphasized another thread of
Eudorus’ thought, namely the emergence of Neopythagoreanism. 186 The trend of attributing
Plato’s thought back to Pythagoras is attested by the first century B.C.E. and seems to have
grown in the Imperial period187—it continues now, in a sense, in the scholarly debate over the
relationship between Plato, the Academy, and early Pythagoreanism.188 A Pythagorean in
183

Cf. Cic. Acad. I.35.133; see also I.46.143-47.144.
E.g. M. in Tusc. I.9.17: “I will press on for you and explain what you want, as I will be able, not like Pythian
Apollo, as if what I will say should be certain or fixed, but as one small man out of many, pursuing probable
inferences” (geram tibi morem et ea, quae uis, ut potero, explicabo, nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint
fixa quae dixero, sed ut homunculus unus e multis, probabilia coniectura sequens). He professes no ability to seek
beyond what “is similar to the truth” (ueri similia). After surveying various opinions on the nature of the soul, he
reiterates his skeptical distance from certainty: “a god could somehow see which of this opinions is true; what is
similar to the truth is a hard question” (harum sententiarum quae uera sit deus aliqui uiderit: quae ueri simillima
magna quaestio est; I.11.23). Cf. Long (1974: 229-31).
185
1978: 90-7.
186
1944. Eudorus’ date is based upon Strabo’s description of him as καθ’ ἡμᾶς (XVII.1.5). The fragments and
testimonies are collected by Mazzarelli (1985), but the “sicuri” (197-209) are far outweighed by the “non sicuri”
(535-55). Griffin (2009) also provides some of these in a useful appendix (410-5).
187
This is part of a broader phenomenon in the intellectual culture of the Roman Empire. Singer (2014), for
example, lists instances where Galen projected certain parts of Plato’s thought back onto Hippocrates (9n7).
188
The question, however, depends on the nature of Pythagoras and Pythagoreans in the Archaic and Classical
periods, which is notoriously difficult to reconstruct. Pythagoras has been viewed as either a heroic founder of
mathematics—e.g. by Sambursky (1956: 25-7)—or as an irrational “shaman”—e.g. by Dodds (1951: 143-6)—or
simply disregarded—e.g. Shorey (1927): “As for Pythagoras, of whom we know nothing, the wise reader turns the
page when he sees that name” (176). Much of the difficulty, as with the comparably difficult issue of sorting out
metaphysical distinctions between the early members of the Academy, depends on the interpretation of Aristotle’s
description of “the Pythagoreans,” whom he argues Plato largely drew upon. but Burkert (1972) influentially
reframed the question by separating Pythagoras’ religious thought and actions from later Pythagorean science and
184
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Porphyry’s Vita—plausibly Moderatus of Gades, a contemporary of Plutarch—evidently marks
an extreme in charging Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates with “usurping
the fruits” of Pythagoreanism with only slight modifications. 189 The scholarship is divided,
however, on the nature of Neopythagoreanism. Is it essentially a form of Platonism that might
well have even begun with Xenocrates, as John Dillon argues?190 Or is it a separate movement
with its own mixture of Plato, Aristotle, and earlier Pythagorean sources, as Troels EngbergPederson contends?191 In one fragment, Eudorus attributes a prior cause to both the monad and
the dyad—a thoroughly Platonic idea that scholars find in both the Philebus and Parmenides192—
mathematics. In particular, he assembles a strong argument that Plato alludes to Philolaus in Phlb. (218-238).
Burkert constructs his case by comparing possible fragments of Philolaus with Aristotle’s testimony, which he
argues proves their authenticity. Yet the debate continues. For the most recent, see Zhmud (2012). See also Riedweg
(2013), and the historiographical survey in Cornelli (2013: 1-51). On the further question of the relationship of Plato
and Pythagoreanism, Horky (2013) argues that Plato draws on Philolaus in the Crat. (125-66) and Phd. (167-99), as
well as a broader tradition of “mathematical Pythagoreans” in the Ti. especially (200-59). Cf. Cornelli (2013: 10021). The case of Plato’s heirs is similarly contentious. Philip (1966) presents a “reinterpretation” of Pythagoreanism,
particularly on the part of Speusippus, which eventually became authoritative (10-2). Dillon (1977) argues, “Again
and again in the doxographic tradition we have a Xenocratean doctrine or formulation attributed also to Pythagoras,”
which might mean that “he, along with Speusippus, becomes in effect the father of Neopythagoreanism” (38).
189
“As the Pythagoreans say, Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates usurped the fruits through
small changes…” (… τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη Σπεύσιππόν τε καὶ Ἀριστόξενον καὶ Ξενοκράτη, ὡς φασὶν οἱ
Πυθαγόρειοι, τὰ μὲν κάρπιμα σφετερίσασθαι διὰ βραχείας ἐπισκευῆς …; Porph. VP §53). The attribution to
Moderatus is usually inferred from Porphyry’s mention of him in §48, e.g. by Dillon (1977) and Zhmud (2012: 75).
Horky (2013) is more skeptical but suggests Moderatus and Nicomachus are “most likely” (261n1). Gorman (1979)
passionately adopts this sentiment (187), which, by invoking Numenius, he uses to classify all Neoplatonists instead
as Neopythagoreans: “Judged from their own lives and their writings they must be classed as Pythagoreans for their
whole purpose was to revive an interest in Orphico-Pythagorean mystical ideas to counter the rising sects of
Christians, Gnostics, Manichees and the host of other oriental cults now mushrooming everywhere in the Roman
empire” (189). See also 194-8.
190
Dillon (2014) defines it as “a branch of Platonism that emphasizes the role of number in the cosmos and which
regards Pythagoreanism as the origin of this emphasis” (250). He concludes, “Plutarch would never be regarded as
being on the ‘Neopythagorean’ wing of Platonism in the Imperial Age, represented by the figures of Moderatus of
Gades, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Numenius of Apamea, but there is no question that he knew a good deal about
Pythagoreanism, and in various important respects exhibits influence from this quarter” (266). See also Dillon
(1988, 2010); Zhmud (2012): “With few exceptions, all known neo-Pythagoreans of whom written works or
fragments are preserved were Platonists” (6).
191
2017: 10-3. He draws on Donini (1988b), among others. Cf. Opsomer (2017) in the same volume as EngbergPederson.
192
Dillon (1977): “Now Eudorus here is merely combining elements which were readily available to him from Plato,
if not from Old Pythagoreanism… from the Philebus (26e-30e) he could have gleaned the elements of this theory,
since the monad and the dyad are inevitably also Limit and Limitlessness, and the Cause above them, though not
called there the One, has a unifying purpose…” (127); Burkert (1972): “The distinction of a highest One above the
pair of opposites come from Pl. Parm. 137c-41d” (60). Aulus Gellius ascribes praise of Pythagoras to Plutarch and
Calvenus Taurus, but the former is for his estimation of the height of Hercules (I.1.1), and the latter the general zeal
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back to the collective “Pythagoreans” of old.193 It therefore seems that the Alexandrian better fits
the former conception. Additionally, many scholars argue that this branch of Neopythagoreanism
is particularly interested in synthesizing Aristotle as well as Plato into their account of
Pythagorean history.194 Roughly contemporaneously, Cicero’s Respublica depicts Scipio
explaining explains Plato’s un-Socratic pursuits and interests by appeal to the tradition of the
latter’s travels to Egypt and Magna Graeca, where he encountered “Archytas of Tarentum and
Timaeus Locrius and the commentaries of Philolaus.”195 In the fragmentary dialogue also entitled
Timaeus, Cicero seems to position Nigidius Figulus, whom he describes as a restorer of
Pythagoreanism, as an authority to give a Pythagorean account of the Platonic dialogue.196

of Pythagorean education compared to contemporary students who want to study merely Plato for the beauty or
titilation of his writing (I.9.8-11)—not exactly indications that they traced their metaphysics back to Pythagoras, in
the same way Eudorus may have. Cf. Numenius’ famous dictum, “for what is Plato other than Moses speaking in
Attic?” (τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων; Euseb., Praep. evang. XI.10.14). On the veracity of the attribution,
however, cf. Whittaker (1967), and, more skeptically, Edwards (1990).
193
καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δὲ οὐ τῶν φυσικὠν μόνων ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων ἁπλῶς μετὰ τὸ ἕν, ὃ πάντων ἀρχὴν ἔλεγον, ἀρχὰς
δευτέρας καὶ στοιχειώδεις τὰ ἐναντία ἐτίθεσαν, αἶς καὶ τὰς δύο συστοιχίας ὑπέταττον οὐκέτι κυρίως ἀρχαῖς οὔσιας.
γράφει δὲ περὶ τούτων ὁ Εὔδωρος τάδε· κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον φατέον τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴν τῶν
πάντων λέγειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον δύο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἶναι, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτῳ
φύσιν (Eudorus frg. 3 Mazzarelli = Simplicius, in Phys. 181.7-30). Bonazzi (2007) adduces parallels from
Pythagorean pseudepigrapha and argues that Plutarch, “a philosopher supposed to have been influenced by
Eurodus,” takes over this idea in the third of the Quaest. Plat. (369-71). Opsomer (2005), however, argues that this
is only one possibility to resolve a problem, unlikely to “represent [Plutarch’s] considered views” (196-7).
194
Bonazzi (2007) emphasizes Neopythagorean interest in Aristotle generally; this is also a prevalent theme in the
essays collected in Donini (2010). Similarly, see Turner (2001: 346-52). Cf. Dillon (1977: 133-5) and Dörrie (1981:
38-43).
195
Scipio explains Plato’s philosophy thus as an interweaving of two strands: “and so, because he loved Socrates
above all and wanted to attribute everything to him, he combined Socrates’ charm and subtlety of speech with
Pythagoras’ obscurity and dignified learning on many arts” (itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset, eique omnia
tribuere uoluisset, leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum illa
plurimarum artium grauitate contexuit; Resp. I.10.16). The context indicatively pertains to natural science: Scipio is
arguing to Tubero, who is enthusiastic about investigating an eclipse, that Socrates himself was not interested in
physical inquiries (§15), although Tubero characterizes the Pythagorean way (Pythagorae more) as the study of
“numbers, geometry, and harmony” (numeros tamen geometriam et harmoniam; §16). See also Tusc. I.17.39 and
Piso in Fin. V.29.87. Apuleius continues the biographical tradition and adds Parmenides and Zeno, such that Plato’s
philosophy is divided into parts: “physics from the Pythagoreans, logic from the Eleatics, and ethics from the very
source, Socrates” (naturalis a Pythagoreis, de Eleaticis rationalis atque moralis ex ipso Socratis fonte; De dog. Plat.
I.3); see also Flor. XV.26. Aulus Gellius mentions that Plato bought three books of Philolaus for an outrageous sum
(III.17.1), which apparently occasioned a vitriolic claim from Timon of Philus that such a purchase was the source
for the Timaeus (§6). Philip (1966) speculates that Aristoxenus was Timon’s source (13-4).
196
Cicero declares that Nigidius Figulus was be a figurehead in the restoration (renouaret) of the “all but extinct
teaching of those noble Pythagoreans” (… illos nobiles Pythagoreos, quorum disciplina extincta est quodam modo;
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Plutarch does appeal at one point to “Zaratas, the teacher of Pythagoras,” to characterize the
monad and the dyad in his description of Xenocrates’ interpretation of the composition of the
world soul.197 This is no indication, however, that Plutarch has a broader agenda of explaining
Platonic metaphysics through Pythagorean sources. Given the context, it could well be that he is
simply summarizing Xenocrates’ own appeal to a Pythagorean authority.
Through these two strands especially, posing philosophical genealogies that hinge upon
Antiochean and Eudorean, scholars argue that Platonists such as Plutarch are adopting Stoic,
Aristotelian, or Neopythagorean ideas, if not some combination of various Hellenistic schools. 198

Ti. §1), apparently reflecting the Roman phenomenon of Neopythagoreanism. Rawson (1980), however, argues that
Varro, based on explicitly Pythagorean passages such as Ling. V.11, has a better claim on Neopythagoreanism; cf.
Flinterman (2014: 345). Cicero describes Nigidius as a fitting interlocutor on the Platonic dialogue because he was
“a sharp and diligent researcher of the things that nature seems to have hidden” (… tum acer inuestigator et diligens
earum rerum, quae a natura inuolutae uidentur; Ti. §1), presumably, as Sedley (2013) argues, Cicero positioned
Nigidius as a Pythagorean expert because he expected for a Pythagorean exegesis to be fitting for Plato’s Ti. Hoenig
(2018) suggests that he is positioned as “a Neopythagorean, likely to be aligned with Plato,” in contrast to Cicero’s
explicitly Carneadian stance (48), but argues that the extant translation is Cicero’s “probabilistic” account (49).
These Roman philosophers are perhaps motivated by the particularly Italian claim on Pythagorean antiquity, on
which see further Flinterman (2014: 341-53), Volk (2016). Numa looms large in this tradition. According to Livy, in
two caskets (lapideae arcae) were found on the foot of the Janiculum in 181 B.C.E., which each bore inscriptions in
Latin and Greek, one purporting to be his tomb and the other to contain his books (XL.29.3-5). One evidently
contained seven books in Latin and seven in Greek, which the annalist Valerius Antias deemed to be “Pythagorean,
to bring probability and belief to the commonly held lie that Numa was a student of Pythagoras” (adicit Antias
Valerius Pythagoricos fuisse, uulgatae opinioni, qua creditur Pythagorae auditorem fuisse Numam, mendacio
probabili accommodata fide; §7-8). Plutarch’s Vita of the king notes that the historicity of his supposed association
is much disputed (1.2-3, 8.4-10), such that it would be “youthful and quarrelsome” (μειρακιώδους ἐστὶ φιλονεικίας)
to press it too far, although he notes further similarities in many of his “precepts” (παραγγελμάτων αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τοῖς
Πυθαγορικοῖς ἐοικότα; 14.3.1, cf. 22.4). See also Vit. Aem. 2.1-3. Plutarch more skeptically records the other main
tradition about Numa (e.g. Ov. Fast. III.151-4), his consultation with or marriage to the goddess Egeria (Vit. Numa
4.2; cf. 13.1 and 15.5). The Greek tradition of reading the Timaeus as a Pythagorean dialogue is especially
represented by the pseudepigrapha, first attested by Nicomachus (§11). On the titles attributed to Timaeus in ancient
and Byzantine catalogues, see Timpanaro Cardini (2010: 615-9).
197
“And Zaratas the teacher of Pythagoras calls [the indefinite dyad] the mother and the one the father” (καὶ
Ζαράτας ὁ Πυθαγόρου διδάσκαλος ταύτην μὲν ἐκάλει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μητέρα τὸ δ’ ἓν πατέρα; 1012e). Plutarch’s
citation of Pythagoras between Plato and Xenocrates in a list in De Is. might similarly reflect the latter’s own
Pythagoreanizing interests (360d = frg. 24 Heinze), although the fourth and final inclusion is Chrysippus.
198
A thread of older scholarship depicts Middle Platonism as “eclectic” by nature, drawing from every possible
source. E.g. Clark (1940): “All schools, perhaps with the exception of Epicureanism, contributed to form his views.
From Stoicism, which he attacked in general, he accepted some points in particular; even skepticism had its
influence, in that mysticism and dependence on revelation are often the counterparts of distrust in reason. Plato,
however, is the chief source of his thought, and so he may be properly described as an eclectic Platonists” (115); he
also describes “the resuscitation of Pythagoreanism” as “the next development leading on to Plutarch” (108). Donini
(1988b) traces the negative valuation behind the term ‘eclectic’ to Kant through Zeller and later (22-31). See further
Hatzimichali (2011) and, on Plutarch, Dillon (1988: 107-13).
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From Zeno onwards, Stoics also drew on Plato, and particularly the Timaeus;199 although Middle
Platonists, definitionally, present themselves as the true heirs of Plato, his authority was claimed
by Stoics and Peripatetics as well, meaning that Stoic positions may influence how Platonists
read Plato themselves, perhaps even leading some to “appropriate” Stoic positions.200 The most
plausible example in Plutarch’s case is perhaps the conception of god as immanent in the world
as well as transcendent.201 Other claims strain credulity, such as Gretchen Reydams-Schil’s
argument that Plutarch could only access the idea of the imitation of god through the Stoics
because he could not return directly to the Old Academy. His engagement with Xenocrates, both
in his explicit adoption of some of his ideas and his targeted critique, is far too extensive for him
to be relying solely on some shadowy intermediary source.202 Arguments that Plutarch adopts
Peripatetic positions regarding natural science and especially ethics are more common.203

199

See Reydams-Schils (1999). Moreau (1939) already identified the Platonic world soul as a major influence on
Zeno and subsequent Stoics. Cf. Rist (1969) on Chrysippus and Posidonius: “… work of the highest caliber,
representing a view of the world and of man sharply opposed to the theories of Plato and Aristotle…” (vii-viii); “As
for the general psychological doctrines, so here too can there be little doubt in the mind of the unbiased reader of the
evidence that it was his interest in Plato’s Timaeus which led to Posidonius’ heresies” (265).
200
Engberg-Pedersen (2017), for instance, describes “the rise of dogmatic Platonism, Aristotelianism and
Pythagoreanism in the first century BCE” and the “inevitable” conflict with Stoicism, which led to some
“‘subordinating appropriation’” by these new groups, taking individual phrases or ideas and integrating them into
their systems, rather than letting contradictory ideas uneasily sit side by side.
201
Whittaker (1981) argues that Quaest. Plat. II is aimed at finding “support in the Timaeus for a basic theme of
Stoic pantheism, and to reconcile this theme with the conception of the transcendent God,” insofar as “maker”
represents what Whittaker takes to be Plutarch’s “transcendent” god, and “father” the “immanent”—“in that rational
soul within the universe is not merely his off-spring but literally a part of himself” (51-2). He goes on to argue that
this was a second century commonplace. Cf. Brenk (2017: 78-80). O’Brien (2015) argues further for “Stoic
influence” on the idea of the demiurge, both on Plutarch (87-111) and Platonism more broadly (4-11).
202
Nikolaidis (1999), for instance, emphasizes “Plutarch’s allegiance to the Academy, more precisely to the
philosophy of Plato as expounded in the Academy, is more or less commonly agreed. Although there are cases
where Plutarch appears to take distances from a particular Platonic doctrine or to disagree with certain Academic
interpretations of Plato, he nevertheless regarded himself as a Platonic philosopher conscientiously adhering to the
teachings of Plato and the Academy” (397). He plausibly argues that Plutarch defended the continuity of the
Academy (especially 399-400). Cf. Opsomer (2005), especially on Antiochus (169n18).
203
Jones (1916) lists potential ethical parallels in Plato and Aristotle (13n39), but cf. Babut (1996). Meeusen (2016)
summarizes some of the broader debate over Plutarch’s explicit citations of Aristotle (68-72). Karamanolis (2006)
offers a balanced account. Plutarch is certainly not as hostile to Aristotle as Atticus, who characteristically conducts
a wholesale attack on Aristotelian ethics (frg. 2 = Euseb. Praep. evang. XV.4). See further infra pg. 153. Teodorsson
(1999) claims that Plutarch’s understanding of natural science is essentially Aristotelian. Plutarch certainly draws
widely on him for facts about the natural world, e.g. in the dialogue De sollertia animalium, in which where two
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Scholars particularly emphasize the role of metriopatheia, the idea that the passions should be
moderated rather than eliminated entirely, especially in the essay De virtute morali;204 Plato had
already, although often overlooked, formulated the idea in the Politicus and suggests it in the
Respublica.205 Plutarch, moreover, does not normally use Aristotelian metaphysical language, as
Apuleius and Alcinous do with “activity” and “potentiality.”206 Other Middle Platonic works,
such as the anonymous papyrus commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus, might betray more of an

young men contend over whether land or sea animals are more intelligent through catalogues of examples (cf. 965de). Museen (2014), however, argues that Plutarch distinctively does not follow adopt Aristotle’s idea of scientific
method (20n54).
204
The treatise presents Aristotle, moreover, as a philosopher who rightly followed Plato’s psychology for the most
part in the beginning, but later strayed wrongly in the development of his own philosophy (ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς
ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ πλέον Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν· ὕστερον δὲ…; 442b). Cf. 447f-8a. On the ethical and
polemical content of this treatise, see Opsomer (2005: 180-3). It begins by criticizing various Stoics for their failure
to make distinctions about what the soul is (a prefatory question for what makes a soul virtuous) and offers what he
presents as Plato’s view as a correction. The aim of the tract is prudence or practical wisdom, but it opens with the
prefatory necessity of an inquiry into the soul: “about the virtue which is called by and known as ‘ethical,’ which
differs most of all from theoretical virtue in that it has emotion as its material and reason as its form, it is the first
task to say what essence it has and what its nature is” (περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς λεγομένης ἀρετῆς καὶ δοκούσης, ᾧ δὴ
μάλιστα τῆς θεωρητικῆς διαφέρει, τῷ τὸ μὲν πάθος ὕλην ἔχειν τὸν δὲ λόγον εἶδον, εἰπεῖν πρόκειται τίνα τ’ οὐσίαν
ἔχει καὶ πῶς ὑφίστασθαι πέφυκε; 440d). Plutarch explicates that the point of the doxography is not exhaustiveness,
but rather that his own arguments become clearer and tighter (βέλτιον δὲ βραχέως ἐπιδραμεῖν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων,
οὐχ ἱστορίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ σαφέστερα γενέσθαι τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ βεβαιότερα προεκτεθέντων ἐκείνων, 440e). It
discusses the positions of four Stoics on the nature of virtue, including Chrysippus (440e-1b), and culminates in a
summary of the common ground of their position, that there is only a rational soul (καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ
παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει [ψυχῆς] τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ὃδὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ
ἡγεμονικόν, …) and that virtue is a disposition or power of this (441c). Stoics are a recurrent target in the treatise:
e.g., καίτοι πάλιν αὐτοὶ (449b); ᾗ καί φασιν αὐτοί… αὐτός τε Χρύσιππος (449c); καὶ αὐτοὶ (450b); αὐτοί τέ φασι
(451b). On Plutarch’s handling of the Stoic arguments, see further Ingenkamp (1999). The authenticity of the
dialogue had been questioned in the past, most recently by Hartman (1916: 203-209), but it is now usually upheld,
but this treatise is one of Dillon’s (1977) principle sources for Plutarch’s ethics (193-196). Dillon, moreover,
characterizes it as markedly “Aristotelian” and from its tone “early, even perhaps an essay written while Plutarch
was still attending Ammonius’ Academy” (193). Teodorsson (1999) took there to be a consensus that Plutarch’s
ethics are “basically Aristotelian,” such that other aspects of his thought might turn out to be basically Aristotelian
as well (674); he later (2010) argues, however, that not only argued are Plutarch’s ethics are built on his
interpretation of Plato, but further that “Plutarch’s cosmology should certainly be regarded as a plausible exegesis
rather than a misrepresentation of Plato’s account of the construction of the World-Soul” (434); “although this
suggests Aristotelian inspiration, it is Plutarch’s own interpretation of Plato’s cosmology that forms the theoretic
basis for” De vir. Mor. (430). Cf. Simonetti (2017): “… he combines Peripatetic and mostly Pythagorean elements,
and develops a doctrine that is ultimately consonant with his spirit of a committed Platonist” (180).
205
Plt. 283d-4d. Cf. Annas (1999: 130-1). See also Pl. Resp. X.603e and Leg. X.959a-d. Plutarch praises his wife,
on the other hand, for maintaining calmness after their first child died (Con. ad uxor. 608d-e).
206
See further infra pg. 128.
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Antiochean mindset.207 There is some dispute, moreover, on how much of the Aristotelian corpus
was actually known to Plutarch.208 There are further historiographical reasons to doubt the older
scholarly reconstruction of a chain from Antiochus to Apuleius through Albinus and the
shadowy “school of Gaius,” which is supposed to explain the link between Plutarch and
Apuleius by way of Arius Didymus. It has been shown to be entirely circular and baseless by
Tryggve Göransson, although it still lingers on.209

207

The commentary was first published by Diels & Schubart (1905), who suggest an affinity with Albinus and the
Didask. Cf. Dillon (1977: 270-1). Tarrant (1983), however, argues that it was written rather by Eudorus (179), if not
another first century B.C.E. author (cf. 162-3). He also suggests that Plutarch drew upon the interpretation of
midwifery in In Tht. in Quaest. Plat. I (166-7, with fns 55-7). The Didask. is often dated to be later than Plutarch,
e.g. by Dillon (1977: 206). The authorship of the treatise is still disputed, particularly between those who assign it to
the manuscript’s otherwise unknown Alcinous, such as Dillon (1993: ix-xiii), and to the attested 2nd century
Platonist Albinus, such as Hershbell (1991). Whittaker 1987) is particularly vehement against the latter position. A
further issue is the extent to which the treatise is dependent on “sources” other than Plato, Aristotle (whose
terminology he uses often), and various Stoics. Perhaps he was influenced by Plutarch himself, as Loenen (1957: 468, 46fn2) suggests. The older scholarship has a tendency to favor Posidonius—as Shorey (1938) calls him, “lost
Posidonius, whom German ingenuity reconstructs” (36)—but cf. already Jones (1926: 105-8). More recently, Dillon
(1993) has taken a reminiscence of the 1st century AD Stoic Arius Didymus in XII.1 to mean that he must have been
the “major source in all of this [physical] section” (114); others take Arius and the Alcinous to share a common
source, such as Annas (1999), who in turn uses Arius as a source for Middle Platonism (1n1). The interpretive
assumption that Alcinous was not reading the relevant classical philosophers himself, however, seems unwarranted,
as Runia (1986) argues against Dillon (1977: 285).
208
Sandbach (1982): “My conclusion is that Plutarch or his sources knew of Topica, Metaphysics, Nicomachean
Ethics, Historia Animalium, Rhetoric III, and probably of De Caelo and De Anima. Direct acquaintance with the
contents is certain only for Historia Animalium and Rhetoric III…” (229). He notes greater awareness of lost
exoteric texts, such as the Eudemus (cf. 210). There have been increasing attempts, on the other hand, to find lost
dialogues of Aristotle lurking behind the text of Plutarch, especially in De fac., above all at the hands of Bos (1989).
He is followed, for instance, by Lanzillotta (2012: 5-8).
209
Evidently Albinus, of whom there is still an extant Prolegomena to Plato—including a section on the divisions of
the dialogues (§3) similar to DL III.49—was a student of Gaius apparently around the 140’s C.E., since Galen
studied with another student of Gaius when he was in Pergamum (Aff. dig. VIII.41). Cf. Singer (2014: 21).
Doxographies in Stobaeus attributed to “Arius” or have been connected with the Stoic Arius Didymus to explain the
connection between Antiochus (or Posidonius) and Albinus, such as by Witt (1937: 95-8). Cf. Dillon (1977: 337-8).
Whittaker (1987) more thoroughly attacks the connection between Albinus and the Didask., the latter of which he
successfully argues should be attributed to an Alcinous, but the narrative persists, such as in Harrison's (2000)
modification (196-7). Göransson (1995), however, attacks every element of the general account of the similarities,
dates, and influences of these philosophical sources: the Didask. and Apuleius’ De dog. Plat. are more dissimilar
than they appear, there is no evidence that the Arius text should be attributed to the 1st century B.C.E. Didymus
beyond the shared given name, there is no evidence that the Didask. was from the 2nd century C.E. other than the
previous identification with the “school of Gaius.” Arius’ text is only held to be 1 st century B.C.E. because of the
unfounded identification of him with Augustus’ Didymus, and Alcinous’ is only held to be 2 nd century C.E. because
of the now usually rejected assumption of Albinus’ authorship (133-6). He argues, moreover, that it is equally
possible if not more likely, that in the one substantial parallel Arius’ argument was in fact following that of Alcinous
(202). Between Alcinous and Apuleius, he concedes narrow band of similarities, but qualifies: “The result of our
comparison between Apuleius’ second book and chapters 27-34 of the Didaskalikos is that there exist very close
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Eudorus’ influence is usually held to reach Plutarch through his fellow-Alexandrian
teacher, Ammonius.210 Perluigi Donini adduces two passages in De virtute and De Iside where he
detects a Hellenistic pseudo-Pythagorean source lying behind Plutarch’s presentation of
Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle in a single doxography.211 The relevant question, however, is if
Plutarch usually attributes the ideas in Plato back to unnamed Pythagoreans, as Eudorus and
Moderatus do, or Pythagoras himself, as Numenius does.212 Plutarch does not. Rather, Plato is
presented in both as the primary authority. When he does discuss Pythagoras—including in a
symposiastic vignette with Moderatus’ student Lucius—it is most often in the context of purity
and abstention from certain foods, particularly meat.213 He does engage with unnamed

parallels between certain sections of the two works, but that the great bulk of Apuleius’ text does not exhibit any
similarity to the corresponding parts of Alcinous’ work. The only possible explanation for this fact is that, as we
have assumed from the beginning of our investigation, both texts are compilations from a multiplicity of sources,
and the two authors, in those sections in which the parallels are found, have used the same source or two closely
related sources, but that in the other sections they build on different sources,” listing “classification of the good,”
“virtue and vice,” and “friendship and love” as the only topics of parallel sections (181). Moreschini (2015),
stressing the similarity in ethics at least, argues for Antiochus as the common source for Apuleius and Alcinous (and
Arius Didymus) (24). Hatzimichali (2017) re-examines the evidence and suggests a date “between 100 BCE and 100
CE,” although cautioning against the identification with Augustus’ court philosopher (86). See also Long (1996).
210
E.g. Tarrant (2000): Ammonius’ “Egyptian name may or may not indicate that he had received his training in
Egypt, but must indicate some kind of Egyptian connection that might explain how Plutarch had come to know the
detailed work of Eudorus” (82). Very little was known about Ammonius except from Plutarch, even in Late
Antiquity. Comparing Philostratus’ V S, Eunapius laments: “but of the philosophers, no one has accurately taken
record: among them, there is Ammonius the Egyptian, the teacher of Plutarch the most divine, and Plutarch himself,
the charm and the lyre of all philosophy” (φιλοσόφων δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀκριβὠς ἀνέγραψεν· ἐν οἷς Ἀμμώνιός τε ἦν ὁ ἐξ
Αἰγύπτου, Πλουτάρχου τοῦ θειοτάτου γεγονὼς διδάσκαλος, Πλούταρχός τε αὐτός, ἡ φιλοσοφίας ἁπάσης ἀφροδίτη
καὶ λύρα; §454). When he claims slightly later that Plutarch “scattered his own and his teacher’s lives throughout
each of his books,” (ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδιον καὶ τὸν τοῦ διδασκάλου καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν βιβλίων ἐγκατέσπειρεν), such that
someone can find them if they zealously search (ὥστε, εἴ τις ὀξυδορκοίη περὶ ταῦτα, …), it seems clear that this
Eunapius himself learned about Ammonius through such a search of Plutarch’s works.
211
Donini (1992a). Cf. [Plut.] De lib. educ. 2c.
212
E.g. as Calcidius describes: “Numenius, from the school of Pythagoras, refutes this Stoic idea of principles
through the doctrine of Pythagoras, to which, he says, the Platonic doctrine coheres. He says that Pythagoras calls
god by the name of singularity, but material by that of duality…” (Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum
hoc de initiis dogma refellens Pythagorae dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram deum
quidem singularitatis nomine nominasse, siluam uero duitatis; §295 = frg. 52 des Places). Numenius evidently holds
that some Pythagoreans misunderstood the master but claims both Socrates and Plato were true Pythagoreans (frg.
24). He, like Cicero, however, nevertheless presents Plato as a perfect intermediate (ἀνὴρ μεσεύων) of Pythagoras
and Socrates, “mixing them into one” (αὐτὸ τοῦτο κεράσας): “he appeared more of the people than the former, and
more reverent than the latter” (τοῦ μὲν δημοτικώτερος, τοῦ δὲ σεμνότερος ὤφθη; Euseb. Praep. evang. XIV.5.9).
213
Lucius, “a certain student of the Pythagorean Moderatus,” sees Philinus abstaining from partaking in meat and, as
one would expect (οἷον εἰκὸς), was impelled into discussing the thought of Pythagoras (ταῦτ’ ἐπαινέσας ὁ Σύλλας
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Pythagoreans in the numerological portion of the De animae procreatione, which is also the
most explicitly Eudorian in the corpus, in that the Alexandrian appears twice. Yet even on the
significance of numbers, Plutarch is rather ambivalent about both. Sometimes they are helpful
for understanding Plato’s difficult ideas—such as his use of the ratio of the ratio of 256:243,
known as the λεῖμμα, in his detailed description of the Demiurge’s harmonization of the world
soul214—but at other times they depart from Plato, to their detriment.215 Rather than tracing

προσεῖπε περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν, ὡς μάλιστα μὲν ἐγεύοντο τῶν ἱεροθύτων ἀπαρξάμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς, ἰχθύων δὲ
θύσιμος οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἱερεύσιμός ἐστιν; Quaest. conv. VIII.8.727c). They turn to interpreting a Pythagorean symbola
(συμβόλοις; 727c and 728b; see further infra pg. 178), but in the next vignette the same characters discuss
abstention from fish, referring to tropes such as Pythagorean secrecy and silence (especially 728c-f; see also De Is.
363f-4a). They introduce, however, variations in the dietary restrictions: “Sulla agreed and added about the
Pythagoreans that they tasted mostly of sacrifices they offered to the gods, and there is no sacrifice or dedication of
fish” (μάλιστα μὲν ἐγεύοντο τῶν ἱεροθύτων ἀπαρξάμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς, ἰχθύων δὲ θύσιμος οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἱερεύσιμός
ἐστιν; VIII.9.729c). Cf. Numa VIII.8, De Iside 353c-e. Plutarch begins the first tract of De esu carnium with the
feint, “while you ask for what reason Pythagoras abstained from eating meat, I marvel at what passion—what kind
of soul—possessed the first man to touch slaughter to his mouth…” (ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν ἐρωτᾷς τίνι λόγῳ Πυθαγόρας
ἀπείχετο σαρκοφαγίας, ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάζω καὶ τίνι πάθει καὶ ποίᾳ ψυχῇ [ἢ λόγῳ] ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἥψατο φόνου
στόματι; 993a). See also De cap. ex amic. util. 86d and Autobulus in De soll. an. 959d-6a. In the second De esu
Plutarch refers to the argument that metempsychosis, the transmigration of souls into different sorts of creatures,
implies the necessity of vegetarianism—cf. e.g. Emped. frgs. B136-7 Diels, Ov. Met. XV.143-75, Riedweg (2013:
49)—but he notes a hesitance to rely on it (998d). Cf. frg. 122 Sandbach, Porph. VP §15; Tsekourakis (1986: 128,
135-8). Although Plutarch himself is evidently at times ambivalent about eating meat (e.g. Quaest. conviv.
VIII.9.729f-30a)—perhaps, because as Brenk argues, these are youthful works, while maturity softened his
vegetarian zeal—he consistently associates the question with Pythagoras and his followers. See also Newmyer
(2006: 18-23, 90-2). See also Sen. Ep. CVIII.17-21, Solon in Plut. Conv. sept. sap. 159b-e. The origins and
distinctiveness of a “Pythagorean” abstention from animal products in earlier antiquity are difficult to elucidate It
might be inherent in the “Pythagorean way of life” (Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον… τοῦ βίου) mentioned by Socrates in
Resp. X.600b, although abstention from meat is not mentioned in some earlier sources, such as Hdt. IV.95 and Isoc.
Bus. 28-9; cf. Zhmud (2012) on the evidence from comedy (179-83). Plato describes “so-called Orphic lives”
(Ὀρφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι βίοι) in the Leg., however, as explicitly abstaining from animal products (VI.782c-d).
There may be overlapping elements between the two: see Bernabé (2013: 144-6), Edmonds (2013: 217-25), and
Betegh (2014: 155-6). The practice of abstinence from flesh attracted some fierce adherents among the
Neoplatonists, such as Porphyry (Abst.) and Proclus (Mar. Vit. Proc. §12, cf. §19).
214
Ti. 36b, quoted in Plut. De an. proc. 1027c and 1020b). Plutarch also notes that “Pythagoreans” (here apparently
agreeing with Plato) call the difference between the two terms, thirteen, by the term λεῖμμα (1017e-f). See further
De an. proc. 1018e, 1027c, and 1020b. Plutarch also notes that “Pythagoreans” (here apparently agreeing with Plato)
call the difference between the two terms, thirteen, by the term λεῖμμα (1017e-f). See further 1018e.
215
The Pythagorean τετρακτύς (1027f) is distinct from the Platonic (1017d, 1022a), and the Platonic is “by far more
elegant in its arrangement and more complete than the Pythagorean” (ὥστε πολὺ τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς τὴν Πλατωνικὴν
τετρακτὺν ποικιλωτέραν εἶναι τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τελειοτέραν; 1019b). It easier, however, to discern Plato’s opinion of
what the λεῖμμα is, however, if you “briefly call to mind the customary things in Pythagorean discourses” (πρότερον
δὲ τί τὸ λεῖμμα ἐστι καὶ τίς ἡ διάνοια τοῦ Πλάτωνος μᾶλλον κατόψεσθε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν ταῖς Πυθαγορικαῖς σχολαῖς
λέγεσθαι βραχέως ὑπομνησθέντες; 1020e). Eudorus is similarly appealed to in 1019e, but dismissed in favor of
Plutarch’s interpretation, because the latter is “more harmonious with Plato” (τοῖς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος λεγομένοις
συμφωνότερόν ἐστιν; 1020c). Eudorus cited as “following Crantor” (ἐπακολουθήσας Κράντορι), but see also the
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Platonic mathematics back to Pythagorean roots, he is distinguishing two separate systems to
show where the latter can be helpful or misleading. He does, however, refer to Pythagorean
identifications of divine names with numbers, which characters in De E seem to adopt in their
speeches, although Plutarch allows them only with heavy qualification in De Iside et Osiride.216
Indicatively, since he traces the origins of Pythagorean symbolism to Egyptian symbolism, he
attributes this numerological practice back to the Egyptians as well.217
The dialogue De genio Socratis presents the most difficult evidence to analyze: it
includes an explicitly Pythagorean character Theanor, who has come from Croton to assure that
his dead companion had received a fitting (Pythagorean?) burial.218 More complicated is that the
central exposition, in the form of a myth, is given by Simmias, familiar from Plato’s Phaedo,
whom some scholars see as himself a Pythagorean.219 Theanor praises the speech then gives his
own, which includes a memorable depiction of the daemones of the dead cheering on the
virtuous as they contend with the contest of life.220 Yet Simmias’ speech shares striking
similarities with Plutarch’s other myths, which have no Pythagorean dressing whatsoever, and

other mathematicians from Soli in 1022c-e. Whether Eudorus is responsible for Plutarch’s citations of unspecified
“Pythagoreans” is possible but not certain.
216
“We should not honor these, but we should honor the divine that works through them, as the clearest mirrors and
instantiations through their nature, because we must recognize the implement or mechanism of the god ordering the
world” (οὐ ταῦτα τιμῶντας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων τὸ θεῖον, ὡς ἐναργεστέρων ἐσόπτρων καὶ φύσει γεγονότων, ὥστ’
ὄργανον ἢ τέχνην δεῖ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος θεοῦ νομίζειν; 382a). For more evidence on the Pythagorean practice,
see Zhmud (2012: 195n102). In De E, the young Plutarch identifies the pentad with “marriage,” while Ammonius
describes god as τὸ ἕν: “thus then one must act piously and greet him with the salutation, ‘you are,’ or even, by
Zeus, as some of the ancients did, ‘you are one’” (οὕτως οὖν αὐτὸν δεῖ σεβομένους ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ προσαγορεύειν,
“εἶ,” καὶ νὴ Δία, ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν παλαιῶν, “εἶ ἕν;” 393b). On the referent, cf. Thum (2013: 255-62)
217
“The Pythagoreans arranged numbers and figures with the appellations of the gods” (οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ
ἀριθμοὺς καὶ σχήματα θεῶν ἐκόσμησαν προσηγορίαις; De Is. 381f); cf. 354f-5a and De E 388c. Plutarch uses the
story of Pythagoras’ journey to Egypt to explain aspects of his thought. See further infra pg. 178.
218
579f. Varro evidently also received a distinctively Pythagorian burial (Pythagorio modo), according to Pliny,
which entailed a casket made of ephemeral and light materials (XXXV.46.160).
219
E.g. Brenk (1977): “Since the members of the discussion are of the Pythagorean brotherhood, Plutarch has filled
the dialogue with Pythagorean overtones…” (139). He argues that “the Pythagorean interpretation of the daimones,”
however, is “principally” contained within Theanor’s speech.
220
593d-4b. Detienne (1963) has argued extensively that this conception of the daemon is distinctively Pythagorean,
projecting the Plutarchean myth back to even the shadowy early Pythagoreans. Cf. Koning (2010: 166n24).
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there is not anything in Theanor’s speech that stands out as un-Platonic.221 What we are left to
conclude, it seems, is that Plutarch is not as outwardly hostile to the Neopythagoreans, as he is to
the Stoics and especially Epicureans, but he does not share in the characteristic Neopythagorean
agenda of proving Plato’s Pythagoreanism.222 When he does construct doxographies to explain
Plato’s place in philosophy, it is rather as the metaphysician who corrected the flaws in
Anaxagoras’ teleology and so, for the first time, explained causation—a lineage he adapts from
Plato’s Phaedo and repeats in several places.223
This tendency in the scholarship to explain Middle Platonism through Eudorus, like the
earlier trend of Antiochus, is now attracting criticism.224 Both are perhaps motivated by
conceptions of Plotinus’ Platonism, which even among his students and colleagues could be
understood either as an extension of Pythagoreanism or a blending of Stoicism and Aristotle into
Plato.225 Plutarch, however, usually depicts his characters as appealing to the Academy, and a

Lamberton (2001), however, argues that Theanor is pointedly ignored: “Undaunted, Theanor picks up the
theological rhetoric of the myth and delivers a stream of inflated, groundless, soteriological bombast that
exemplifies Galaxidoros said earlier about the damage that Pythagoras had done to philosophy. This is met by a
wonderfully bathetic silence and a return to the world of action” (187). See also Dillon (2010: 143-4).
222
In one of the Quaest. conv., Florus does claim that Plato “mixed Lycurgus in with Socrates no less than
Pythagoras, as Dicaearchus thought” (τῷ Σωκράτει τὸν Λυκοῦργον ἀναμιγνὺς οὐχ ἦττον ἢ τὸν Πυθαγόραν <ὡς>
ᾤετο Δικαίαρχος; VIII.2.719). Dillon (2010) misleadingly cites as evidence that for Plutarch “Plato combines the
spirit of Socrates with that of Pythagoras, and it is that combination which in his view makes Plato the supreme
philosopher” (143). Cf. Jaeger (1948). The context of the full vignette weighs against this being Plutarch’s meaning,
however. The character of Plutarch gives an exegesis of the Ti. as the last speech, and the rest of Florus’ speech—
fittingly for a Roman politician, consul in 75 C.E. under Vespasian, cf. Stadter (2015: 34-6, 40-2)—focuses on
Lycurgus, not Pythagoras. This gives the citation of Dicaearchus a certain edge: the pure materialist advocate of the
active life attacks both Plato and Pythagoras for their beliefs about the soul, and the latter for his political failures.
See Huffman (2014).
223
See infra pg. 285.
224
Moreschini (2015) compares old claims of Poseidonius’ and Antiochus’ influence over Middle Platonism:
“Eudorus of Alexandria has recently been considered instead of Antiochus. This philosopher was in some way
‘rediscovered’ by Dörrie in now distant 1944” (21). Hatzimichali (2017) is more dismissive, casting him along with
Philo of Larissa as “two figures who were never particularly prominent in the history of philosophy and whose
works do not seem to have achieved much circulation, judging from the small number of surviving direct
quotations” (85). See also Zeller (1955: 306).
225
Porphyry attests that his former teacher Longinus held the former—describing Plotinus in a letter as “he who, as
it seems, brought Pythagorean and Platonic principles into a clearer interpretation than those who came before” (ὃς
μὲν τὰς Πυθαγορείους ἀρχὰς καὶ Πλατωνικάς, ὡς ἐδόκει, πρὸς σαφεστέραν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καταστησάμενος
ἐξήγησιν; §20)—while Porphyry himself explained Plotinus’ achievement as “mixing in hidden dogmas of the
221
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line of recent scholarship has increasingly questioned whether he might be better understood in
light of the skeptical Academy—although what that might represent by the second century C.E.
is rather daunting to attempt to explain. Much of the debate centers around to what degree there
is a break between different phases of the Academy as Antiochus contended, which manifests
especially in the question of skepticism versus dogmatism—a subject that Diogenes Laertius
treats as well-trodden question by his day.226 This has been an especially contentious topic in the
case of Plutarch, who, according to the Lamprias catalogue, wrote a treatise on the unity of the
Academy.227 John Glucker, for instance, argues that the Academy as an institution had long
ceased to function by the time of Plutarch, but nevertheless identifies some strands of Academic
skepticism in Plutarch’s explicit citations of Carneades and similar philosophers.228 These
citations are restricted to the polemical anti-Epicurean and anti-Stoic works, however, which
prompts him to a propose a developmental scheme of a dogmatic youth and a skeptical maturity,
which is meant to explain Plutarch’s influence on his student Favorinus, who in turn
distinguished his own form of “skepticism” from the extreme Pyrrhonians.229 On the other hand,

Stoics and the Peripatetics, even condensing the core of Aristotle’s treatise Metaphysica” (ἐμμέμικται δ' ἐν τοῖς
συγγράμμασι καὶ τὰ Στωικὰ λανθάνοντα δόγματα καὶ τὰ Περιπατητικά· καταπεπύκνωται δὲ καὶ ἡ “Μετὰ τὰ
φυσικὰ” τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματεία; §14). Cf. Long (1974) on Antiochus (229). Evidently there were claims that
Plotinus essentially took over the philosophy of Numenius, which both Porphyry and Longinus denied at length. See
also Hani (1976), citing De Is. 382d-e: “Ces idées de vision, de contact direct et supra-rationnel, de bond, de grâce,
et de don et d’accueil, préfigurant déjà les traits spécifiques de l’extase plotinienne” (476-7).
226
“Since there is much disagreement between those that say he holds dogmatic opinions and those that say he does
not, let us discuss this issue further” (ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὴ στάσις ἐστὶ καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸν δογματίζειν, οἱ δ᾽ οὔ, φέρε
καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν; III.51).
227
No. 63.
228
1978. Cf. Obsieger (2013: 383-6). Donini (1986), however, argues that, even if “Ammonio non fu certamente
uno scolacra dell’Academia,” nevertheless “che professò una cauta filosofia platonica (medioplatonica)
difficilmente distinguibile da quella di Plutarco, una filosofia che esibiva le stesse venature di scetticismo
academico” (110). Cf. Whittaker (1969).
229
The Lamprias catalogue apparently attributes a similar sort of work to Plutarch (περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν
Πυρρωνείων καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν; no. 64). Further, Glucker (1978): “… there were, at the time [of Favorinus] some
philosophers who professed Academic skepticism and taught it to others, claiming that theirs was the best sort of
philosophical instruction… One of them was Plutarch in his later years. Another was Favorinus. It is, indeed, not
unlikely that in his Plutarch, where the description of this ‘best method of instruction’ appears, Favorinus was
paying homage to the teaching activities of his old friend and master, and at the same time advertising his own
method of teaching philosophy as the best available” (292). Cf. Ioppolo (1993).
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there has been pushback against the idea of Plutarch as a “dogmatist” by Harold Tarrant and
especially Jan Opsomer, who take the Quaestiones Platonicae to indicate Plutarch’s willingness
to consider every side of a question, and so to engage in a sort of “semi-skepticism.”230 He is
overtly skeptical, however, about certainty in physical inquiry, although he still engages in
speculation. In a symposiastic vignette where the character of Plutarch defends the medical
portion of the Timaeus against a critical doctor, for instance, he concludes two hypothetical
arguments by cautioning, “the intricacy of nature’s functioning is not accessible to an account
(logos), nor is it possible to credibly explain with any precision what mechanisms it uses.” 231
Plutarch argues in this vein more strongly in regard at the end of the physical treatise De primo
frigido, exhorting Favorinus to the consideration of multiple positions but withholding of

Tarrant (1983) defines “semi-skeptic factions” as “The Fourth Academy, or such of its members as accepted the
meaningfulness of ἐνάργεια as well as the impossibility of certainty, along with Cicero, Plutarch” (169n68), and
Eudorus, whom he argues to be the author of the Anon. In Tht. He argues further: “there is no doubt that [Eudorus]
held many doctrines, as did Philo of Alexandria and Plutarch, upon whom we suspect [Eudorus’] influence: doctrine
rather than dogma (in our sense). Philo and Plutarch have a very fluid doctrine, built in various ways around a few
key principles. In Eudorus’ terms, they (like Plato) are πολύφωνος without being πολύδοξος” (184). Tarrant (1985)
further elaborates his conception of a “Fourth Academy.” Opsomer's (1998) dissertation book has an extensive
treatment of Plutarch in this respect. Among other issues, he draws attention to Plutarch’s deeply held assumptions,
such as that Socrates and Plato would never be impious, especially in the first Quaestio. He is largely followed by
Simonetti (2017), who describes Plutarch’s attitude as “anti-dogmatic” and “aporetic-zetetic” (195), which she
connects particularly with the Timaeus and the dialogue form (196-7), as does Opsomer (2005: 199-2000). Gerson
(2013) argues that Platonism is defined in part by “antiscepticism,” deeming Plutarch as a Platonist generally, but
not in this respect (188n28). Cf. Philo’s claim in De aet. mund. that human stupidity and vice (τοὺς ἀφροσύνης καὶ
ἀδικίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακιῶν… τύπους δυσεκπλύτους) necessitates that it be difficult even to “discover by
ourselves some likeness of the truth” (δι’ αὑτῶν μίμημά τι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνευρίσκωμεν; §2) about the destructability
or indestructibility—consequently also the temporality or eternality—of the world.
231
ἡ γὰρ φύσις οὐκ ἐφικτὸν ἔχει τῷ λόγῳ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας εὐμήχανον, οὐδ’ ἔστι τῷν ὀργάνων αὐτῆς τὴν
ἀκρίβειαν οἶς χρῆται… ἀξίως διελθεῖν (Quaest. conv. VII.1.699b). He concludes the speech on a similar note: “This
is more likely by far than the others, but the truth is nevertheless beyond our reach in these matters; but one should
not, in such an unclear matter with so many arguments on each side, speak so arrogantly against a philosopher
preeminent in esteem and authority” (εἰκότα γὰρ μακρῷ ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐκείνων. τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς ἴσως ἄληπτον ἔν γε
τούτοις, καὶ οὐκ ἔδει πρὸ φιλόσοφον δόξῃ τε καὶ δυνάμει πρῶτον οὕτως ἀπαυθαδίσασθαι περὶ πράγματος ἀδήλου
καὶ τοσαύτην ἀντιλογίαν ἔχοντος; 700b).
230
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judgement.232 Certain knowledge is not even theoretically obtainable, if the object is the world of
becoming—both because of the unstable nature of the object and the fallability of sensation.233
Pierluigi Donini, while emphasizing on the one hand Neopythagorean influence on
Plutarch, also detects a substantial Academic component in both Plutarch and Ammonius, such
as in the final speech of De E.234 Jan Opsomer considers a similar position, but with a heavy
qualification: “Pythagorean ideas often figure in Plutarch’s dialogues, but they do not always
carry great weight and rarely constitute Plutarch’s last word on a given issue. Plutarch is a
Platonist, in some respects a pythagoreanising Platonist, but not a Pythagorean.”235 George BoysStones, however, provides another model of the impetus for Middle Platonism—or as he prefers
“post-Hellenistic philosophy”—which seems to better explain Plutarch’s position in what BoysStones argues to be the first generation of true “Platonists.” He considers the movement “rather
as a methodology than as a collection of doctrines.”236 By viewing Plato as an authority,
Platonist philosophy involved imprimis puzzling out what Plato meant as a means of
advancing towards knowledge: and the real uncertainties that might be thrown up by this
exegetic process (as, for example, in Plutarch’s Platonic Questions) show that the process
was quite honest in its conception, not a disingenuous appropriation of Plato for doctrines
worked out in spite of him.237
“Compare these things, Favorinus, to those said by others. If they neither fall short of persuasiveness nor exceed
it by much, bid opinions farewell, thinking that it is more philosophical to hold back in unclear things than to assent”
(ταῦτ᾽, ὦ Φαβωρῖνε, τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων παράβαλλε· κἂν μήτε λείπηται τῇ πιθανότητι μήτε ὑπερέχῃ πολύ,
χαίρειν ἔα τὰς δόξας, τὸ ἐπέχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαι φιλοσοφώτερον ἡγούμενος; 955c). Cf. BoysStones (1997: 44).
233
Ammonius in De E is particularly skeptical about this human faculty: “sense-perception is beguiled by ignorance
of existence to think that what is coming to be actually exists” (ψεύδεται δ’ ἡ αἴσθησις ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ὄντος εἷναι τὸ
φαινόμενον; 392e). Reason (ὁ λόγος), on the other hand, has objects beyond time (392f). See also De Is. 373a-c.
234
2005: 199.
235
Modifying Donini, he distinguishes three sources: “(1) Plato himself, (2) the (New) Academic tradition, and (3)
Neopythagoreanism (which it is perhaps better to call ‘pythagoreanising Platonism’)” (176).
236
2001: 126. He considers Thrasyllus and Ammonius, as well as Eudorus and Philo before them, as “important for
fostering an interest in Plato,” but not in fact Platonists (100-1). Cf. Boys-Stones (2017): “if it is right to think that
Eudorus is the first ‘Platonist’ of the post-Hellenistic age…” (67). On the Imperial period, see Whitmarsh (2005):
“At once conservative and radical, traditional and innovative, centripetal and centrifugal, the ‘Second Sophistic’ …
offers a new and exciting perspective on ancient literature, one that will be unfamiliar to many readers” (3).
237
103. He connects this change in orientation to the “basis for the extensive commentary tradition that grows up
with the movement as well,” and argues, against David Sedley, that the early works were mainly philosophical and
not linguistic, on the evidence of “Plutarch’s Platonic Questions, or his exegetical discussion On the Procreation of
the Soul in the Timaeus, neither of which presupposes difficulties in understanding Plato’s Greek” (103n11).
232
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Boys-Stones still sees Plutarch and other Middle Platonists as “dogmatic,” in that they “were
able to commit themselves to the truth of a proposition on the grounds that Plato had said it, and,
it might be, even before they themselves understood why it was true,” thus orienting their
principal assumptions to the text of Plato.238 The detailed exegesis of Plato by Plutarch and other
members of his circle, it seems, reflects a trend of returning to the texts of traditional
philosophical authorities. In light of Roman domination of the political world, the jewels of the
old cultural and intellectual world of Athens, and especially Plato, provided relevancy for the
Greek aristocrats of the provinces, such as Plutarch.239

Conclusion
While figures such as Alcinous and Apuleius appeal to Aristotelian and Stoic concepts to
enhance their presentations of Plato, and while others such as Eudorus explain his thought by
attributing central ideas to Pythagorean influence, Plutarch develops a system of interpreting
myths, rituals, and images from Greek and Egyptian traditions to fit his rationalistic system of
Platonic religion, which assumes the goodness of the divine and provides a model for virtue in its
portrayal of the imitation of god. All of these positions, it seems, harken back to Platonic models,
whether the theodicy of Leges X, the interpretive examples of the Cratylus, or the various
formulations of the assimilation to god insofar as possible for a human. Just as many scholars
argue that Plutarch subordinates philosophy to religious commitments, however, a substantial

102. Cf. Brittain (2001): “Plutarch accepts, in some manner, that Plato is an authority, while the Academics held
it to be an important principle that there is no authority beyond the reason of the individual” (231).
239
The broader trend is also reflected, for example, in what is still called the “Second Sophistic.” Cf. Whitmarsh's
(2005) characterization of the period as “at once conservative and radical, traditional and innovative, centripetal and
centrifugal” (3).
238
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strand in the scholarship on Plutarch’s myths argue that they transcend the bounds of dialectic.240
The two extended studies, Wolfgang Beck’s 1953 dissertation and Yvonne Vernière’s 1977
monograph, both distinguish elements of the myths as irrational—although for Beck that is
beneath reason and for Vernière that is above reason.241 I argue, to the contrary, that Plutarch’s
myths are bounded by the same rationalism as his interpretation of Plato. Vernière often
compares the hieros logos of the mysteries, as if Plutarch pre-empted the eventual position of the
Middle Platonist Numenius, who does develop a sort of obscurantistic attitude towards Plato.242
Plutarch, however, does not. The dialogue De defectu oraculorum makes it especially clear that
Plutarch treats both mythmaking and interpretation of Plato as distinctive styles of argument
through the juxtaposition of two characters each deploy one sort of discourse but not the other in
the course of an argument over the number of worlds. Cleombrotus conveys a myth concerning
an exotic stranger, while Lamprias offers purely dialectical exegesis of the Timaeus.243 The
debate goes undecided, such that the two sorts of discourse both seem to have a potential to reach
See also Gallo (1998): “il mito serve da un lato a chiarire il pensiero filosofico, aiuta a capirlo; in altri casi puo
integrarlo superando con procedimento intuitivo gli ostacoli e i limiti della ragione” (208); Santamaría Álvarez
(2007): “La principal finalidad de estos mitos es la misma que la de los platónicos: ilustrar la creencia en la
inmortalidad del alma y convencer de ella a sus lectores, no apelando a la razón sino a la intuición religiosa” (878).
Plutarch’s myth as a whole occasionally receive attention by comparison with Plato’s. Stewart (1905) justifies
printing a translation of the entire myth from De Sera (369-76) in the course of a discussion of the Phaedrus:
“Plutarch’s Aridaeus-Thespius Myth seems to me to be so important for the understanding of what I have called the
celestial and astronomical mis en scène given to eschatology by Plato…” (368-9). He also describes the De fac.
myth (440-1) and quotes again the De gen. myth in full (441-5). Cf. Frutiger (1930: 279).
241
Beck’s dissertation, entitled Plutarchs Mythopoiie, is unpublished, but I was able to examine it. In her tripartite
division of myth, “proprement religieux” or initiatory myth transcends reason: “La fable ... prolonge parfois sur des
points où la raison achoppe” (1977: 314). Cf. De Is. 378a. She casts Plutarchean exegesis of Platonic myth as the
forebearer to that of Neoplastonism (e.g. 37-8). Roskam (2007), building on Hardie (1992), is warier of myth
(although he still interprets the content as straightforward doctrine): “Plutarch here obviously enters the domain of
myth, the argumentative value of which is certainly not up to the level of rational argumentation” (165).
242
On Numenius, see infra pg. 206.
243
Attitudes differ on Cleombrotus. Goldschmidt (1948) distinguishes the “[p]latonisme populaire” of Cleombrotus
from the “platonisme savant” of Lamprias (301). Brenk (1977), pointing to the “satirical introduction” (89) in 410a11e is dismissive (91). (Babut 1992). Babut (1992) stresses his lack of dogmatism and Platonism to argue against the
position that he is “une sorte d'amateur peu versé dans les problèmes philosophiques et inapte à en comprendre les
subtilités” (218). Dušanić (1996) analyzes the character as a conscious Platonizing fiction in light of the name
appearing in Phd. 59c (293-4). Schröder (2010) argues that “Cleombrotus himself appears in a somewhat doubtful
light” (158), but notes Babut’s argument (n19). On the dialogue generally, see Flacelière (1947), Brenk (1977: 85112), and Lamberton (2001: 165-72).
240
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the truth. 244 They are epistemically parallel—the reason is that this issue is difficult, but no
indication that Plutarch thinks that Plato intentionally hid the truth from all but the initiated.245
The dialogue is centered around a discussion between Lamprias, Ammonius, and others
such as Cleombrotus, discussing the puzzling question of why previously great oracles have
evidently declined by their day.246 There are a few mythic narratives in the dialogue—such as the
relatively famous story of Thamus and the death of the “Great god Pan”247—and Cleombrotus,
when the conversation returns to the nature of daemones, continues the trend by introducing a
fantastical man:
But I would marvel if it does not seem much stranger to you than the things already said.
And yet, it seems to concern natural philosophy and Plato provides a keynote, although
he does not speak simply but through a murky opinion, inserting an enigmatic underlying
meaning with caution. But other philosophers reproach him greatly for this. Since there is
a bowl of myths and accounts mixed together in the midst of us, however—where could
someone come across a more charitable audience so he could test these accounts as if
foreign coins?—I will not shrink from indulging a narrative of a foreign man.248
Cf. Simonetti (2017): “The hypothesis of a plutarlity of worlds raised in the centre of the dialogue represents a
typical philosophical question (ζήτημα) of the kind of those discussed in Platonist circles of the Imperial age” (7980).
245
Simonetti (2017): “The hypothesis of a plutarlity of worlds raised in the centre of the dialogue represents a
typical philosophical question (ζήτημα) of the kind of those discussed in Platonist circles of the Imperial age” (7980).
246
Lamprias, the narrator, asks Cleombrotus to “tell us more about the oracle; for the ancient reputation of the
divinity there was great, but now it seems to have diminished” (μᾶλλον… περὶ τοῦ μαντείου δίελθ’ ἡμῖν, ὦ
Κλεόμβροτε· μεγάλη γὰρ ἡ παλαιὰ δόξα τῆς ἐκεῖ θειότητος, τὰ δὲ νῦν ἔοικεν ὑπομαραίνεσθαι; 411d-e). Various
solutions are raised, but Ammonius offers a simple, but dreary, political explanation: all of Greece is diminishing
over time (413e-4c). It is no longer the center of even the Greek world.
247
Philip, described as a historian (συγγραφεύς; 418a), relates a story told by Epitheres, a grammarian who evidently
taught some of the interlocutors. The myth, set in the time of Tiberius (419d), recounts a memorable sea voyage.
The sailers here “someone shouting for Thaumus, such that we were struck with wonder” (Θαμοῦν τινος βοῇ
καλοῦντος, ὥστε θαυμάζειν)—a clear pun, but cf. Dušanić (1996) on Phdr. 274c-e (278-80)—which turned out to
be the name of the Egyptian helmsman. The voice instructs him to shout, “the great Pan is dead” (ὁ μέγας Πὰν
τέθνηκεν) at a certain point in the journey (419c). When he does, “a great groaning mixed with marveling came
about, not from one voice, but many” (γενέσθαι μέγαν οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πολλῶν στεναγμὸν ἅμα θαυμασμῷ
μεμιγμένον; 419d). Eusebius summarizes the myth at length (Praep. evang. V.17.2-9). The myth has inspired some
English literature, such as Browning's 1844 poem entitled “The Dead Pan” (1862: 256-66). De def. or. also includes
a myth about a distant island, under which Cronus slumbers (419e-20a), which is also a part of the more elaborate
myth of De fac. See infra pg. 271.
248
ἀλλὰ θαυμάσαιμ’ ἄν… εἰ μὴ πολὺ φαίνεται τῶν εἰρημένων ὑμῖν ἀτοπώτερος. καίτοι δοκεῖ φυσιολογίας ἔχεσθαι,
καὶ Πλάτων αὐτῷ παρέσχε τὸ ἐνδόσιμον οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀποφηνάμενος ἐκ δόξης <δ’> ἀμαυρᾶς [καὶ] ὑπόνοιαν ἐμβαλὼν
αἰνιγματώδη μετ’ εὐλαβείας· ἀλλ’ ὅμως πολλὴ γέγονε κἀκείνου καταβόησις ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων. ἐπεὶ δὲ
244
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Cleombrotus is evidently sympathetic to Plato, but he prefers an exotic myth. This move befits
the context of the dialogue. Cleombrotus had responded to the dialogue’s earlier myths with the
sarcastic quip “I too have things of this sort to relate” and rejects Epicurean “infinity” as another
myth.249 When he presents his own myth, he emphasizes the exoticism of the unnamed stranger:
I managed to find him only through many wanderings and much bribery for information
near the Red sea, where one time each year he encounters others, since he lives in glades
with nymphs and daemones, as he said. I found kind conversation with him. He is the
most beautiful man in form to be gazed and he lived without suffering sickness since
once per month he eats a medicinal, bitter fruit. He was learned in many tongues, but to
me he mostly spoke a Doric that was not far off from music. When he spoke, his breath
was very sweet and the fragrance gripped the place.250
The man even has the power of prophecy on this one occasion per year and is visited by political
potentates. He is thoroughly exotic, but he evidently gives an account of figures from myth,
whom he claims are not gods but rather punished daemones.251 When another interlocutor,
Heracleon, asks Cleombrotus “how this pertains to Plato and provides the keynote for the

μύθων καὶ λόγων ἀναμεμιγμένων κρατὴρ ἐν μέσῳ πρόκειται (καὶ ποῦ τις ἂν εὐμενεστέροις ἀκροαταῖς ἐπιτυχὼν
ὥσπερ νομίσματα ξενικὰ τούτους δοκιμάσειε τοὺς λόγους;), οὐκ ὀκνῶ χαρίζεσθαι βαρβάρου διήγησιν ἀνδρός (420f1a). Cf. Brenk (1977): “It is hard to believe that Plutarch is doing anything but spoofing here… Cleombrotos
attempts to bamboozle his friends with tales of the mystic’s accomplishments” (67).
249
ἔχω μέν… καὶ ἐγὼ τοιαῦτα διελθεῖν… (420a); ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν ἀπειρίαν μῦθον εἶναί φαμεν… (420b). The latter is a
reversal, since he objects that the Epicureans scoffing dismiss providence as a myth (κατὰ τῆς προνοίας μῦθον
αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες). Cf. Lamprias’ epistolary introduction to the dialogue (409e-10b).
250
ὃν πλάναις πολλαῖς καὶ μήνυτρα τελέσας μεγάλα περὶ τὴν Ἐρυθρὰν θάλασσαν ἀνθρώποις ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος ἅπαξ
ἐντυγχάνοντα τἄλλα δὲ συνόντα νύμφαις νομάσι καὶ δαίμοσιν, ὡς ἔφασκε, μόλις ἐξανευρὼν ἔτυχον λόγου καὶ
φιλοφροσύνης. κάλλιστος μὲν ἦν ὧν εἶδον ἀνθρώπων ὀφθῆναι νόσου τε πάσης ἀπαθὴς διετέλει, καρπόν τινα πόας
φαρμακώδη καὶ πικρὸν ἑκάστου μηνὸς ἅπαξ προσφερόμενος· γλώσσαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἤσκητο χρῆσθαι, πρὸς δ’ ἐμὲ τὸ
πλεῖστον ἐδώριζεν οὐ πόρρω μελῶν. φθεγγομένου δὲ τὸν τόπον εὐωδία κατεῖχε τοῦ στόματος ἥδιστον ἀποπνέοντος
(421a-b). The mystic’s foreigness is emphasized further by Lamprias’ comparison of Petron of Himera, “not a
barbarian, but a Greek” (οὐ βάρβαρος ἀλλ’ Ἕλλην)—“neither an Egyptian nor an Indian but a Dorian from Sicily”
(ὢν Αἰγύπτιος οὐδ’ Ἰνδὸς ἀλλὰ Δωριεὺς ἀπὸ Σικελίας; 422d).
251
“Thus he said are the things of Typhons and Titans: battles arise of daemones against daemones and then there
are exiles or punishments for those that are overpowered and did wrong, for example the things that Typhon is said
to have done to wrong Osiris or Cronus Uranus” (οὕτως δ’ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ Τυφωνικὰ καὶ τὰ Τιτανικά· δαιμόνων μάχας
γεγονέναι πρὸς δαίμονας εἶτα φυγὰς τῶν κρατηθέντων ἢ δίκας ὑπὸ θεοῦ τῶν ἐξαμαρτόντων, οἷα Τυφὼν λέγεται περὶ
Ὄσιριν ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ Κρόνος περὶ Οὐρανόν; 421c-d). The speech is described as causing wonder (θαυμαστός;
421e). See also Heracleon’s invocation of Empedocles, as well as Plato and Xenocrates, for evil daemones (418e9a).
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account,” the topic turns to the number of worlds.252 In the Timaeus, Plato had supposed that it is
possible there are five worlds, although he ultimately holds that there is just one.253 The mystic,
by Cleombrotus’ account, corrects Plato by postulating one hundred and eighty-three worlds
arranged in a triangle.254 The argument has no traditional names of gods nor narrative nor
anything else that would mark it off as distinctively mythic, yet Cleombrotus concludes, “this is
what I heard him mythologize about these things, simply, as if in a rite of the mysteries, offering
no demonstration for his account or proof.”255
The question recurs, however, of why Plato specified five: Heracleon references
explanations of the grammarians by reference to Homer, which prompts Demetrius to bid
“enough with myths!”256 Lamprias eventually takes up the challenge of explaining Plato’s
hypothetical number of worlds by comparing different ways in which five is a significant
number, and hence Plato’s postulation is not at all “mythic or irrational,” unless someone is
misled by Aristotle.257 He distinctively attempts to explain the reasoning in the Timaeus through
Platonic physics—the Epicurean concept of void, for instance, is ruled out of hand, because
“according to him it does not exist.”258 Rather than importing the Aristotelian formulation of a
fifth element or appealing to another mythic source, he compares concepts such as the five

τοῦ δ’ Ἡρακλέωνος πυθομένου πῆ ταῦτα προσήκει Πλάτωνι καὶ πῶς ἐκεῖνος τὸ ἐνδόσιμον τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ
παρέσχεν (421e-f).
253
Timaeus contrasts someone postulating boundless (ἀπείρους) worlds, which would be the doctrine of a foolish
person (ἀπείρου), with the question of “one or five” (ἕνα ἢ πέντε), as bringing greater doubt (εἰκότως διαπορήσαι),
although “according to the likely account” (κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον) it is one (55c-d).
254
… τρεῖς καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν… (422b).
255
ταῦτ’… περὶ τούτων μυθολογοῦντος ἤκουον ἀτεχνῶς καθάπερ ἐν τελετῇ καὶ μυήσει, μηδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ
λόγου μηδὲ πίστιν ἐπιφέροντος (422c).
256
μύθων γὰρ ἅλις (423a). Evidently the grammarians (γραμματικῶν) think that Homer conceives of five worlds,
“the heavens, water, air, earth, and Olympus above all” (τὸ πᾶν εἰς πέντε κόσμους διανέμοντος, οὐρανὸν ὕδωρ ἀέρα
γῆν ὄλυμπον; 422e-f).
257
… τούτων οὔτε μυθῶδες οὔτε παράλογον (424b). His rejections of “the suspicions of Aristotle” (Ἀριστοτέλους
ὑπόψονταί τινες) is perhaps a reference to De caelo I.276b.
258
οὐ δήπου πρὸς τὸ κενόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν κατ’ αὐτόν (424d). He does, nevertheless, hedge his argument with an
attack directed at those that think it does exist. Plutarch dedicates Quaest. Plat. VI to the physical issues that arise
from the denial of the existence of void in the Ti.
252

123
shapes in the Timaeus and the five kinds from the Sophista, not unlike the argumentation of the
character of young Plutarch in De E.259 Lamprias engages in Platonic interpretation as another
sort of discourse, which is constrasted from Cleombrotus’ myth.260 He is careful to disavow
certainty: “but if we call the Academy to mind in these matters, here as elsewhere as well, let us
remove excessive belief.”261 The issue of the number of worlds is never resolved in De defectu,
but Cleombrotus’ and Lamprias’ competing arguments constitute two possibilities, each built up
from a different sort of discourse.
This sort of parallel structure reveals, I argue, how Plutarch’s longer and more elaborate
myths in De sera numinis vindicta and De facie in orbe lunae should be understood. Like
Platonic interpretation, mythmaking provides “likely accounts,” hypothetical accounts of the
structure of the world and its relationship to the divine. Here, as elsewhere in the corpus,
Plutarch constructs a consciously Platonic system through the use of these parallel discourses.
The next chapter argues that the discourse of Platonic interpretation, and of the likely myth of the
Timaeus in particular, is based on consistent hermeneutic principles such as the internal
consistency and coherence of the dialogues, through both exegesis in prima persona and through
characters in the dialogues. These two chapters form the initial part of this study. The following
two chapters, the second part of this study, argue that the discourse of mythmaking in imitation
of Plato, namely in De sera numinis and De facie in orbe lunae, respectively, forms another sort
of discourse that strengthens the argumentation in the rest of the dialogue, whether that is in the
form of an additional exhortation that emphasizes a major ethical idea or a teleological account

259

Kinds: 428c-d; shapes: 428d-e, 430b.
Cf. the citation of the Egyptian myth (Αἰγύπτιοι μυθολογοῦσι) of Rhea bearing five children (429f).
261
εἰ δ’ ἀλλαχόθι που κἀνταῦθα τῆς Ἀκαδημείας ὑπομιμνήσκοντες ἑαυτοὺς τὸ ἄγαν τῆς πίστεως ἀφαιρῶμεν…
(431a).
260
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of the physical world that illustrates how providence could be unfolding. In this way, Plutarch
imitates the function of both the myths of the Respublica and the Timaeus.
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Chapter two. Myth as a metaphysical puzzle: Plutarch’s De animae
procreatione
While Plutarch interprets the Platonic corpus broadly, his exegesis of “likely myth” in
Plato’s Timaeus is especially extensive. It is often implicit, for example, when Plato is cited in
polemical treatises, but he also depicts characters engaged in Platonic inquiry, such as Lamprias’
speech in the plurality of worlds debate in De defectu oraculorum.1 In the eighth book of the
Quaestiones convivales, the topic of “why Plato says god is always doing geometry” arises, and
a series of speeches appeal to Plato’s Timaeus and other dialogues for evidence.2 The historical
Plutarch was evidently well-known for his exegesis of this dialogue in particular. In the
immediate generations after Plutarch’s life, Aulus Gellius—who in scattered parts of the Atticae
noctes describes studying with both Calvenus Taurus and Favorinus, themselves friends and
students of Plutarch3—begins a discussion of the medical portion of the Timaeus by citing

1

Even in political contexts, Plutarch tends to invoke the demiurge of the Ti., such as in De fort. Rom. 316e-7c, on
which see further Dillon (1997).
2
Διογενιανὸς [εῖπεν] “ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος γενεθλίοις αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα κοινωνὸν παραλάβωμεν, ἐπισκεψάμενοι τίνα
λαβὼν γνώμην ἀπεφήνατ’ ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεόν; εἴ γε δὴ θετέον εἶναι τὴν ἀπόφασιν ταύτην Πλάτωνος”
(VIII.2.718b-c). The preface of the eighth book, which contains more overtly philosophical content as befits Plato’s
birthday, argues that, if empty, drunken babbling should take hold, the conversation might give way to violence and
result in a most uncultured and unpleasant affair (ἀμουσότατον καὶ ἀχαριστότατον, 716e). Harrison (2000) notes
that “eight of the ten ζητήματα in the Quaestiones Platonicae have parallels with Quaestiones convivales Book 8.2
and Book 9.2 and 14; there are almost no correspondences to any other part of the Quaestiones convivales” (198).
But in Quaest. conv. I.2, Plutarch has his father appeal to his and his brothers’ belief that “the great god” changed an
akosmia into the kosmos, “neither taking nor adding anything, but by placing each thing to the fitting place he
perfected the most beautiful figure from the most shapeless” (τὸν μέγαν θεὸν ὑμεῖς πού φατε τὴν ἀκοσμίαν εὐταξίᾳ
μεταβαλεῖν εἰς κόσμον, οὔτ’ ἀφελόντα τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε προσθέντα, τῷ δ’ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν
χώραν καταστῆσαι τὸ κάλλιστον ἐξ ἀμορφοτάτου σχῆμα περὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀπεργασάμενον; 615f-6a). He continues,
“we learn these revered and greater things from you” (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ σεμνότερα καὶ μείζονα παρ’ ὑμῶν
μανθάνομεν, 616a), before moving onto the ‘cosmification’ of the banquet. Valuations of the philosophical aspects
of the rest of the Quaest. conv. are usually negative, because these sorts of obviously and explicitly philosophical
episodes are relatively few, but Kechagia (2011) makes the case that the method of inquiry throughout is essentially
protreptic, especially in conjunction with these few episodes.
3
Plutarch dedicates De pr. frig. to Favorinus and includes him regularly appears as a character in the Quaest. conv.,
such as in VIII.10. Glucker (1978) argues that the former treatise was aimed at a younger Favorinus who was
δαιμονιώτατος Ἀριστοτέλους ἐραστής (287), while both he and Plutarch later professed Academic skepticism and
taught it to others (292). Bowie (2002) evaluates Favorinus’ “decision to attach himself to Plutarch’s circle” as
demonstrating “the prestige of the now aging sage” (51). According to Galen, Favorinus wrote a work “On the
Academic disposition, subtitled Plutarch” (“Περὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημαϊκῆς διαθέσεως,” ὃ “Πλούταρχος” ἐπιγέγραπται; De
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Plutarch as a learned authority.4 Within Plutarch’s lifetime, even apparent non-philosophers
would request his solutions to the difficulties of the Timaeus, as we learn from De tranquillitate
animi: the ethical treatise begins with an epistolary greeting to the orator Paccius and an
acknowledgement of his request for a work on the calmness of the soul, as well as “something
also on the parts of the Timaeus needing the most careful exegesis.”5 Plutarch often refers to
these sorts of passages which require explanation, such as in the speech given by Plutarch’s own
character in the vignette of the discussion on why Plato says god always does geometry. It
culminates in a description of the demiurge, “the best of causes,” ordering (κοσμησαῖ) nature by
“proportion and measure and number,” to make a unity out of the pre-existing material.6
Plutarch evidently draws this explanation from the description of the demiurge’s
composition of the world soul in the Timaeus. This part of the dialogue is notoriously difficult, as

opt. doct. I.41.5-6), as well as a polemical work against Epictetus, “in which Onesimus, the slave of Plutarch, speaks
with Epictetus” (ἐν ᾧ δῆθέν ἐστιν Ὀνήσιμος ὁ Πλουτάρχου δοῦλος Ἐπικτήτῳ διαλεγόμενος; I.41.7-8), evidently a
jeer at the Stoic’s social status. Cf. Ioppolo (1993: 199). Calvenus Taurus was the teacher of Aulus Gellius—who
depicts them discussing something in Problematis Aristotelis, for instance (XIX.6)—also describes a lengthy,
explicitly exemplary anecdote the teacher gave about Plutarchus noster, uir doctissimus ac prudentissimus (I.26.4),
indicating his own friendship or tutelage with the Chaeronean.
4
et Plutarchus et alii quidam docti uiri…(XVII.11.1). Gellius cites him again in the final section of the chapter (sed
Plutarchus in libro symposiacorum…; §6), grounding the entire discourse in Plutarch’s opinion on the relevant part
of the Ti. There is some disagreement on Gellius’ degree of philosophical interest. Tarrant (1996) is generally
optimistic, but Holford-Strevens (2003), while allowing that Gellius “appreciated Plutarch as a source of interesting
information and found his philosophy quite deep enough” (285), argues that Gellius’ interests were narrowly ethical
(260-2). He suggests that, although Gellius praises Timaeum nobilem illum dialogum (III.17.5), he did not read it,
perhaps because “Taurus reserved Timaeus (and his commentary) for the more advanced students.” See also Trapp
(1997) on Maximus of Tyre, another second century C.E. orator with ethical interests and Platonic leanings.
5
… παρεκάλεις περὶ εὐθυμίας σοί τι γραφῆναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ δεομένων ἐπιμελεστέρας ἐξηγήσεως (464e).
The work begins with the formula, Πλούταρχος Πακκίῳ εὖ πράττειν. Plutarch describes Paccius his reputation as
“less than none of those that speak in the market” (δόξαν οὐδενὸς ἐλάττονα τῶν ἐν ἀγορᾷ λεγόντων; 465a). Cf.
Glucker (1978: 259 with fn4).
6
ἐβούλετ οὖν μηθέν, ὡς ἀνυστὸν ἦν, ὑπολιπεῖν ἄχρηστον καὶ ἀόριστον, ἀλλὰ κοσμῆσαι λόγῳ καὶ μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ
τὴν φύσιν, ἕν τι ποιῶν ἐκ πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οἷον ἡ ἰδεὰ καὶ ὅσον ἡ ὕλῃ γενόμενον (720b). Plutarch
apparently expects his audience to know the Ti.—“you all will be able to easily recall the division in the Timaeus”
(εἴσεσθε ῥᾳδίως… ἀναμνήσαντες αὑτοὺς τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ διαιρέσεως…; 720a)—since he explicitly cites one division,
which Sandbach in Minar et al. (1961: 129fnb) suggests derives from 48e, while still expecting them apparently to
think back on the geometrical language of the composition of the world toward the beginning of the dialogue. In the
first speech, Tyndares the Lacedaemonian takes heart “hearing Plato himself naming the unbegotten and eternal god
as the father and maker of the world and of all things begotten” (ἀναθαρρῶ δὲ πάλιν αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀκούων
πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητῶν τὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀίδιον θεὸν ὀνομάζοντος, 718a). Cf.
Pl. Ti. 28c.
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Plato himself anticipated and signaled by having Timaeus interrupt the narration, which had been
focused on the composition of the world’s body, with the claim that the world’s soul is in fact
older, despite the order of the presentation.7 He continues:
“The things of which he composed soul and the manner of its composition were as
follows: (1) Between the indivisible Existence that is ever in the same and the divisible
Existence that becomes in bodies, he compounded a third form of Existence composed of
both. (2) Again, in the case of Sameness and in that of Difference, he also on the same
principle made a compound intermediate between that kind of them which is indivisible
and the kind that is divisible in bodies. (3) Then, taking the three, he blended them all
into a unity, forcing the nature of Difference, hard as it was to mingle, into union with
Sameness, and mixing them together with existence.”8
This passage, and the subsequent description of the proportions by which the demiurge
harmonizes this world soul, are the subject of much of Plutarch’s extant work dedicated to in
prima persona Platonic exegesis: namely, the De animae procreatione in Timaeo, which quotes
the passage in full and extensively argues about its interpretation, and second and fourth of the
Quaestiones Platonicae, which directly relate to this passage and interpretation, in addition to the
other three on passages in the Timaeus.9 These generically related exegetical works are

“We do not attempt to say now that the soul is indeed not older, that the god thus even designed it to be younger—
for the one uniting them would not allow for the older to be ruled by the younger—but we men speak, perhaps both
partaking in much chance and with some likelihood perhaps; but he composed, from these things and in a way like
this, the soul as prior and older than the body in birth and excellence, as its ruler and commander and leading the led
(body)” (τὴν δὲ δὴ ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν—οὐ
γὰρ ἂν ἄρχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου συνέρξας εἴασεν—ἀλλὰ πως ἡμεῖς πολὺ μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος
τε καὶ εἰκῇ ταύτῃ πῃ καὶ λέγομεν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς
δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο ἐκ τῶνδέ τε καὶ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ; 34b-5a). Cf. Sambursky & Pines
(1971: 10): “In many ways, various doctrines concerning Time propounded by various Platonic schools are for all
intents and purposes commentaries on this text.” See also Leg. X.892a and 896b-c.
8
τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ
ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα
συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ. μειγνὺς δὲ
μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἕν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκεν διένειμεν, ἑκάστην δὲ ἔκ τε
ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμειγμένην. ἤρχετο δὲ διαιρεῖν ὧδε (Tim. 35a-b); translation from Cornford
(1937: 59-60). Grube (1932), and many after him, reconstruct and understand the text following Proclus In Tim.
II.156, which Grube includes with a translation (81-2). The text was considered very difficult even in antiquity:
Macrobius offers a commentary on the Platonic text as a preliminary to a Ciceronian text that draws on it, and, he
thinks, would be incomprehensible without it freshly in mind (Comm. II.2).
9
De an. proc. 1012b-c, Quaest. Plat. V, VII, and VIII. On the genres of Platonic exegesis in Plutarch’s corpus, see
also infra the appendix to this chapter.
7
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presumably the sorts of response Paccius expected he might receive: expositions of Plutarch’s
interpretations of particularly intricate and curious passages, such as this.10
In this chapter, I argue that Plutarch’s exegesis of Plato, especially in these two works but
also throughout the corpus, is meaningfully interpretive, rather than arbitrary or manipulative.
Plutarch, as a Platonist, accordingly applies consistent principles to the text: Plato would never
contradict himself, it is better to interpret Plato through Plato, and Plato’s narratives entail
temporal differences in the things they describe.11 The first two are often related, but they are
distinct. Alcinous presumably also considered Plato to be consistent, but he found it useful to
draw on Aristotle, for instance, for formulations of categories in logic and argument, which he
seemed to think of explications of what was implicit in Plato before, with numerous examples
from various dialogues.12 Similarly, Apuleius and Alcinous both seem to explain matter in a way

10

These discussions were evidently frequent: Plutarch introduces one possibility in the fourth of the Quaest. Plat.
with the transition, “or is what we frequently say true?” (ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ’ ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν; 1003a).
See also De an. proc. 1027a.
11
Cf. Teodorsson (2010): “He himself considered that he used the only correct method, namely to explicate
Platonem ex Platone, i.e. to set out from the assumption that Plato actually had a consistent doctrine and that
internal contradictions are mere appearances and can be neutralized through a proper exegesis” (419). Opsomer
(2004) formulates two similar but distinct principles, drawing on Helmer (1937): “it is assumed that Plato’s works
express (different parts of) the same doctrinal system; Plutarch displays an extraordinary literal-mindedness when
interpreting specific phrases, passages, and dialogues” (138, cf. fn8 on Helmer). It is certainly possible to identify
other principles, such as Tarrant's (1996) attribution of a “principle of clarity” to Calvenus Taurus based on Aulus
Gellius, XII.5.6; Plutarch displays an intention to clarify points of obscurity in Plato, such as which part of the
divided line is larger in Quaest. Plat. III. This point is uncontroversial, however, and only explains that Plutarch
undertook exegesis, rather than what sort of interpretation he thought best explained Plato. Cf. the principles of
interpretation that Hershbell (1987) cites from Helmer (1937): “Plutarch’s interpretation of the ‘Timaeus’ arises
from three factors: Plutarch’s ingenuity (‘Scharfsinn’), his conception of Plato’s thought as a unity, and his literal
interpretation of the text” (237). Gerson (2013) finds rather different principles in Plutarch’s thought: “(a) the
amalgamation of Platonic and Pre-Socratic (especially Pythagorean) doctrines; (b) the use of Aristotle for the
elucidation of Platonic doctrines; and (c) the effort to show that a consistent Platonic account of issues arising in
contemporary debates could be given” (187-8).
12
V-VI. Dillon (1993) explains Alcinous’ terminology as often distinctively Aristotelian (72-80). Eudorus seems to
have discussed (or perhaps commented upon) the Cat., and hence appears in Simplicius’ list of τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν
κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς, along with Boetheus, Ariston, Andronicus, and Athenodorus (frg. 14 Mazzarelli =
Simplicius, In Cat. 159.30-3). He apparently adopted the Aristotelian formulation of an actuality/potentiality
distinction: “Eudorus the Academic objects that the wing does not cohere with the winged, because wing is said in
actuality, while winged in potentiality, as in able to become winged” (Εὔδωρος δὲ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκος ἐγκαλεῖ ὡς οὐ
συντάττεται τὸ πτερὸν τῷ πτερωτῷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πτερὸν ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ πτερωτὸν δυνάμει, ὡς δυνάμενον
πτερωθῆναι; frg. 16 Mazzarelli = Simplicius, In Cat. 187.10-1). There has been much recent attention on Eudorus
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that requires the specifically Aristotelian idea of potentiality.13 Plutarch, on the other hand,
explains Plato’s consistency through Plato alone. These assumptions allow Plutarch to use
certain interpretive techniques, such as making distinctions between ostensibly contradictory
terms to show an underlying coherency or explaining difficult ideas in the Timaeus’ “likely
myth” by comparing different terms and passages across the dialogues—approaching the text as
a sort of puzzle, whose pieces are to be found in the rest of the Platonic corpus.14 The third

and the Cat.: e.g. Tarrant (2008), Bonazzi (2013), Griffin (2015: 82); cf. Boys-Stones (2017). Tuominen (2009)
outlines the metaphysical significance of the Cat. in later Neoplatonism (201-217).
13
Apuleius’ account of matter (materia) relies on distinctly Aristotelian conception of δύναμις as potential (as
opposed to ἐνεργός, actual), literally translated by uis: sed neque corpoream nec sane incorpoream concedit esse. …
sine corpore uero esse non potest dicere quod nihil incorporale exhibeat, sed ui et ratione sibi eam uideri
corpoream… (De dog. Plat. I.5.192). Alcinous’ account is very similar on this point, including the importation of
the Aristotelian concept in exactly this way: τοιαύτη δ’ οὖσα οὔτε σῶμα ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἀσώματον, δυνάμει δὲ σῶμα,
ὡς καὶ τὸν χαλκὸν ὑπακούομεν δυνάμει ἀνδριάντα, διότι τὸ εἶδος δεξάμενος ἀνδριὰς ἔσται (VIII.3). Göransson
(1995) lists these as one of three instances of “verbal similarities” on the topic of matter, on which they have more
similarities than any other non-ethical topic (145, with comparanda in fn3). In De deo VIII.1-8, Apuleius more
explicitly but qualifiedly discusses Aristotle’s idea of tiny animals made of flame. Apuleius’ works, like the
Didaskalikos, are largely doxographical, but he does include one example of explicit exegesis. He distinguishes
Socrates from soothsayers (harioli) who have no doubt what they hear is divine by stressing the qualification in
Plato’s phrase τινα φωνὴν (Phd. 242c), the context of which was just described in De deo (XIX.163-4): “but
Socrates indeed does not say that ‘a voice’ appeared to him, but ‘some voice,’ so that you might surely understand
by that addition that neither a common nor human voice is signified. If this was what he meant, the ‘some’ was
useless, but rather he would have said either ‘voice’ or certainly ‘the voice of someone,’ as the courtesan in Terence
says: ‘I seem just now to hear a voice of a soldier.’ But as to why he says he heard ‘some voice’: either he does not
know from whence it arose, or he has some doubt about it, or he demonstrates that it was something unaccustomed
or secret, as Socrates thus says the voice came to him divinely at opportune moments” (at enim Socrates non uocem
sibi sed ‘uocem quampiam’ dixit oblatam, quo additamento profecto intellegas non uistatam uocem nec humanam
significari. quae si foret, frustra ‘quaepiam,’ quin potius aut ‘uox’ aut certe ‘cuiuspiam uox’ diceretur, ut ait illa
Terentiana meretrix [Eun. 454]: audire uocem uisa sum modo militis. quid uero uocem puampiam dicat audisse, aut
nescit unde ea exorta sit, aut in ipsa aliquid addubitat, aut eam quiddam insolitum et arcanum demonstrat habuisse,
ita ut Socrates eam, quam sibi (ac) diuinitus editam tempestiue accidere dicebat (XX.165-6). The De deo is
sometimes considered apart from De Platone and De mundo—it is published together just with the Apologia and
Florida, for instance, in Harrison et al. (2001) and Jones (2017)—perhaps because an imagined interlocutor
describes the narrator as orator (V.129). The idea of Apuleius drawing on Plutarch, literarily or philosophically, is
appealing, because in the Metamorphoses, Apuleius twice characterizes Lucius as a descendant of Plutarch: nam et
illic originis maternae nostrae fundamenta a Plutarcho illo incluto (I.2); nam et familia Plutarchi ambae prognatae
sumus (II.3). See Fletcher (2014: 62n108), cf. Walsh (1981:22-9). Heller (1983) assumes “Apuleius synthesized his
Platonism with Isis religion in a manner similar to Plutarch’s,” based again on the basis of the claim of “kinship with
Plutarch” in the Metamorphoses—“this claim, taken in a literal sense, is absurd. It must, therefore, signal a
philosophical kindship with Plutarch, and thus it furnishes an important clue to Apuleius’ philosophical orientation
in the Metamorphoses” (325). Moreschini (2015) is more skeptical, but posits the belief that daemonology had its
origin in “Zoroastrian magi or… Orpheus from Thrace, or perhaps from Egypt and Phrygia” as a possible “doctrine
of Middle Platonism” (144). Drews (2015) argues for Platonism generally in Apul. Met. XI.
14
For example, besides his various identifications of indivisible essence in the Ti. (discussed below), he also makes
arguments such as that mother and nurse are both used in the Timaeus to refer to matter (ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων μητέρα μὲν
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principle is distinctive to Plutarch, but it stems from the commonly held assumption that Plato’s
choices, such as the specific ordering of narratives, must be deliberate and significant. Because
Plutarch maintains some skeptical distance, these interpretations are not authoritative statements
of Platonic dogma, but likely accounts, aimed at clarifying what Plato “might have had in mind.”
Toward the end of the second of the Quaestiones Platonicae, for example, he exhorts the readers
to consider whether the argument was plausible to themselves as well, which is evidently a
separate question from what Plato himself found plausible: evidently, the former is the primary
topic of Plutarchean exegesis.15
Plutarch’s exegesis therefore aims at explaining aspects of Plato’s thought by consistently
applying certain principles—namely, the consistency of Plato, the preference for reading Plato
through Plato, and the “literal” significance of narrative distinctions.16 His corpus reflects, and
depicts, a cultured and erudite practice of Platonic interpretation, in which Plutarch, his teacher,
brother, sons, and students or friends such as Paccius detected and interpreted problems from the
text of Plato, and resolved them by applying a set of procedures bounded by certain
hermeneutical assumptions;17 it seems to reflect what Medieval scholars have termed a “textual
community,” centered especially around the Timaeus.18 By applying these principles to the

καὶ τιθήνην καλεῖ τὴν ὕλην…; 1015d), responding to the Peripatetic Eudemus of Rhodes, whom Plutarch alleges
was mistaken (ἀγνοήσας) in thinking Plato called difference (ἀνομοιότης) by these names.
15
“Given that these things very much grasp the opinion of Plato, consider if it was said plausibly also” (τούτων δὲ
μάλιστα τῆς Πλάτωνος ἁπτομένων δόξης, ἐπίστησον εἰ κἀκεῖνο λεχθήσεται πιθανῶς; 1001b).
16
Cf. Opsomer’s work contra Cheniss, e.g. 2005: “Given his hermeneutic principles and presuppositions, Plutarch
does all he can to reconcile apparently conflicting texts so as to arrive at a consistent interpretation. The consistency
of the interpretation with Platonic texts and the consistency that is established between Plato’s texts as a result of the
interpretation, are the criteria for correctness” (178).
17
The social circle in which Plutarch interpreted Plato was, at least as reflected in his own writings, extremely
broad. In the beginning of Quaest. conv. VII.2, he refers to “sessions of reading Plato together” (ἐν ταῖς
Πλατωνικαῖς συνανανγνώσεσιν), in which hapax legomena from Leg. IX.853d “always provide a topic” (ζήτησιν
ἀεὶ παρεῖχεν; 700c), although the subsequent discussion is biological (via etymology) rather than philological. In the
previous vignette, a physician’s assault on the medical portion of the Ti. leads Florus to ask, “are we to leave Plato’s
case undefended?” (οὕτως ὑφησόμεθα τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐρήμην ὀλισκάνοντος; 698e), prompting Plutarch to take up
the defense at length.
18
See further the appendix to this chapter infra.
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Platonic dialogues, Plutarch creates an account of each of the elements described in the
demiurge’s composition of the world soul, deriving sameness and difference from the monad and
the dyad. He strenuously contends that the elements existed separately before the composition,
such that there was a pre-cosmic soul, whose disorderly influence can still nevertheless be felt
periodically even in the ordered universe in the form of cosmic upheavals. Plutarch takes this to
be a resolution of the tension, identified and attacked as early as Aristotle, between Plato’s claim
of an ungenerated soul in the Phaedrus and a generated one in the Timaeus. These
interpretations, like Plutarch’s mythic expositions, comprise “likely accounts.” First, however, I
survey the assessment of Plutarch’s interpretations of Plato in the scholarship.
While Matthias Baltes depicted Plutarch as a philologically careful interpreter of the
Timaeus, John Dillon treated him as even a cogent exegete in some respects, and Jan Opsomer
has especially increased the prominence of this sort of position, two competing trends in the
scholarship preclude the possibility of claiming that Plutarch is meaningfully interpreting Plato:19
either he was entirely unoriginal and relatively faithfully transmitting earlier opinions, which

1976: “Nur ist er ein viel sorgältigerer Philologe, beachtet alle möglichen Implikationen einer Annahme, zieht in
größtem Ausmaß die übrigen platonischen Dialoge heran und errichtet ein Lehrgebäude von staunenswerter innerer
Kohärenz und Geschlossenheit” (45); Dillon 1977: “Plutarch adduces Philebus, 24Aff. and Politicus 273B to fortify
his position and, all in all, puts forward a well-argued and coherent case, though it depends, of course, on the
premise of the unity of Plato’s thought” (208); Opsomer’s dissertation book on Middle Platonism (1998) dedicated a
long chapter to Plutarch (127-212), important parts of which he has reconsidered and restated (2005). Helmer (1937)
and Phillips (2002) also treat Plutarch as an interpreter, and similarly, Runia (1986b) argues that Middle Platonists
“were loyal to the texts and considered it their task to explain Plato’s writings. But their Plato is a Plato dimidiatus,
drawn almost exclusively from the ‘classical’ dialogues (Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium, Timaeus) with a
few snippets from elsewhere (e.g. Tht. 176a-c)” (52). Donini tends to straddle a sort of intermediate position, e.g.:
“Non è certamente questo il luogo per pronunciare un giudizio che pretenda di essere definitivo a proposito della
coerenza complessiva dell’interpretazione platonica di Plutarco; e forse non è neanche il tempo: forse si deve ancora
lavorare non poco nell’approfondimento degli scritti dei Moralia. Ci si può limitare a dire, per il momento, che
l’incongruenza tra le due genealogie in cui Platone è incluso potrebbe essere una spia, un segnale manifestamente
visibile di una tensione latente in tutta la produzione filosofica di Plutarco, quella tra la tendenza dogmatica e
sistematica dell’interpretazione platonica e la ripugnanza a chiudere il pensiero del maestro in una rigida collezione
di dottrine fissate una volta per tutte. Questa tensione deve essere stata presente abbastanza a lungo nel platonismo
della prima età imperiale, per quanto a noi è possibile ricostruire dalle scarne testimonianze che ne sono state
conservate” (1992, reprinted in 2010: 372).
19
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John Whittaker for instance takes to be a sort of “scholastic” inheritance;20 or his commitment to
certain ideas, particularly of a “religious” rather than philosophical sort, was so strong that he
manipulated the text of Plato to fit these preconceptions, as Harold Cherniss influentially argued
in his Loeb edition of the Quaestiones Platonicae and De animae procreatione. These arguments
are grounded in the sorts of assumptions about the nature of Middle Platonism, namely its
relationship to the Hellenistic schools and religious traditions, which the last chapter surveyed. I
argue, however, that Plutarch—like later figures such as Calvenus Taurus and Atticus—is
engaged directly in consistent interpretation of Plato through Plato.
Cherniss’ Loeb is the locus classicus for the reading of interpretation of Plutarch as a
manipulator of Plato, alleges that the De animae procreatione is something of a cautionary tale,
in that it shows how “Plutarch could manipulate for his own purpose philosophical texts still
available for comparison,” in the service of his “dogma of ‘creation’ as an historical
beginning.”21 A few pages into his introduction, he launches into an extended critique. These

1974. Dillon (1977) similarly uses the term “scholastic” to describe Platonists contemporaneous and posterior to
Eudorus (135), both drawing on Dörrie (1971). The latter coined the term “Schulplatonismus” (36), which he links
particularly to Eudorus, but argues that Plutarch uniquely exists outside of this, because his aim is broad but
thoroughly ethical: “dabei ist er keineswegs einem Maximos von Tyros zu vergleichen, dem es allzu sehr auf
Breitenwirklung ankam; sondern Plutarch hat offenkundig die Mission gespürt, sein Wissen auszubreiten und
weithin zugänglich zu machen, weil allem Wissen eine ethische Wirkung zukommt; παιδεία im besten Sinne war der
eigentliche Antreib für Plutarch, sein vielschichtiges Werk zu verfassen. Was dagegen aus dem Platonismus seines
und des folgenden Jahrhunderts erhalten ist, ist durchweg schul-intern” (38). He takes this to mean that Plutarch was
more influenced by non-Platonic sources than later Middle Platonists: “Auf jedem Fall hat er ausser-platonischen
Elementen in viel stärkerem Masse Rechnung getragen als die ihm zeitgenössischen Platoniker, von denen
zumindest das Lehrgebäude des Kalvisios Tauros zu Athen und das des Albinos zu Smyrna gut bekannt sind” (40).
Cf. Dillon (2014: 223n2); Turner (2001): “clearly, Plutarch’s metaphysics is highly original and occasionally
contradictory; perhaps his overwhelming desire to insist that Plato believed that the world had a beginning in time
was responsible for its somewhat fluid character” (376).
21
1976: 149. See further 146: “This theory of his, despite all narrow literalism and despite his protest against
interpreting Plato for the promotion of one’s own doctrines (1013b), was not the consequence of his literal
interpretation of the Timaeus but was the formulation of his own theology and theodicy, which, to be plausibly
represented as in his words “something that agrees with Plato,” required the “creation” in the Timaeus to be taken
literally. This is indicated… even more clearly by his way of manipulating texts to support it” (137-8); “similar
treatment of Plato’s text and similar internal contradictions characterize Plutarch’s literal interpretation of the
generation of the physical universe”; “so Plutarch’s interpretation upon closer inspection proves to be far from
‘literal.’ His motive was not strict fidelity to Plato’s words but concern to enlist Plato’s authority for the proposition
that the universe was brought into being by god” (147). Cf. Dillon (1988: 108-9, 112-3).
20
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“manipulations” range from the identifications of concepts together, such as receptacle (χώρα)
with matter (ὕλη), to the deliberate omission or alteration of the text so as to sway opinions.22
Cherniss is followed in his valuation of Plutarch’s fidelity by Jackson Hershbell, Radek Chlup,
and Carl Séan O’Brien, among others.23 On the charge of textual manipulation, however, Jan
Opsomer compares Plutarch’s citation with Burnet’s Oxford Classical Text, and shows
persuasively that there is only one substantial difference, which is nevertheless more likely to be
a textual variant than a conscious manipulation.24 Cherniss alleges, however, that Plutarch’s
ulterior motivations were “theological” and “religious reasons.” Whittaker similarly argues that
“Plutarch and Atticus denied the eternity of the universe and hence (in opposition to other
equally religiously motivated Platonists) insisted upon the literal interpretation of the Timaeus.”25

22

185nc, 189ne. Cf. Plut. De Is. 374e; Timaeus Locrius XX. Gerson (2013) takes this identification to be a sign of
Plutarch’s reading Plato through Aristotle (189) and argues similarly about the demiurge and the Aristotelian
unmoved mover (194).
23
Hershbell (1987) takes the assumption “that Plato’s thought forms a unity” to uphold “Cherniss’s belief that
Plutarch’s interpretation uses Plato’s authority for his own theology” (240 with n34). See further 238-9; cf. 246-7.
Chlup (2000): “we need not go into the details of Plutarch’s exegesis of Timaeus 35a-36b. As Harold Cherniss
demonstrated in his LCL introduction and notes to the treatise, the whole interpretation is irreconcilable with many
Platonic passages, and to pursue it, Plutarch has to commit himself to many misrepresentations of Plato’s meaning.
What is more, Plutarch is not even entirely consistent with himself and it seems that he is really expounding the
Timaeus passage at two different levels” (140); O’Brien (2015): “as Cherniss comments on Plutarch’s supposedly
literal interpretation of the Timaeus,… as Cherniss also points out, there is little in the treatise that is original and it
is interesting mainly due to information which it provides on earlier treatments of the Timaeus…” (113). See also
Dörrie & Baltes (1993: 212).
24
Opsomer (2004: 140-2). The difference is between reading αὐτὴν and αὐτῶν in Ti. 35a, which is substantially
different, but does not show that Plutarch consciously emended the text, as Cherniss implies and Ferrari & Baldi
(2002) argue. Opsomer plausibly argues that Xenocrates also took the reading to be αὐτὴν (160-1). Opsomer
moreover acutely points out that Cherniss does not take issue with Plutarch’s practice of making identifications
across dialogues, because he does it himself: his objection is that, in his view, Plutarch makes the wrong sorts of
identifications, while Cherniss himself made the right ones (155). Cherniss’ methodology was criticized much
earlier on these grounds by De Lacy (1946): “he assumes that the dialogues express Plato’s beliefs, and that a
comparison of the dialogues makes possible a more or less systematic reconstruction of these beliefs. When
confronted with the obvious fact that the dialogues are not in all respects entirely consistent, he resorts to the
distinction between literal and figurative statements. Statements that violate the basic principles of Plato’s thought
are to be taken figuratively, whereas those that express integral parts of his thought must be accepted literally” (76).
25
1987: 82, 109, and 122. Hankinson (1995) comparably concludes “Plutarch was a dogmatist in religion, and held
strong views on moral virtue, its nature and acquisition,” confining “his Middle and New Academic tendencies… to
his love of refutational argument” (140). Cf. Moreschini (2015): “in one of my earlier studies, I proposed
distinguishing Apuleius and Alcinous from other Middle Platonist currents through the distinction between a
‘religious current’ and a ‘rationalist current’, because no Platonic philosopher ever wanted to be anything other than
Platonic. … it too was eventually abandoned, because, as was said, it substituted one division for another: it thus
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As the previous chapter demonstrates, however, Plutarch shapes his theology to his philosophy;
he constrains traditional ideas to fit Plato, rather than bending the dialogues.
Although some, such as David Runia, see Plutarch as aloof from general trends, other
scholars attribute Plutarch’s interpretations to either the Hellenistic schools26—particularly the
Stoic Posidonius in older scholarship27—or some Middle Platonist tradition. John Whittaker, for
example, argues that specific un-Platonic combinations of Platonic phrases and passages indicate
scholastic heritage from earlier Middle Platonists.28 The idea of Plutarch and later figures as
inheritors of earlier Hellenistic thought seems to render their method of interpreting Plato is, to at
least some extent, simply compiling earlier writers from any number of schools and choosing
between options. The sort of view of Middle Platonism as a development through polemic with

seems more useful to consider Middle Platonism as a ‘battleground’ of the various schools, according to the
description suggested by H. Dörrie” (19). Against assigning influence based on shared terminology alone, cf. Barnes
(1999: 5).
26
1986: “Plutarch… remains a rather independent figure, difficult to pin down precisely but revealing much
indubitable Middle Platonist material in his copious works” (77). There is, for instance, disagreement on whether
Plutarch’s interest in metaphysics was ancillary—e.g. Chlup (2000): “his primary philosophical interests were
ethical, not metaphysical” (138)—or substantial—e.g. Karamanolis (2006): “unlike Antiochus, who was driven
primarily by epistemological and ethical concerns, Plutarch shows a strong interest in metaphysics” (87). Cf.
Nikolaidis (1999): “sceptic influences and, occasionally, sceptic propensities are undoubtedly present in Plutarch’s
work; but so are also Pythagorean, Peripatetic and Stoic ones, without anyone so far having felt the need to depict
Plutarch, for this reason, as Pythagorean or Peripatetic or Stoic. Plutarch is first and foremost a Platonist, while all
other philosophical doctrines that can be identified in his work are not actually incompatible with his own
interpretation of Plato” (413).
27
Cf. Jones (1916: 80) and (1926: 105-108); Dörrie & Baltes (1993: 297). Attempts to find echoes of Posidonius in
Plutarch tend to be older—as surveyed, for instance, in Brenk (1977: 3-4)—but often finding their impulse in
Plutarch’s explicit discussion of Posidonius in De Proc. 1023b-c. Cf. Hershbell (1987: 239). Posidonius is
particularly prominent in the older scholarship on De fac., as the last chapter discusses, infra pg. 316.
28
E.g. 1987b: “the triad is already explicit in Plutarch’s exposition of Plato’s myth of Πενία and Πόρος in the
Symposium 203Bff. Identifying Πενία with basic matter and Πόρος with the self-sufficient first principle, Plutarch
says of the latter (De Iside 374D) ὁ Πόρος οὐχ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ πρώτου ἐραστοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ καὶ τελείου καὶ
αὐτάρκους. We note first of all that Plutarch has substituted the adjective αὐτάρκης in place of Plato’s ἱκανός. Such
substitutions are an important part of the technique practiced by Middle Platonists of introducing their own stylistic
variations into Plato’s formulations. … This, of course, is all part of the Middle Platonic technique of combining and
conflating Platonic formulae drawn from various dialogues. We notice further that Plutarch’s formulation is repeated
in the theological chapter X of the Didaskalikos of Alcinous at the close of the statement of the uia eminentiae based
on Symp. 210A-D… We should conclude not that Alcinous has borrow from Plutarch but that both are exploiting
independently of each other a lost Middle Platonic source which combined the Philebus triad with the designation τὸ
ἐραστόν…” (288-9). More generally, see Whittaker (1987a): “Middle Platonic scholastic technique [was based on]
the supposition that the writings of Plato contain along with much else a certain number of Platonic δόγματα which
can be removed from their contexts and forged into a systematic whole” (81).
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other Hellenistic schools similarly precludes the idea of interpretation of Plato through Plato.
Mauro Bonazzi, for instance, recently addresses the ancient claims “that the main task for
Platonists is exegesis” because of the lack of clarity in the dialogues with some doubt:
This is what ancient Platonists repeated over and over again. In spite of many
divergences, today several scholars agree with the view that Platonism consists in the
systematization of the doctrines latently present in the dialogues. Personally I find things
much more complex. It is certainly true that Platonism results from the interpretation of
Plato’s dialogues. But such a description is not exhaustive. The confrontation with the
other schools is equally important for the development of Platonism.29
Plutarch certainly engaged in extended polemic especially against Epicureans and Stoics,
perhaps more than some Platonists in this period such as Alcinous or Apuleius. Plutarch
distinguishes himself, however, in his own self-presentation. In his treatise on the composition of
the world soul, De animae procreatione in Timaeo, Plutarch addresses his sons Autobulus and
Plutarch, describes their request as the spur for composing the work and explains his intentions
as a conscientious but controversial interpreter of Plato:30
Since you think it is necessary to compile the things that have been said many times and
written sporadically in various works into a single work for those interpreting the opinion
of Plato about the soul, as we supposed it was at least, and for this account to obtain its
own definitive statement, because it is not especially easy to understand, and because it
requires exhortation to refute most of those expert in Plato.31

29

2017: 120.
Like De tranq. anim., De an. proc. begins with an epistolary heading—ὁ πατὴρ Αὐτοβούλῳ καὶ Πλουτάρχῳ εὖ
πράττειν. At 1022c he claims he should have left the math for their training (ὑμῖς ἂν αὐτοῖς ἕνεκα γυμνασίας
παρῆκα). Perhaps relatedly, Autobulus was a character in Quaest. conv. VIII.2, although not a speaking one: the first
speaker playfully calls on him to put a hand to the second speaker and chastise the speech (παρεκάλει… ἅψασθαι…
καὶ κολάσαι τὸν λόγον; 719c). He is also the narrator of the Amat.
31
ἐπεὶ τὰ πολλάκις εἰρημένα καὶ γεγραμμένα σποράδην ἐν ἑτέροις ἕτερα τὴν Πλάτωνος ἐξηγουμένοις δόξαν ἣν
εἶχεν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς, ὡς ὑπενοοῦμεν ἡμεῖς, οἴεσθε δεῖν εἰς ἓν συναχῆναι καὶ τυχεῖν ἰδίας ἀναγραφῆς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον,
οὔτ’ ἄλλως εὐμεταχείριστον ὄντα καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι δεόμενον
παραμυθίας… (1012b). Hershbell (1987) notes that ἀναγραφῆς has “connotations of ‘placing on record’ or ‘setting
out in public,’ and no doubt Plutarch intended to provide not only his sons, but his circle of friends and readers with
a unified collection of his frequent statements and sporadic writings on Plato’s opinion about the soul” (238).
30
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When Plutarch specifies his grounds for opposing earlier authorities—particularly aiming at
Xenocrates and Crantor, two of the earliest Academics32—his primary criticism is their lack of
attention to Plato’s intentions: “both men seem to me to err from the opinion of Plato, if we must
use the plausible as a benchmark—not to work out one’s own doctrines, but to desire saying
something in concord with Plato.”33 Plutarch’s stated intention, in contrast, was to consider what
Plato most plausibly intended to say. While it is possible that he was either hypocritically forcing
his own interpretations or trying to hide his faithful transmission of prior dogma, he is better
understood, I argue, as he presents himself throughout the exegetical works, as a sincere albeit
consciously controversial interpreter of Plato.34 His interpretations are not derived from a static
body of transmitted “scholastic” opinions on Plato, but rather the result of living arguments
about the meaning of the text of dialogues such as the Timaeus. This chapter is divided into three
sections, each of which examines one of Plutarch’s interpretive principles: that Plato is selfconstitent across dialogues, that Plato ought to be read through Plato, and that temporal aspects
of Platonic narratives must be significant. Even throughout his most controversial interpretations,
namely that the world soul “came to be” at a distinct time from pre-existing, constituent parts,
Plutarch explains his intention to be exemplary, rather than exhaustive, following the quotation of Ti. 35a: “to
start, it is a boundless task at present to go through so many differences these words have given interpreters, and at
the same time a superfluous one, given that you have read most of them… I think that the clarification when they
[Xenocrates and Crantor] are revealed will provide something like a keynote” (ταῦτα πρῶτον ὅσας παρέσχηκε τοῖς
ἐξηγουμένοις διαφοράς, ἄπλετον ἔργον ἐστὶ διελθεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πρὸς δ’ ὑμᾶς ἐντετυχηκότας ὁμοῦ ταῖς
πλείσταις καὶ περιττόν… οἶμαι τι τὴν τούτων ἀνακαλυφθέντων σαφήνειαν ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον ἡμῖν παρέξειν; 1012cd). Apparently there are others he could have included, as Jones (1916) adduces a scholion on Aristotle’s Cael. (ad
279b32) that attributes a similar reading to Xenocrates, as well as to Speusippus, who is even more shadowy in this
connection. Dillon (2003: 80) surveys other evidence for Speusippus’ positions on the dialogue (81-5; see also
Cherniss [1976: 219n3, 221n4]), but there is even less for Xenocrates (86-7) and Crantor (87-9).
33
ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀμφότεροι διαμαρτάνειν δόξης, εἰ κανόνι τῷ πιθανῷ χρηστέον, οὐκ ἴδια δόγματα
περαίνοντας ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ τι βουλομένους λέγειν ὁμολογούμενον (1013b). Cf. 1014a: “I will apply and bring together
both the interpretation and the proof with the texts themselves: for the matter is thus, in my opinion” (ἔπειτα ταῖς
λέξεσιν ἐπάξω συνοικειῶν ἅμα τὴν ἐξήγησιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν τὰ πράγματα
δόξαν). He seems to prioritize consonance with the Platonic texts. Cf. Cherniss (1976): “The object of συνοικειῶν is
the texts, τὰς λέξεις ‘understood’ … and not, as Thévenaz has it, the interpretation and the demonstration” (179ng).
34
Roskam (2010) argues that Plutarch’s polemical works formulate “intellectual rules for a good debate” (134),
which are not only explicitly formulated, but also illustracted in “the actual πρᾶξις in Plutarch’s circle” as presented
by the Quaest. conv. (136).
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Plutarch is applying the same sorts of assumptions that are evident also from the simpler and
clearer Quaestiones Platonicae, which have generally received less attention.35 Finally, I contrast
this distinct form of discourse, Platonic interpretation, with Plutarch’s presentation of another,
the ethical interpretation of Pythagorean symbola.

The consistency of Plato
Contradiction is a central concern for Plutarch’s polemics. Some of his most sustained
and effective arguments against the Stoics and Epicureans, for instance, contend that they
inherently contradict their own positions and assumptions, such that their philosophies cannot
possibly provide a correct or complete answer.36 Conversely, he also defends Plato against such
opposing claims by showing that any potential contradiction is only ostensible. This tactic is
increasingly common in philosophical polemic in the early Empire, at least as is evidenced by
the earliest extant commentary on Aristotle, an early second century C.E. lemmatic exegesis of
the Ethica Nicomachea attributed to Aspasius.37 He worries, for instance, over a potential tension
between virtue being both an extreme and a mean: “But what he introduces next bears some
puzzlement (τινὰ ἀπορίαν): for he says ‘according to the essence and the definition that says

Jones’ (1916) dismissal of the Quaest. Plat.—“a work of much less importance” (68)—and short treatment,
mostly dealing with the parts overlapping with De an. proc., are representative (104-6). However, Oikonomopoulou
(2013: 143-4) surveys Quaest. Plat. VI (the shortest and simplest), and Wouters (1996) is dedicated to X (on the
parts of speech). There has been recent interest in the Quaest. Rom., such the treatment of them as cultural polemic
in Preston (2001), but the Quaest. conv. tend to attract the most attention of Plutarch’s collections of Quaestiones.
36
This is especially apparently from the title De stoicis repugnantiis, still extant, and the attestion of a Περὶ τῶν
Ἐπικουρέων ἐναντιωµάτων in the Lamprias catalogue (no. 129). More generally, see also De soll. an. 964c-d,
Hershbell (1987: 246-7), Hilton (2019: 152-7). Inconsistency is also Taurus’ main critique of the Stoics, according
to Gellius: “You know well that I do not get along well with Stoics, or perhaps more properly with the Stoa; for it
seem especially contradictory to both itself and to us, as I argue in the book which I dedicated to the subject” (me
autem scis cum Stoicis non bene conuenire uel cum Stoica potius; est enim pleraque et sibi et nobis incongruens,
sicut libro, quem super ea re composuimus, declaratur; XII.5.5).
37
The text is translated with short notes by Konstan (2006); the main treatments are Becchi (1994) and the essays in
Alberti & Sharples (1999).
35
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what it is, virtue is an intermediate, but according to the best and the good, an extreme.’”38
Aspasius resolves the potential contradiction by appealing to the different sorts of definitions in
the Analytica posteriora, deeming the former an “essential” definition and the latter a
“conclusory” one, meaning that Aristotle could hold both virtue as a mean and as an extreme in
different senses.39
Whereas the Aristotelian commentator tackles here an ostensible contradiction in a single
sentence, Plutarch evidently expects Plato to remain consistent across all the dialogues and
rejects interpretations on the grounds that they would introduce a contradiction.40 He chides those
who follow Xenocrates’ interpretation of the critical passage of the Timaeus for connecting
sameness and difference to resting and motion:
They are clearly ignorant also about sameness and difference, because they say that the
one provides resting and the other motive capability into the generation of the soul, while
Plato himself in the Sophista disposes and divides being and the same and the other, as
well as resting and motion, as each is different from each and the five exist apart from
one another.41
Plutarch frames the debate as if his opponents share this fundamental assumption that Plato never
contradicted himself, even across dialogues, and so explains their interpretations as arising from
ὃ δὲ ἐξῆς ἐπιφέρει τινὰ ἀπορίαν· φησὶ γὰρ “κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης” (48.7-9, citing 1107a).
39
He references the “middle” term—εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς Ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς (48.33-9.1)—
then contrasts the “definitions called conclusory by him” (τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις συμπερασματικοῖς ὅροις; 49.34). He gives an illustration from geometry (49.4-9), concluding: “and such a thing holds also for ethical definitions:
for the man that says it is an intermediacy both in passions and activities described the essence of it (virtue) and
what makes it a virtue, while he who says it is an extreme speaks according to the the good as a conclusion. For
since it is an intermediacy in passions and activities, it would be an extreme in regard to the good” (τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁρισμῶν ἐστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰπὼν μεσότητα εἶναι καὶ ἐν πάθεσι καὶ πράξεσι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς
εἴρηκε καὶ δι’ ὅ ἐστιν ἀρετή, ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν ἀκρότητα κατὰ τὸ εὖ ὥσπερ συμπέρασμα λέγει. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μεσότης ἐν
πάθεσι καὶ πράξεσιν, εἴη ἂν ἀκρότης κατὰ τὸ εὖ; 49.10-3). Humans are best when they have as much virtue as
possible, rather than a moderate amount.
40
In the eighth of the Quaest. Plat., for example, he anticipates that the reader might be troubled by the idea in the
Ti. that the sun is an “instrument” of time, because it is described so highly in the Resp. (1006f). The fourth chapter
discusses the sun further, infra pgs. 302 and 316.
41
ἐκφανῶς δὲ τούτοις ἠγνόηται τὸ περὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου· λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς τὸ μὲν στάσεως τὸ δὲ κινήσεως
συμβάλλεται δύναμιν εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσιν, αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον,
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν, ὡς ἕκαστον ἑκάστου διαφέρον καὶ πέντε ὄντα χωρὶς ἀλλήλων τιθεμένου καὶ
διορίζοντος (1013d).
38
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either perverse incentives or ignorance: perhaps they have more interest in their own theories
than Plato’s, or perhaps they do not know what he meant. This criticism reveals Plutarch’s
central concern of resolving ostensible contradictions in Plato to show the underlying
coherency.42
This concern, of course, is more broadly prevalent among commentators on Plato, such as
the Neoplatonists and many modern commentators.43 Plato’s description of the world soul being
generated in the Timaeus, however, presents a problem, because in the Phaedrus, Socrates
argued that all soul is ungenerated.44 Plutarch firmly rejects the possibility that Plato had held
each in such a contradictory way:
The first proof is the dissolution of his supposed, ostensible discrepancy and disharmony
towards himself: no one would impute such confusion and lack of care to even a drunken
sophist—so how possibly to Plato!—such that the nature of the soul appears at once both
ungenerated and generated—ungenerated in the Phaedrus but generated in the Timaeus.45
Before engaging with the details of the world soul’s elements and composition, Plutarch
undertakes to show that Plato does not actually contradict himself on the grounds that he used the
words in different senses. This was a pressing burden for Plutarch, presumabily in no small part
because the tension between an ungenerated soul in one dialogue and a generated one in another

See also Opsomer (2004): “here we see at work one of the guiding principles of Plutarch’s hermeneutics: the
search for consistency. I believe that this, in general, was also one of his reasons for writing the treatise: Plutarch
wanted to make sense of the text, to resolve difficulties and remove contradictions” (147).
43
Shorey (1903) is an early but indicative example: “the attempt to base such a chronology on the variations and
developments of Plato’s doctrine has led to an exaggeration of Plato’s inconstancy that violates all sound principles
of literary interpretation and is fatal to all genuine intelligence of his meaning. The implicit canon of this method is
that variation in literary machinery and expression must be assumed to imply divergence or contradiction in thought.
To this I wish to oppose an interpretation based on the opposite canon: that we are to assume contradiction or
serious alternation in Plato’s thought only in default of a rational literary or psychological explanation of the
variation in the form of its expression” (5).
44
Ti. 34b and Phdr. 245c-6a. Plutarch quotes this passage again in 1013c. Cf. Porph. Sent. XXI.
45
ἀπόδειξις δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τῆς λεγομένης καὶ δοκούσης αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀσυμφωνίας καὶ διαφορᾶς λύσις. οὐδὲ
γὰρ σοφιστῇ κραιπαλῶντι, πόθεν γε δὴ Πλάτωνι, τοιαύτην ἄν τις ἀναθείη… ταραχὴν καὶ ἀνωμαλίαν, ὥστε τὴν
αὐτὴν φύσιν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀγένητον ἀποφαίνειν καὶ γενομένην, ἀγένητον μὲν ἐν Φαίδρῳ, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν δὲ Τιμαίῳ
γενομένην (1015f-6a). Calcidius responds to a similar argument concerning the Ti. and Phdr. (§228-9). Ferrari &
Baldi (2002) compare another “accusa di incoerenza e autocontraddizione” concerning the Ti. and Leg. (259),
leveled by the Epicurean character Velleius in Cicero’s Nat. D. (I.30).
42
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drew almost immediate attack onto Plato. Aristotle already exploited it in the Metaphysica by
hinting at Plato’s difficulty in making soul both that which moves itself and that which comes
into being with the heavens in the Timaeus.46 He continues the attack in De caelo, but there
focuses on the tension between Plato’s claim that the world was generated, and therefore
destructible47—although Timaeus insists that it never will be because of the goodness of the
creator and the beauty of creation.48
Although Plutarch does not mention Aristotle in De animae procreatione, it is clear from
his anti-Epicurean dialogue Adversus Colotem that he took these Peripatetic criticisms of Plato as
an obvious sign of Aristotle’s strong divergence from Plato: if Colotes had read De caelo,
Plutarch jeers, he certainly would not have claimed Aristotle and the Lyceum generally followed
Plato.49 For some of the later Middle Platonic commentators, the Aristotelian critique is the
explicit spur for explaining this aspect of the Timaeus. Calvenus Taurus apparently began his

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ
ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φησίν (XII.1072a).
47
εἰσι γάρ τινες οἷς ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ ἀγένητόν τι ὂν φθαρῆναι καὶ γενόμενον ἄφθαρτον διατελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ
Τιμαίῳ (280a). The related problem of “whether motion came to be, not existing before” (πότερον δὲ γέγονέ ποτε
κίνησις οὐκ οὖσαν πρότερον) is the opening topic Arist. of Ph. VIII (250b). See further Jones (1916: 72) and Baltes
(1976: 5-18).
48
Timaeus describes the demiurge professing that only an evil character would dissolve something beautifully
harmonized and functioning well (τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν
ἐθέλειν κακοῦ, 41a-b), so it will never be destroyed; time, moreover, simultaneously came to exist with the would
soul in, such that one could not be destroyed without the other (38b, cf. 37e). Plutarch seems to invoke this detail in
Quaest. Plat. III when he argues that “each of us is destructible, but the world will not be destroyed” (καὶ φθαρτὸς
ἡμῶν εἷς ἕκαστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐ φθαρησόμενος; 1002c). Cf. Amat. 770a-b. Philo also approvingly quotes the
passage (De aet. mund. §13). Diogenes Laertius similarly seems to see the demiurge’s will, rather than the world’s
eternality, as the cause of its persistence: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτον διαμένειν τὸν κόσμον διὰ τὸ μὴ διαλύεσθαι εἰς τὸν
θεόν (III.72). Apuleius—in what Göransson (1995) calls “a confused treatment of the well-known problem” (147)—
seems to both interpret the generation of the world as metaphorical and to insist that it is indestructible on these
same grounds (De dog. Plat. I.8.198). Cf. Justin Dial. V.
49
“But first, let’s examine the attentiveness and great learning of this philosopher, who says that Aristotle and
Xenocrates and Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics followed the dogmas of Plato, For where beyond the inhabited
world did you write the book, such that you composed these accusations and did not happen upon their writings, or
get your hands on Aristotle’s works De caelo and De anima…” (καὶ πρῶτόν γε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ πολυμάθειαν τοῦ
φιλοσόφου σκεψώμεθα, λέγοντος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπηκολουθήκασιν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ
Ξενοκράτης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί. ποῦ γὰρ ὢν τῆς ἀοικήτου τὸ βιβλίον ἔγραφες, ἵνα ταῦτα
συντιθεὶς τὰ ἐγκλήματα μὴ τοῖς ἐκείνων συντάγμασιν ἐντύχῃς μηδ᾽ ἀναλάβῃς εἰς χεῖρας Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ περὶ
Οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὰ περὶ Ψυχῆς, …; 1114f-5a). He goes on to cite works of Theophrastus, Heracleides, and
Dicaearchus, as well as Strato (1115b). Cf. Sandbach (1982: 215-6).
46
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brief doxography of opinions on whether the world is generated with Aristotle, who, he notes,
thought Plato meant that it was generated but indestructible.50 Proclus claims that Atticus and
Harpocration—rare Platonists that followed Plutarch in arguing that Plato held that the
generation of the world soul entailed a change of state from chaos to order51—were trying to
combat Aristotle, but inadvertently allowed that the world was destructible:
Since Aristotle in De caelo charged the divine Plato with saying that the world is
begotten in time, as Aristotle thought at least, and therefore saying that it is destructible,
Harpocration and Atticus and those taking Plato to have said in the Timaeus that the
world is begotten in time think they have found a defense against Aristotle by saying that
the world is destructible through its own nature but remains indestructible through the
will of the god.52
The destructibility of the world was as unthinkable for Proclus, as it was for Aristotle.53 The
latter’s criticism seems to constitute the context for the roughly contemporaneous responses of
Xenocrates and Crantor, as with the later arguments of Atticus and Harpocration.

Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν φησιν λέγειν τὸν Τίμαιον γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, τοῦ Τιμαίου λέγοντος γεγονέναι· καὶ
γὰρ φέρεται αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς γενητοῦ (frg. 22b.12-5 Lakmann). See also Philo De aet. mund.
§7.
51
Baltes (1976) argues that Atticus followed Plutarch rather closely: “dabei hat Attikos sich in der Entwicklung
seiner Lehre so eng an Plutarch angelehnt, daß die beiden fast immer wie ein Zwillingspaar zusammen genannt
werden, wenn die zeitliche Entstehung der Welt zur Diskussion steht” (38); “Die Neuzeit hat ihm die Bewunderung
dafür nicht versagt, in der Antike hingegen ist er mit seiner Lehre anscheinend bald in den Schatten des Attikos
getreten, der Plutarchs Lehren adaptiert und, wie es scheint, weiter ausgebaut hat. Kein Wunder, wenn die spätere
Kritik sich vor allem auf den kongenialem Nachfolger konzentrierte , dem wir uns nun zuwenden wollen” (45). Cf.
Dillon (1988: 116-9).
52
ὁ Ἁρποκρατίων καὶ ὁ Ἀττικὸς οἱ τὸ γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ἐν Τιμαίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ χρόνον
ἀκούοντες, ἐπειδὴ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ θείῳ Πλάτωνι ἐν τῇ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ, διότι λέγων κατὰ χρόνον τὸν
κόσμον γενητόν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος οἴεται, λέγει αὐτὸν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι, ἀπολογίαν οἴονται εὑρίσκειν πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγοντες,
ὄτι φθαρτὸς μέν ἐστι διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, ἄφθαρτος δὲ διαμένει διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν (In Remp. II.377.1523). Harpocration was supposedly Atticus’ student, and composed a ὑπόμνημα εἰς Πλάτωνα in twenty-four books,
the fragments of which are collected in Dillon (1971). Proclus might have included Plutarch in this group because he
tends to treat Plutarch and Atticus as a pair in In Ti. Harpocration, however, separated himself from Atticus on the
issue of the demiurge and apparently followed Numenius’ distinction between three first gods, as Dillon notes (frg.
14, 143-5). Lakmann (2017) provides a description, bibliography, text, and translation for Harpocration (122-6, 47491) and Severus (230-6, 684-97). On the Aristotelian side, Kupreeva's (2016) survey reveals that Cael. was
apparently one of the most common objects of commentary in the second century C.E., including a work by Apasius
(139).
53
Some scholars, however, go to great lengths to defend Aristotle’s basic affinity with “his teacher” Plato, such as
Claghorn (1954: 97-8).
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Plutarch, on the other hand, echoes without further comment Plato’s argument in the
Timaeus that the world could be destroyed, although it never will be because the demiurge would
not want to destroy anything excellent. He does not indicate much concern about this particular
aspect of Aristotle’s critique. The alleged contradiction between a generated and ungenerated
world soul, however, evidently posed a serious problem for Plutarch. In De animae procreatione,
he invokes a passage in Leges X and he states, “if the world is ungenerated, undone is Plato’s
contention that the soul, older than the body, rules over all change and motion, established as the
leader and the primary actor, as he himself said”54—a potential contradiction Plutarch does not
accept. His solution rather is to distinguish different senses of the term “becoming” (γένεσις,
γίγνεσθαι): it could either mean “becoming,” he claims, or a sense of “being”—an interpretive
move familiar from Socrates’ exegesis of Simonides in the Protagoras, for instance, but used in
a surprising and peculiar sense by Plutarch.55 He introduces the distinction after dismissing a line
of Heraclitus—“no one either of gods or men made this world”56—and instead appeals to the text
of the Timaeus to characterize the demiurge’s arrangement as a sort of becoming:
It is better to believe Plato, to say that the world, on the one hand, came to be by the
agency of god and to sing “for it is the most beautiful of things begotten and he the best
of causes;” but the essence and material, from which it came to be, however, is not
becoming, but always available for the demiurge and offering itself into arrangement and
order and likeness to him, insofar as possible.57

εἰ γὰρ ἀγένητος ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν, οἴχεται τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸ πρεσβυτέραν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν οὖσαν ἐξάρχειν
μεταβολῆς καὶ κινήσεως πάσης, ἡγεμόνα καὶ πρωτουργόν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν, ἐγκαθεστῶσαν (1013e-f). Cf. the
πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις in Leg. X.897a. Apuleius similarly stresses the relative age of the world soul, “truly the oldest
of everything generated” (animam uero… omniumque gignentium esse seniorem; De dog. Plat. I.9.199; cf.
I.10.201).
55
“For Simonides does not seem to say anything self-contradictory. So you, Prodicus, declare your opinion: do
‘becoming’ and ‘being’ seem to be the same thing to you, or different?” (οὐ γὰρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν
γνώμην· ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; 340b).
56
κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν (B30 Diels).
57
βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν “ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν
γεγονότων, ὁ δ’ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων” (Ti. 29a) τὴν δ’ ὀυσίαν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην ἀλλὰ
ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὑτὴν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν ἐμπαρασχεῖν
(1014a-b).
54
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Plutarch is characterizing “becoming” as specifically “becoming ordered,” which he
distinguishes from simply “existing:”
Generation did not come from something not being, but from something which was
neither beautiful nor sufficient, as in the case of a house or a garment or a statue. For
there was disorder before the generation of the world: disorder not lacking body nor
motion nor soul, but bearing a shapeless and incohesive corporeal part, as well as a stupid
and irrational kinetic part. This was the cacophony of soul without reason.58
The technical metaphor is useful for clarifying Plutarch’s point. The wood that will become a
house still exists in trees, but the house only comes into being when that wood is shaped by a
rational agent.59 Although γίγνεσθαι can have both of these senses, Plutarch distinguishes a
qualification of εἶναι to describe the former, while using the latter to explain Plato’s use of
ἀγένητος in the Phaedrus.60
Plutarch makes a similar sort of distinction in Quaestiones Platonicae IV, where he sets
out to explain how the body is said in the Timaeus to both be unbegotten and begotten by the
soul: “mindless soul and shapeless body always coexisted (συνυπῆρχον) with one another, but
they bore no generation or origin,” until the soul partook of reason and then ordered the body.61

οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μηδ’ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ
ἀνδριάντος. ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τὴς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως· ἀκοσμία δ’ οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδ’ ἀκίνητος οὐδ’
ἄψυχος ἀλλ’ ἄμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικὸν ἔμπληκτον δὲ καὶ ἄλογον τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν
ἀναρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐχούσης λόγον (1014b). Alcinous uses similar language (XII.2). Plutarch further uses a
musical metaphor. See 1014c; in greater detail: 1026a. He further describes harmonizing with ratios and numbers
even the “dumbest materials” (τὰ κωφότατα σώματα) such as wood and stone (1029e).
59
One could explain this sort of distinction as an adoption of the Aristotelian conception of entelecheia, but the
chaotic pre-cosmic state seems to have a “being” that is not just potential orderliness. And when the ordered world
soul comes to be, the chaotic tendency of the primordial soul is not eradicated, which we would expect if it were
actualized orderly soul.
60
This is most clearly and explicitly at 1016c.
61
ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ’ ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα συνυπῆρχον
ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ καὶ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔσχεν οὐδ’ ἀρχήν· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ μετέλαβε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ
γενομένη διὰ συμφωνίας ἔμφρων μεταβολῆς αἰτία γέγονε τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κρατήσασα ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσι τὰς ἐκείνης
ἐπεσπάσατο καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν, οὕτω τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ἔσχεν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ κατασχηματιζόμενον καὶ
συνοιούμενον (1002f-3a). Both the body and the soul are begotten. De an. proc. specifies the relationship further: “it
is necessary that the composition, which is coming into being around the body of the earth, be taken as an image of
the proportion (εἰκόνα… τῆς ἀναλογίας), by which [the demiurge] harmonized the soul” (δεῖ δὲ τὴν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
τοῦ κόσμου γενομένην σύντηξιν εἰκόνα λαβεῖν τῆς ἀναλογίας ἐν τᾗ διηρμόσατο ψυχήν; 1025a). In this sense, the
body and the soul are more similar than either is to the intellect. This point, as well as the intermediacy of soul
58
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In De animae procreatione, Plutarch quotes various parts of the Timaeus to support this
distinction. He remarks that Plato, for instance, described “the soul” as “invisible and partaking
in reason and harmony, became the best of begotten things at the hands of the best of intelligible
and eternal things.”62 Plutarch takes this to be the “the clearest difference and distinction, by
which the eternal and the ungenerated have been stripped from her,” meaning the ordered world
soul.63 Calvenus Taurus, following soon after Plutarch, also attempts to explain the “generation”
in the Timaeus and its lack in the Phaedrus by elaborating philological distinctions. He
distinguishes four separate meanings of γίγνεσθαι, each of which is unlike Plutarch’s distinction
between γίγνεσθαι and εἶναι: “becoming” as belonging to the class of things that become, even if
it did not; by being composite, even if it was not combined; by always being in a state of
becoming (ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι), like Proteus changing into various shapes; and being always
dependent on something external to it, namely god.64 Each of these explanations clearly
precludes the possibility of the world soul changing in any meaningful way, and certainly not
something like “becoming ordered from pre-existing material.”65

generally, argues against the Stoic influence that Reydams-Schils (1999) postulates in Plutarch’s “view on matter”
(167-71).
62
… αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μέν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου
ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων (36e-7a).
63
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἄριστον εἰπὼν τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀρίστην τῶν γεννηθέντων, σαφεστάτῃ
ταύτῃ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἀντιθέσει τὸ ἀίδιον αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἀγένητον ἀφῄρηται (1016b-c).
64
λέγεται τοίνυν τὸ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον μέν, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ὂ γένει τοῖς γενητοῖς. … λέγεται γενητὸν καὶ
τὸ ἐπινοίᾳ σύνθετον, καὶ εἰ μὴ συντεθῇ. … λέγεται γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος, καθὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαί ἐστιν ὡς ὁ Πρωτεὺς
μεταβάλλων εἰς παντοδαπὰς μορφάς. … λέγοιτο δὲ γενητός, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἰναι αὐτῷ ἀλλαχόθεν ἐστὶν καὶ παρὰ τοῦ
θεοῦ, πρὸς ὂν κεκόσμηται (frg. 22b Lakmann = Philoponus, De aet. mund. 145.1-7.25). The fragments of Taurus’
notes on the Ti. (as well as the testimonia of Aulus Gellius and a few others) are collected in Lakmann (1995: 22958), and this is the most salient fragment of exegesis; see also Taylor (1831: 41-8). Dillon (1977) translates and
comments on the entire passage, as “excellent evidence for Middle Platonic scholasticism” (243), noting parallels
with other Middle Platonic authors (244). The different senses of γενητός remain an important inquiry in later
Platonism. Porphyry, for instance, distinguishes generated meaning depending on an anterior cause (τῷ ἀπ’ αἰτίου
τινὸς ἀνηρτῆσθαι) from generated meaning being composite (τῷ σύνθετα εἶναι): bodies are generated in both senses,
but soul and intellect only the former (Sent. XIV).
65
Although Taurus aligns himself with the Chaeronean generally—according to Gellius, calling him Plutarchus
noster, uir doctissimus ac prudentissimus (I.26.4)—and, I argue, further develops hermeneutic principles and
practices that are in some ways similar, he departs from Plutarch on the contentious issue of the generation of the
world soul in the Ti.
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Plutarch’s impetus for this solution, I argue, was an often-overlooked section of Leges X.
The recent commentators Franco Ferrari and Laura Baldi, however, posit Aristotelian influence,
by pointing to the method of resolving contradiction to the twenty-fifth chapter of Aristotle’s
Poetica, subtitled, appropriately enough “about problems and solutions.”66 The procedures
described on linguistic issues are not particularly distinctive to Aristotle but are succinctly
explicated: one must resolve some problems attending to diction, whether dialect or accent or
punctuation accounts for a difference, whether a word is used metaphorically, and, in particular,
whether “a word seems to signify a contradiction” but actually has multiple meanings in different
contexts.67 The Italian commentators argue that Plutarch in De animae procreatione engaged in
the last procedure. This sort of attribution, however, better fits interpreters after Plutarch who
distinguish multiple definitions of γίγνεσθαι to resolve ostensible issues arising from the
Timaeus, such as Taurus. Plato himself, however, formulated a sort of “becoming” that both
entails a change of state, and yet precludes the sort of chaotic “existence” that Plutarch seeks to
distinguish from “becoming.” In Leges X, the Athenian Stranger, resting his claim to knowledge
of scientific sophistry on his Athenian origin, proposes and explicates a tripartite distinction in
the meaning of γίγνεσθαι to explain how they attempt to surplant law with nature: “some perhaps
say that everything that is becoming, has become, or will become, is either by nature, by art, or

περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων (1460b); Ferrari & Baldi 2002: “il metodo adottato da Plut. per risolvere
l’aporia testuale, vale a dire per liberare Platone dall’accussa di inconstantia, è esattamente quello consigliato da
Aristotele, il quale suggeriva di valutare se le affermazioni apparentemente contraddiorie in questione si riferiscono
davvero alla medesima cosa e se vanno prese nello stesso senso. … Plut. si muove seguendo le indicazioni
metodologiche aristoteliche…” (260). One could also compare the discussion of the πρόβλημα διαλεκτικόν in Top.
I.11. They describe this in greater depth in the introduction (24-5), but also posit a consistent concern to “Platonem
ex Platone σαφηνίζειν” (22-3). Cf. Oikonomopoulou (2013): “The two answers… both attempt to shed light on the
problem according to the principle of ‘explaining Plato from Plato’, that is, by recourse to well-known aspects of
Platonic ‘doctrine’ (thought by imperial Platonists to be a complete and fully elaborated system of philosophical
thought)” (143).
67
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν… δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῇ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν
ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ (1461a). This last example is the emphasis of Ferrari and Baldi’s
argument, but similar the same method is often used by earlier philosophers, such as in the Derveni Papyrus.
66
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by chance.”68 The example of “becoming by nature or chance” is the existence of the four
elements, which maps onto Plutarch’s example of the unworked wood or stone: it is the stuff that
exists without art or intent.69 The “becoming” that the demiurge undertakes is clearly of the “by
art” sort, in contrast. One might object that the distinction is sophistic, but both Cleinias and the
Athenian Stranger find it immediately “likely.”70 Their objection is to the subordination of
“becoming by art” to the other sorts, and not the tripartite distinction itself. Plutarch too would
agree that “becoming” according to a rationally intended end is superior to arbitrary sorts of
“becoming.” Without the demiurge’s ordering, shapeless matter and chaotically moving soul
simply exist is a lesser and qualified sense, beneath this sense of “becoming.”71
While Plutarch does not specifically cite this passage, he accuses earlier Platonists of
mangling Leges X as a whole:72 “and now this said will suffice, that the contest and discourse
about the gods, which Plato agrees was proclaimed against the atheists most ambitiously and
beyond his old age, they confound, or rather entirely destroy.”73 He can leave off here because a
separate treatise has been dedicated (ἰδίᾳ τε λόγου τέτευχε) to the subject. His omission of the
sorts of becoming in Leges X is perhaps due to the terseness of the account in De animae
procreatione and its coverage in this separate work. The few scholars that consider Plutarch in
light of this book, however, focus on the distinction between twelve different kinds of motion

λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ,
τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην (888e).
69
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασίν, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων… (889b).
70
Κλεινίας· οὐκοῦν καλῶς; Ἀθηναῖος· εἰκός γέ τοί που σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν (888e). It would not
necessarily bother Plutarch, however, that antagonists in Plato proposed a useful consideration: he attributes
Protagoras’ anthropological myth to Plato himself, for instance (De fort. 98d, citing Protagoras 321c). Similarly,
Tarrant (1996) discusses Gellius’ and Calvenus Taurus’ method of looking “for depth of meaning in the words of a
wide variety of Plato’s characters,” including even Callicles (178-84); see also Olymp. In Alc. 61.8-11.
71
On the conception of matter as “inert” cf. Dillon (2014): “Plutarch, we may note, has no hesitation in attributing
the Aristotelian conception of Matter to Plato” (234).
72
On the impact of this book’s arguments against atheism and superstition on Plutarch, see supra pg. 76.
73
ὅτι τὸν περὶ θεῶν ἀγῶνα καὶ λόγον, ᾧ Πλάτων ὁμολογεῖ φιλοτιμότατα καὶ παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν πρὸς τοὺς ἀθέους
κεχρῆσθαι, συγχέουσι, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅλως ἀναιροῦσιν (1013e).
68
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and ignore the earlier part about pious and impious beliefs.74 Plutarch, who thinks of book X as
the tirade against the atheists, rather than just the discursus on types of motion, seems to consider
them together. So, while what might have been in Plutarch’s lost treatise is necessarily
speculative, I posit that the tripartite distinction in kinds of becoming at the beginning of book X
might well have provided useful distinctions for the “becoming” and pre-“existing” of the world
soul in the Timaeus.
The next section argues further that Plutarch and his characters practice a principle of
interpreting Plato through Plato, rather than appealing to a figure such as Aristotle, to construct a
coherent account of his cosmology in the Timaeus. Plutarch seems entirely committed to a sort of
Platonic unitarianism, although he does not seem to have been bothered that some of the
solutions he proposes in each of the Quaestiones Platonicae are mutually exclusive—
presumably because each is only a likely account with the potential to resolve a puzzle. As the
next section argues, Plutarch finds the pieces to complete the puzzles elsewhere in the Platonic
corpus, a practice which reflects a central interpretive principle. The third section will then
examine the most controversial part of Plutarch’s resolution of the contradiction of the
ungenerated and generated soul, his insistence that the two states occur somehow at different
times, rather than representing different aspects of an eternal state—an issue that so thoroughly

74

This might explain why this source has not been detected. Both Cherniss (1976) and Ferrari and Baldi (2002), for
example, cite Plutarch’s reference as beginning at 891e (117nd, 238), where the Athenian stranger signals that he is
proceeding into a more unaccustomed argument (λέγοιμ’ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἤδη σχεδὸν οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον τινὰ τόνδε),
that the impious are ignorant about the true nature of souls, which are prior to all bodies (892a). This is not the entire
episode, but only the beginning of the more logically intricate argument, which leads to a discussion of the issue of
theodicy: “Is it necessary to agree then from this that soul is responsible for both good things and bad, beautiful
things and ugly, both just and unjust, and of everything opposite, if we set it as responsible for everything?” (ἆρ᾽ οὖν
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν
δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν; 896d).
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divides subsequent Platonists that the Neoplatonist Iamblichus describes it as a raging civil war
(διαστάζουσιν).75

Reading Plato through Plato
The previous section examined the principle of non-contradiction that Plutarch applies to
his interpretation of Plato, which other interpreters, such as Peripatetics, similarly apply to their
philosophical authority. Aspasius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea, continuing
from the last section, not only assumes that a tension in Aristotle is merely ostensible, but also
presumes that the best solution is applying a distinction from the Analytica posteriora, rather
than appealing to another philosophical authority—so to speak, interpreting Aristotle from
Aristotle. This impulse was evidently shared by many ancient schools of interpretation, but
Porphyry formalizes and explicates in his Homericae quaestiones of reading Homer through
Homer:76 “but I, thinking it best to clarify Homer from Homer, was showing that he interprets

Iamblichus includes this in a section entitled “regarding the activities of the soul” (περὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ψυχῆς) in
his doxography in De an. He describes three factions: Plotinus and Porphyry—whom he refers to as the “purest of
the Platonists” (οἱ δὲ καθαρώτεροι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, §32)—bring “many forms and portions of activities of life into
one arrangement and one form”; another, represented by Numenius, “strain them into conflict” (ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ ἐν
αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς πολλοὶ διαστάζουσιν, οἳ μὲν εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν καὶ μίαν ἰδέαν τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ζωῆς
καὶ τὰ ἐνεργήματα συνάγοντες, ὥσπερ Πλωτῖνός τε καὶ Πορφύριος· οἳ δὲ εἰς μάχην ταῦτα κατατείνοντες, ὥσπερ
Νουμήνιος; §23); and finally, the one represented by Plutarch and Atticus receives the longest description: “and
there are those who harmonize (the soul) from conflicting parts, as those around Atticus and Plutarch do. And they
say that the ordering and arranging (motions) come later than the underlying and unarranged and disorderly motions,
and they [Atticus and Plutarch] thus weave together a harmony from both” (οἳ δὲ ἐκ μαχομένων αὐτὰ
συναρμόζοντες, ὥσπερ οἳ περὶ Ἀττικὸν καὶ Πλούταρχον. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν προϋποκειμένων τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ
πλημμελῶν κινημάτων ἐπεισιέναι φασὶν ὕστερα τὰ κατακοσμοῦντα αὐτὰ καὰ διατάττοντα καὶ τὴν συμφωνίαν ἀπ’
ἀμφοτέων οὕτως συνυφαίνουσι; §23). Finamore & Dillon (2002) make sense of ἐπεισιέναι with the idea of
“supervenience” (49, 137), but it could just emphasize the temporal aspect. Proclus often names Plutarch and Atticus
together (e.g. In Tim. I.381.26-2.12), and Iamblichus might also mention them again in §28, depending on the
solution to corrupt text, as they discuss (2002: 158). The topic there is that of this chapter’s next section: Iamblichus
signals at least Atticus as unusual in arguing that every sort of soul is incorporated by a single method (καθ’ ἕνα δὲ
τρόπον), the imposition of a rational soul on pre-existing, irrational soul.
76
As will Hellenistic Judaism, for instance, according to Runia (1986b): “Indeed the method of interpreting Moses
via Moses is an essential aspect of Philo’s interpretation of scripture” (488).
75
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himself, sometimes similiarly, other times in other ways.”77 Plutarch, although he does not
explicitly formulate this sort of position, similarly tends to interpret Plato through Plato. In the
symposiastic vignette that depicts the discussion on why Plato says god is always doing
geometry, all three of the speakers, including the character of Plutarch, cite parts of various
Platonic dialogues. The first speaker, Tyndares, begins by asking whether Plato said something
unusual, difficult, and riddling, or “what he himself has said and written many times.”78 Even
when Platonic interpretation is depicted as symposiastic play, it nevertheless follows a serious
rule: Plato is best interpreted from Plato.
This principle is evident throughout the Quaestiones Platonicae and De animae
procreatione. 79 The latter explains the elements of the composition of the world soul in the
Timaeus by comparison with other dialogues, but the Quaestiones similarly use other passages of
Plato to explain puzzling passages.80 In the third, Diotima’s ladder from the Symposium is

ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐγὼ Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἑαυτὸν ὑπεδείκνυον, ποτὲ μὲν παρακειμένως,
ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις (I.56). Porphyry’s Ὁμηρικὰ ζητήματα (cf. Plutarch’s Πλατωνικά ζητήματα) begins with by
stating the intention to read Homer through Homer, “because Homer interprets many things himself” (ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν
ἑαυτὸν τὰ πολλὰ Ὅμηρος ἐξηγεῖται; I.1). The idea of interpreting Homerus ex Homero is often attributed to the
Alexandrian school of Aristarchus and his followers, but Pfeiffer (1968) points out that this is based on an a priori
assumption about Porphyry’s sources. He argues against this: “Scholars are not inclined to pronounce general
principles, but philosophers are… the formula Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν was coined by Porphyry and should
not be taken as an authentic remark of Aristarchus, though it is not against his spirit” (227). But the general account,
which Pfeiffer shares in this respect, is that Porphyry wrote these when he was “a young philosopher, an Athenian
pupil of the φιλόλογος and κριτικός Cassius Longinus” (226), because the style of interpretation is very different
from the explicitly Numenian style of allegory that dominates Porphyry’s De antr. nymph. But Lamberton (1986)
argues that both of the works could have been written in either period, or indeed at the same time (108-13).
78
οἴει γὰρ, εἶπεν, ὦ Διογενιανέ, τῶν περιττῶν τι καὶ δυσθεωρήτων αἰνίττεσθαι τὸν λόγον, οὐχ ὅπερ αὐτὸς εἴρηκε καὶ
γέγραφεν πολλάκις, ὑμνῶν γεωμετρίαν ὡς ἀποσπῶσαν ἡμᾶς προσισχομένους τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀποστρέσουσαν
(Quaest. conv. VIII.2.718c). See also Lamprias’ speech in IX.5.740b-e.
79
Simonetti (2017) argues that the Ti. constitutes “Plutarch’s reference-work in this hermeneutical operation,”
referencing the construction of his cosmology. She describes Plutarch’s philosophy as “fundamentally guided by the
leading idea that a coherent philosophical system is hidden in Plato’s dialogues and can be reconstituted out of
them” (193).
80
Plutarch uses the phrase, “Phaedrus the father of erotic speeches” (τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων πατέρα Φαῖδρον; Symp.
177d; II.1000f, also quoting the Phdr. in 1001a) in one explanation of why Plato calls “the highest god the father of
all” (τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα τῶν πάντων) in the Ti. (paraphrasing 28c; II.1000e); he raises a possible (and
obstensible, to be dispelled) objection to the passage of the Ti. that calls the lumps the sun in with other astral
objects as the ὄργανα χρόνου (42d), because of the height Plato elevates the sun to in the Resp. (VIII.1006f-1007a);
See infra pg. 323.
77
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introduced as another image to help explain why the intelligible half of the divided line might be
longer.81 Perhaps, Plutarch suggests, to turn towards readers the “vast sea of the beautiful,” and
hence a larger and loftier segment of the divided line, Plato “himself teaches that one must turn
the soul away from sense-perceptible beauties and towards the intelligible ones.”82 In the ninth,
he sets out to answer which string the Respublica’s rational part of the soul is represented by on a
lyre, and explains the musical image largely by exegesis of the Phaedrus, where “Plato himself
likened the form of the soul to a composite two-horse yoke and a charioteer.”83 Plutarch carefully

“What was he thinking when he divided the whole into unequal sections? And which of the sections, the
intelligible or the sensible, is larger? For he did not make it clear himself” (‘τί οὖν διανοηθεὶς εἰς ἄνισα τὰ τμήματα
τὸ πᾶν ἔτεμε; καὶ πότερον τῶν τμημάτων, τὸ νοητὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητόν, μεϊζόν ἐστιν;’ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε; 1001d).
Cf. Pritchard (1995: 112n12). In this case, there are two possibilities. It could be, “as it immediately seems” (δόξει
δ’ αὐτόθεν), that the sensible part is larger than the noetic parts: among other arguments, limit is befitting for
incorporeality, while unlimited for body; it is necessary for the bodies to surpass in quantity because, according to
Plato (κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα), the intelligibles, the ideas, are the patterns of sense-perceptible things, as with images or
reflections; and to contemplate, we have one intellect, but because bodies are multiple, we have multiple senses
(1001d-2a). After laying out all of these reasons, Plutarch also makes the contrary case with comparably many
arguments, drawing yet other passages of Plato for support: “someone might argue to the contrary” (πρὸς δὲ
τοὐναντίον εἴπον τις ἂν): the thing encompassed is always less than the thing encompassing it, even if it is invisible,
as with the soul which, according to Plato in the Leges, god stretched around the visible world (ἔπειτα πανταχοῦ
δήπου τὸ περιεχόμενον ἔλαττόν ἐστι τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις τῷ νοητῷ περιέχει τὸ αἰσθητόν· ὁ γὰρ
θεός “τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ μέσον θεὶς διὰ παντὸς τ᾽ ἔτεινε καὶ ἔξωθεν τὰ σώματα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψεν.” ἔστι δ᾽ ἀόρατος
ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ “πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἀναίσθητος” ὡς ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις [X.898e] εἴρηται; 1002b-c). Either solution, it
seems, would plausibly explain the intent behind the image. Plato’s consistency goes unquestioned, but the difficulty
of elucidating his thought might require several approaches.
82
… ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ καλοῦ πέλαγος τρέπεσθαι (1002e, cf. Pl. Symp. 210d) … μετάγοντα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν
αἰσθητῶν καλῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητά (1002e). Cherniss (1976) is characteristically critical of the selection of the
“paraphrase” (47ne). The Ti. is quoted earlier in this Quaestio (1002c).
83
καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς εἰκάσας συμφύτῳ ζεύγει καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος… (1008c). He uses it in each of the
two possibilities for revolving the question. In the second, that reason is the intermediate string: “For the pair, the
better of the horses, does not bear the middle, nor should the driving be considered an extreme but rather the
intermediate between the horses’ disproportion in sharpness and slowness, as the power of reason lays hold of
passions moving irrationally, harmonizes them around (the reason) itself, and sets measure in them with an eye
toward the moderation of deficency and excess” (οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνωρὶς μέσον ἔχει τῶν ὑποζυγίων τὸ κρεῖττον, οὐδὲ τὴν
ἡνιοχείαν ἀκρότητα θετέον ἀλλὰ μεσότητα τῆς ἐν ὀξύτητι καὶ βραδύτητι τῶν ἵππων ἀμετρίας, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ λόγου
δύναμις ἀντιλαμβανομένη κινουμένων ἀλόγως τῶν παθῶν καὶ συναρμόττουσα περὶ αὑτὴν εἰς τὸ μέτριον ἐλλείψεως
καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητα καθίστησι; 1009b). This is an imagistic illustration of the idea put abstractly earlier
(1009a-b), which illustrates that the role of reason is qualitatively distinguished from the irrational pair, although
they are distinguished with reference to the Phdr. in 1008c. Conversely, he argues that the same image supports the
identification of the rational part (λογιστικῷ) as the highest string (ὑπάτη), rather than an intermediate string: “as
then the charioteer of the pair is not the intermediate in virtue and ability, but of the horses…” (ὥσπερ οὖν
συνωρίδος οὐχ ὁ ἡνίοχός ἐστιν ἀρετῇ καὶ δυνάμει μέσος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἵππων…; 1008d). The same image of Plato is
used to argue both possibilities. Cf. Opsomer (2012) on this text (329), and on similar reminiscences of the image
from the Phdr. in De virt. mor., such as εὐήνιος (325fn78). Quaest. Plat. VI relatedly asks “how is it said in the
Phaedrus that the nature of the wing, by which the heavy is lead upwards, has shared most of the things around the
81
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attends to how exactly, moreover, Plato envisioned a lyre and its harmony in the numerological
portion of the De animae precreatione, when he not only distinguishes how “the ancients” (τοὺς
παλαιοὺς) allocated notes from “contemporaries” (οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι), but also, based on his
interpretation of the music of the Sirens image in the myth of Er, how Plato himself innovated
upon the ancient in a different way from the modern.84 Plutarch evidently considers the salient
harmonic scale for examining Plato’s imagery or cosmology to be Plato’s own conception.
Throughout the Quaestiones Platonicae, a few poets and prose writers are quoted sporadically,
but usually for a turn or phrase or a formulation rather than as an authority or source for an
interpretation.85 In the second Quaestio, for instance, Plutarch illustrates his explanation of why
god is the maker (ποιητής) and not father of “mindless and soulless” things by quoting
Chrysippus: “no one calls the one that provides the seed the father of the placenta, even though it
came from the seed.”86 This citation is entirely extrinsic to the inquiry and gives no indication
that Plutarch was reading any specific interpretation of Plato by Chrysippus, insofar as the
interpretation would remain the same without adopting this precise phrase from the Stoic. The

body in the divine?” (πῶς ποτ’ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ λέγεται τὸ τὴν τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσιν, ὑφ' ἧς ἄνω τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἀνάγεται,
κεκοινωνηκέναι μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου; 1004c). In Quaest. conv. IX.5, Lamprias takes ἅρμα to
playfully allude to the “harmonious revolution of the world” (τὴν ἐναρμόνιον τοῦ κόσμου περιφοράν; 740b).
84
“But Plato, it is clear, added to the sharp: for he says in the Respublica…” (ὁ δὲ Πλάτων δῆλός ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξὺ
προσλαμβάνων· λέγει γὰρ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ…; 1029b-c). Plutarch also discusses the historical arrangement of notes in
De E 389d-f.
85
E.g. the long linguistic examples in Quaest. Plat. X, drawn from Homer (1009c, 1010b-f) and Demosthenes
(1010f-11a).
86
οὐδὲ γὰρ χορίου φησὶ Χρύσιππος πατέρα καλεῖσθαι τὸν παρασχόντα τὸ σπέρμα, καίπερ ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος
γεγονότος (1000f = SVF II.1158). The orator Demades is similarly quoted for the phrase “festivals, the glue of
democracy” (ὠς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, κόλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας; X.1011b = frg. 36 de Falco).
Theognis, for instance, is quoted in I.1000c. More philosophically significantly, in the ninth, he appeals to
Xenocrates for a characterization of different kinds of gods: “and Xenocrates calls Zeus the highest he who is among
things that are consistent and self-same, while the lowest he who is under the moon” (καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία τὸν ἐν
μὲν τοῖς κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν ὕπατον καλεῖ, νέατον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην; 1007f = frg. 18 Heinze).
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procedure is fundamentally explaining Plato through Plato, even with these sprinkled
embellishments.87
This question of what authorities are appropriate for Platonic interpretation, however,
divides Middle Platonic interpretation. Alcinous’ Didaskalikos, as described above, adopts the
terminology and categories of Aristotelian logic and projects them back onto Plato. Calvenus
Taurus and Atticus, however, take strong positions against ever interpreting Plato through
Aristotle. According to Philoponus, Taurus criticizes Theophrastus for introducing the fifth
element to explain the Timaeus:
It is worthwhile to examine how the Platonic interpreter Taurus not only thinks it is true
that Plato says the world was mixed together from four elements alone, but also how he
fought against Theophrastus for saying that the heavens are not from these—for
Theophrastus is from Aristotle’s school. Taurus says that the interpreter of Plato does not
think that it has been accepted that, by the authority of Aristotle, there is a fifth element:
“for whenever it occurs to him that it exists,” he says, “let him stand strong against these
things.”88
Taurus categorically rejects that anyone who appeals to a distinctively Aristotelian concept such
as the fifth element, such as Theophrastus, could be thought of as an interpreter of Plato.89 Even
when interpreting the Timaeus, a Peripatetic’s appeals to the authority of Aristotle preclude

87

Embellishments such as these seem to make the work more literary: Hartman (1916) for example, apparently very
taken by this variatio as well as concision and eloquence, took it to be the source of Plutarch’s superlative fame for
Platonic interpretation, rendering the De an. proc., which is now more often discussed, only secondary for his
reputation as a Platonic exegete (e.g. 581 and 592).
88
σκοπεῖν ἄξιον, πῶς οὐ μόνον ἀληθὲς οἴεται Πλάτωνα ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων μόνων στοιχείων συγκεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον
λέγειν ὁ τούτου ἐξητητὴς Ταῦρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεοφράστῳ μάχεται λέγοντι μὴ εἶναι ἐκ τούτων τὸν οὐρανόν (τῆς γὰρ
Ἀριστοτέλους διατριβῆς ὁ Θεόφραστος), καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ οἴεται ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητὴς τὸ πέμπτον ἀποδεδεῖχθαι
στοιχεῖον, ὅτι ἔστιν, ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους· “ὅταν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο παραστήσῃ,” φησίν, “ὅτι ἔστιν, τότε πρὸς ταῦτα
ἐνιστάσθω” (frg. 26b Lakmann = De aet. mund. 520.23-1.6). He goes onto discuss the configuration of the elements
in the Ti. Almost all of these fragments are preserved by Philoponus, a Christian interpreter of Plato and Aristotle
engaged in polemic against the Neoplatonists on the temporality or eternality of the world.
89
Similarly, but without the use of exegetical terminology, Atticus describes a group of “those who come together to
study the thought of Plato, having recognized that the greatest contest of speeches is necessarily very much set in
this,” meaning the theory of forms (οἵ τ’ αὖ τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος συνιστάναι ἐγνωκότες τὸν πλεῖστον ἀγῶνα τῶν λόγων
ἐν τούτῳ τίθενται πάνυ ἀναγκαίως; frg. 9 = Euseb. Praep. evang. XV.13.4). Cf. frg. 7 = ibid. XV.9.2.
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Platonic exegesis90—presented by Taurus as a distinctive sort of philosophical endeavor with
particular rules. Atticus, as the extensive fragments quoted by Eusebius under the title of Against
those undertaking the thought of Plato through that of Aristotle make clear, systematized this
position even further.91 More vehemently than Taurus, he claims that Aristotle was “very
stupidly deceiving himself” (παντευκόλως αὑτὸν ἐξαπατήσας) by assigning the world’s circular
motion to a fifth element rather than a soul.92 Aristotle furthermore, Atticus argues, “appears to
have desired discord and did not agree with Plato about the other elements, even with the fifth
removed.”93 Both Taurus and Atticus thus treat the Peripatetics as if they should have been doing
philosophy by interpreting Plato through Plato, without appealing to Aristotle.
The opposite trend, of interpreting Plato through Aristotle, nonetheless seems to have
eventually prevailed in later Platonism. Julian the Apostate, for example, introduces the fifth
element with the maxim that “Aristotle’s ideas are incomplete if someone does not lead them
into harmony with Plato.”94 Plutarch, however, does not make this sort of interpretive move, with

Perhaps this was a part of Theophrastus’ polemical work entitled Against the Academics (Πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ
Ἀκαδημείας α᾽; DL V.2.49).
91
Πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπισχνουμένους (frg. 1 = Praep. evang. XI.1.2). All of the
citations of this work come from Eusebius, who sympathetically deems him “Atticus, a distinguished many among
the Platonist philosophers” (Ἀττικὸς διαφανὴς ἀνὴρ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων).
92
“For Plato, because there are four bodies and each moves itself in a simple and straight manner by its nature, fire
towards the outward, earth towards the middle, and the others toward the between, but he gave circular motion to
soul. But he (Aristotle), just as any other motion to another body, thus attributed the circular motion to the fifth
element, as if the motion were something bodily—but he very stupidly deceived himself” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων, ἅτε
ὄντων τεσσάρων σωμάτων καὶ πάντων φύσει κινουμένων ἁπλῆν καὶ εὐθεῖαν κίνησιν, πυρὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκτός, γῆς δ’
ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὰ μεταξύ, τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ κίνησιν ἀπέδωκε τῇ ψυχῇ· ὁ δ’, ᾗπερ ἄλλῳ σώματι ἄλλην,
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ, καθάπερ σωματικήν τινα, τῷ πέμπτῳ προσένειμε σώματι…; frg. 6 = Euseb. Praep.
evang. XV.8.7).
93
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ σωμάτων, ὑπεξαιρουμένου τοῦ πέμπτου, φαίνεται φιλονεικῶν Ἀριστοτέλης μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ
λέγειν Πλάτωνι (frg. 6 = Euseb. Praep. evang. XV.8.10).
94
ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος ἔφη, τοῖς ἄγαν ἐφείσθω Περιπατητικοῖς ὀνυχίζειν, ὅτι δὲ οὐ προσηνῶς ἐμοὶ παντί που
δῆλον, ὅπου γε καὶ τὰς Ἀριστοτελικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐνδεεστέρως ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, εἰ μή τις αὐτὰς ἐς ταὐτὸ τοῖς
Πλάτωνος ἄγοι… (Or. V.162c-d). The context is the 1st century B.C.E. Peripatetic Xenarchus of Seleucia. Both
Plato and Aristotle, Julian concludes, must be brought into conformity with “the prophecies given from the gods”
(μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ταῖς ἐκ θεῶν δεδομέναις προφητείαις) According to Sheppard (1980), Proclus tried to
reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian positions on the elements by making the fifth element the purest part of each
of the other four (166).
90
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perhaps one notable exception—his detection of “an outline of the ten categories” in the
Timaeus.95 If Plutarch dedicated a work to the fifth element, as F. H. Sandbach denies, he appears
ambivalent in extant works.96 Even when characters do propose a fifth element, however, such as
that of the young Plutarch does in De E, the Aristotelian formulation is ignored, in favor of the
five geometrical solids described by Plato in the Timaeus;97 Xenocrates had already argued that
Plato believed there were five elements, deriving the last, like Plutarch, from the dodecahedron.98
Plutarch suggests possible interpretations from Aristotle and Theophrastus only once in
the Quaestiones Platonicae, in the eighth quaestio, where he rejects both as contradicting what
Plato said. He asks, “why does Timaeus say that souls are sown into the earth and the moon and
the rest of the instruments of time?”99 Plutarch briefly considers Theophrastus’ claim that Plato
changed his mind as an older man, but quickly rejects it, because it would necessitate
contradiction:100
Or do many of the things that harmoniously appeal to the man stand against these things?
And would there be a need to change “time” from the genitive to the dative, and to take
instruments not to mean the stars but the bodies of living things? Aristotle thus defined
the soul as the “actualization (ἐντελέχειαν) of a natural and instrumental body possessing
life in potential (δυνάμει).” This would yield an account such as that souls are sown into
the fitting instruments in time. But this also is against his opinion: for not once but many

ἐν τούτοις ἅμα καὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριών ποιούμενος ὑπογραφὴν… (De an. proc. 1023e, referencing Ti. 37a-b).
Whittaker (1987) emphasizes that Plutarch attributes the Aristotelian categories to Plato (111), whereas Alcinous
assigns the whole of Aristotelian logic to Plato. Plutarch is broadly familiar with Aristotelian metaphysics, but he
attributes it to Peripatetics (e.g. Quaest. conv. VII.6.708e), rather than adopting it into his own system.
96
περὶ τῆς πεμπτῆς οὐσίας βιβλία ε’ (Lamprias catalogue no. 44); cf. Sandbach (1969): “Possibly πεμπτῆς should be
omitted as dittography” (10n1). See also Sandbach (1982: 216-7). Cf. Dillon (1977): “…the Aristotelian fifth
element, the aether, which had been accepted (though not quire consistently) by Plutarch” (224). In the treatise
Aquane an ignis utilior, part of the Plutarchean corpus but sometimes thought to be spurious, the sea is said to be a
fifth element that water provides (καὶ μὴν τεττάρων ὄντων στοιχείων τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πέμπτον, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι,
πεποίηκε στοιχεῖον τὴν θάλασσαν; 956e).
97
389f-90a. Also see the discussion in De def., on which see further supra pg. 122.
98
Xenocrates frg. 53 Heinze, on which see Dillon (2003a: 128n112).
99
πῶς λέγει τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ Τίμαιος εἴς τε γῆν καὶ σελήνην καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου σπαρῆναι; (1006a). On this
Quaest., see further infra pg. 323.
100
“And Theophrastus includes in his treatment that Plato changed his mind as an old man, when he realized he
gave the middle place of everything unworthily to the earth” (Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ προσιστορεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι
πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ μεταμέλειν, ὡς οὐ προσήκουσαν ἀποδόντι τῇ γῇ τὴν μέσην χώραν τοῦ παντός; 1006d).
95
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times he called the stars the instruments of time, such as where he said that “the sun came
to be for the division and protection of time” along with the other planets.101
Plutarch rejects both Theophrastus’ and Aristotle’s interpretations because neither was what
Plato said, and both would create tensions.102 The latter even uses a fundamental distinction in
Aristotelian metaphysics in the exact same language as Arisotle famously formulated, the same
set of coinages which Apuleius and Alcinous evidently sometimes found useful.103 Rather than
importing Peripatetic concepts and language, however, Plutarch focuses on Plato.104
In De animae procreatione, explanation of Plato through Plato similarly emerges as the
dominant means of interpreting the complicated details of the demiurge’s composition of the
world soul from indivisible and divisible essence, a combination of the two, and sameness and
difference.105 Plutarch’s argument is fittingly complicated.106 He associates “indivisible being”
with the intelligence and therefore with orderly motion, while identifying “divisible being,”

ἢ τούτοις μὲν ἀντίκειται πολλὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως ἀρεσκόντων τῷ ἀνδρί, μεταγραπτέον δὲ τὸ “χρόνου”
“χρόνῳ” λαμβάνοντας ἀντὶ τῆς γενικῆς τὴν δοτικήν, καὶ δεκτέον ὄργανα μὴ τοὺς ἀστέρας ἀλλὰ τὰ σώματα τῶν
ζῴων λέγεσθαι; καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ὡρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν “ἐντελέχειαν σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν
ἔχοντος.” ὥστε τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν λόγον· αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ὀργανικὰ σώματα ἐν χρόνῳ κατεσπάρησαν.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν δόξαν ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὄργανα χρόνου τοὺς ἀστέρας εἴρηκεν, ὅπου καὶ
τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν “εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γεγονέναι” φησὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων πλανήτων (1006de). Plutarch is evidently referring to De an. II.412a-b, although two nearby passages are merged, as Cherniss (1976:
80na) notes. After rejecting these possibilities, the transition to an acceptable reading is strong, compared to the
earlier unmarked “or”s (ἢ): “it is best, then…” (ἄριστον οὖν…; 1006e).
102
Plutarch goes on to reject Aristotle’s definition of time in a doxography beginning in 1007a-b.
103
See especially Arist. Metaph. X. On Alcinous and Apuleius, see supra pg. 128.
104
In the eighth of the Quaest. Plat., Plutarch does consider definitions from Aristotle and Theophrastus, but these
are soundly rejected—unlike the other possibilities he raises.
105
Toward the end of the essay, he describes the demiurge’s ordering as “taking over the disorder and discord in the
motions of the disharmonious soul, differing even from itself, and divided and distinguished and separated some
things and combined and composed some things toward others, using harmonies and numbers” (παραλαβὼν γὰρ ὁ
δημιουργὸς ἀταξίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσι τῆς ἀναρμόστου καὶ ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς διαφερομένης πρὸς
ἑαυτὴν τὰ μὲν διώρισε καὶ διέστησε τὰ δὲ συνήγαγε πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ συνέταξεν, ἁρμονίαις καὶ ἀριθμοῖς
χρησάμενος; 1029e). The harmonizing of motion is a persistent theme of De an. proc., which explains why the
questions about ratio and harmony are appended to the main section.
106
Opsomer (2001) offers a strong identification: “‘that which is indivisible,’ namely the rationality which is the
demiurge” (192), building on Ferrari: “the demiurge, who is equated with the first god or the One or the Good, is
among the intelligibles and the ideas are around god. This means that they are situated on the same ontological level,
without being identical. Plutarch assigns a certain priority to the demiurge, but apparently rejects the popular Middle
Platonic view that the ideas are just his thoughts” (192n42).
101
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meaning the primordial soul itself, with chaotic motion.107 Each is not equivalent with their
associated sort of motion, but they are causally responsible for it, it seems. But this is
complicated, as they are compounded to form being, and to this compound, sameness and
difference were then added.108 Sameness and difference, in turn, Plutarch claims, “each descend
(κάτεισι) from a certain source (ἀρχῆς), sameness from the one, and otherness from the dyad.
And they are first mixed then around the soul, by numbers and ratios.”109 Sameness is not rest
and difference is not motion, Plutarch continues to hold;110 rather, as a result of this mixture,
there is a “dyadic and indefinite part” and a “simple and monadic” one.111 In the compounded
world soul, the former part is responsible for disorderly motion, and the latter orderly. This
fundamental bipartition is further reflected in the mental faculty of “judgement” (κρίσις), which
“bears two principles, the mind from the same towards the general and the sense-perception from
the other towards the particulars.”112
Plutarch is aware of the difficulty of these arguments, which he cites as part of his
motivation to write the treatise.113 He therefore illustrates these aspects of the world soul by

107

On this summary, cf. Jones (1916: 80-3), Froidefond (1987: 189-93), Opsomer (2001: 191-3), Opsomer (2004:
140-6), and Simonetti (2017: 182-5).
108
οὕτως ἐνδείκνυται πολλαχόθεν ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ πᾶν ἔργον εἶναι θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον ἔχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν
τοῦ κακοῦ μοῖραν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου διακεκοσμῆσθαι, τῷ μὲν ἑνὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ὁρίσαντος, ἵν᾽ οὐσία γένηται πέρατος
μετασχοῦσα, τῇ δὲ ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἑτέρου δυνάμει τάξιν καὶ μεταβολὴν καὶ διαφορὰν καὶ ὁμοιότητα συμμίξαντος,
πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις, ὡς ἀνυστὸν ἦν, κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ φιλίαν ἐργασαμένου δι᾽ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονίας (1027a).
109
ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ δὲ θάτερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυάδος· καὶ μέμικται πρῶτον ἐνταῦθα περὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
ἀριθμοῖς καὶ λόγοις… (1024d). On the monad and the dyad, cf. Plutarch’s criticism of Xenocrates (and comparison
with “Zaratas teacher of Pythagoras”) in 1012e, as well as Lamprias in De def. or. 428e-9d.
110
ἦν δὲ τὸ θάτερον οὐ κίνησις, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν στάσις, ἀλλ’ ἀρχὴ διαφορᾶς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος (1024d). Earlier
in the treatise, as discussed above, Plutarch argues against Xenocrates that such an identification would violate the
whole project of the Soph. of showing the difference between each of these four types as well as being.
111
… τῆς δυαδικῆς καὶ ἀορίστου μερίδος… δὲ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ μοναδικῆς… (1025d). Cf. Cherniss (1976): “Plutarch
comes near to giving soul an arithmetical character not unlike that to which he objects in the Xenocratean
interpretation” (234nf). But there is a difference between being derived from metaphysical principles and being
equivalent to them.
112
ἡ δὲ κρίσις ἀρχὰς μὲν ἔχει δύο, τόν τε νοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰ καθόλου καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου
πρὸς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα (1024e-f).
113
“… being not particularly manageable, and through the need of an exhortation to oppose the majority of
Platonists” (οὒτ’ ἄλλως εὐμεταχείριστον ὄντα καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὐπεναντιοῦσθαι
δεόμενον παραμυθίας; 1012b). See supra pg. 135.
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comparing passages from various other parts of the Platonic corpus: given the assumed harmony
of the corpus, various parts help to illustrate the difficult parts of others. Plutarch thus identifies
the “divisible being around bodies” with the Timaeus’ necessity (ἀνάγκην), the Philebus’
immeasurability and unboundedness (ἀμετρίαν καὶ ἀπειρίαν), “congenital desire” (σύμφυτος
ἐπιθυμία) of the Politicus.114 Book X of the Leges is especially important for his purpose. The
Athenian Stranger’s defense of the gods necessitates an exposition of ten sorts of non-psychic
motion, and then that of the soul, as “motion being able to itself move itself.”115 But, by the
principle that there must be an opposite, he also postulates another sort of motion: “is it one soul
or several [that conducts the heavens]? I will answer for you: several. Let us not at least suppose
less than two, both the one effecting good and the one able to effect the opposite.”116 Plutarch
interprets one sort of motion—“which [Plato] called, as it was said, soul opposite and opponent
to the one doing good”—to explain the element of the composition of the world soul which Plato
called “becoming divisible around bodies.” As such, it is the “kinetic cause (αἰτὶαν) of evil, a
motion disorderly and irrational but not soulless.”117 Earlier on, Plutarch similarly identifies it as
what befits the same element “becoming divisible around bodies,” but calls it “that disordered
and indefinite self-motion, what [Plato] often calls necessity but in the Leges openly called
disordered and baleful soul.”118 These identifications have sometimes119 been taken to suggest
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1014f-5a. He also identifies the compound of divisible and indivisible being with another part of the Philebus:
τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν Φιλήβῳ μὲν ἀπειρίαν κέκληκεν, ἀριθμοῦ καὶ λόγου στέρησιν οὖσαν ἐλλείψεώς τε καὶ
ὑπερβολῆς καὶ διαφορᾶς καὶ διαφορᾶς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἐν αὑτῇ πέρας οὐδὲν οὐδὲ μέτρον ἔχουσαν (1014d). See
also the young Plutarch in De E.
115
τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν (896a).
116
μίαν ἢ πλείους; πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῷν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε
εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι (896e). This gains easy assent: σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.
117
αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τὴν κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένην μεριστὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἄλογον οὐκ
ἄψυχον δὲ κίνησιν, ἣν ἐν Νόμοις ὥσπερ εἴρηται ψυχὴν ἐναντίαν καὶ ἀαντίπαλον τῇ ἀγαθουργῳ προσεῖπε (1015e).
118
… ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἀόιστον αὐτοκίνητον δὲ καὶ κινητικὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην, ἣν πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἀνάγκην ἐν δὲ
τοῖς Νόμοις ἄντικρυς ψυχὴν ἄτακτον εἴρηκε καὶ κακοποιόν (1014d-e). On ἄντικρυς, cf. below on the Leg. in De Is.
119
Such claims are generally caught up in the scholarship that attributes a sort of “dualism” to Plutarch’s thought, on
which see supra pg. 61.
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that Plutarch introduces two separate souls—which is, according to Calcidius at least, how
Numenius later explicitly understood the passage120—and so entail a sort of cosmic “dualism.”
Rather than positing a second soul, however, Plutarch is clearly identifying the motion from the
Leges with the chaotic motion of the primordial soul before it became part of the world soul.
Plutarch even calls the disorderly motion “soul itself in itself,” or soul qua soul, which then
“partook of mind and reason and intelligent harmony, so that it would become the soul of the
world.”121 The primordial soul was the only soul before the composition into the orderly world
soul: it never existed as a separate and independent soul opposing an orderly or good one.122
As a part of the composite soul, the part that was the chaotic soul can still make itself felt,
which is a model of cosmic disruption that Plutarch draws from Plato’s Politicus myth, as the
final section examines further. Rather than drawing on Aristotle or other authorities to explain
the difficult implications of Timaeus’ likely myth, he draws on other parts of the corpus. He even
explicitly rejects Xenocrates’ interpretation of the composition of the world soul in De animae
procreatione on the grounds that Plato himself did not specifically say that soul was number.123

The human soul does not have three or even two parts (τρία μέρη ψυχῆς μιᾶς), Numenius claims according to
Poryphyry, but rather there are two separate souls (δύο ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς), one irrational and the other rational, both
somehow being immortal (οἱ μὲν ἄμφω ἀθανάτους; frg. 44 des Places = Porph. frg. 253.18-22 Smith). According to
Calcidius, Numenius makes a similar claim on the cosmic level by appeal to the same passage of Leg. X, but rather
than positing two parts again posits two separate souls, “one most benevolent, and one baneful (that is of matter).”
Apparently silua is a literal gloss for ὕλη. See frg. 52 des Places = In Tim. 297. Plutarch’s irrational part, in contrast,
is a tendency that is usually suppressed by the rational, and only makes itself felt when the rational part wanes,
rather than of its own agency. The first chapter, supra pg. 61, discusses attributions of “dualism” to Plutarch further.
121
αὕτη γὰρ ἦν ψυχὴ καθ’ ἑαυτήν, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας ἔμφρονος μετέσχεν, ἵνα κόσμου ψυχὴ γένηται
(1014e).
122
The passage is used similarly in De Is. 370e-1a, but with more focus on a “third part” that prefers the better: “but
he also leaves a certain third nature between (these two), not soulless nor irrational nor unmoving from itself, as
some thing, but depending on both of them, always desiring and longing for and pursuing the better” (ὧν τὴν μὲν
ἀγαθουργὸν εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δημιουργόν· ἀπολείπει δὲ καὶ τρίτην τινὰ μεταξὺ φύσιν
οὐκ ἄψυχον οὐδ’ ἄλογον οὐδ’ ἀκίνητον ἐξ αὑτῆς, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀνακειμένην ἀμφοῖν ἐκείναις,
ἐφιεμένην δὲ τῆς ἀμείνονος ἀεὶ καὶ ποθοῦσαν καὶ διώκουσαν; 370f). In 371a, he specifies that power with the
superior of part (τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν) but notes that the worse cannot be destroyed (ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν
φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον).
123
“Surely Plato never called the soul a number at least, but motion always moving itself and ‘the source and origin
of motion’” (ἀριθμὸν γε μὴν ὁ Πλάτων οὐδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν προσεῖπεν, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν αὐτοκίνητον ἀεὶ καὶ [Phdr.
245c] “κινήσεως πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν;” De an. proc. 1013c).
120

159
The objection is not that this numeric interpretation would contradict Plato, but that it is simply
not found in the Platonic dialogues. Throughout both of Plutarch’s Quaestiones Platonicae and
De procreatione, difficult passages in Plato are explained through recourse to other phrases,
images, and passages in other dialogues.124 Rather than either manipulating Plato to serve some
unphilosophical end or passing on some “scholastic” opinion from earlier Platonists, Plutarch
consistently interprets the composition of the world soul in the Timaeus by identifying
connections between the dialogues—and so, reading Plato through Plato.

Narrative sequence and distinctions in time
Plutarch, as the previous sections argue, interpreted Plato through the assumptions that
Plato does not contradict himself and that he is best interpreted through his own dialogues, rather
than by appeal to other authorities. Many Platonic exegetes, ancient and modern, share these
assumptions, as well as Plutarch’s contention, which this section examines, that the details of
Platonic narrative as such must be significant. In the last book of the Quaestiones convivales, for
instance, the question of “why Plato said that the soul of Ajax got the twentieth lot” in the myth
of Er arises.125 Lamprias gives a distinctively philosophical answer, but is upstaged:
But while Lamprias was still speaking, the literary scholar Marcus already seemed to be
counting up and numerating a sum to himself. Once Lamprias stopped, he said: “of the
Homeric souls, how many he named in the Nekyia … if you take away these two
[Elpenor and Tiresias], Lamprias, and count up the rest, the very thing occurs—the soul
of Ajax arrives twentieth into Odysseus’ sight! It seems that Plato plays at this, applying
a bit of color with to Homeric Nekyia.126

124

Although it was only explicated in the subsequent generations of Platonists, these are all indications that
Plutarch’s exegesis was a precursor to Taurus and Atticus in this respect.
125
διὰ τί Πλάτων εἰκοστὴν ἔφη τὴν Αἴαντος ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τὸν κλῆρον ἐλθεῖν; (IX.5.739e). I examine this vignette
further infra pg. 219. On Plato’s myth of Er generally, see supra 26.
126
ἔτι δὲ τοῦ Λαμπρίου λέγοντος ὁ γραμματικὸς ἤδη Μᾶρκος ἐδόκει τι συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ διαριθμεῖν πρὸς αὑτόν·
ἔπειτα παυσαμένου, “τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν,” ἔφη, “ψυχῶν, ὅσας ἐν Νεκυίᾳ κατωνόμακεν, … ἄν οὖν ταύτας ὑπεξελόμενος,
ὦ Λαμπρία, τὰς ἄλλας διαριθμῇς, αὐτὸ συμβαίνει, τὴν Αἴαντος εἰκοστὴν εἰς ὄψιν ἀφῖχθαι τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως· καὶ πρὸς
τοῦτο παίζειν τὸν Πλάτωνα τῇ Ὁμηρικῇ Νεκυίᾳ προσαναχρωννύμενον” (740e-f).
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Plutarch, and his characters, are far from alone in striving to cleverly find significance in these
sorts of details in Plato’s myths. Among modern interpreters, the Straussian Robert Zaslavsky
provides an extreme example.127
While the contention that there must be some significance behind Plato’s ordering of
narratives is widespread, Plutarch’s position on where the weightier significance lies might not
be met with much agreement, as he anticipates. This, he describes in the preface explaning the
purpose of the treatise to his sons, is because of the “strangeness and paradox of the account,” as
well as his awareness that many Platonists, even “most of those familiar with Plato”—namely
the Early Academics128—have been overwhelmed by the strangeness of his true interpretation:129
“fearing and comforting themselves, they contrive and force and spin everything, because they
think it necessary to hide and deny something strange and unspoken, the generation and
composition of both the world and its soul.”130 His central claim about the significance of the
narrative ordering, that it requires the reader to understand the demiurgic creation of the world
soul as a ‘literal’ change of state from pre-cosmic chaos to order, is indeed controversial.131 Yet,
he argues, failure to explain Plato’s narrative would be unacceptable, and, without some sort of
temporal or “pseudo-temporal” distinction, how could Plato have meaningfully called the world
soul “older” than its body?
Although Harold Cherniss argues that “the creation in the Timaeus had already been
taken literally by Aristotle and others but so far as is known not by anyone regarded as a
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1981. His treatment of the myth of Er is long and selectively detailed (156-71), reading the order of lots as an
allusion not just to the Homeric Nekyia, but a reverse telling of Odysseus’ entire story to the Phaeacians (159-60).
128
Specifically, Xenocrates, Crantor, and their followers. See supra pg. 136.
129
… πιστούμενος τῷ εἰκότι καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὡς ἔνεστι, τὸ ἄηθες τοῦ λόγου καὶ παράδοξον (1014a).
130
οὗτοί τε κοινῇ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν χρωμένων Πλάτωνι φοβούμενοι καὶ παραμυθούμενοι πάντα μηχανῶνται καὶ
παραβιάζονται καὶ στρέφουσιν, ὥς τι δεινὸν καὶ ἄρρητον οἰόμενοι δεῖν περικαλύπτειν καὶ ἀρνεῖσθαι, τήν τε τοῦ
κόσμου τήν τε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γένεσιν καὶ σύστασιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀιδίου συνεστώτων οὐδὲ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον οὕτως
ἐχόντων, ἰδίᾳ τε λόγου τέτευχε καὶ νῦν ἀρκέσει ῥηθὲν… (1013d-e).
131
The subsequent section considers the significance of “literal” interpretation further.
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Platonist,” Cicero and Philo both seem to indeed take it “literally” in the sense of involving a
change of state, rather than representing different aspects of a timeless truth as Xenocrates and
Crantor understood it.132 The modern debate too over the significance of the generation of the
world soul in the Timaeus is still immense and contentious.133 In this section, I argue that
Plutarch not only applied this distinct sort of “literal” reading, as opposed to Cherniss’
dismissive category of “narrow literalism,” to several of Plato’s narratives, such as the Diotima’s
tale of Porus and Penia in the Symposium and the complicated Politicus myth, as well as his
better known and more elaborated interpretation of the birth or composition of the world soul in
the Timaeus.
A substantial element of Plutarch’s objection to the Early Academics he takes to be
representative authorities is that they take the narrative ordering of the Timaeus to be essentially
arbitrary.134 Xenocrates argued that the essence of soul is number moving itself, while for Crantor
it is a mixture of intellectual and sense-perceptive nature.135 Although their explanations are
strikingly divergent, Plutarch levels a methodological criticism against both of their interpretive
assumptions:
But all of them similarly think that the soul did not become in time and is not begotten,
but bears numerous faculties, into which Plato divided them for the sake of
1976: 137, 176na, cf. Vallejo (1997: 147). See e.g. Cic. Tusc. I.70: “… if these things came into existence, as it
seems to Plato, or, if they always were, at it seems to Aristotle…” (si haec nata sunt, ut Platoni uidetur, uel, si
semper fuerunt, ut Aristoteli placet…) See further §63. Philo in De aet. mund. dismisses “metaphorical”
interpretations (§14-5) and similarly appeals to the Stagirite: “Aristotle also witnesses these things about Plato, and
because of his respect for philosophy he could not lie about anything” (καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ταῦτα μαρτυρεῖ περὶ
Πλάτωνος, διὰ τὴν τῆς φιλοσοφίας αἰδῶ μηδὲν ἂν ψευσάμενος; §16). This is perhaps not a convincing claim for
Aristotle’s doxographic fidelity, but it need not mean that Philo took Aristotle to be the “decisive authority” for the
interpretation. On Philo’s general attitude toward the Ti., see Runia (1986b) and Niehoff (2007: 171-7).
133
For the issue in modern scholarship, cf. Zeyl (2000: xx-xxv) and Slaveva-Griffin (2005: 312), with more
citations. Carone's (2004) proposal of a “middle path” is perhaps indictative of the frustration. Already for Jones
(1916), there are too many opinions to describe more than briefly (70).
134
It would be hard to evaluate Plutarch’s charity or fidelity in his characterization of the earlier Academics, as he
provides most of what we know about their interpretations of this aspect of the Ti.
135
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δοκιμωτάτων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν Ξενοκράτης προσηγάγετο, τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ'
ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἀποφηνάμενος, οἱ δὲ Κράντορι τῷ Σολεῖ προσέθεντο, μιγνύντι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔκ τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ
τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσψητὰ δοσαστῆς φύσεως (1012d). Cf. Plotinus Enn. III.5.24-7.
132
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understanding, supposing that the essence came to be and is mixed together in word. But
they think that Plato supposed these very things about the world while knowing that it is
eternal and ungenerated, but seeing that it is not easy to learn the way in which it has
been composed and is managed, for those who do not suppose in advance either the
generation of it or conjunction of generated things from a cause; so he chose this path for
the sake of understanding.136
These interpreters apparently take the narrative’s parts, distinguished by sequence or time, to
represent simultaneous and eternal qualities. According to Plutarch, Xenocrates argues that the
first qualities of the world soul’s composition, divisible and indivisible essence, represent the
unitary and the multiple, “and that from these things number comes to be, with the one limiting
the multiple and with limit being implanted in limitlessness;” then the functions of motion and
rest added through the addition of difference and sameness, respectively. 137 But soul never lacked
the latter aspects—Plato only introduces them, Xenocrates seems to have argued, sequentially as
parts to make the whole easier to understand. Crantor similarly posits intellectual and senseperceptible essences as the definite and indefinite being, adding sameness and difference to serve
as the mechanisms for intellection and opinion.138 Implicitly, the soul never lacked the ability to
distinguish sameness and difference, but they are added later to make the composition easier to
distinguish. This seems to be what Plutarch means by the qualification “for the sake of

ὁμαλῶς δὲ πάντες οὗτοι χρόνῳ μὲν οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ’ εἶναι γενητήν, πλείονας δὲ δυνάμεις
ἔχειν, εἰς ἃς ἀναλύοντα θεωρίας ἕνεκα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς λόγῳ τὸν Πλάτωνα γιγνομένην ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ
συγκεραννυμένην· τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον ἐπίστασθαι μὲν ἀίδιον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον, τὸ δ’ ᾧ
τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μήτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τῶν γενητικῶν
σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν τραπέσθαι (1013a-b). Plutarch later emphasizes his
disagreement with this final qualification further: “that he intended these thoughts about these things, not for the
sake of understanding…” (ὅτι δὲ περὶ τούτων διενοεῖτο ταῦτα, καὶ οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα…; 1017b).
137
οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας: ἀμέριστον
μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὁρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ
ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐπιτιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. … τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ. τοῦ δὲ
ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγέντων, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγονέναι,
μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ἱστάναι καὶ ἵστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὖσαν (1012d-f).
138
οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τά τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ τάς τε τούτων ἐν αὑτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γιγνομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα
γιγνώσκῃ, συγκεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν: ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως
ἔχουσαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καὶ μεταβλητήν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου διὰ τὸ κἀκείνων
ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἑτερότητος καὶ ταὐτότητος (1012f-3a).
136
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understanding” (θεωρίας ἕνεκα): to make it easier to understand difficult concurrent qualities
through narrative sequencing.139 Distinctions in stages of a story stand for different metaphysical
aspects, but these aspects exist concurrently, rather than at separate times, as the narrative
account would more obviously suggest. This is a way to make difficult presentations, such as the
extensive creation narrative of the Timaeus is making more broadly, easier to understand.
Understood in this sort of way, the world’s body and soul always existed co-eternally, but
Timaeus distinguishes stages of creation, such as the difficult composition of the soul from
samenesss and the rest, easier to understand. Xenocrates and Crantor seem to be using this sort of
interpretive method to explain this one element of the text, presumably in part to undercut the
criticisms of Aristotle and others.
Plutarch finds this approach lacking and insists that the ordering of events must have a
non-arbitrary significance. His interpretation is often called, as a result, “literal,” but this term
can confusingly be understood in various ways.140 The most vehement critic of the “literal”
aspect of Plutarch’s exegesis of the world soul’s generation, the Proclus, was nevertheless
intimately concerned with another sort of “literal” meaning of the Timaeus’ narratives—the
historicity of the Atlantis myth.141 It is necessary for understanding Plutarch’s approach to

139

Calvenus Taurus testifies that Theophrastus, apparently unlike Aristotle, similarly took Plato to be saying the
world was generated “perhaps for the sake of clarity” (παρεμφαίνει δὲ, ὅτι ἴσως σαφηνείας χάριν γενητὸν αὐτὸν
ὑποτίθεται; frg. 22b.18-9 Lakmann = Philoponus De aet. mund. 145.23-4).
140
Usually what is meant by “literal” is not specified, e.g. by Simonetti (2017): “the treatise contains Plutarch’s
personal and literal reading of the Timaeus psychogony” (182); Tarrant (2000): “to those used to reading
Neoplatonic texts Plutarch will perhaps appear as rather an unimaginative interpreter, thoughtful but inclined to
dwell too much on the details of what was said rather than on the wider Platonic enterprise. He is one who insisted
on taking the Timaeus’ picture of temporal creation literally, and he wants to find some explanation of every word
that Plato wrote” (82). Cf. Opsomer (2004): “a ‘literal’ reading of the Timaeus could mean various things. … It is
not necessary that the champions of the literal reading take every single element of Timaeus’ story literally; they do
not have to believe, for instance, that the demiurge actually looked at eternal being (29a3), of which it was
previously denied that it is of a perceptible nature (27d5-8a4). Neither do they have to endow the demiurge with all
the anthropomorphic traits with which Timaeus depicts him” (146-7).
141
Proclus’ critique of Plutarch’s interpretation of the world’s generation is particularly fierce—the most detailed
discussion is on the lemma of Ti. 30a (I.381.22-2.12), but cf. Phillips (2002) on Proclus’ sources (232n2)—although
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Platonic narrative, I argue, to divide the issue between nouns and verbs, as his own linguistic
discussion in the tenth of the Quaestiones Platonicae does, attempting to explain why, in Plato’s
Sophista, speech is only divided into nouns and verbs.142 Plutarch is clearer about the former. He
signals “literal” translations by forms of the adverb κύριως, such as when he demarcates
different kinds of signification in poetry.143 In De Iside et Osiride, Plutarch discusses Plato and

he is no less convinced that parts of Plato must be read literally. Critias’ description of the Atlantis myth as “very
strange, but entirely true nonetheless” in the beginning of the Ti. spurs Proclus to insist on its literal as well as
metaphorical meaning: “for the entire truth is not true in one place and false in another, nor is it false on the surface
but true according to a hidden meaning (ὑπόνοιαν)—for this would not be a sort of entire truth” (‘μάλα μὲν ἄτοπος ὁ
λόγος, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθής’ … τὸ γὰρ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς οὐ πῇ μέν ἐστιν ἀληθές, πῇ δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές, οὐδὲ
ψεῦδος μὲν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀληθὲς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πάντη τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀληθές; In Tim.
I.76.13-6). He takes it as certain, however, that the surface meaning of the generation of the world is false. They
both use a mixture of interpretive strategies, although Proclus’ metaphors are more elaborate than those of Plutarch.
Proclus’ vehemence about the ostensible meaning of the Ti. is probably heightened by polemic with Christians over
the destructibility of the world, which seems to be take Plato’s implicit and Aristotle’s systematic argument that a
generated world is a destructible one as the starting point: the Neoplatonist Simplicius upheld the eternity of the
world against the Christian Philoponus, who in turn argued for its temporality against Proclus’ De aet. mund. See
Lang & Macro (2001). Philoponus also addressed another De aet. mund. against Aristotle, which is preserved
partially in Simplicius’ responses, collected by Wildberg (1987). On Philoponus and his pagan teacher Ammonius,
see Westerink (2016: 351-2). See also Sall. De diis et mund. on the Gallus myth: “these things never happened, but
always are; while the mind sees everything at once, the account says it as first and second things” (ταῦτα δὲ ἐγένετο
μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἔστι δὲ ἀεί, καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ λ΄ογος τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τὰ δὲ δεύτερα λέγει; §4).
142
“We perhaps call what clarifies actions a ‘verb…’ And the linguistic signifier of the people doing these things is
set as ‘noun.’” (τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα ῥῆμά που λέγομεν… τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖνα πράττουσι
σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν; Soph. 261e-2a; cf. Plut. Quaest. Plat. X.1009b). Plutarch asks why Plato left off
articles, prepositions, pronouns, and so on. His answer is that the ancients considered nouns and verbs the primary
parts of speech: “What should be said in defense of Plato? Possibly that the ancients were calling ‘first speech’ what
was called then a ‘proposition’ and now a ‘premise,’ denoting that first thing which they judge true or false? For this
is comprised of noun and verb…” (τί δὴ ῥητέον ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἦ ὅτι πρῶτον λόγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν τότε
καλουμένην πρότασιν νῦν δ’ ἀξίωμα προσηγόρευον, ὃ πρῶτον λέγοντες ἀληθεύουσιν ἢ ψεύδονται; τοῦτο δ’ ἐξ
ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν…; 1009c). Plutarch closes by comparing terminology, characteristically closing
with Plato’s own dictum: “therefore each of these [other sorts of words] bear some utility for speech, but none is a
part and element of speech, except as has been said the verb and the noun, which make a proposition first receive
truth and falsity, which some call a ‘proposition,’ others a ‘premise,’ but Plato ‘speech’” (διὸ χρείαν μέν τινα τῷ
λόγῳ παρέχεται τούτων ἕκαστον, μέρος δὲ λόγου καὶ στοιχεῖον οὐδέν ἐστι, πλὴν ὥσπερ εἴρηται τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ
τοὔνομα, ποιοῦντα τὴν πρώτην τό τ' ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος δεχομένην σύνθεσιν, ἣν οἱ μὲν πρότασιν οἱ δ' ἀξίωμα,
Πλάτων δὲ λόγον προσηγόρευκεν; 1011e). The arguments between these passages discuss how each other part of
speech is potentially superfluous, such as the article, which does not appear in Latin (1010d), and the pronoun
(ἀντωνυμία), which “is manifestly a sort of noun” (περιφανῶς γένος ὀνόματος ἐστιν; 1011c).
143
Plutarch contrasts, for instance, “the bulk of the things said seeming to be said strangely about Zeus” (… τὰ
πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπως περὶ τοῦ Διὸς λέγεσθαι δοκούντων…; 24a), such as Achilles’ image of the two jars in the Iliad
(XXIV.528-51), and things said “rightly:” “these things were said as if about fate or destiny, in which the illogicality
of the cause and the entire externality to us is signified. But where it is fitting and according to reason and likely,
then let us think that the god is named kuriôs, as in the following” (ὡς περὶ τῆς τύχης ἢ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λεγομένων,
ἐν αἷς τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἡμῖν τῆς αἰτίας σημαίνεται καὶ ὅλως οὐ καθ’ ἡμᾶς. ὅπου δὲ τὸ προσῆκον καὶ κατὰ λόγον καὶ
εἰκός ἐστιν, ἐνταῦθα κυρίως ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸν θεὸν νομίζωμεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις…; 24b).
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contrasts the Timaeus, which hides the identification of two opposing parts of the world soul,
with Leges X, which is open or rather “literal”:
Plato many times seems to disguise or conceal what he thinks when he calls one of the
opposing principles by the name of “the same” (ταὐτὸν) and the other by that of “the
different” (θάτερον); but he speaks in the Leges, because of his older age, not through
riddles or symbols, but using literal words (κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν), that the world is moved
not by one soul, but by perhaps more than two but certainly not less…144
This claim not only reveals that Plutarch takes the nouns in the Leges to be literal, but that he
takes the ones in the Timaeus to be in a sense metaphorical. This explains why, as explored in the
previous section, he explains “divisible essence” by comparing different terms from different
dialogues. Plutarch evidently assumes that nouns in the Timaeus generally have metaphorical
signification. The second of the Quaestiones Platonicae, in which Plutarch asks why Plato has
Timaeus call “the highest god the father and maker of all,” begins, “or perhaps, as he was
accustomed, he is using a metaphor, and called the one responsible for the universe its
‘father?’”145 Plutarch expects Plato to use certain nouns non-literally, to refer to separate names
or concepts.
If the “literal” part of Plutarch’s interpretation is not in the nominal, that leaves the
verbal. Such a “literal” reading could mean a few things, but for Plutarch, there is evidently a

Πλάτων δὲ πολλαχοῦ μὲν οἷον ἐπηλυγαζόμενος καὶ παρακαλυπτόμενος τῶν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν ταὐτὸν
ὀνομάζει, τὴν δὲ θάτερον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν οὐ δι’ αἰνιγμῶν οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς, ἀλλὰ κυρίοις
ὀνόμασιν οὐ μιᾷ ψυχῇ φησι κινεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ πλείοσιν ἴσως δυεῖν δὲ πάντως οὐκ ἐλάττοσιν (370e-f).
Earlier on, Plutarch compares a Persian king nicknamed for his brutality: “For they gave the name of ‘dagger’ to the
cruelest and most fearsome king of the Persians, Ochus, who killed many and finally slaughtered and dined upon
Apis with his friends. They still call him this now in the catalogue of kings, not because they are signifying his
substance literally (κυρίως), but rather likening the crookedness and evil of his character to the murderous
instrument” (καὶ γὰρ τὸν ὠμότατον Περσῶν βασιλέα καὶ φοβερώτατον Ὦχον ἀποκτείναντα πολλούς, τέλος δὲ καὶ
τὸν Ἆπιν ἀποσφάξαντα καὶ καταδειπνήσαντα μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἐκάλεσαν “μάχαιραν” καὶ καλοῦσι μέχρι νῦν οὕτως
ἐν τῷ καταλόγῳ τῶν βασιλέων, οὐ κυρίως δήπου τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σημαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τρόπου τὴν σκληρότητα
καὶ κακίαν ὀργάνῳ φονικῷ παρεικάζοντες. οὕτω δὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν ἀκούσασα καὶ δεχομένη παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγουμένων
τὸν μῦθον ὁσίως καὶ φιλοσόφως καὶ δρῶσα μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ διαφυλάττουσα τῶν ἱερῶν τὰ νενομισμένα, τοῦ δ’ ἀληθῆ
δόξαν ἔχειν περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν οἰομένη μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς μήτε θύσειν μήτε ποιήσειν [αὐτοῖς] κεχαρισμένον, οὐδὲν
ἔλαττον ἀποφεύξῃ κακὸν ἀθεότητος δεισιδαιμονίαν; 355c-d). Cf. Cic. Fin. II.5.15.
145
τί δήποτε τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα τῶν πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν (Tim. 28c); … ἢ τῇ μεταφορᾷ χρώμεονς,
ὧσπερ εἴωθε, τὸν αἴτιον πατέρα τοῦ κόσμου κέκληκεν; (1001e-f).
144
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usual meaning: that a narrative with temporal sequences actually represents a change of state,
rather than a metaphorical representation of different timeless qualities. His exposition in De
Iside et Osiride of Diotima’s myth in Plato’s Symposium makes this clear. After summarizing the
story of Penia (Poverty) contriving to conceive a child with the sleeping Porus (Plenty)—leaving
out the details such as the latter’s drunkenness and the setting of the feast of the birth of
Aphrodite in the garden of Zeus146—Plutarch describes what the divine parents and their child
Eros represent:
For Porus is none other than the primordially lovely and desirable and complete and selfsufficient: but he says Penia is the material, lacking in and of herself the good, but being
filled by him and desiring and partaking of him. And the world that was born from them
is also Horus, not everlasting and not impassive and not indestructible, but he is “always
coming to be” (ἀειγενὴς) and contrives to always be young in the changes and cycles of
incidents, going on to remain unperishing.147
Apparently, like the world soul in the Timaeus, Eros or Horus is taken to be formed from two
pre-existing figures and is always in generation. This interpretation thus entails a metaphorical
understanding of the verbal action: a goddess becoming pregnant by use of the unconscious body
of a very drunk god would not square easily with the view of the gods either of Plato or Plutarch.
This is further clarified in the following sentence, which cautions that “we must not use myths as
if they are entirely accounts but must take each thing suitably according to its similarity (to the

“But these things somehow or other call as winess the myth of Plato, which Socrates described in the Symposium
about the birth of Eros. He says that Penia lacked children, laid beside sleeping Porus, and conceived and bore from
him Eros, mixed and manifold by nature, because indeed his father is good and wise and entirely self-sufficient, but
his mother is without recourse and resource and always desiring another because of lack and desperate after another”
(προσκαλεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνος ἁμωσγέπως τὰ πράγματα μῦθον, ὃν Σωκράτης ἐν Συμποσίῳ [203a-e] περὶ τῆς
τοῦ Ἔρωτος γενέσεως διῆλθε, τὴν Πενίαν λέγων τέκνων δεομένην τῷ Πόρῳ καθεύδοντι παρακλιθῆναι καὶ
κυήσασαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τεκεῖν τὸν Ἔρωτα φύσει μικτὸν ὄντα καὶ παντοδαπόν, ἅτε δὴ πατρὸς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ καὶ
πᾶσιν αὐτάρκους, μητρὸς δ’ ἀμηχάνου καὶ ἀπόρου καὶ δι’ ἔνδειαν ἀεὶ γλιχομένης ἑτέρου καὶ περὶ ἕτερον
λιπαρούσης γεγενημένον; De Is. 374c-d).
147
ὁ γὰρ Πόρος οὐχ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ πρώτως ἐρατοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ καὶ τελείου καὶ αὐτάρκους· Πενίαν δὲ τὴν ὕλην
προσεῖπεν ἐνδεᾶ μὲν οὖσαν αὐτὴν καθ’ ἑαυτὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πληρουμένην δ’ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ποθοῦσαν ἀεὶ καὶ
μεταλαμβάνουσαν. ὁ δὲ γενόμενος ἐκ τούτων κόσμος καὶ Ὧρος οὐκ ἀίδιος οὐδ’ ἀπαθὴς οὐδ’ ἄφθαρτος, ἀλλ’
ἀειγενὴς ὢν μηχανᾶται ταῖς τῶν παθῶν μεταβολαῖς καὶ περιόδοις ἀεὶ νέος καὶ μηδέποτε φθαρησόμενος διαμένειν
(374d). On the epithet, cf. Ti. 52d: οὗτος μὲν οὖν δὴ παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψήφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δεδόσθω λόγος,
ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι, τρία τριχῇ, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι.
146
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truth).”148 Yet the result of this union is nevertheless taken to be generated, apparently at a
distinct point in time. The “metaphorically” understood verbal action nevertheless represents a
“literally” significant change of state.149
The narrative of the generation of the world soul in the Timaeus similarly entailed a
change of state Plutarch, particularly from pre-existing but chaotic elements into an ordered
whole. This narrative, however, of composition or harmonization does not seem to require a
metaphorical interpretation in the same way the scandalous verbal action of the myth of Penia
and Porus does. Metaphors might help make it more comprehensible, such as the comparison of
worked artifact and pre-existing material discussed earlier in the distinction in sorts of
“becoming.” But this sort of framework is not necessary and the attention that Plutarch bestows
upon the ratios that follow the combination of essences, sameness, and difference indicates that
he takes at least this aspect of the demiurge’s composition, the binding by numbers and ratios,
seems to entail taking the nominal elements seriously, such as the technical final ratio mentioned
by Plato, 256:243, which Plutarch analyzes under the the technical name λεῖμμα.150

χρηστέον δὲ τοῖς μύθοις οὐχ ὡς λόγοις πάμπαν οὖσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρόςφορον ἑκάτου [τὸ] κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα
λαμβάνοντας (374e). On this, cf. Froidefond (1987): “la déclaration de méthode du ‘De Iside’, 58, 374E (‘il ne faut
pas en user avec le mythes comme avec des exposés parfaitment objectifs de la vérité, mais emprunter à chacun
d’eux en fonction de la vrai-semblance’) peut faire penser à ce sens moderne de ‘mythe’, mais au fond, pour
Plutarque (interprète) comme pour Platon (créateur), le mythe est, en même temps qu’un suject d’étude, une matière
polyvalente prête à être utilisée pour une demonstration (comme une ebauche de clé fait connaître à la fois la clé
achevée et la serrure)” (212n114).
149
Not much is usually made of this interpretation: Vernière (1977) treats it as proof that Plutarch approached the
myths of Plato in the manner of “un texte déjà sacré,” as she thinks he also treated “mythes traditionnels” (37).
Brenk (1999) finds the section embarrassing. Cf. the brief treatment in the Egyptological commentary of Griffiths
(1970) and the philological one of García Valdés (1995: 277-8).
150
On the ratio, see further supra pg. 112. Cherniss (1976) notes that Plutarch was not the only thinker to attribute
the term to Plato, comparing Theon of Smyrna (273nc). He begins the second portion of the treatise with a renewed
second-person address: “regarding these (numbers and harmony), even if you heard many times and happened upon
many speeches and writing, it is not worse for me to go through it quickly, prefacing the passage of Plato” (περὶ ὧν
εἰ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε καὶ πολλοῖς ἐντετυχήκατε λόγοις καὶ γράμμασιν, οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστι κἀμὲ βραχέως διελθεῖν,
προεκθέμενον τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; 1027a). An extended quotation of Ti. 35b-36b follows (1027b-c), as if a
continuation of the quotation of 35a-b in the first part of the treatise (1012b-c), and then Plutarch distinguishes three
questions: “in these, it is first asked about the quantity of numbers, second about the arrangement, and third the
function” (ἐν τούτοις ζητεῖται πρῶτον περὶ τῆς ποσότητος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, δεύτερον περὶ τῆς τάξεως, τρίτον περὶ τῆς
148
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This latter interpretation, however, raises a potential tension with another part of the
dialogue. In the Timaeus, time in the phenomenal world, in contrast to the demiurge’s everlasting
and unchanging model, only comes to be along with the birth of the world.151 Time and the world
soul not only came into existence simultaneously in some sense, but they are in fact inseparable,
given the impossibility of one being dissolved without the other. Before the world, then, it would
ostensibly be impossible to temporally distinguish anything, because time did not exist yet.
Hence, perhaps, Timaeus’ qualifications that humans rely on chance and likelihood, and that the
demiurge’s action was “in a way of this sort” (τοιῷδε τρόπῳ) rather than in any precise manner.
Yet why would Timaeus break the narrative to stress the relative age of the world’s soul and
body if they did not meaningfully come to be? One possibility, which is more explicitly
produced by modern interpreters of the Timaeus such as Richard Mohr, is that only “ordered”
time is generated simultaneously with the world soul, such that before that there is disorderly
pre-cosmic time.152 Jan Opsomer, for instance, similarly argues that Plutarch “avoids saying that
the universe had a begninning κατὰ χρόνον,” and instead posits that, especially in the eighth of
the Quaestiones Platonicae, “well-ordered time” was only “made possible by the well-ordered

δυνάμεως; 1027c). Similarly to the first portion, which begins with the opinions of Xenocrates and Crantor, the
second begins by introducing Theodorus’ and Crantor’s opinions on the arrangement of numbers (1027d). Although
Cherniss (1976) takes this to reveal some of “Plutarch’s characteristic weaknesses” (135), he nevertheless grounds
his analysis in “what Plato understood” (ὡς αὐτὸς ὑφηγεῖται; 1027e) “or said” (καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὅ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων;
1021e).
151
“So time then came about with the world, so that things which came into being are also dissolved, if there should
ever come about some dissolution of them; and, following the model of the everlasting nature, in order that the
world might be as similar as possible to the model: for the model exists throughout all time, and the world, through
this beneficence, for the duration of all time has come to be, persists, and continues on” (χρόνος δ’ οὖν μετ’ οὐρανοῦ
γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηεται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς
διαιωνίας φύσεως, ἵν’ ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, ὁ δ’
αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος; 38b-c). This follows a correction that it does not
make sense to talk about any tense of time—past, present, or future, all said to have “become” rather than “exist”—
in regard to the eternal model: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου, καὶ τό τ’ ἦν τό τ’ ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἴδη, ἃ δὴ
φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς (37e).
152
Mohr (1985: 53-81), revised in Mohr (2005: 51-80). See also Vallejo (1997: 147).
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movement of the world-soul.”153 While he does not discuss disorderly pre-cosmic time, it would
not be surprising, given Plutarch’s position on pre-cosmic motion if he had a conception such as
this in mind, although he is in no way specific.Both of these interpretations are, I argue,
“literally” significant, in that their narratives are taken to entail an actual change in state. This,
more than the question of whether the verbal action is taken as a metaphor, is what causes
Plutarch’s disagreement with Xenocrates and Crantor, who did not take the differences in states
to signify either literal or metaphorical meaning, and what furthermore provokes Plutarch’s often
hostile reception among the later Neoplatonists such as Proclus. The principle of narrative
sequence “literally” entailing either a change of states or—however much difficulty this might
cause when the event in question relates to the beginning of ordered time—temporal distinctions,
rather than just those of logical priority, such as Proclus’ unfolding but co-eternal “gifts of the
demiurge,” for instance.154 Plutarch nevertheless meets the burden of explaining how Plato’s
narrative is significant, unlike Xenocrates and Crantor, and he is consistent in applying this
principle. Plutarch also interprets the myth in Plato’s Politicus in such a way that he takes the
distinctions in narrative time to represent actual temporal distinctions, particularly between
cosmic cyles of order and disorder, rather than different aspects of a single eternal state. 155 Only a

153

Opsomer (2001: 188-9), citing Quaest. Plat. VIII.1007d. Calvenus Taurus distinguishes two sorts of positions
among those who think the world was literally generated: that “some time is signified” (σημαίνεται χρονος τις) other
than time (so pseudo-time), and that the world came to be “through the demiurge” (frg. 22b.50). Plutarch, it seems,
would better fit the latter category.
154
Proclus also assumes that the order of Timaeus’ presentation is significant rather than arbitrary, although he
contends that all the elements of the demiurge’s creation were always present. Rather, he constructs an elaborate
reading of each element as an increasingly greater “gift of the demiurge.” Proclus takes the “most beautiful of
bonds” (δεσμῶν… κάλλιστος) between fire and earth in Ti. 31b-c, for instance, interprets this as the image of the
principle of unification (ὁ μὲν δεσμὸς ὡς εἰκόνα παρεχόμενος ἑαυτὸν τῆς ἑνώσεως…; II.13.19-20), which is the
“second gift from the demiurge to the world” (δεύτερον τοῦτο δῶρον ἐκ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τῷ κόσμῳ διδούς; II.14.2).
Presumably he finds confirmation in the discussion of middle numbers and binding in the abstract in 31c-2b. Baltzly
(2015) gives a good description of this aspect of the structure of Proclus’ commentary (1). Kutash (2011) reads the
series of gifts as “a philosophical document… that is inextricably hieratic” (1).
155
Plutarch does not discuss the myth elsewhere, but the idea of similar cycles of cosmic irrationality also arise in
Quaest. conv. VIII.2, for instance, when the character Plutarch concludes: “for through the innate necessity of the
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few scholars have discussed Plutarch’s interpretation of this myth, and either take it as
“literal”—such as Roger Miller Jones156—or a mixture of “literal” and “metaphorical”—such as
Radek Chlup and Jan Opsomer.157 But the exact details of Plutarch’s interpretation are difficult to
determine, given how summarily he discusses the myth in De animae procreatione. It seems
though, that he is using a similar sort of interpretation of the sequential or temporal distinctions
as meaningful, as with his interpretation of generation in the Timaeus, from which he concludes
that cosmic disruptions are a recurring feature of the world soul.158
In Plato’s Politicus, the Eleatic stranger, after making an initial attempt to dialectically
reach a definition of the “statesman,” presents a choice between mythic and dialectic discourse.
He begins with the former and tells Young Socrates about how the world’s divine governance
entails cosmic cycles, at first in summary:159
Stranger: Hear then. For god himself was once guiding and conducting the world in its
spherical course, but then, whenever the cycles have already obtained the measure of
some seeming fit to him, he lets go, and it still rotates into the opposite of its own accord,
posessing a mind from him harmonizing it through princples. But moving inversely
becomes innate (ἔμφυτον) in it by necessity, for this reason.
Socrates: For what sort of reason?

body, it [the world] is always in generation and upheaval and all matter of incidents, but it is aided by its father and
demiurge, who by proportion (logos) limits being in reference to the paradigm” (ἀεὶ γὰρ ὢν διὰ τὴν σύμφυτον
ἀνάγκην τοῦ σώματος ἐν γενέσει καὶ μετατροπῇ καὶ πάθεσι παντοδαποῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ βοηθεῖται
τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα τὴν οὐσίαν ὁρίζοντος; 720b-c).
156
Jones (1916), explaining this present passage of De an. proc.: “in this Plutarch follows literally the Politicus
myth” (83n37). Cf. Brenk (1977): “the world soul thus acts like Plato’s human soul…” (132).
157
Chlup (2000: 145-7) and Opsomer (2001). Cf. Schicker (1995: 382). This sort of conception might fit Severus
who, according to Proclus, claimed that the world was both generated and ungenerated by interpreting the “mythic
cycles” of the Plt. (τὰς ἀνακυκλήσεις τὰς μυθικὰς προσέμενος καὶ γενητὸν οὕτω ποιῶν καὶ ἀγένητον τὸν κόσμον; In
Resp. II.95.29-6.1, citing Plt. 269a in 95.27). See further Dillon (1995: 368-9). There is good evidence for Severus’
authorship of a comprehensive commentary on the Ti., because Proclus mentions where he started his inquiry (after
the προοίμιον), implying an otherwise systematic treatment (In Tim. I.204.16-7). Little is known about Severus
otherwise, but Dillon (1977), based on Proclus’ “reverse chronological order” of “Severus-Atticus-Plutarch” in In
Tim. III.212 (262), places him after Atticus.
158
Dillon (1995) similarly connects the importance of the interpretation of the Plt. myth to the Ti. for Neoplatonic
interpreters (366). See also Schicker (1995: 386-8).
159
On the myth as a whole, see especially Brisson (1995) and Carone (2004b).
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Stranger: Because always being the same, and in the same state and conditions, belongs
to the most divine things alone, but the nature of the body is not of this rank.160
The stranger identifies the age of guidance with the rule of Cronus, when he still steered the
rudder directly and humans were born from the earth rather than one another. After all of the
humans had died and souls had engendered new embodied humans the ordained amount of
times, he lets go. At first, the world maintains its course, as the summary describes, but
eventually the lower parts of its nature overcome it, until Zeus comes to its aid, lest what order of
the world remains should be entirely destroyed.161 Plutarch does not present a concise
interpretation of the myth, but discusses it in three contexts, two of which are especially salient:
the first asks how the “necessity and inborn desire” that disrupted the world in the Politicus, as
well as what he takes to be Plato’s other names for the primordial soul, could be in matter if
Plato regularly claims matter is inert; second, he quotes three passages from the myth to show
that Plato attributed evil to this tendency in the world soul, and not to matter.162 The first citation
takes two causal agents—“necessity and inborn desire” (ἀνάγκη καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία)—from
the Politicus passage quoted above—where inborn (ἔμφυτον) propensity comes about by
necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης)—and applies it to a narrative portion later in the myth. The “great

ΞΕ: ἀκούοις ἄν. τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ξυμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυλκεῖ, τοτὲ δ’ ἀνῆκεν,
ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ μέτρον εἰλήφωσιν ἤδη χρόνου, τὸ δὲ πάλιν αὐτόματον εἰς τἀντία
περιάγεται, ζῷον ὂν καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαντος αὐτὸ κατ’ ἀρχάς. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἰέναι
διὰ τάδ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔμφυτον γέγονεν. ΝΕ ΣΩ: διὰ τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ: τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἀεὶ καὶ
ταὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσήκει μόνοις, σώματος δὲ φύσις οὐ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως (269c-d).
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272b, 271a-c, 272d-3a. Scholars have detected various influences in the myth, particularly Hesiodic—see e.g.
Van Noorden (2015: 142-67)—and Empedoclean—see e.g. Coates (2018); Plutarch, however, focuses narrowly on
the reversal of cosmic courses.
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1015a, c-d. The third utilization of the Plt. myth is, again, as a source for one of a series of paraphrases to show
that Plato always speaks of the universe as generated, while he calls soul both generated and ungenerated: “in the
Politicus, the Parmenidean Stranger says that the world was composed by god and partook of many good things, and
if it bears some baseness or harshness, this is because it has been mixed together from a prior, unharmonius and
irrational state” (ἐν Πολιτικῷ δ᾽ ὁ Παρμενίδειος ξένος τὸν κόσμον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ συντεθέντα φησὶ ‘πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν
μεταλαβεῖν, εἰ δέ τι φλαῦρόν ἐστιν ἢ χαλεπόν, ἐπ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως ἀναρμόστου καὶ ἀλόγου συμμεμιγμένον ἔχειν;
1017c). These are the only explicit references Plutarch makes to Plato’s myth in the extant corpus. Cf. Dillon (1995:
374n24) on Quaest. conv. VIII.2.720c and Plt. 273b; see also Proclus Theo. Plat. V.6-10.
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partaking in chaos, congenital to its old nature, before it arrived into the present world,” as well
as “necessity and innate desire,” are all taken to be parallels to “turning back the world toward
the opposite.”163 Rather than connecting the one great upheaval to the narrative of Cronus,
Plutarch draws the name and explanation for its cause from the Stranger’s statement of a cosmic
principle—that only the divine can remain eternally stable—and casts the destabilizing element
as the desire of its primordial nature.
When Plutarch returns to the Politicus myth, he gives a series of quotes introduced by the
claim that Plato “removed matter from all divergence, and set the responsibility for evil very far
off from god, and so wrote these things about the world in the Politicus”: that everything harsh
and unjust is said to be from the prior condition, that “time and forgetfulness strengthen the
effect of ancient disharmony,” and finally that the world risked “sinking again into the great
place of disparity.”164 Plutarch is taking the sequence of the world soul’s “forgetting” to be its
falling asleep as the “innate desire” entailed by the primordial part is gaining control. The
identification of the innate desire and necessity makes this part of a recurrent cycle, and so, in a
sense, unmoors it from the narrative of Cronus’ reign and retreat. John Dillon raises the
possibility that Plutarch did not actually accept “the literal account of the alternating cycles,”
because in a similar discussion he describes the world as “assisted by its father and creator…

ἡ γάρ ἀναστρέφουσα τὸν οὐρανόν, ὥσπερ ἐν Πολιτικῷ λέγεται, καὶ ἀνελίττουσα πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀνάγκη καὶ
σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως σύντροφον πολλῆς μετέχον ἀταξίας, πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον
ἀφικέσθαι, πόθεν ἐγγέγονε τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἄποιος ἦν ὕλη καὶ ἄμοιρος αἰτίας ἁπάσης, ὁ δὲ
δημιουργὸς ἀγαθὸς καὶ πάντα βουλόμενος αὑτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιῶσαι, τρίτον δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα μηδέν; (1015a-b).
On the derivations from Platonic phrasing, cf. Cherniss (1976: 191ne, f).
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ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τὴν γ᾽ ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν
ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος ταῦτα περὶ τοῦ κόσμου γέγραφεν ἐν τῷ Πολιτικῷ παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ξυνθέντος πάντα τὰ καλὰ
κέκτηται παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν οὐρανῷ γίγνεται, ταῦτ᾽ ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτός τε ἔχει καὶ
τοῖς ζῴοις ἐναπεργάζεται.’ καὶ μικρὸν ἔτι προελθὼν ‘προϊόντος δέ’ φησι ‘τοῦ χρόνου καὶ λήθης ἐγγιγνομένης ἐν
αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δυναστεύει τὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀναρμοστίας πάθος καὶ κινδυνεύει διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος
ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δῦναι πάλιν’ ἀνομοιότης δὲ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἄποιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν, οὐκ ἔστιν (1015c-d,
closely paraphrasing a selection of sentences in Plt. 273b-e). See also Quaest. Plat. VIII.1009a on slackening and
sleep.
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which it would precisely not be according to a literal understanding of the myth.”165 But if
Plutarch took the statement of the impossibility of stability from the beginning of the myth
seriously, then every cycle would end as the great one did, in the narrative surrounding the final
quotation listed above: “god who ordered the world sees that it is in dire straits and is
concerned—lest it should be tossed by upheaval, sundered apart, and sink into that boundless sea
of disparity—again sits near to the rudder…”166 Plutarch, I think, takes it to be a feature of the
cosmic intellect that it will never let the chaotic motions of the world deteriorate too far, as he
also states in the passage about the world’s tendency to disorder quoted above from De animae
procreatione. It seems to rouse itself and to ameliorate the situation, as the nameless god in the
Politicus myth does.167
How Plutarch interpreted many of the details and points of tension in the myth is unclear
from De animae procreatione, but from the few passages that he quoted and the brief
interpretation, it seems that he took the myth to represent some sort of cyclical propensity such
as this. It is not quite “literal” in every possible sense, in that the Eleatic Stranger stresses that
there was one disruption in particular, which is the single source of the myth of Atreus and “the
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1995: 374n24.
διὸ δὴ καὶ τότ’ ἥδη θεὸς ὀ κοσμήσας αὐτόν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ
ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα πόντον δύῃ, πάλιν ἔφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων
γιγνόμενος (273d-e).
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There seems to be a tension later, when Plutarch asks in the numerological section how, in contrast to
astronomers who cleverly but “bearing nothing of truth or accuracy at all” try to describe heavenly positions and
motions with numerical relationships (1029a), whether instead the heavens are ordered by the harmony and ratios in
the world soul itself (σκοπεῖτε δὲ μὴ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἄγει καὶ τὰ οὐράνια ταῖς περὶ αὑτὴν ἐμμελείαις καὶ κινήσεσιν
ἡ ψυχὴ…; 1029d). The tension is that the world soul is claimed to guide them in a superlative state because of its
harmonious ratios (… ἡ ψυχὴ φρονιμωτάτη καὶ δικαιοτάτη γεγονυῖα, γέγονε δὲ τοιαύτη τοῖς καθ’ ἁρμονίαν λόγοις),
yet his exegesis of the Plt. myth would seem to imply periods where it is less than superlatively harmonious. The
description of the demiurge (or the rational part of the ordered soul) taking up the disordered and dissonant soul and
ordering it (παραλαβὼν γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀταξίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσι τῆς ἀναρμόστου καὶ ἀνοήτου
ψυχῆς διαφερομένης πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὰ μὲν διώρισε… συνέταξεν ἁρμονίαις καὶ ἀριθμοῖς χρησάμενος…; 1029e) can
be taken in two ways: it could describe the initial composition and harmonization of the world soul, or it could
represent one of these sorts of cycles where the intelligent part rouses itself and orders the discordant part before it
falls to chaos entirely. The former is more natural given the specification of the demiurge, but Plutarch’s own
hermeneutics would also allow for the second meaning, especially if a contradiction were alleged.
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countless other things more marvelous still than these,” whereas Plutarch seems to take this to
represent all upheavals.168 He seems, moreover, to think about the “backwards” motion as a more
general chaotic deterioration of order, and not as motion diametrically opposed to the forward
under divine guidance, as part of the myth ostensibly implies.169 Yet it seems plausible (given
that he paraphrases from the line), that stability is impossible for the phenomenal world, and so
the drowsing of the rational intellect’s guidance and the reemergence of primordial soul’s chaotic
tendency is inevitable, as is the intervention of the divine. In contrast to the Neoplatonic
interpretation of Proclus, Plutarch is indeed “literal” in the same corresponding regard as Proclus
is “metaphorical,” in that he takes the temporal distinctions to nevertheless represent qualities of
an eternal truth. In his commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus argues that “if he is the demiurge of
all things existing always, he does not act as demiurge at one moment, and let go of the tillers at
another.”170 Similarly, he takes the governing divinities in the Politicus myth, Cronus and Zeus,
to represent coeternal presences in the world, the one concerned with “unseen and more
intellectual,” the other with the “physical and the visible” orders of the world.171 As with the
Timaeus narrative, Plutarch takes the sequence of events as significant literally, while Proclus
takes the Politicus myth to be metaphorically representing eternal and simultaneous qualities.
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269a, cf. 270b-c.
“… we say that this is the cause of the most marvelous of things… that the motion of the world is sometimes
borne through the ways it is turns now, and at other times the opposite” (ὃ πάντων ἔφαμεν εἶναι τῶν θαυμαστῶν
αἴτιον… τὸ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν τοτὲ μὲν ἐφ’ ἃ νῦν κυκλεῖται αἴτιον, τοτὲ δ’ ἐπὶ τἀναντία; 270b). Plutarch uses the
terms ἀναστρεφουσα τὸν οὐρανόν and ἀνελίσσει, but is this strictly meant as diametrically reversing, or more
generally overthrowning or upsetting? Cf. Chlup (2000), citing De an. proc. 1026e-f: “[Plutarch] reads the myth
literally, seeing the backward and divine revolution as two alternate temporal stages in the history of the universe. It
is not clear what his exact idea of historical movements is, but it seems not unlikely that he connected them to some
cyclic scheme of the rise and fall of civilizations” (146).
170
ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἐστίν, οὐχὶ ποὲ μὲν δημιουργεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ ἀφίησι τοὺς οἴακας (In. Tim.
I.228.14-5. Dillon (1995: 366-7), with parallels from Proclus. He argues furthermore that Plotinus, from the few
mentions he made of the Plt. myth, took it similarly metaphorically (365-6), and points out that Proclus cites his
teacher Syrianus’ commentary on the dialogue (367-8).
171
διττῆς γὰρ οὔσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ζωῆς, τῆς μὲν ἀφανοῦς καὶ νοερωτέρας, τῆς δὲ φυσικωτέρας καὶ ἐμφανοῦς… ἡ
μὲν δευτέρα καὶ πολυειδὴς καὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιτελουμένη τῆς Διίας ἐξήρτηται τάξεως, ἡ δὲ ἁπολουστέρα καὶ
νοερὰ καὶ ἀφανὴς τῆς Κρονίας (Theo. Plat. V.6).
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Plutarch, however, invokes and implicitly interprets the myth’s periodic reversal of
cosmic motion in parallel with other passages from other texts, to help illustrate the characteristic
tendency of primordial soul—the Timaeus’ divisible being before it was composed into the
world soul, or soul qua soul. This appeal to other Platonic passages, both mythic and nonmythic, further reflects the principle of reading Plato through Plato; the temporal distinctions in
cosmic states coheres to his general methodology of reading Platonic narratives as “literally”
temporal, just as with his treatment of the composition of the world soul in the Timaeus. The
resulting interpretation of the Politicus myth might seem idiosyncratic, but a rather similar one
appears in the summary of the dialogue in the Middle Platonic Latin summary of Plato, simply
known as the Expositio, as well.172 Gabriela Carone’s consciously “literal” interpretation,
moreover, similarly also entails pre-cosmic chaos and continuous cycles of cosmic upheaval.173
The central idea of Plutarch’s interpretation of the myth in the Politicus, that of universal cycles
of chaos, also seems to appear in a disputed passage of De animae procreatione. He argues,
because a rational part has been imposed upon the primordial, erratic part of the world soul, that
the latter still occasionally makes its nature felt, when its chaotic motion predominates as the
rational part exerts less influence:
For the soul gives the impassioned part from itself but partakes of mind from the
presence of a greater principle. Nor has the nature of the world been spared from this
twofold communion, but leaning on one side now it is straightened because the cycle of
“Moreover, it seems to him that the world is ruled in certain ages now by god himself, and at other times it
returns to the opposite in turn because it is a rational and ensouled. And because it is corporeal, its return is
somehow a sort of passion. For all bodies bear a mortal nature. God therefore is not the instigator of this return,
because he is always like unto himself” (placet illi praeterea mundum certis saeculis nunc ab ipso deo regi, alias
ipsum se inuicem remeare in contrarium quia sit animal rationale; et quia corporalis sit, hanc illius remeationem
quasi quandam passionem esse. omnia enim corpora naturam habere mortalem. nam deum idcirco remeationis non
esse auctorem quia semper sit sui similis; 31.4-9). Stover (2016) argues that the Expositio is both Apuleian and the
third book of De Platone, despite the radical difference in form, but cf. Moreschini (2017), who is much more
skeptical about the identity of the author: “Certo essa non è così tarda come quell’accessus, ma può risalire ad un
ambiente medioplatonico di occidente, ancora non influenzato dal neoplatonismo (un’ipotesi: prima di Macrobio;
altra ipotesi: un’opera tarda, ma antiquata, come quella di Calcidio).”
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2004b: 91 (principle of “literal reading”), 95-6 (alternating cycles and pre-existing time). Carone, like Plutarch,
takes seriously the “‘law’” of alternating cycles (92), rather than just the ages of Zeus and Cronus.
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the same bears power and pilots the soul, but there will be some portion of time, and
there has already been many times, in which the reason becomes dull and falls asleep,
filled with forgetting of what befits it, the part accustomed to the body and empathetic
with it drags and weighs down and unravels the conveyance of everything on the right
side, but it is not able to break through entirely, since the better parts carry it back and
look toward the model of god, who helps to turn and guide it.174
John Dillon finds it “rather disturbing that Plutarch should introduce [this image] here, as it
implies a cyclic sequence of order and disorder in the universe which he does not seem to hold
elsewhere.” His solution is that Plutarch “merely wants to emphasize the continued presence of
the Disorderly Soul in the world.” 175 The two are not mutually exclusive, however: there could
always be some disorder present in the world soul, while cosmic cycles are an occasional,
extreme cases. How this disorder manifests precisely is unclear, although his praise of the
enduring stability of the pax Romana in De fortuna Romanorum might indicate that Plutarch
does not conceive of history as an unending series of the decline and rise of civilizations;176 yet if

τὸ γὰρ παθητικὸν ἀναδίωσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἡ ψυχή, τοῦ δὲ νοῦ μετέσχεν ἀπὸ τῆς κρείττονος ἀρχῆς ἐγγενομένου. τῆς
δὲ διπλῆς κοινωνίας ταύτης οὐδ’ ἡ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπήλλακται φύσις, ἀλλ’ ἑτερορρεποῦσα νῦν μὲν ὀρθοῦται τῇ
ταὐτοῦ περιόδῳ κράτος ἐχούσῃ καὶ διακυβερνᾷ τὸν κόσμον· ἔσται δέ τις χρόνου μοῖρα καὶ γέγονεν ἤδη πολλάκις,
ἐν ᾗ τὸ μὲν φρόνιμον ἀμβλύνεται καὶ καταδαρθάνει λήθης ἐμπιπλάμενον τοῦ οἰκείου, τὸ δὲ σώματι σύνηθες ἐξ
ἀρχῆς καὶ συμπαθὲς ἐφέλκεται καὶ βαρύνει καὶ ἀνελίσσει τὴν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ παντὸς πορείαν, ἀναρρῆξαι δ' οὐ δύναται
παντάπασιν, ἀλλ' ἀνήνεγκεν αὖθις τὰ βελτίω καὶ ἀνέβλεψε πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα θεοῦ συνεπιστρέφοντος καὶ
συναπευθύνοντος (1026e-f). The opinions of the primordial world soul, in contrast, are described not in terms of
nodding to sleep, but drenched in dream: “the power arranged around it [the indefinite] neither had articulate
opinions nor did it have motions which were all ordered, but rather everything dreamlike (ἐνυπνιώδεις) and frenzied
and disturbing the bodily, except when it by change it was falling upon the better” (ἥ τε περὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένη
δύναμις οὔτε δόξας ἐνάρθρους οὔτε κινήσεις ἁπάσας εἶχε τεταγμένας, ἀλλὰ τὰς πολλὰς ἐνυπνιώδεις καὶ
παραφόρους καὶ ταραττούσας τὸ σωματοειδές, ὅσα μὴ κατὰ τύχην τῷ βελτίονι περιέπιπτεν; 1024b).
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1977: 205. See also Alt (1993: 19-20). Dillon then quotes a passage that describes the demiurge’s ordering “as far
as practicable, there be communion and affinity and affinity accomplished through numbers and harmony” (ὡς
ἀνυστὸν ἦν, κονωνίαν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ φιλίαν ἐργασαμένου δι' ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονίας, 1027a). He takes to mean
that Plutarch “merely wants to emphasize the continued presence of the Disorderly Soul in the world, but that
qualification is significant: the practability of stability and harmony is implied to be limited, perhaps by varying
degrees.” Dillon is interpreting Plutarch in the manner that Proclus interprets Plato.
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“The greatest powers and empires among men thus clashed and were driven together by chance, everyone
wanting to win power over all others but no one being able, there was enormous destruction, wandering, and
migration, throughout every people, until the time that Rome took strength and expansion, binding tribes and
peoples in itself, even foreign kingdoms across the sea. She obtained a magnificent and stable seat, her reign
enduring as an order of peace and a single, inevitable cycle” (οὕτω τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνάμεων καὶ
ἡγεμονιῶν κατὰ τύχας ἐλαυνομένων καὶ συμφερομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μηδένα κρατεῖν βούλεσθαι δὲ πάντας, ἀμήχανος
<ἦν> ἡ φθορὰ καὶ πλάνη καὶ μεταβολὴ πᾶσα πάντων, μέχρις οὗ τῆς Ῥώμης ἰσχὺν καὶ αὔξησιν λαβούσης καὶ
ἀναδησαμένης τοῦτο μὲν ἔθνη καὶ δήμους ἐν αὑτῇ τοῦτο δ’ ἀλλοφύλους καὶ διαποντίους βασιλέων ἡγεμονίας ἕδραν
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he had a physical upheaval in mind, a periodic waning of the laws that govern demiurge’s
cosmic order, then human chaos would be merely a corollary.
But some scholars fasten upon the detail of becoming dull and sleeping (ἀμβλύνεται καὶ
καταδαρθάνει), and compare a passage of Alcinous:
And god does not make the soul of the world, which exists always, but orders it, and
someone might even say that in this way he makes it, waking and turning its mind and it
towards himself, as if from some heavy sleep or slumber, so that the soul might look
toward the intelligible things in him and receive the forms and shapes, aiming after his
thoughts.177
From this, Dillon, for instance, postulates a shared source for Alcinous and Plutarch.178 But the
salient similarity is image of a sleeping or waking world soul and, as J. H. Loenen thoroughly
details, the two authors use it in strikingly differently ways, and toward different ends.179
Plutarch’s description of the world soul’s chaotic tendency, however, is much more consistent
with his earlier interpretation of the myth in Plato’s Politicus: given his commitment to the unity
of the Platonic corpus, it would be surprising if his conception of the instability of the world soul
differed between interpretations.

ἔσχε τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀσφάλειαν, εἰς κόσμον εἰρήνης καὶ ἕνα κύκλον τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἄπταιστον περιφερομένης; 317bc). Plutarch’s view of civilizational cycles is more reminiscent of Hegel than Herodotus. This work may, however,
be early if it was prompted by Plutarch’s own travels to Rome. Dillon (1997) thus suggests 78 C.E. (236n5).
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καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀεὶ οὖσαν τοῦ κόσμου οὐχὶ ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ κατακοσμεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ λέγοιτ’ ἂν καὶ ποιεῖν,
ἐγείρων καὶ ἐπιστρέφων πρὸς αὑτὸν τόν τε νοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἐκ κάρου τινὸς βαθέος ἢ ὕπνου, ὅπως
ἀποβλέπουσα πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ αὐτοῦ δέχηται τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰς μορφάς, ἐφιεμένη τῶν ἐκείνου νοημάτων (XIV.3).
178
1977: “this image of the sleeping World Soul… is rather mysterious in origin. It is not a Platonic image in this
form, though the image of our life as a sleep or dream is an old and espectable one. It may simply be an imaginative
development of the Politicus myth, but the fact that it is found in both Plutarch and Albinus suggests that it is far
older than both” (206). Cf. Bos (2004: 177).
179
1957: “in Albinus there is no trace of the view that the worldsoul is the principle of evil. Although he does not
speak about it explicitly, it is probable that, in accordance with the current opinion of his time, he regarded matter as
such. The most important difference, however, is that, according to Plutarch, God formed the cosmos out of (in a
literal sense) pre-existent (animated and chaotically moving) matter… In Albinus, on the contrary, the cosmos is coexistent with chaos, and God’s causality has a metaphysical and extra-temporal character” (48).
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Plutarch presents the interpretation of Plato as a
distinctive sort of discourse, which implicitly consists in consistently applied exegetical axioms,
such as the deeply held assumption of Plato’s consistency. Apparent contradictions arise, it
seems, because of the vexing difficulty and importance of the subject, which forms a
fundamental part of Plutarch’s metaphysics. The Timaeus is presented as a complex puzzle,
which requires careful comparison with other dialogues to fit together. Numenius, as the next
chapter argues, marks a departure from Plutarch by arguing that Plato used myth to piously
shroud important philosophical ideas from the vulgar masses, while Plutarch never imputes this
motive to Plato. Rather, he associates it with Egyptian and Pythagorean symbolism.180 As a
result, interpretation is required to bring out the hidden truth, not just in the central myth of Isis
and Osiris, which prompts Plutarch to propose a variety of allegorical interpretations in his
largely exegetical treatise, but also even in single hieroglyphs. After he lists great sages who
travelled to Egypt—Solon, Thales, Plato, Eudoxus, Pythagoras, and perhaps Lycurgus—he
emphasizes Pythagoras’ particular debt to Egyptian wisdom:181
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On the latter, see Hardie (1992: 4781-3), Struck (2004: 96-104), and Thom (2013). Because Plutarch refers to
them as σύμβολα or αἰνίγματα, I prefer the term symbola to acusmata, which appears often in the scholarship but, as
Zhmud (2012) points out, only found in Iamblichus in antiquity (173-4). Lists of symbola and interpretations, with
some differences, are found in e.g. DL VIII.17-8, Porph. VP §42. See further Struck (2004: 103n58). This tradition
is particularly associated with Anaximenes, Aristotle, and Androcydes, who is especially associated with ethical
interpretation—e.g. Burkert (1972: 174). According to Porphyry, divine names and the exhortations are two
different sorts of symbola, the former of which Aristotle collected together (§41). He divides Pythagoreans into two
groups (οἳ μὲν ἐκαλοῦντο μαθηματικοί, οἳ δ’ ἀκουσματικοί; §37), apparently associating one group with one sort of
utterance (ἢ διεξοδικῶς ἢ συμβολικῶς). The degree to which this represents an authentic distinction, however,
haunts the scholarship on Pythagoreanism: Zhmud (2012) argues that some of the symbola were early but the
distinction of sects is “Imperial” (169-205), while Horky (2013) argues that the division is latent in Aristotle (3-35),
reflecting an early disagreement which is central to his reconstruction of “mathematical Pythagoreanism.” On their
connection to Hesiodic adages, see Proc. In Hes. ad 707-8, 744-5, Struck (2004: 103-4), and Zhmud (2012: 204-5).
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Plutarch tends to present unnamed followers of Pythagoras as particularly interested in Egyptian tradition, such
as when he claims that “it is clear the Pythagoreans too consider Typhon a daimonic power” (φαίνονται δὲ καὶ οἱ
Πυθαγορικοὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα δαιμονικὴν ἡγούμενοι δύναμιν; De Is. 363a), before relating a list of identifications
between gods and shapes that he attributed to Eudoxus. He explains one Pythagorean symbolon, “the sea is a tear of
Cronus” (ἡ θάλαττα Κρόνου δάκρυόν ἐστιν), by reference to Egyptian attitudes to fish and the sea (364a). See
further 367e-f. On the connection between Egypt and Pythagoras, see supra pg. 113.
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He most of all, as it seems, was struck by awe and marveled at the men: he imitated their
symbolic and mysterious manner, mixing doctrines with riddles. Many of the
Pythagorean exhortations desist from none of the manner of the letters called
hieroglyphics, such as the “do not sit upon a chariot” and “do not sit on a bushel” and “do
not stir fire in a house with a sword.”182
Plutarch then gives examples of hieroglyphs where the symbolism of the letter illustrates a
quality of what it signifies. The representation of the heavens with a cobra, for instance, signifies
“agelessness because of everlastingness;” 183 nor do they call Hermes the Dog literally (κυρίως),
but rather because of the mental traits Plato attributes to dogs in the Respublica.184
Plutarch, it seems, views these Pythagorean symbola as a distinctive non-literal sort of
signifier, motivated by the Egyptian concern for secrecy. A few examples of interpretations,
particularly of their ethical significance, are scattered through the corpus.185 Most extensively, in
the symposiastic vignette surrounding Moderatus’ student Lucius, the Neopythagorean boasts

μάλιστα δ’ οὗτος, ὡς ἔοικε, θαυμασθεὶς καὶ θαυμάσας τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπεμιμήσατο τὸ συμβολικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ
μυστηριῶδες ἀναμίξας αἰνίγμασι τὰ δόγματα· τῶν γὰρ καλουμένων ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων οὐθὲν ἀπολείπει τὰ
πολλὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν παραγγελμάτων, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ “ἐσθίειν ἐπὶ δίφρου” μηδ’ “ἐπὶ χοίνικος καθῆσθαι” μηδὲ
“φοίνικα φυτεύειν” μηδὲ “πῦρ μαχαίρᾳ σκαλεύειν ἐν οἰκίᾳ” (354e). The symbolon about stirring fire was common
enough in the Imperial period for Lucian to parody it in Ver. hist. II.28. Many doubt the historicity of Pythagoras’
travels, but cf. Kingsley (1994).
183
… ἀγήρω δι’ ἀϊδιότητα… (355a). He later specifies that the snake does not age (ἀγήρω, 381a). Griffiths (1970)
surveys possible referents for this hieroglyph (288). See also 354f, 355b, and 363f. Cf. Porph. VP §12.
184
355b. On the hermeneutic significance of κυρίως, see infra pg. 165.
185
In the Numa, Plutarch compares the king’s religious institutions, such as assuring that men attend thoughtfully
with the exhortation hoc age (ὃκ ἄγε) with Pythagorean piety (XIV.1-2). He compares other institutions more
extensively: “many of his other exhortations also resemble those of the Pythagoreans” (ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
παραγγελμάτων αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς ἐοικότα), listing three Pythagorean examples—“of which they keep
the meaning hidden from the many” (ὧν ἑκάστου τὴν διάνοιαν ἀπεκρύπτοντο πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς)—with three
attributed to Numa—“some of which thus bear a hidden significance” (οὕτως ἔνια… ἀπόρρητον ἔχει τὸν λόγον; §3).
Plutarch also compares Roman customs to the Pythagorean symbola in Quaest. Rom. LXXII.281a-b and CXII.290ef. See also Plutarch in Quaest. conv. VII.4.703e-f. A fragment in Stobaeus (III.1.199 = frg. 202 Sandbach) gives a
more abstract account that compares Pythagorean obsecurity with Orphic, Delphic, Heraclitean sorts, culminating:
“thus with Pythagorean symbola what is signified seems to be hidden and what it hidden is understood” (οὕτω τῶν
Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων καὶ τὸ φράζεσθαι δοκοῦν κρυπτόμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ κρύπτεσθαι νοούμενον). The ascription
is based only on Wyttenbach’s stylistic intuition, and therefore, as Sandbach (1969) notes, “far from certain” (377).
Cf. Scannapieco (2012: 197n20). In the treatise De libris educandis, transmitted as the beginning of the Plutarchean
Morlia but generally thought to be inauthentic, praises the practice of teaching them to children as “riddles”
(αἰνίγμασιν) that must be interpreted (ἅπερ ἐγὼ παραθεὶς ἐξηγήσομαι), providing short interpretations as examples.
“Do not stir fire with steel” (πῦρ σιδήρῳ μὴ σκαλεύειν), for instance, means “do not provoke an angry man” (12e);
“do not eat beans” (κυάμων ἀπέχεσθαι) means say out of politics, for “votes through beans” (κυαμευταὶ…
ψηφοφορίαι) were once an institution for removing archons (12f).
182
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that his people, the Etruscans, were the only ones to truly preserve and live in accordance with
them, implying disagreement over what they mean.186 Perhaps in an attempt to impress the other
symposiasts, Lucius offers five evidently more obscure examples, such as “shake bedclothes out
upon awaking,” “do not leave the mark of a lifted pot in the ashes,” and “do not allow swallows
in the house.”187 The crowd discusses the last, beginning with a traditional ethical explanation:
“the means by which some of the men of old thought sufficient to solve the symbolon, that it
warns through riddles about the slanderous chitterings of companions, but Lucius himself did not
approve,” because whispering is not distinctive to swallows, which are not particularly noisy for
birds.188
Sulla, the host, ventures to offer a mythological aetiology with the tragedy of Philomela,
but the character of Plutarch offers a two-pronged interpretation that wins over the crowd. First,
he gives a zoological explanation that latches onto unsavory characteristics of the swallow that
are particularly objectionable in a Pythagorean context: it is a flesheater (σαρκοφάγος), with a
perverse proclivity for “divine and musical cicadas,” and, although they build their nests in
human structures, “the swallow is by nature misanthropic, forever untamable because of its
distrust and suspicion.”189 Taking a start from this specific scientific lore, Plutarch articulates a
specifically Pythagorean ethical interpretation:

ταῦτα γὰρ ἔφη τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν λεγόντων καὶ γραφόντων μόνους ἔργῳ Τυρρηνοὺς ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ
φυλάττειν (Quaest. conv. VIII.7.727c).
187
… τὸ συνταράττειν ἀναστάντας ἐξ εὐνῆς τὰ στρώματα καὶ χύτρας τύπον ἀρθείσης ἐν σποδῷ μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἀλλὰ
συγχεῖν καὶ χελιδόνας οἰκίᾳ μὴ δέχεσθαι… (727c). Braccini & Pellizer (1998) list parallels (262-3).
188
καὶ γὰρ ᾧ μόνῳ τινὲς τῶν παλαιῶν ᾤοντο λύειν τὸ σύμβολον, ὡς πρὸς τοὺς διαβόλους καὶ ψιθύρους τῶν
συνήθων ᾐνιγμένον, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ Λεύκιος ἐδοκίμαζεν· ψιθυρισμοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἥκιστα χελιδόνι μέτεστι, λαλιᾶς <δὲ>
καὶ πολυφωνίας οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ κίτταις καὶ πέρδιξι καὶ ἀλεκτορίσιν (727c-d). The use of λύειν as resolve a question
before the symposiasts mirrrors its use with problema in the context of Platonic interpretation. The reference to
ancient interpretations could perhaps refer to Androcydes’ ethical interpretation of the symbolon. Cf. Braccini &
Pellizer (1998): “risale verosimilmente ad Anassimandro e conobbe un certo sviluppo” (260).
189
σαρκοφάγος γάρ ἐστιν καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς τέττιγας, ἱεροὺς καὶ μουσικοὺς ὄντας, ἀποκτίννυσι καὶ σιτεῖται (727e,
cf. Pl. Phdr. 258e-9d)… ἡ δὲ χελιδὼν τῷ φύσει μισάνθρωπος εἶναι καὶ δι' ἀπιστίαν ἀτιθάσευτος ἀεὶ καὶ ὕποπτος
(728a). In contrast, the stork (πελαργὸς) kills dangerous snakes but takes nothing from humans (727f).
186
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If, therefore, it is necessary in these sorts of things to speculate not through the obvious
path, but considering them as if reflections of something in another thing, then he sets the
swallows as the example of the fickle and ungrateful man and forbids us from taking on
people who opportunistically approach and steal upon us as companions for long, nor to
let them share in hearth and home and the most sacred of things.190
The issue with the earlier interpretation was not the ethical orientation, but the facts it was built
upon. Correcting these, Plutarch constructs a plausible explanation which spurs the other guests
to more boldly “make plausible ethical solutions” (ἠθικὰς ἐπιεικῶς ποιούμενοι τὰς λύσεις) for
the symbola. The prohibition against letting the pot leave a mark, Philinus explains, is an
admonition against anger, or perhaps resentment.191 Sulla, who had previously offered an
unpersuasive mythological answer, gets the final word to show that he learned how to play the
game: the shaking of bedsheets is an admonition against napping. He takes another Pythagorean
trope, that companions do not relieve each other from burdens but rather increase them to
discourage laziness, to “corroborate” (συμμαρτυρεῖν) his interpretation.192
Just as Plutarch presented Platonic interpretation as a symposiastic activity with a certain
set form and consistent interpretive principles, so too are interpretations of Pythagorean symbola
presented here as a distinctive sort of intellectual pastime. While the literal details are evidently
important, the greater task for exegesis is discerning the human qualities implied by the qualities
of the literal details, especially in an ethical context that emphasizes ‘Pythagorean values such as
secrecy and austere living. Interpreting Plato’s Timaeus and the Pythagorean symbola are thus
both presented as distinctive forms of discourse.193 Yet while the latter are relatively simple

εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν ἀλλ’ ἀνακλάσαντας ὥσπερ ἐμφάσεις ἑτέρων ἐν ἑτέροις θεωρεῖν,
παράδειγμα τὰς χελιδόνας τοῦ ἀβεβαίου καὶ ἀχαρίστου θέμενος οὐκ ἐᾷ τοὺς ἕνεκα καιροῦ προσφερομένους καὶ
ὑποδυομένους ποιεῖσθαι συνήθεις ἐπὶ πλέον, ἑστίας καὶ οἴκου καὶ τῶν ἁγιωτάτων μεταδιδόντας (728a-b).
191
Philinus, perhaps relevantly, is described several times in the Quaest. conv. as a refraining from meat, including
earlier in this vignette.
192
ὁ δὲ Σύλλας μᾶλλον εἴκαζε κοιμήσεως μεθημερινῆς ἀποτροπὴν εἶναι τὸ σύμβολον… τούτοις δὲ συμμαρτυρεῖν
ἐδόκει καὶ τὸ παρεγγυᾶν τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς τοῖς ἑταίροις μηδενὸς ἀφαιρεῖν βάρος, συνεπιτιθέναι δὲ
καὶ συνεπιφορτίζειν, ὡς μηδεμίαν σχολὴν μηδὲ ῥᾳστώνην ἀποδεχομένους (728c).
193
As is, pehraps, the interpretation of Egyptian symbolism and myths, especially in De Is.
190
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signifiers that are constrained to a specifically ethical context, Plutarch treats the Timaeus as a
complex narrative whose difficult details, when illuminated by passages from the rest of the
Platonic corpus, offers an account of the relationship between the highest metaphysical objects
and the ordered, ensouled world we inhabit now. Both discourses can perhaps be seen as serious
games, but the game of Platonic interpretation is central to Plutarch’s philosophy. As the next
chapters demonstrate, Plutarch’s imitations of Plato’s eschatological and teleological myths
reflect the centrality of Platonic interpretation no less than the in prima persona exegesis of the
Quaestiones Platonicae and De animae procreatione.

Appendix: the genres of Platonic exegesis
It might seem strange that Plutarch, who evidently wrote commentaries on poetic texts
such as Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aratus—presumably in the Alexandrian tradition194—should
have composed the Quaestiones Platonicae and De animae procreatione in the genre of
problems and answers, rather than composing a full commentary on the Timaeus as, it seems,
Calvenus Taurus would write only one or two generations after his death.195 In this appendix, I

The evidence for Plutarch’s poetical commentaries tends to come from Aulus Gellius: he mentions a discussion
of onions he found apud Plutarchum in quarto in Hesiodum commentario (XX.8 = frg. 102 Sandbach), and
discussions of Pythagoras and Epicurus in primo librorum quos de Homero composuit (IV.11 = frg. 122) and in
secundo (II.8-9, frgs. 123-4). Hippolytus claims: καὶ Πλούταρχος ποιεῖται λόγους ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα δέκα
βίβλοις (Refutatio V.20.5 = frg. 24). He apparently also appears in the scholia on Aratus, Hesiod, and Nicander,
although these (except the Hesiodica that discuss textual criticism) could have been taken from other sources.
Plutarch discusses critical marks (παράσημα) used on Homeric text, however, in Quaest. Plat. X.1010d. On the
Alexandrians, Pfeiffer's (1968) standard account reveals uncertainty when he identifies some ὑπομνήματα (defined
broadly in 29) as comprising “a loose series of notes” (e.g. Lycophron and Eratosthenes) and others “commentaries
on individual plays,” which is how he understands Εὐφρόνιος ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν Ὑπομνήματι Πλούτου
Ἀριστοφάνους (161). The ὑπομνήματα attributed to Aristarchus, he argues, discuss the entire text of Homer (among
others), with perhaps two versions, the first based on Aristophanes’ text, and the second his own (217). Diogenes
Laertius attributes six books of ἀπορημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν to Aristotle (V.26), and Gudeman (1927) lists Alexandrian
ζητήματα Ὁμηρικά, such as Zenodotus’ (2513-4), but none of these survive.
195
It has been suggested from a title in the Lamprias catalogue that Plutarch wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s
Categoriae—which seems to have already been the subject of a commentary by the first century B.C.E. Peripatetic
Boethius—but cf. Sandbach (1982).
194
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argue that there is no indication of a commentary on Plato when Plutarch was writing, so that this
genre of Quaestiones, which persists in importance until Late Antiquity, was still the
predominant vehicle for philosophical interpretation.196 This, I suggest, might not be coincidental,
although the evidence is only partial: the philological argumentation of De animae procreatione
is relatively sophisticated and elicited philological responses from Taurus, which perhaps
indicates that sort of argumentation in particular spurred Platonists to begin composing
commentaries by adapting the form of lemmatic poetic commentaries.197 It is only as the
philosophical authority of Plato and Aristotle developed further in the 3rd and 4th centuries C.E.
that this becomes the predominant genre for philosophical inquiry.
Many scholars, however, argue that the Early Academic Crantor composed a
commentary on the Timaeus, although the only evidence for this is that Proclus describes him
with the term “exegete.”198 Others are more confident about Eudorus’ time, the first century

196

The Latin term Quaestiones is apparently something of a catch-all category, as the the Greek terms are varied: the
contrast there is between Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία and Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα, compared to Αἰτίαι
Ρωμαϊκά and Αἰτίαι φυσικαί (also traditionally translated Quaestiones). There are also extant Αἰτίαι Ἑλληνικαί, as
well as six other lost Αἰτίαι in the Lamprias catalogue (nos. 119, 139, 149, 160, 161, 167). Gudeman (1927) already
identified Plutarch with “eine besonders rührige Tätigkeit” in this broader genre (2535). Cf. Harrison (2000):
“Although Plutarch would seem to have been determined to preserve the distinctions among the genres, perfect
consistency is illusory. Even Plutarch himself occasionally mixed terms, and consistent use of quaestiones for the
four genres by medieval and Renaissance scholiasts and commentators recognizes a connection between the giveand-take of sympotic literature and the more straightforward question-and-answer format of αἰτίαι” (194). Genre can
perhaps influence or delimit the sorts of arguments Plutarch makes. E.g. Meeusen (2016): “We are very remote from
the arguments in the ‘tierpsychologische Schriften’, where Plutarch, in an overt anti-Stoic fashion, often emphasises
the rational abilities of animals in combination with their moral capacities. Interestingly, the irrational nature of
animals is also a common topic in Ps.-Aristotle’s Problems, which served as Plutarch’s model in his own natural
problems. One may presume, then, that the concptual differences and inconsistencies in Plutarch’s writings on
animals are genre-related” (65).
197
Aulus Gellius attributes a commentary on the Grg. to Taurus—noster Taurus in primo commentariorum, quos in
Gorgiam Platonis composuit (VII.14.5)—before quoting part of the final myth (525a) in Greek (§7). Philoponus
claims “certainly Taurus says in his commentary on the Timaeus these things on the lemma” (λέγει γοῦν ἐν τοῖς εἰς
τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνήμασιν ἐπὶ λέξεως ταῦτα, frg. 22b.9-10), which seems to mean a relatively formal commentary.
Favorinus’ fragments include ὑπομνήματα, but scholars of philosophy often dismiss him: e.g. Dillon (1977)
“Favorinus of Arles, a noted sophist” (307); Tarrant (1996): “I believe there is very little indication that Favorinus
was interested in exegetical matters. The case of Taurus is quite different” (176n6; cf. 192-3); cf. Moreschini (2015:
153-5). Plutarch’s aim, however, was more immediately and specifically to elucidate solutions to the particularly
hard parts of the Ti., and not to systematically comment on the text as a whole.
198
ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωος ἐξηγητής (In Tim. I.76.2). See e.g. Jones (1916: 71n7), Mette (1984: 23-8), Dillon
(2003a: 218), and Obbink (2003: 179).
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B.C.E. Luc Brisson, for instance, characterizes it as a time when “philosophical courses became
primarily commentaries on texts” as a result of Sulla’s sacking of Athens in 87 B.C.E. and the
consequential diaspora of “the four philosophical schools.”199 The sort of running commentary on
Plato imagined here would presumably have the aim of comprehensive comment, a prologue on
the work as a whole, and perhaps lemmata, such as the anonymous Commentarius in Platonis
Theaetetum offers.200 Yet aside from this, the evidence is rather lacking until the generations
immediately after Plutarch, of Taurus and the Peripatetic Aspasius, the teachers of Aulus Gellius
and Galen, respectively.201 Eudorus, for example, is sometimes held to be an early commentator,
but according to Stobaeus, his “book worth buying,” called a “division of the account about
philosophy” (διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου), was apparently organized “problem by
problem” (προβληματικῶς), and we have no indication of the structure of his other works.202

199

2004: 57.
Dörrie & Baltes (1993), for instance, deemed De an. proc. “der erste Kommentar zu einem Platondialog, der uns
erhalten ist” (213) and Tarrant (1996) takes this work, along with the Quaest. Plat., as evidence that “the
commentary was therefore becoming an important vehicle in the teaching of Plato” in the second century (175).
Sluiter's (2000) survey of commentaries “whose interest is not primarily literary from the fourth to the first centuries
B.C.E.” is indicatively light until the 1st century (185-7). Niehoff (2007) is even more skeptical (166n14).
201
The dating of Aspasius is indeed based on Galen’ report that, among the other philosophers his father had him
study under, such as a student of Gaius (see above), one was also a student of Aspasius (Ἀσπασίου τοῦ
Περιπατητικοῦ μαθητής; Aff. dig. VIII.41-2). Barnes (1999) takes a mention of the Olympeion (106.1-6), completed
by Hadrian in 131 CE, to perhaps hint that Aspasius was an Athenian living shortly thereafter (3). The manuscripts
of his commentary on the Eth. Nic., the earliest extant commentary on Aristotle, contains lemmas, which Wittwer
(1999) argues were, with perhaps one exception (82-3), indeed perhaps planned by Aspasius.
202
ἔστιν οὖν Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως, Ἀκαδημιακοῦ φιλοσόφου, διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, βιβλίον
ἀξιόκτητον, ἐν ᾧ πἀσαν ἐπεξελήυθε προβληματικῶς τὴν ἐπιστήμην (II.7.2.64-7 = frg. 1 Mazzarelli). Griffin (2015),
however, is skeptical: “several further works and commentaries are inferred from fragments and testimonia, but I
take it that, in reality, any of the following testimonies may equally well derive from essays in the Διαίρεσις” (80);
See also Tarrant (2000: 51-5) and Niehoff (2007: 168n23). We have no idea what form this commentary took, and it
would have been strange if it were lemmatic, centuries before conclusive evidence of another. Cf. Dillon (2006):
“the earliest commentator is probably Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. c. 25 BCE). We know from Plutarch (Mor. 1013b,
1020c) that he composed a fairly comprehensive commentary on the Timaeus, but we know of no comments from
him on any other dialogue” (20). Neither passage actually specifies what sort of work Plutarch found an opinion in:
the former takes the vague form of ὁ μὲν Εὔδωρος … οἴεται, and the latter similarly of ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὔδωρος
ἐπακολουθήσας Κράντορι πρῶτον ἔλαβε… Cherniss (1976) skeptically offers as a comparandum a papyrus
fragment (POxy. 1609, vol. xiii, pgs. 94-96), then argues that the argument for attributing this to the 1st century BCE
Alexandrian is entirely circular—“Eudorus, who has recently been proposed as the source of an ever-increasing
number of later texts” (171nc). For Eudorus, however, Tarrant (2000) argues that he had a shaping influence over
the Tht. commentator (72-4, 162, 165), whom he had earlier suggested as Eudorus himself (1983). One could argue
200
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Whether the title of ὑπομνήματα signals this sort of comprehensive commentary is part of the
controversy, since it could just mean notes, as Plutarch manifestly uses it in De tranquillitate
animi, or it could mean comprehensive philosophical commentary, as Porphyry seems to use it.203
Ferrari and Baldi, on the other hand, suggest the category of a “Spezialkommentare,” evidently a
restricted commentary on a particular problem or set of problems, which might prove preferable
for considering Plutarch’s De animae procreatione.204 This treatise, on the other hand, shares
affinities with the Quaestiones genre, such as the language of “solution.”205 Plutarch’s
interpretive principles, moreover—such as the consistency of Plato and, implicitly, the

that the emendations attributed to him by Aspasius (frg. 2 Mazzarelli = Alexander Aphrodisias, In Met. 58.25-9.8)
implies the sort of philological context of commentary writing, on which cf. Bonazzi (2007: 375-6).
203
In the scholarship on Plutarch, it is tied to his notes which he describes himself as consulting at the beginning of
the treatise 464f. Although Plutarch emphasizes that he made these ὑπομνήματα for himself in the last clause, rather
than gathering them from other sources, this was a significant impetus for Quellenforschung-minded scholars to find
shadowy “sources,” as the introduction to the Loeb still evidences. Van der Stockt (1999) has extensively pushed
back against this idea by arguing that Plutarch reuses the same notes. Demulder (2016) has similarly argued that
Plutarch used such a note on the Ti. both in De an. proc. and in a speech of Lamprias in De fac. Does this mean that
Plutarch’s ὑπομνήματα were commentaries (particularly on Plato) for personal use? Or were they more similar to
what we find in the Quaest. Plat.? But beyond Plutarch, the term can be understood and translated as “commentary,”
such as when Porphyry describes the reading practice of Plotinus’ circle: ὑπομνήματα is thus used by Porphyry to
describe what was read in meetings (ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνουσίαις), and he mentions works by Severus, Cronius, Numenius,
Gaius, Atticus, and some Peripatetics (§14.10-14).
204
2002: 11-6. They also trace this genre to Crantor. The other extant example would be the second century C.E.
treatise by Theon of Smyrna entitled De utilitate mathematicae. They also emphasize the generic similarities
between the Quaest. Plat. and De an. proc.: “Per quanto concerne questo secondo aspetto, la vicinanza tra il De
procreatione e le Quaestiones Platonicae non attiene solamente alla presenza di un comune repertorio di procedure
esegetiche, ma arriva a interessare la struttura stessa dei due scritti che non sempre risulta chiaramente distinguibile”
(9). By allowing him to argue against ostensible contradictions in the Ti. by reference primarily to other Platonic
texts, with the expectation that this would yield a plausible elucidation of the qualities of the world soul, the Quaest.
Plat. and De an. proc. suited his purpose, as we will see in the subsequent sections. As Sheppard (1980) argues, in
her characterization of the background of Proclus’ 5th Essay in In Remp., itself a series of ten questions on book II of
Plato’s Resp., and thus a form rather unlike his more common lemmatic commentaries: “although this is not line-byline commentary, it is commentary in a wider sense of the term as a comment on problems that arise in the course of
studying a particular text. … just as today, the study of texts could also take the form of the selection and discussion
of specific problems” (21-2). She also compares Proclus’ De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam.
205
The “first exposition” is called thus (ἀπόδειξις δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ… λύσις; 1015f), which sets the problem in the
same terms as the various Quaest. genres, where satisfaction is reached when a problem is dissolved (sometimes
thus using a form or compound of λύειν). This is how the symposiasts talk about difficult philosophical, scientific,
and literary inquiries in the Quaest. conv., e.g. 702e: γελάσας δ’ ὁ Φλῶρος ‘οὐκοῦν’ εἶπεν ‘ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρόβλημα
λέλυται, …’; 689d: …ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲ λέλυται τῆς ἀπορίας τὸ μέγιστον…; 720d: καὶ ὁ Ἀμμώνιος ἔφη τοῦτο
μὲν ὑπ’ Ἀριστοτέλους [Probl. 903b13] λελύσθαι (similarly, 734e). The term λύσις is also connected with ζητήματα,
the Greek term for the Quaest. Plat., as Gudeman (1927), still the standard account, argues (2511).

186
preferability of interpreting Plato through Plato, rather than appealing to other philosophers or
authorities—are shared between the two works.
The Quaestiones Platonicae genre, furthermore, remains apart of Platonist communities
well past the age of Plutarch. In Porphyry’s presentation of intellectual life in the Vita Plotini, for
instance, there it still plays a role in the third century C.E., despite the appearance by that point
of lemmatic commentaries. He mentions that “Euboulus the Platonic Successor from Athens
wrote and sent treatises about some Platonic questions” (συγγράμματα ὑπὲρ τινων Πλατωνικῶν
ζητημάτων) to Plotinus, but Porphyry only mentions that he was personally entrusted with
studying and responding to them, and gives no idea about their content.206 Given the dearth of
evidence, the scholarship on Plutarch’s ten Quaestiones Platonicae is unsurprisingly divided on
their nature and status as texts.207 Are they “literary” texts drawn from “a solid foundation of
notes (hypomnēmata),” as Klotz and Oikonomopolou argue, or themselves “ten separate notes on
Platonic passages that [Plutarch] had written at different times and had found no suitable
occasion to incorporate into his other compositions,” as Cherniss posits? 208 On this issue, the use
of imperatives such as “consider whether…” or “see that…” seems to favor the “literary” view,
because they imply a didactic context.209 The generic origins of Plutarch’s Quaestiones in general

γράφοντος δὲ Εὖβούλου Ἀθήνηθεν τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ διαδόχου καὶ πέμποντος συγγράμματα ὑπέρ τινων
Πλατωνικῶν ζητημάτων ἐμοὶ Πορφυρίῳ ταῦτα δίδοσθαι ἐποίει καὶ σκοπεῖν καὶ ἀναφέρειν αὐτῷ τὰ γεγραμμένα
ἠξίου (§15.18-22).
207
The first eight books of Plutarch’s Quaest. conv. each contain exactly ten problems, and the preface to the ninth
and last urges one against surprise (οὐ θαυμαστέον) that “the number questions might exceed the customary ten of
zētēmata” (ὁ δ’ ἀριθμὸσ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ τὴν συνήθη δεκάδα τῶν ζητημάτων; 736c).
208
Klotz and Oikonomopoulou (2011: 17); Cherniss (1976: 4). Meeusen (2016) argues that the Quaestiones in
general were intended as school texts (177-82) and discusses the conceptual difficulty of the Quaest. nat. (which
require “a minimal acquaintance with the theoretical and terminological apparatus”) compared to the more complex
and difficult Quaest. Plat. (210-1). But Adams (2017) compares Philo’s systematicity and concludes: “It is unlikely,
though, that Plutarch’s Questions are school related and more likely that they come from his own reading” (176).
209
This imperative construction (similarly, ὅρα δὲ μὴ in I.1000d), I think, indicates that these texts are intended to be
didactic, and not for Plutarch’s own use; cf. the ‘didactic tag’ nonne uides in Lucretius (e.g. II.196, 207, 263, etc.).
There are other tags broadly of this sort, such as “or is it laughable…” (ἢ… γελοῖόν ἐστιν, …; Quaest. Plat.
IX.1008e). Cf. below on poetic quotations, another feature I take to be literary.
206
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presents a puzzle, because they seem related to multiple extant works, such as Philo’s
Quaestiones, the Aristotelian Problemata tradition, and the Alexandrian tradition of poetic
commentaries which Plutarch himself may have been following directly in some works.210
Leaving these questions dependent upon perhaps scant evidence aside, however, I want to
suggest that both these shorter Quaestiones Platonicae and the longer De animae procreatione
are reflections of the living practice that Plutarch depicts in his dialogues: they are explorations
of difficult issues in Platonic interpretation that Plutarch evidently had a practice of sending to
people such as the orator Paccius and his sons. They reflect a sort of “textual community,” where
the truth is pursued by piecing together exegesis through fixed—mutually understood, even if
sometimes unspoken—principles for reading a central text, such as the Timaeus. This practice is
at the heart of Platonism, an emerging trend in the early Empire, but not entirely unlike
Porphyry’s depiction of the flourishing school of Plotinus, or what emerges from even later
Neoplatonic Vitae.211 Plutarch’s creative imitation of Plato in dialogues—and particularly
Philo’s Quaestiones in Genesim and in Exodum might seem similar in some respects, at least insofar as they
interpret authoritative philosophical texts in the question-and-answer format. But, as Adams (2017: 180) argues,
these span hundreds of questions each, apparently totaling 636, concerning passages distributed throughout their
target texts. This vastness and distribution gives the collection an exhaustive quality which is unlike Plutarch’s set of
ten problems. On the Aristotelian Problemata tradition, Oikonomopoulou (2013) argues that it is a literary
antecedant for all of Plutarch’s Quaestiones, and characterizes each of the relevant works as essentially “Peripatetic”
as a result: “the encyclopaedic zeal of his intellectual predecessors, the Peripatetics” (139); the Problemata are
discussed in 133-138. The introduction and some of the essays in Klotz and Oikonomopoulou (2011) are similar
(e.g. 18-21, although the genre of “The imperial miscellany” is also discussesd in 22-4). Roskam (2011) similarly
connects the Quaest. Plat. to the “Aristotelian and Peripatetic philosophical tradition” (423). This seems likely in
certain places in the QC, such as when Plutarch depicts one character as reading “physical problems of Aristotle”
and being spurred to further inquiry and discussion: προβλήμασιν Ἀριστοτέλους φυσικοῖς ἐντυγχάνων Φλῶρος εἰς
Θερμοπύλας κομισθεῖσαν κομισθεῖσιν αὐτὸς τε πολλῶν ἀποριῶν, ὅπερ εἰώθασι πάσχειν ἐπιεικῶς αἱ φιλόσοφοι
φύσεις, ὑπεπίμπλατο καὶ τοῖς ἑταίροις μετεδίδου (VIII.10, 734d); Oikonomopoulou (2013: 134-5). This discourse,
moreover, is titled “why is it that we trust our autumnal dreams least?” and begins with the διὰ τὶ tag which is
distinctive to the Aristotelian Problemata, as are many other of the Quaest. conv. do as well (in book VIII, for
instance, 3, 4, 5, and 8; very often in the Quaest. nat.). But of the Quaest. Plat., only the fifth begins with this
distinctly Aristotelian tag, so the strict generic similarity seems limited in this case. Cf. Harrison (2000): “All but
one of the ten ζητήματα in Plutarch’s Quaestiones Platonicae are longer and more elaborate than the individual
αἰτίαι, and most also begin with τί δήποτε, τί οὖν, πῶς or πῶς ποτέ rather than διὰ τί, the most frequent phrase
introducing the question in the several collections of αἰτίαι” (195).
211
The rules for interpretation differ between Plutarch’s depiction of his own intellectual circle and that of Plotinus,
however, such as on the role of Aristotle. Cf. Niehoff (2007: 178-91) on Celsus’ and Porphyry’s “textual
communities” as polemic against Christianity.
210
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through the myths examined in following chapters—is unparalleled in the evidence for
subsequent Platonism, but it no less than the Quaestiones forms a particular sort of discourse for
Platonic interpretation. While his myths themselves require interpretation, as with Plato’s, they
imbue the dialogues with a deeper pleasure and wonder than the relatively dry, dialectical
puzzle-solving of De animae procreatione.
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Chapter three. Myth as ethical exhortation: hellish cures in Thespesius’
myth in De sera
Plutarch’s dialogue De sera numinis vindicta opens with a character simply named
Epicurus delivering a whirlwind assault on the concept of divine providence and sauntering off
before the dumbstruck crowd of Plutarch and his fellow-Platonists can respond.1 As they regain
composure, they address one contention in particular: if the world is justly governed, why does
so much evil seem to go unpunished? The interlocutors raise further questions and the character
of Plutarch responds at length. His concluding speeches are structured into two parts. After
introducing the prospect of ancestral guilt, he considers relating what he fears his audience might
take for a mythos:2
“For I even have a certain logos that I heard recently, but I hesitate lest it should appear
to be a mythos to you: therefore allow me to use only the likely.”
“Not at all,” Olympichus said, “but recount this as well.”
When the rest were also asking for the same, I said, “Allow what is likely to be offered
by the logos, but let us later, if it seems right, rouse the mythos, if that is what it is.”3

The dialogue thus begins: “Epicurus said things of this sort went off, Quietus, and left even before someone could
respond, as we arrived at the end of the of the stoa: and how we marveled at the strangeness of the man, standing in
silence looking at one another…” (τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος εἰπών, ὦ Κυῆτε, καὶ πρὶν ἀποκρίνασθαί τινα, πρὸς τῷ
πέρατι τῆς στοᾶς γενομένων ἡμῶν ᾤχετ’ ἀπιών· ἡμεῖς δ’ ὅσον τι θαυμάσαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ἀτοπίαν, ἐπιστάντες
σιωπῇ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαβλέψαντες…; 548a-b). The manuscripts print Ἐπίκουρος, although Paton, Pohlenz, &
Sieveking (1972) print Fabricius’ unnecessary emendation, Ἐπικούρειος. “Aristotle” is similarly a character in De
fac. Opsomer (2016) draws out further coloring through the other Hellenistic schools in this opening passage (39);
cf. Vernière (1974), who argues for Fabricus’ emendation (129n1). See also Griffiths (1991: 78) and Einarson
(1958: 266n4). Plutarch eventually characterizes Epicurus’ speech as “attacking and inveighing against providence”
(σπαράττων ἅμα κατεφόρει τῆς προνοίας), before Patrocleas claims more specifically that “the slowness and delay
of vengeance against the wicked by the divinity seems the most fearsome to me” (ἡ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας… τῶν
πονηρῶν βραδυτὴς τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ μέλλησις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μάλιστα δεινὸν εἶναι; 548c-d). In De def. or., a certain
Cynic named Didymus inveighs against oracles—including any connection they might have to providence (413a)—
before Heracleon bids him to calm and he similarly flees (412f-3d).
2
On the problem of ancestral guilt in ancient Platonism, see also Cic. De fin. III.86. In Pl. Leg. VI.775c-e, the
Athenian Stranger relatedly argues that actions of the father—drunkenness, committing injustices—can adversely
impact the bodies and souls of offspring. The passage appears in Plut. frg. 157.2.
3
“ἔχω μὲν τινα καὶ λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔναγχος ἀκηκοώς, ὀκνῶ δὲ μὴ φανῇ μῦθος ὑμῖν· μόνον οὖν χρῶμαι τῷ εἰκότι.”
“μηδαμῶς,” εἶπεν ὁ Ὀλύμπιχος, “ἀλλὰ δίελθε κἀκεῖνον.” τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δεομένων, “ἐάσατε,” εἶπον,
“ἀποδοῦναί τε τῷ λόγῳ τὸ εἰκός· ὕστερον δὲ τὸν μῦθον, ἐὰν δόξῃ, κινήσωμεν, εἴ γε δὴ μῦθός ἐστιν” (561b).
1
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Plutarch echoes the same concern as Socrates right before the myth in the Gorgias.4 Olympichus
indeed expects a myth, and so playfully spurs Plutarch on:
And when I said these things and stood silent, Olympichus smiled and said, “I do not
praise you, lest we should seem to let the mythos pass by on the grounds that the logos is
sufficient for the exposition. Rather, we will give the decision whenever we hear it.”5
Why does Plutarch introduce this myth at the end of the otherwise dialectic De sera? His
motivation is partly revealed through its long-recognized similarity to the myth that concludes
Plato’s Respublica, especially in the frames that explain the source for each.6 In the latter, a man
named Er appeared to die in war, but rose on his pyre twelve days later to describe what he
learned during the flight of his soul out of the body and throughout the world—surveying the
meeting place of souls, the public punishment of incurable tyrants, the spindle of Necessity, the
plain of forgetting, and the drawing of lots to determine the order in which the souls would pick
their next lives.7 Plutarch ascribes his myth to a rather different sort of man—rather than a
soldier, a knavish youth who squandered his inheritance with vice, then began stooping to any
means to regain his formerly luxurious lifestyle, although this protagonist undergoes a similarly
extraordinary circumstance: “he tumbled from some height onto his neck, suffered only a blow

ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον: ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι
λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν (Plut. De sera 561a); cf. Pl. Grg. 523a.
5
ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν ἐσιώπησα, διαμειδιάσας ὁ Ὀλύμπιχος “οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμέν σ’” εἶπον, “ὅπως μὴ δόξωμεν ἀφιέναι
τὸν μῦθον ὡς τοῦ λόγου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλὰ τότε δώσομεν τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὅταν κἀκεῖνον
ἀκούσωμεν” (562e).
6
E.g. Barrow (1967) sees “the only defense” for the myth in De sera as “the Platonic tradition,” citing the myth of
Er (101). Bernstein (1993) is more positive: “Plutarch of Chaeronaea deserves a place in this survey for his use of
Plato’s themes and his skillful adaptation of a near-death experience like Er’s to an extended investigation of divine
justice and punishment after death” (73); Moellering (1962): “the precedent established by the myth of Er… must
have pushed him with an almost irresistible impulse to compose something similar” (153). Vernière (1974), on the
other hand, reduces both to Zoroastrian influence: “Directement ou indirectement, cette mort proviso ire suivie de
réssurection est bien dans la ligne des Mages” (110). At most, in this view, the myth of Er is one of several potential
“intermédiaires.” She later adds Pythagoras, Empedocles, and, following Frutiger, Orphics as further sources for
Plato (115). Cürsgen (2002), however, in his survey of Plutarch’s adaptations of the myth of Er only discusses the
myths of De gen. and De fac. (126-8), ignoring the Thespesius narrative despite its much more manifest affinities
with the myth of Er.
7
See further supra pg. 26.
4
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rather than a mortal wound, but appeared dead, and recovered just on the third day, during his
funeral rites.”8 Outside of the body, the soul travels throughout the cosmos and beholds the
imaginatively depicted forces of cosmic governance, especially those of eschatological
punishment. After this experience, Aridaeus makes an unbelievable (ἀπιστόν) change in his life
and becomes renowned for his superlative justice and piety—so thoroughly changed that even
his name has become Thespseius, as the dead relative who serves as his guide decrees at the
beginning of the otherworldly narrative.9
De sera and its myth, particularly because of their presentation of providence and
punishment, tend to provoke strong reactions.10 The Enlightenment behemoth David Hume, for
example, singles out this dialogue as the only one of Plutarch’s works deserving ridicule (other
than De defectu oraculorum’s “wild, absurd, and contradictory opinions”): “It is also writ in
dialogue, contains like superstitious, wild visions, and seems to have been chiefly composed in
rivalship to Plato, particularly his last book de republica.”11 On the other hand, even Proclus,
who vehemently criticizes Plutarch’s interpretation of the Timaeus, apparently found it worth

κατενεχθεὶς γὰρ ἐξ ὕψους τινὸς εἰς τράχηλον οὐ γενομένου τραύματος ἀλλὰ πληγῆς μόνον ἐξέθανε, καὶ τριταῖος
ἤδη περὶ τὰς ταφὰς αὐτὰς ἀνήνεγκε (563d). This type of morality tale was common in the Early Modern world, e.g.
in Hogarth’s A Rake’s Progress (1732-1734), but perhaps less so today.
9
“Then he said that he recognized some kinsman, but not very clearly, since he was still a boy when he died. But he
approached him straightaway and said ‘hail, Thespesius.’ But he marveled and said that his named was not
Thespesius, but Aridaeus. The relative said, ‘it was Aridaeus before, but from this point on it is Thespesius. For you
have not died, but by some apportionment of the gods you arrive to here in your intellect, as you leave the rest of the
soul behind in the body like an anchor’” (ἐνταῦθα μίαν ἔφη <γνῶναι> συγγενοῦς τινος, οὐ μέντοι σαφῶς· ἀποθανεῖν
γὰρ ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνην προσαγαγοῦσαν ἐγγὺς εἰπεῖν ‘χαῖρε, Θεσπέσιε.’ θαυμάσαντος δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ
φήσαντος ὡς οὐ Θεσπέσιος ἀλλ’ Ἀριδαῖός ἐστι, ‘πρότερόν γε’ φάναι, ‘τὸ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε Θεσπέσιος. οὐδε γάρ τοι
τέθνηκας, ἀλλὰ μοίρᾳ τινὶ θεῶν ἥκεις δεῦρο τῷ φρονοῦντι, τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ὥσπερ ἀγκύριον ἐν τῷ σώματι
καταλέλοιπας;’ 564b-c). Stewart (1905) interprets this detail as initiatory (338), but cf. even Vernière (1974: 113).
10
Vernière (1974) describes the history of editions and translations of the dialogue (124-6). Since this Budè edition,
there is also Taufer's (2010) Italian edition, focused solely on the myth. Despite the relatively broader attention it
receives, W. Hamilton published one article in 1934 on Plutarch’s myth in De fac. and another article on De gen. in
the same year, but never addressed De sera. Roig Lanzillotta (2015) even sets out to defend “the unity of Plutarch’s
cosmological views as expressed in De genio, De facie and De sera” (180), but later qualifies, “the three famous
mythological expositions, of which I have only analysed De genio and De facie…” (191).
11
1752: 261. This is despite his positive general impression that “the plain sense of Plutarch” is very unlike “the
visionary systems or ravings of Plato” (260). See also Smith (1990) on the Enlightenment hostility of John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson to Plato’s Resp. (8) and what they took to be his corruption of Christianity (9-13).
8
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using heavily as a source for the eighth and ninth of his De decem dubitationibus circa
providentiam.12 Andrew Peabody, a nineteenth century Unitarian chaplain associated with
Harvard, is more explicit with his positivity, declaring in his introduction to the dialogue that it is
“the most remarkable of all Plutarch’s writings, and the most valuable equally in a philosophical
and an ethical point of view, and the most redolent of what we almost involuntarily call Christian
sentiment.”13 The contentiousness of the dialogue seems indelibly related to the most salient
question for this: why did Plutarch conclude his largely dialectic work with an eschatological
myth such as this, in this dialogue in particular?
Some scholars, as part of a broader trend in thought on Plutarch’s philosophical myths,
argue that the mythos is necessary to transcend the limits of the logos.14 H. Armin Moellering

12

§49-60. See Opsomer & Steele (2013: 50-9). Van den Berg (2014), however, argues that there is a significant
philosophical difference: “Proclus has adapted these similarities to fit his argument from which the notion of
therapeutic punishment is absent” (250). Gagné (2013) responds that Proclus understands “the therapy of
Providence” as “exercised directly on the genos or the city,” an ontologically higher entity; thus: “It is not the case
that the imagery of healing is central to one and secondary to the other; it simply plays a different role in each text”
(47). Both van den Berg (252n39) and Gagné (29-30, 39) discuss the Proclean scholion to Hesiod, Op. 284—which
compares divine punishment to a preemptive medical cure (προκαθαίροντές)—and suggest that it has been adapted
from Plutarch. On Proclus’ positions on evil and providence more generally, see Chlup (2012: 201-33), who finds
the “nutshell” of the latter in Leg. X.903b-4b (228-9). On Proclus’ knowledge of other Plutarchean works, Hunter &
Russell (2011) argue that Proclus, particularly in the fifth and sixth essays of In Remp., “knew and used” Plutarch’s
essay on poetry (4n16). The first chapter surveys Proclus’ polemic against Plutarch’s interpretation of the Ti.
13
1885: xxvi. Peabody’s assessment of Plutarch’s character is similar: “nor can we find, even in Christian literature,
the record of a firmer belief than his in human immortality, and in a righteous retribution beginning in this world and
reaching on into the world beyond death” (xii, cf. xiv-xvii). Similarly, Scholten (2009): “Kein Übeltäter kommt
ungeschoren davon, keiner entgeht seiner gerechten Strafe, alle unterliegen am Ende dem göttlichen Strafgericht was wie ein Gedanke aus der christlichen Vorstellungswelt klingt, ist die Kernaussage der religionsphilosophischen
Schrift Plutarchs, De sera numinis vindicta” (99). In a similar vein, Super (1899) published a translation of De sera
together with Sen. Prov. as a sort of best of collection of pagan treatments of providence and theodicy from what he
took to be a proto-Christian world. Bernstein's (1993) monograph on the development of the afterlife in early
Christianity, places De sera as the last case study after Plato’s myths and Aeneid VI in his chapter on “Moral Death”
(73-83). Similarly, Opsomer (2016) describes the praise of this dialogue by De Maistre, “a Catholic reactionary, and
adversary of the Revolution and the Enlightenment and an apologist of the inquisition” (37). See further 38, 40, and
53. Cf. Torraca (1991: 91).
14
E.g. Oakensmith (1902): “In the ‘De Sera Numinis Vindicta’ we saw that he could not accept as a subject of
rational demonstration the theory of rewards and punishments in a future life; but so convinced is he of the ethical
value of that belief that he has recourse to a most solemn myth, which he clearly hopes will poerate for goodness
through the imagination if not in the intellect” (173). Vernière (1977) connects this myth, above the other two, with
“Oriental” mysticism: “C’est une indication précieuse, comme l’origine pampylienne d’Er, dont l’Épicurien Colotès,
au dire de Porphyre, s'amusait à remplacer le nom par celui de Zoroastre. Aprè le merveilleux occidental de Sylla, le
merveilleux hellénique de Timarque, voici, baignant l’histoire de Thespesios, le merveilleux oriental” (110).
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argues that he faced problems that “reason could not answer, so that with the choice limited to
silence or myth, Plutarch understandably chose myth.”15 Reginald Haynes Barrow goes farther in
claiming that, because Plutarch realizes “that the problems are in the end insoluble by argument,
he concludes the dialogue with a myth, a story which shall place the issue on the level of
imagination rather than reason.”16 The essay in the commentaries on selected parts of the
Moralia organized by Hans Dieter Betz argues that the details of the mythic afterlife are essential
to the dialogue:
What popular religion calls “punishments” must, according to Plutarch, be reinterpreted
soteriologically as corrective and preventive measures deriving from the divine therapy
for the soul. The confirmation of this truth cannot be achieved by the λόγος, but only by
the μῦθος, since it is in this myth that we learn about the destiny of the soul in the
afterlife.17
In this chapter, however, I argue that the mythos is complementary to the logos, in that both
advance the argument that afterlife punishment is essentially curative, understood as a part of the
providential care of the world.18 Although scholars cite various influences, the most salient
15

1962: 154.
1967: 95. Similarly, Ziegler (1951): “Der Mythus, in den P. angesichts der Unlösbarkeit des Problems mit
rationalen Methoden sich rettet und in dem er durch die Erfindung von der besonders harten Bestrafung derer, die
durch ihre Schuld ihre Nachkommen ins Unglück gestürzt haben, mit dem κολοφὼν τῆς ἀπορίας (4, 549d) fertig zu
werden meint—als ob sie daran schuld wären, daß die strafende Gerechtigkeit Gottes sie auf Erden nicht ereilt hat—
, knüpft deutlich an den Mythus am Ende des platonischen Staates an und fügt pythagoreische und heraklitische
Gedanken und Motive ein, ist aber zugleich das starkste Dokument der poetischen Erfindungs- und Gestaltungskraft
des Autors” (cols. 849-50). Barrow concludes rather negatively, however, on what he takes to be a disjunction
between the myth and the rest of the dialogue: “A modern reader who has read with some admiration the earlier part
of this dialogue with its conception of God as an infinitely patient and sympathetic healer of souls and its conviction
that sin is its own punishment, will find the concluding myth to be a crude anticlimax, however well narrated” (101).
17
Betz et al. (1975: 182). They further note an “apologetic purpose”: “The vision of punishment occurring in the
afterlife ultimately acquits the god of any injustice in his delaying the punishment of the wicked while they are still
on earth” (182). Cf. Gallo (2003): “Perché la divinità punisce tardivamente i peccatori? La spiegazione fornita dal
ragionamento ha bisogno di essere completata dal mito, che non sostituisce ma rafforza il logos. Non si tratta di
dimostrazione, ma di rivelazione” (204).
18
Much of the scholarship on providence in Plutarch addresses the context of the Hellenistic schools. Vernière
(1974) argues that Seneca’s Prov. used “même sources que Plutarque” in De sera (105). Dillon (2014) compares
Plutarch’s conception of providence to Stoicism more generally but critically (223-36), the difference being the
transcendence of the highest god, represented by Apollo (228-9). On the arguments on Stoic providence in De stoic.
rep., cf. Algra (2014: 117-9, 131-5). Dörrie (1977) sees Middle Platonism as generally following Stoicism in regard
to providence, but sees Plutarch as an exception—“Plutarch hat Platon auf das höchste verehrt; indes vertrat er
keinen schulgerechten Platonismus”—particularly due to his emphasis on eschatology (77). Cf. Boys-Stones (2018),
16
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models are more likely the Platonic dialogues. Many Greek intellectuals, moreover, thematize
medicine as the curing of the body and philosophy as the curing of the soul, including Plato and
Plutarch.19 In De sera, however, Plutarch extends Plato’s more distinctive and innovative
identification of punishment as the cure for the ailing soul, which he expands to ancestral
punishment through a postulation that ethical traits are genetically inherited from parents like
physical ones.20 Like the logos, the mythos has the epistemological status of a “likely account,”
which is grounded on Plutarch’s conception of providence such that central arguments can be
distinguished from the imaginative and colorful—even pleasurable, if at times gruesome—

who usefully compares the Aristotelian conception, which extends “only as far as the moon,” with the Platonist
system of agents of providence, comprised of daemones, the world soul, and even virtuous humans (323-9).
19
Pl. Chrm. 157a-c; in De superst., Plutarch’s the superstitious man (δεισιδαίμων) “dares to neither come to aid nor
to dissolve the misfortune nor service nor resist, lest he seem to fight against the gods or to resist being punished:
rather, when he is sick, the doctor is ejected from the house, and when he is sorrowing, the philosopher is shut off
from chastising and exhorting him. ‘Leave me,’ he says, ‘man, to pay the penalty—me, impious, cursed, hated by
gods and daemones” (ὅθεν οὐδὲ τολμᾷ βοηθεῖν οὐδὲ διαλύειν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὐδὲ θεραπεύειν οὐδ' ἀντιτάττεσθαι,
μὴ δόξῃ θεομαχεῖν καὶ ἀντιτείνειν κολαζόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὠθεῖται μὲν ἔξω νοσοῦντος ὁ ἰατρός, ἀποκλείεται δὲ
πενθοῦντος ὁ νουθετῶν καὶ παραμυθούμενος φιλόσοφος. “ἔα με,” φησίν, “ἄνθρωπε, διδόναι δίκην, τὸν ἀσεβῆ, τὸν
ἐπάρατον, τὸν θεοῖς καὶ δαίμοσι μεμισημένον;” 168c). He blames fate when he suffers, saying to himself: “‘you
suffer, wretched man, at the hands of providence and the commands of god’” (“ταῦτα πάσχεις, ὦ κακόδαιμον, ἐκ
προνοίας καὶ θεοῦ κελεύοντος;” 168f). If the philosopher could break through, one infers, Plutarch expects he would
correct the superstitious man’s misapprehension of providence. The metaphor of philosopher as the doctor of the
soul is particularly prevalent in the Stoics, beginning, evidently, with Chrysippus: “It is not the case that there is an
art for the ailing body, called medicine, yet no art for the ailing soul” (οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ νοσοῦν σῶμά ἐστί τις τέχνη
ἣν προσαγορεύομεν ἰατρικήν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν νοσοῦσαν ψυχήν ἐστί τις τέχνη; Galen De plac. Hipp. et Plat
V.2.22 = SVF 3.471). Musonius Rufus uses this motif particularly frequently in the extant remains of his discourses,
such as in the beginning of the first of his extant discourses. On the Stoic metaphor of soul-healing in general, see
further Nussbaum (1994: 316). Cf. Sorabji (1997).
20
See e.g. Socrates in Resp. II.380a-b. Plato’s medical metaphor, as Saunders (1994) elucidates, represents a radical
innovation upon the traditional Greek conception of punishment, which was primarily retributive (162-5). Cf.
Mackenzie (1981: 183-6, 214-6). Mackenzie finds the eschatological punishments, however, to be fundamentally
retributive: “Exculpation has been dropped, and the humanitarian approach has lapsed. Punishment in the
eschatology is certainly not reformative. Nor is it deterrent in the Platonic mould…” (230); on the myth in the Pl.
Phd., cf. Sedley (1991: 381n43). The two metaphors, philosophy or punishment as the healing of the soul, can be
related, however, as Edmonds (2012) argues by emphasizing the painful effect of philosophical elenchus in Pl. Grg.:
“While the exposure of contradictions corresponds to the examination by the judge in the hereafter, the pain and
shame (to elenchos) the interlocutor feels as he loses the argument and his way of life is turned on its head
correspond to the punishments (kolaseis) the judged soul undergoes” (177). Boethius at one point adopts the medical
metaphor and refers to “god, the ruler and healer of minds” (rector ac medicator mentium deus; IV.6.121), but he
nevertheless allows for purely retributive punishment: “All fortune that seems bitter, unless it trains or heals,
punishes” (omnis enimu quae uidetur aspera nisi aut exercet aut corrigit punit; IV.7.54-5). This position seems to
abandon a critical element of Plato’s formulation of curative punishment and Marenbon (2003) accordingly argues
that Philosophy’s argument on providence “does little to explain the existence of wicked people, who may be justly
punished but, because they remain wicked, receive no benefit from punishment” (121).
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details of the narrative.21 Yet the frame of the mythos depicts an additional function besides the
reinforcement of a key dialectical argument: the imagistic and pleasurable narrative serves as a
forceful ethical exhortation, which prompts the protagonist to reform his wayward ways before
he should become so evil as to require the same punishments as, among others, his own father.22
This use of fiction to argue that afterlife punishment must be fundamentally curative, I argue, is
directed against Epicurean criticisms of the myth of Er, upon which the De sera myth is in part
modelled.
This sort of punishment, I argue, is drawn from Plutarch’s interpretation of the two
functions or justifications for afterlife punishment that are described in Plato’s Gorgias.23 In
Socrates’ final speech in that dialogue, after describing the mythic change of regime concerning
infernal punishment, he argues:
It is fitting for everyone condemned to punishment, if they are to be punished rightly, to
either become better and themselves benefit, or to become an example for others, in order
that they, who see what the punished suffer, should become better out of fear lest they
should suffer it themselves.24

Cf. Edmonds (2012) on the myths of punishment in the Grg.: “The myth of the water-carriers, like the myth of
judgement at the end, serves to amplify and clarify the arguments in the dialogue, not to present ideas ungraspable
by reason or to supplement a deficient argument with threats ungraspable by reason or to supplement a deficient
argument with threats of hell-fire hereafter” (182).
22
Cf. Gagné (2013): “The punishments of the afterlife and the punishments of ancestral fault through generations
are complementary. … The two sanctions are simply facets of the same operation. They have different audiences,
and different forms of communication. One can only be told through μῦθος, whose pedagogical role is thus
reclaimed at the end of the text, and the other, the spectacle of ancestral fault, can be understood through probability,
τὸ εἰκός” (44).
23
On punishment in the Grg. myth, see especially Edmonds (2012: 171-82).
24
προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ’ ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ
παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται
(525b). The concept of punishment after death appears sporadically throughout the Platonic corpus, including in Ep.
VII: “For it is in no way worthwhile to consider good and evil applying to soulless things, rather it will come to each
soul, either in a body or separated. And it is entirely necessary to thus always believe the old and sacred accounts,
which indeed reveal to us that our soul is immortal and bears judges and pays the greatest penalties, whenever
someone is freed from body” (κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν λόγου ἄξιόν ἐστιν τοῖς ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ’ ἢ μετὰ σώματος
οὔσῃ ψυχῇ τοῦτο συμβήσεται ἑκάστῃ ἢ κεχωρισμένῃ. πείθεσθαι δὲ ὄντως ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις,
οἳ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι δικαστάς τε ἴσχειν καὶ τίνειν τὰς μεγίστας τιμωρίας, ὅταν τις
ἀπαλλαχθῇ τοῦ σώματος; 334e-5a).
21
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Plato emphasizes the justifications for punishment. The curably wicked are punished for their
own good, and so as to deter others from wickedness for as long as the punishments last, while as
the incurably wicked can only serve as negative examples for any souls who see their torments.
The first section sketches the polemical context of De sera and the myth that concludes it.
The dialogue is explicitly oriented against Epicurus’ attacks on providence and the affinity of the
narrative with Plato’s myth of Er connects it to the broader Epicurean polemic against Platonic
myth. Specifically, Epicurus’ dear student Colotes criticized the myth of Er on three grounds:25
first, that it is absurd to teach truth with fiction, as a poet might try; second, that it is absurd for
Plato to criticize the poets for terrifying depictions of the underworld, while nevertheless
depicting gruesome tortures; and third, it is absurd that either philosophers or non-philosophers
could benefit from this sort of fiction. The Epicurean is particularly disturbed by the depiction of
the tortures of the incurable tyrant Ardiaeus in the myth of Er, which is indeed unusually
gruesome for Plato:
When they finally thought to approach, the mouth did not receive them, but bellowed
whenever someone incurably wicked like them, or escaping punishment early, should
attempt to approach. And then there were men rough and fiery to behold, who stood by
and perceived the noise. They intercepted and lead them off, binding Ardiaeus and other
tyrants all together by the hands, feet, and head, hurling them down and flaying of their
skin, hauling them beside the road and contorting them over spikes as a warning forever
to whoever should approach.”26
Plutarch, I argue, is implicitly aiming to outmaneuver these criticisms in his imitation of the
myth of Er. Colotes occupies a prominent position in Plutarch’s anti-Epicurean polemic, to such

25

Sodano (1966) also summarizes these arguments and attributes them to Porphyry (206-7).
οὓς οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ’ ἐμυκᾶτο ὁπότε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς
πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες… ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες
καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε
καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἷλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ’ ἀσπαλάθων κνάμπτοντες,
καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο (Respublica X.615e6a). Cf. Bernstein (1993): “We must note the unusual harshness of this punishment and how rarely Plato gives any
physical details at all” (59).
26
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an extent that the dialogue Adversus Colotem is dedicated to mocking him for “refuting the
writings and beliefs of Epicurus” in his attempt to refute every philosopher except for his
teacher.27 Although Plutarch never addresses Colotes’ polemic against the myth of Er directly—it
is only preserved by the Neoplatonists Macrobius and Proclus—De sera nevertheless reflects
responses to each of his particular criticisms.
Colotes remained a prominent target for Platonists after Plutarch. The second section
argues that Porphyry, drawing to some extent on Numenius’ comparison between fictive
exteriors and the mysteries, develops a positive defense of Platonic myth through the distinction
between poetic and philosophical myth, which was elaborated by subsequent Neoplatonists until
Olympiodorus in the sixth century.28 Yvonne Vernière argues that Plutarch is essentially a
precursor to Numenius and Porphyry, with the qualification “jamais le Chéronéen ne s’est laissé
aller à de tels excès.”29 In the third section, however, I argue that Plutarch’s response to the

“I do not know if Colotes refuted anything of the others so much as he truly refuted the writings and beliefs of
Epicurus” (οὐκ οἶδα τί τηλικοῦτο κατέψευσται τῶν ἄλλων ὁ Κωλώτης, ἡλίκον ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ
δογμάτων κατηγόρηκεν; 1127e). Plutarch begins the dialogue: “Colotes, my dear Saturninus, whom Epicurus used
to call affectionately his ‘Colly’ and ‘Collikins,’ brought out a book entitled On the Point that Conformity to the
Doctrines of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes it Impossible to Live” (trans. Einarson & De Lacy [1967];
Κωλώτης, ὃν Ἐπίκουρος εἰώθει Κωλωταρᾶν ὑποκορίζεσθαι καὶ Κωλωτάριον, ὦ Σατορνῖνε, βιβλίον ἐξέδωκεν
ἐπιγράψας περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστιν; 1107d-e). The dialogue begins with
an epistolary heading (as he does in De sera and, more elaborately, De E), but, as with many of Cicero’s dialogues
(such as Amic. and Sen.), the frame emerges soon after: “just now, as (Colotes’) treatise was being read, one of the
companions…” (ἔναγχος οὖν ἀναγινωσκομένου τοῦ συγγράμματος εἷς τῶν ἑταίρων; 1107e). Even the fellowatomist Democritus evidently did not escape Colotes’ attack (especially 1108d-e).
28
Porphyry’s role in the formulation of this idea has largely eluded the scholarship, probably because the evidence is
preserved by the often-neglected Latin Neoplatonist Macrobius. Jackson et al. (1998) compare Olympiodorus, In
Gorg. 46.4 with Proclus, Ammonius (Int. 249.11-23), Philoponus (In De An. 69.30-70.2, 116.23-26) and the Anon.
Proleg. (17.18-33) but conclude that “these parallels prove disappointing” (291n878). Further, Jackson (1995):
“Contrast Proclus’ more elaborate distinction of types of poetry into inspired (especially Homeric, non-mimetic,
corresponding to the highest level of soul), didactic or mimetic (appealing to the lowest soul, emotions and
phantasia), itself based, Proclus tells us, on Syrianus’ comments on Phaedrus 245. The nearest point of contact
appears to be that by ‘poetic myth’ Olympiodorus refers only to what Proclus calls inspired poetry, particularly that
of Homer and Hesiod, and particularly concerning the gods” (279n8). The parallel with Olympiodorus, however,
shares common elements with both Macrobius’ treatment (full distinction between poetic and philosophical myth,
comparison of pious coverings in the mysteries) and Proclus’ (Plato rejects scandalous poetic myth, comparison of
pious coverings in the mysteries, and identification of the phantasia as the audience for the fictive in myth). This
suggests that Olympiodorus was drawing, directly or indirectly, on a source that included elements from both
Macrobius and Proclus, which I suggest is Porphyry’s defense of the myth of Er against Colotes.
29
1977: 333.
27
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Epicurean polemic, although more sporadic than that of these Neoplatonists, is rather different,
focusing especially on the idea of myth as a “likely account” that must be interpreted by
distinguishing intrinsic core ideas from extrinsic, or at best pleasurable or bolstering, details.
Rather than distinguishing philosophical myth from poetry, Plutarch treats it precisely as sort of
fiction that must be interpreted in the same manner as poetry, which yields a rather different
conception than Vernière’s inviolable hieros logos from the mysteries.30
The fourth section then argues that Plutarch’s argument throughout the logos of De sera,
that divine punishment is essentially curative, is another part of his response to Colotes’ criticism
of the myth of Er. This conception of afterlife punishment, moreover, is consistent broadly
throughout Plutarch’s corpus, despite the scholarly arguments that the treatment in De
superstitione is so dissimilar that either Plutarch could not have written the treatise, or, if he did,
only when he was substantially younger than when he wrote works such as De sera.31 The fifth
and final section then argues that the myth serves a complementary argumentative role by
depicting the system of afterlife punishment as aiming entirely at the prevention and correction
of wickedness, without the sort of purely deterrent displays like the incurable tyrant Ardiaeus in
the myth of Er. By naming the protagonist of the De sera myth Aridaeus, and depicting the
vision as corrective or redemptive, Plutarch emphasizes the diminution of the incurables in his
sketch of the cosmic penal system, where punishments are curative and thus performed primarily
for the good of the punished.

Against the mysteries as an impetus for doctrine, cf. Nilsson (1948): “Much more important than the mysteries
were the generally accepted religious idea which seemed a matter of course to that age, and of which the mysteries
are only one expression. The mysteries did not create but adopted ideas” (161).
31
See supra pg. 70.
30
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Both the logos and the mythos of De sera therefore contribute to a common defense
against the same Epicurean critiques:32 myths contain fictional details, but these are used in an
plausible and useful way to support central ethical arguments in the narrative; the depictions of
ethically required or justified afterlife punishments are not harmful, but even beneficial to the
audience. Rather than transcending the logos, Aridaeus-Thespesius’ transformative vision
presents the same central idea in a different, more imagistic and even pleasurable manner. These
are, moreover, not dogmatic accounts, because the difficulty of the topic requires laying aside
claims to certainty about the workings of the divine, as Plutarch emphasizes in his initial speech:
“But first, beginning from the caution of the philosophers of the Academy towards the divine as
if from an ancestral hearth, let us acquit ourselves of saying something about these things as if
we surely know it.”33 Both the dialectical arguments and the myth are accordingly only likely
accounts, based on the assumption of the goodness of the divine ordering of the world.34 The
character of Plutarch in De sera nevertheless sees fit to secure and encourage his companions—
who are rattled by the difficult charges of the Epicureans yet still inclined toward defending the
idea of providence—through this combination of both sorts of discourse. The seriousness of the
topic, it seems, merits a variety of approaches, even if they aim towards the same end.

Karamanolis (2014) attends carefully to the dual structure in De sera, and emphasizes the Platonic model: “On the
Delays of the Divine Vengeance, where Plutarch sets out to defend divine providence, yet, following Plato’s claim of
presenting only a likely account (eikôs mythos) in the Timaeus, he claims to be offering only what seems likely to
him about divine actions (549E-F), and also like Plato, Plutarch structures his work into argument (logos) and a
narrative (mythos).” There surely is a looming reference to the idea of Plato’s eikôs mythos here, but it is not
explicit. Plutarch’s presentation of the logos as parallel to the mythos is more immediately reminiscent of the same
structure in Prt. 320c. Wiener (2004) similarly sees Plutarch’s myth as responsive to Colotes’ critique of the myth of
Er, but focuses on other details, such as the criticism that Er’s body, from an atomistic standpoint, would have rotted
(60).
33
πρῶτον οὖν ὥσπερ ἀφ’ ἑστίας ἀρχόμενοι πατρῴας τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐλαβείας τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσόφων τὸ
μὲν ὡς εἰδότες τι περὶ τούτων λέγειν ἀφοσιωσόμεθα (549e-f).
34
Bremmer (2002) more generally emphasizes the “literary nature” and “lack of authenticity” in the frame of De
sera (94), and argues further on the Platonic model: “The incredible, dramatic details of Er’s survival surely should
read as a warning to the reader of the fictional character of the account, not as an attempt to provide an eye witness
report” (90).
32
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Colotes’ Epicurean assault upon the myth of Er
Although there is relatively little discussion of the form of Platonic myth in the ancient
world, at least one Epicurean, Colotes, did attack Plato for it, apparently principally on the
grounds that they are too similar to poetic falsehoods, especially in their depictions of fearsome
eschatological punishments. 35 This polemic against Platonic myth is preserved solely in two
Neoplatonic commentaries: Proclus’ on Plato’s myth of Er in the Respublica and Macrobius’ on
Cicero’s imitative narrative, the Somnium Scipionis, the capstone of his own Respublica.36
Colotes, whom Macrobius calls “conspicuous among the students of Epicurus for his
fulsomeness,” was evidently a prolific critic of non-Epicurean philosophers, but particularly
hostile to Plato.37 He apparently targeted specific dialogues, but what remains of his criticism of
the Respublica is aimed at the myth of Er.38 Macrobius translates one passage into Latin, in

35

Cf. supra pg. 45.
Plato’s myth of Er is vastly influential on subsequent literature and philosophy. Bremmer (2002), for example,
describes Origen’s use of it “in his attempt to explain the resurrection to his pagan readers” (90 with n 16).
37
Colotes uero, inter Epicuri auditores loquacitate notabilior, … (I.2.3). Macrobius’ commentary. begins with a
consideration of why Plato uses the form of a myth (I.2.1-2), because any attacks that apply to Plato’s form of myth
also apply to Cicero’s Somn.: “While these things are hurled against Plato’s Er, because they also impugn the rest of
our dreaming Africanus—each persona, which is held to be fitting to the things needing to be articulated, is chosen
according to an argument—let us oppose the critic, and let the one arguing in vain be refuted, and, as is just, let the
single refuted criticism maintain the established dignity of each intact. Philosophy does not oppose all myths, not
does it concede to all of them. So that it might be easily distinguished from what those things it rejects from itself,
just as if shutting the profane out from the very entrance of the holy argument, and what it often and gladly
permits—the division must be expounded step by step” (haec quoniam, dum de Platonico Ere iactantur, etiam
quietem Africani nostri somniantis accusant—utraque enim sub adposito argumento electa persona est quae
accommoda enuntiandis haberetur—resistamus urgenti et frustra arguens refellatur, ut una calumnia dissoluta
utriusque factum incolumem, ut fas est, retineat dignitatem. nec omnibus fabulis philosophia repugnat, nec omnibus
adquiescit; et ut facile secerni possit quae ex his a se abdicet ac uelut profana ab ipso uestibulo sacrae disputationis
excludat, quae uero etiam saepe ac libenter admittat, divuisionum gradibus explicandum est; I.2.5-6; cf. I.1.3).
38
He seems to have targeted the Euthyd. and Lys. individually, as the papyri fragments printed by Wessely (1965)
suggest (4-8). Warren (2011) argues that Colotes wrote against various parts of the Resp. and not just the myth of Er
(290-3). In De Stoic. rep., Plutarch addresses works by Chrysippus directed against Plato by topic rather than by
dialogue (1040a-1e), particularly “in the works against Plato himself on justice” (ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλατωνα
περὶ Δικαιοσύνης; 1040a), although he also refers more simply to “the works against Plato” (ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρὸς
Πλάτωνα; 1041c).
36
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which the Epicurean argues that it is categorically impossible to use any fictionality in the
pursuit of the truth:
He says that it is not fitting for a myth (fabulam) to be composed by a philosopher,
because no sort of fiction is fitting for teacher of truth. “Why indeed,” he says, “if you
want to teach us the conception of celestial things or the condition of souls, was it not
arranged simply and without pandering; rather, artificial character, affected novelty, and a
stage set for a contrived fiction all stain with lies the door of the truth being sought?”39
Colotes implicitly compares Plato to a tragic poet absurdly playing at physics and psychology,
perhaps building on Epicurus’ argument that it is impossible for anyone who “suspects
something in the myths” might be true to learn physics and thus expel fear from life.40
Proclus’ commentary on the myth of Er, which makes up the extensive sixteenth essay of
his In Rempublicam, provides further testimony by distinguishing Colotes’ argument into three
specific points of contention.41 First, similarly to Macrobius’ translation, Colotes alleges that

39

ait a philosopho fabulam non oportuisse confingi, quoniam nullum figmenti genus ueri professoribus conueniret.
“cur enim,” inquit, “si rerum caelestium notionem, si habitum nos animarum docere uoluisti, non simplici et
absoluta hoc insinuatione curatum est, sed quaesita persona casusque excogitata nouitas, et composita aduocati
scaena figmenti, ipsam quaerendi ueri ianuam mendacio polluerunt?” (I.2.4). On the title of Colotes’ work,
Wessely (1965) speculates that it may have been “Περὶ τῶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι μυθικῶς πεπλασμένων oder Πρὸς τοὺς
Πλάτωνος μύθους” (12). Macrobius’ testimony, however, is not as well known as Proclus’: Von Arnim (1921) does
not mention Macrobius as a source for “Angriffe des K. gegen Platons Republik… auf den eschatologischen Mythos
des Armeniers Er im 10. Buche” (1120). Festugière (1970), on the other hand, does compare Proclus with
Macrobius (3.48n1). Wiener (2004) is more extensive (53-8). These fragments are only sporadically mentioned in
the scholarship on Colotes, such as Waerdt (1989): “Colotes’ other objections led to extensive replies by Porphyry
and Proclus as well as Macrobius, and this debate over the proper philosophical uses of myth would well repay
study” (233).
40
“It is not possible to dissolve fear about the most important things if someone does not know the nature of
everything, but suspects something of what is in the myths” (οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ
κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ’ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους; RS XII). See also Ep. Hdt.
§81, Ep. Pyth. §104, §116, and especially §87; cf. Ep. Men. §134. Corti (2014) cites PHerc. 1431 as a comparandum
(92n152).
41
“Colotes the Epicurean alleges against Plato that he… and that… and third, that…” (ὁ μὲν Ἐπικούρειος Κωλώτης
ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτων, ὅτι… καὶ ὅτι… καὶ τὸ τρίτον, ὅτι…; II.105.23-6.9 = Porph. frg. 182 Smith). This is the only of
the seventeen essays that takes the form of a lemmatic commentary with an introduction, which begins with
characteristically Neoplatonic considerations of “purposed end” or skopos of the myth (ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου πρόθεσις;
II.97.1): “Therefore the entire skopos starts out from the speeches about justice and here is about the entire cosmic
constitution, that order of the heavenly things and the things beneath the sky which Plato revealed in the form of a
myth” (ὥστ’ εἶναι τὸν πάντα σκοπὸν ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὁρμηθέντα λόγων κἀνταῦθα περὶ πάσης τῆς
κοσμικῆς πολιτείας, ἣν ἐν μύθου σχήματι Πλάτων ἐκφαίνει τῶν τε οὐρανίων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν τάξιν;
II.98.14-7). On the concept of the Neoplatonic skopos, Baltzly (2017), comparing the moderate level of interest in
the Anon. In Tht. (178), partly explains the predominant importance by the assumptions that “‘x is a good thing to
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Plato “removes himself from scientific truth and wastes his time on falsehood when he tells
myths like a poet.”42 The second, related criticism is built on the characteristically Epicurean
emphasis on the misery of fearing afterlife punishment. Lucretius, for example, describes the fear
of Acheron as “fundamentally disturbing human life from the innermost, filling everything with
the black of death and leaving no pleasure clear and pure.”43 Proclus relates that Colotes
criticized Plato for “fighting against himself” by ridiculing the poets for “crafting frightful things
about what is in the house of Hades and implanting the fear of death in their hearers,” while still
“changing his philosophical muse to tragic myth-telling—for the bellowing mouth there and the
fiery executioners of the tyrant and Tartarus and so many things of this sort which, he said,
surpass the excess of the tragic poets.”44 The references are to the punishments in the myth of Er,

the extent that it is unified,’” that Plato’s dialogues are the best, and that therefore the most unified (184); he
connects it to the order of education (187-8) and the idea of the “textual community” (189-94). Cf. Proclus’
summary of the myth in the fifteenth essay (II.92.20-5.25). The commentary on the myth of Er is dedicated to
Proclus’ friend and eventual biographer (ὦ φίλε Μαρῖνε; II.96.1), and the introductory portion didactically employs
second-person appeals: εἴπερ ὄντως ἐθέλοις ἰδεῖν… ἴδε (II.100.3-5); ὄψει… εὑρήσεις… τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς μυθολογίας
ταύτης καταδήσει τὸν τελεώτατον (II.100.29-1.4). On the signifiance of this commentary in Proclus’ corpus,
Lamberton (2012) takes the length of the myth of Er commentary to indicate that “the Myth of Er was the portion of
the Republic that was taught in Athens, and it probably constituted part of the Neoplatonic curriculum” (xv). On the
composition, Sheppard (2013) argues, “The concluding lines describe this essay as a ὑπόμνημα. As in his
commentaries on other Platonic dialogues, Proclus draws extensively on earlier discussions and uses individual
lemmata as starting points for lengthy disquisitions. … Some of the material reappears in PT VI 23 where Proclus
uses Rep. 617b-e as a source for his account of the Fates as gods separated from the world, between the hypercosmic
and encosmic gods” (114).
42
… ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφεὶς τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν περὶ τὸ ψεῦδος διατρίβει μυθολογῶν ὡς ποιητής, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἀποδεικνὺς ὡς ἐπιστήμων (II.105.23-5). Kechagia (2011) further compares the Epicurean “poetics and the rejection
of poetry as a vehicle for conveying philosophical truth” (69, with n79). Corti (2014) argues that Colotes’ objection
is rooted in Epicurus’ ideal of ἐνάργεια—“fu senza dubbio la caratteristica precipua della filosofia di Colote” (92).
43
… et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, / funditus humanam qui uitam turbat ab imo omnia suffundens
mortis nigrore neque ullam / esse uoluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit (III.37-40). The misery of fearing
underworld punishments is a recurrent theme of this book, and emblematically, when Lucretius sees “the terrors of
the mind flee, the walls of the world depart” (diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi / discedunt; III.16-7) to reveal
the truth, he emphasizes the absence of Acherusia templa (III.25). Torquatus in Cic. Fin. similarly begins an
argument, “just as every condition of quite life is thrown into chaos by the fear of death…” (ut enim mortis metu
omnis quietae uitae status perturbatur; I.15.49).
44
καὶ ὅτι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μαχομένως ἐν μέν γε προοιμίοις τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας ἐλοιδόρησε τοὺς ποιητὰς ὡς περὶ τῶν
ἐν Ἅιδου φρικτὰ πλάσαντας καὶ θανάτου φόβον ἐντεκόντας τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς μεθήρμοσεν τὴν
φιλόσοφον μοῦσαν εἰς τραγικὴν τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγμάτων μυθολογίαν· τὸ γὰρ στόμιον τὸ μυκώμενον ἐκεῖ καὶ οἱ
διάπυροι ἄγριοι τοῦ τυράννου δήμιοι καὶ ὁ Τάρταρος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα τίνα, φησίν, τραγῳδιοποιοῖς ἀπολέλοιπεν
ὑπερβολήν; (II.105.26-6.8).
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an image evidently much more liable to interrupt ataraxia, for instance, than the traditional
punishments of Tantalus, Tityus, and Sisyphus in Homer as well. This aspect of Platonic myth
was evidently particularly attractive for Epicurean critique.45 Finally, Colotes argues that the
myths are useless because there is no audience for whom they are appropriate or beneficial: the
many are incapable of being improved or benefited by them, and the wise are beyond them; the
myths, moreover, are unable to signal “for whom they are written,” rendering “zeal about one’s
myth telling empty.”46
Proclus records a few more specific criticisms of the myth of Er from Colotes, such as
that Er’s body, if the soul were absent, would have rotted by the twelfth day47—after all,
Lucretius argues that the body begins to decay and reek of death in the same instant that the soul
begins to seep out.48 The crux of the Epicurean polemic against Plato’s form of philosophical
myth, however, seems to be the comparison with poetry, the detriment of filling the audience
with fears of infernal punishments, and the lack of an audience that would benefit from the form
of argumentation. Macrobius and Proclus thus testify to a similar attack upon the form of the

45

Other Epicureans, and perhaps the master himself, attack the belief in the traditional punishments of the Homeric
underworld, for example through Lucretius’ series of rationalizations (III.978-1023). On these, and Plutarch’s
response in the conclusion of De lat. viv., see Hilton (2019).
46
καὶ τὸ τρίτον, ὅτι τοὺς τοιούσδε μύθους πολὺ τὸ μάταιον ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ συνεῖναι
δυναμένοις αὐτῶν εἰσιν ἀσύμμετροι, τοῖς δὲ σοφοῖς οὐ δεομένοις ἀμείνοσιν ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε γίνεσθαι δειμάτων
περιττοί· πρὸς τίνας οὖν γράφονται, παρ’ αὑτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχοντες μάταιον ἀποφαίνουσιν τὴν περὶ τὰς μυθολογίας
ἑαυτῶν σπουδήν (II.106.9-14). Cf. Plato’s discussion of the lower part of the soul as the audience of mimetic poetry
(Rep. X.603d-5d).
47
“But Colotes asks how the body of Er was not destroyed by rotting in so many days, when the soul is absent…”
(ζητοῦντος δὲ τοῦ Κωλώτου, πῶς οὐ διεφθάρη τὸ σῶμα σαπὲν ἐν τοσαύταις ἡμέραις τοῦ Ἠρός, καὶ ταῦτα ψυχῆς μὴ
παρούσης, …; II.116.19-21). Proclus, however, appeals to Democritus’ Περὶ τοῦ Ἅιδου γράμμασιν for many
examples of this sort of thing occuring (II.113.6-9).
48
This is the beginning of his twelfth proof for the mortality of the soul: “And then, given that the body is unable to
endure the separation of the soul unless it decays with a foul odor, how do you doubt that the force of the soul has
rises out from the deepest depths, flows out, and scatters like vapor” (denique cum corpus nequeat perferre animai /
discidium quin in taetro tabescat odore, / quid dubitas quin ex imo penitque coorta / emanarit uti fumus diffusa
animae uis…; III.580-3). Cf. Warren (2002) on Democritus and Epicurus on this issue, a point of disagreement
which he eventually connects to the frame of the myth of Er (204-6).

204
myth of Er.49 Porphyry may have been a mediating source for both of the later Neoplatonists,
especially since Proclus cites him rather prominently and proximately to his discussion of
Colotes’ polemic;50 many scholars have, moreover, argued that he is a prominent source for
Macrobius generally, although there is some contention over the degree to which such a
connection can be assumed.51 In this case, however, the parallel details between Macrobius’ and
Proclus’ accounts renders it very likely that Porphyry was the mediating source for Colotes’
polemic against the myth of Er.52 Even in an early stage of the Neoplatonic treatment of Plato’s
myths, the Epicurean polemicist looms as a serious opponent, and, as the next section examines,
Wessely (1965), however, assumes that Porphyry and Proclus are both drawing on an unknown “Platonerklärer”
(12), while Macrobius used “ähnlichen Kommentar,” evidently because Proclus includes the third objection that
Macrobius does not. Yet, Proclus’ first two objections, however, are entirely coherent with Macrobius’ translation of
Colotes. It should not be surprising that Proclus emphasizes the more metaphysically complex solution required by
Colotes’ third objection, while Macrobius focuses more on translating Greek literary theory into Latin.
50
Proclus lists predecessors close to the start of his commentary: “… there are many of the preeminent Platonists
touched upon understanding about it—Numenius, Albinus, Gaius, Maximus Nicaeus, Harpocration, and Eucleides,
but above all, Porphyry, whom I say was the perfect interpreter of all that is hidden in the myth” (… πολλοὶ τῆς περὶ
αὐτὸν ἐφήψαντο κατανοήσεως καὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν οἱ κορυφαῖοι, Νουμήνιος, Ἀλβῖνος, Γάιος, Μάξιμος ὁ Νικαεύς,
Ἁρποκρατίων, Εὐκλείδης, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Πορφύριος, ὃν ἐγὼ πάντων μάλιστα τῶν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ κεκρυμμένων
γενέσθαι φημὶ τέλεον ἐξηγητήν; II.96.10-5). Festugière (1970) discusses the identity of the authors and works
mentioned (3.39n3).
51
Macrobius explicitly cites Porphryry only occasionally, but once in his initial discussion of the myth of Er (I.3.178; cf. I.17.70), and later with qualified praise: “Porphyry includes this opinion of the Platonists in the books in which
he pours some light at least on the obscurities of the Timaeus” (hanc Platonicorum persuasionem Porphyrius libris
inseruit quibus Timaei obscuritatibus non nihil lucis infudit, …; II.3.15). There is, however, a contentious argument
in the scholarship about the role of Porphyry in Macrobius, since he is the latest cited author. Whittaker (1923) for
instance draws attention to the lack of attention to “Iamblichus or his disciples, whose influence so far may have
travelled exclusively eastward” (57). The segments that cite Plotinus are particularly contentious: Henry (1934)
strenuously contends that Macrobius, even when he used Porphyry’s language, “il suffit d’admettre qu’il a en main
les deux textes, et qu’il se sert de l’un pour mieux comprendre l’autre” (191); Courcelle (1943), on the other hand,
argues that Macrobius typically “révèle que le véritable maître de la pensée de Macrobe est non pas Plotin, mais
Porphyre” (22). Stahl (1952) surveys the earlier scholarship further (24-38), and himself points out that “no one has
called attention to the similarity between Proclus’ chapter on the purpose of myths in his Commentary” (38); he also
postulates an additional unknown Latin commentary on Cicero (38-39). See further Flamant (1977: 170) and
Armisen-Marchetti (2001: LVIII-LIX). The present inquiry, however, is clearer than these contentious cases, e.g.
52
See Gersh (1986): “This is Porphyry who, although he cannot be identified as a source in as many passages as
some modern scholars have maintained, is clearly the unspoken authority on certain occasions. Thus, the refutation
of Epicurean objections to Plato’s employment of myth can be attributed to this writer on the basis of a parallel
discussion in Proclus’ Commentarius in Rempublicam where he is explicitly cited” (520, with n143). Wilberding
(2011) argues that Macrobius’ and Proclus’ shared source is Porphyry’s fragmentary “On What Is in Our Power,”
which he holds is equivalent to the fragments others attribute to a commentary on the Resp. (123-4). Cürsgen (2002)
also identifies Porphyry as Macrobius’ source, but identifies the work as a “Timaios-Kommentar” (123n149). Neri
(2007), however, detects many sources for Macrobius, such that “emergono elementi enciclopedici notevolmente
ampi” (24). He cites Plutarch, De Is. 382d, for instance, as one source (26), although he argues that “le principali
fonti di Macrobio sono neoplatonische” (30).
49
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he prompted robust defenses of the myth of Er. As I argue in the rest of the chapter, Colotes’
polemic prompts Plutarch to defend the ethical function of Platonic myth in education—a model
he finds in the Respublica—in a rather different way than the late Neoplatonists.

The Numenian and the Neoplatonic responses
Just as Macrobius and Proclus present the only record of Colotes’ polemic against the
myth of Er, so too do they expound the only direct Neoplatonic responses. There is, however,
another Latin commentary on the Somnium, attributed to Favonius Eulogius, an orator who
apparently studied under Augustine.53 He argues that Cicero composed a clever and reasonable
dream that is unlike Plato’s myth of Er, such that only the latter is “mythic” and so liable to
Epicurean mockery.54 Macrobius, however, takes any strike against the myth of Er as a potential
blow against the Somnium by extension and sets the defense against Colotes’ criticism as a
preliminary task before discussing Cicero’s narrative. 55 Proclus similarly treats the refutation of

“But in nearly the same time, in which we heard this, it happened that we met the Carthaginian orator Eulogius in
Milan, who was my student in this art, when he was handing down the rhetorical books of Cicero to his own
students, as he told me after return to Africa, reviewed the reading which he was going to treat on the next day and
found a certain obscure passage, and was so bothered by not understanding it that he was barely able to sleep” (sed
eodem ipse ferme tempore, quo id audiuimus, id est nobis apud Mediolanum constitutis Carthaginis rhetor Eulogius,
qui meus in eadem arte discipulus fuit, sicut mihi ipse, posteaquam in Africam remeauimus, retulit, cum rhetoricos
Ciceronis libros discipulis suis traderet, recensens lectionem, quam postridie fuerat traditurus, quendam locum
offendit obscurum, quo non intellecto uix potuit dormire sollicitus; cura mort. 11.13). Perhaps the context, seeing
authorities, and earlier fathers, in sleep, indicates Favonius’ particular interest in the Somnium further. Cf. Rose
(2013: 339-40).
54
“Cicero writes about the republic in imitation of Plato, a treatment of the return into life of Er the Pamphilian,
who, as he says, was placed on the pyre and came back to life and described many secrets about the underworld;
Cicero devised in comparison not mythic things, as Plato did, but composed by a certain imagination something of a
clever and reasonable dream, clearly indicating these things intelligently, what is said about the immortality of the
soul and heaven, fictions of dreaming philosophers, not inconceivable myths, which the Epicureans mock, but
inferences of the wise” (imitatione Platonis Cicero de re p(ublica) scribens locum etiam de [r]Eris Pamphili reditu
in uitam, qui, ut ait, rogo impositus reuixisset multaque de inferis secreta narrasset, non fabulosa, ut ille,
assimulatione conmentus est, sed sollertis somnii rationabili quadam imaginatione conposuit, uidelicet scite
significans haec, quae de animae inmortalitate dicerentur caeloque, somniantium philosophorum esse conmenta,
nec fabulas incredibiles, quas Epicurei derident, sed prudentium coniecturas; 1.5-24).
55
“And so, before we turn to the words of the Somnium, we must make clear what sort of men Cicero says either
mocked the myth of Plato, or that he has no cause to fear at least” (ac priusquam somnii uerba consulimus,
53
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Colotes as the initial skirmish before embarking on his commentary on the Platonic myth. They
seem to share a common foundation in the comparison between fictionality in myth and
symbolism in the mysteries formulated by Porphyry, apparently drawn from Numenius to some
unclear degree.56 They emphasize different defenses in addition to this basic core—Macrobius
appeals to the distinction between philosophical and poetic myth, while Proclus argues that the
nature of embodied souls makes them suited to the form of myth—but together they reflect a
coherent response to Colotes’ assault upon the myth of Er.
Against the contention that fiction is categorically unsuitable for conveying truth, Proclus
appeals to Porphyry and the Heraclitean adage “nature loves to hide herself.” Some level of
fiction is therefore appropriate to discussing nature.57 Proclus later discusses the mysteries
further, but Macrobius, in even greater detail, appeals again to Numenius—further indication that
he played some role in Porphyry’s formulation—and argues that nature wants to hide itself in
pious coverings of images and figures.58 The Latin Neoplatonist even relates an anecdote about
Numenius’ personal transgression and recantation, spurred by a warning of divine displeasure:

enodandum nobis est a quo genere hominum Tullius memoret uel irrisam Platonism fabulam uel ne sibi idem
eueniat non uereri; I.2.1).
56
For Numenius’ influence on Porphyry generally, see Zambon (2002: 186-250). See also Lamberton (1992: 123-8).
57
Against these arguments, not only are we able to meet them by saying as many things as the most philosophical
Porphyry laid out: … And (he argues that) this is fictitious by nature in some way, for which reason nature loves to
hide herself according to Heraclitus” (ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοιούσδε λόγους οὐχ ὅσα μόνον ὁ φιλοσοφώτατος
κατέτεινεν Πορφύριος ἔχοιμεν ἂν ἀπαντῶντες λέγειν· … καὶ ὅτι τὸ πλασματῶδες τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν πώς ἐστιν, διότι
καὶ ἡ φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον [frg. B123 Diels]; In Remp. II.106.14-6, 107.5-7). Proclus
distinguishes his own arguments from his summary of Porphyry’s (106.14-7.14) with the tag, “It must be added to
these…” (προσθετέον δὲ τούτοις…; 107.14), as Festugière (1970) noted (III.49n3). On the meaning of Heraclitus’
phrase, and particularly φιλεῖ with the infinitive, see Tor (2018). Hadot (2006) examines this Heraclitean concept in
Numenius and the Neoplatonists more broadly (58-75).
58
“Thus the very mysteries are covered by the secret devices of images, lest the nature of things of this sort should
reveal itself to even those who obtain these them, but only the most eminent of men with wisdom as their guide are
cognizant of the secret truth, the rest must be content with the worship removed from baseness with the protection of
images” (sic ipsa mysteria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur ne uel haec adeptis nudam rerum talium natura se
praebeat, sed summatibus tantum uiris sapientia interprete ueri arcani consciis, contenti sint reliqui ad
uenerationem figuris defendentibus a uilitate secretum; I.2.18). Cf. Proclus In Remp. II.108.17-30. Olympiodorus
similarly appeals to mystery religion: “For as in rituals both hieratic operations and mysteries bear screens, lest the
unworthy see what happens, thus also myths are coverings of internal ideas, lest they should be naked and accessible
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Indeed, dreams revealed to Numenius, marked for curiousity about secrets among the
philosophers, his offense against the gods, because he divulged the Eleusinian mysteries
with his exposition: appearing to him in harlot’s garb, the Eleusinian goddesses seemed
to be selling themselves before a conspicuous brothel, and angrily responded to
Numenius, who was marveling and asking about the cause of their shame unfitting for
divinities, that it was he who dragged them from their sanctuary of modesty by force, as
prostitutes for whoever should approach.59
Myths are more appropriate for describing the divine, according to this argument, because it is
pious to discuss the divine in a certain traditional and allegorical manner. These testimonies are
insufficient to show how Numenius himself used this argument and whether he was also directly
addressing Epicurean polemic, but Macrobius’ and Proclus’ arguments—both probably building
on Porphyry—seem to take this as a first step and build further, defensive arguments.
In response to the argument that myths neither satisfy philosophers or non-philosophers,
Proclus distinguishes two audiences within every embodied human and argues that the two parts
of a certain sort of myth, the fictive exterior and the deeply true interior, indeed each find an
audience in every embodied soul:
But for souls assuming the phantastic intellect and existence, without which they would
not be able to remain in this place of generation… for them, there is a fitting means of
education through myths of a certain sort: they contain the, mostly hidden, intellective
light of truth, but they project a fictive covering outward, which hides it through likeness
as the imagination within us covers the partial intellect with shadow.60

for whoever wants them” (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἱεροῖς τά τε ἱερατικὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰ μυστήρια παραπετάσματα ἔχει, ἵνα μὴ
οἱ ἀνάξιοι ὡς ἔτυχεν θεῶνται, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα προκαλύμματά εἰσιν οἱ μῦθοι τῶν δογμάτων, ἵνα μὴ γυμνὰ ὦσι καὶ
βατὰ τοῖς βουλομένοις; In Gorg. 46.6).
59
Numenio denique inter philosophos occultorum curiosiori offensam numinum, quod Eleusinia sacra interpretando
uulgauerit, somnia prodiderunt, uiso sibi ipsas Eleusinias deas habitu meretrico ante apertum lupanar uidere
prostantes, admirantique et causas non conuenientis numinibus turpitudinis consulenti respondisse iratas ab ipso se
de adyto pudicitiae suae ui abstractas et passim adeuntibus prostituas (I.2.19).
60
ταῖς ψυχαῖς νοεραῖς μὲν οὔσαις κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὕπαρξιν καὶ λόγων πλήρεσιν ἀσωμάτων καὶ νοερῶν,
ἐνδυσαμέναις [δὲ] τὸν φανταστικὸν νοῦν καὶ ζῆν… ταύταις δ’ οὖν, ὡς εἴπομεν, γενομέναις ἀπαθέσι παθητικαῖς,
ἀμορφώτοις μορφωτικαῖς, πρέπων ἐστὶν τρόπος διδασκαλίας εἰκότως ὁ διὰ τῶν τοιῶνδε μύθων· οἷς πολὺ μέν ἐστιν
ἔνδον τὸ νοερὸν τῆς ἀληθείας φέγγος, προβέβληται δὲ τὸ πλασματῶδες, ἀποκρύπτον ἐκεῖνο κατὰ μίμησιν τῆς ἐν
ἡμῖν φαντασίας ἐπιλυγαζούσης τὸν μερικὸν νοῦν (II.107.14-26).
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The acquisition of phantasia in the process of generation explains, for Proclus, the necessity of
the fictive exterior of myths.61 He soon, however, introduces the problem of myths with fictive
surfaces that are harmful rather than benign, and claims that Plato distances himself from these:
“Plato strips away the representations of poetic myth, because the uninitiated souls are full of
vulgar notions.”62 This sort of myth with the potential to harm is thus distinguished from
“Platonic myth” at the end of the lemma, which indicates that Proclus’ idea of myth appropriate
for both parts of the soul is a conception of philosophical myth.63
Macrobius more extensively explicates a categorization of myth through a series of
divisions, culminating with poetic and philosophical myth. He begins by distinguishing myths
that “are learned for the sake of acquiring pleasure for the ears,” and those that possess “an
exhortation toward virtue also.”64 The former sort, the solely pleasurable, which Macrobius
associates with New Comedy and novels, is strictly forbidden from philosophy, as some
profanity that might pollute the pure.65 The didactic sort, on the other hand, is subdivided again,

61

Olympiodorus similarly argues that all myths are fitting for tripartite humans, possessing mind, opinion, and
phantasia (καὶ νοῦν καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν; In Gorg. 46.6). Sheppard (1997) argues that the faculty of phantasia
was at least sometimes considered an organ of inspiration for many Neoplatonists, such as Iamblichus (206-7), while
as for Proclus it exclusively refers the lowest faculty of its sort (209-10). Gertz (2011) examines two other
approaches to myth in Proclus (183), and two in Damascius (183-4).
62
διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἀπεσκευάζετο τὰς τῶν ποιητικῶν μύθων διαθέσεις, ἀναπιμπλάσας τὰς ἀτελέστους ψυχὰς
ὑπονοιῶν φορτικῶν (II.108.14-6).
63
Proclus concludes his discussion of poetic myth with the disclaimer that he has discussed it further in a lost work
“on mythic symbols” (περὶ τῶν μυθικῶν συμβόλων), and that the account must therefore progress onto Platonic
myth (ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἤδη τὸν Πλατωνικὸν μῦθων χωρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον; II.108.30-109.2).
64
fabulae… aut tantum conciliandae auribus uoluptatis, aut adhortationis quoque in bonam frugem gratia repertae
sunt (I.2.7).
65
“The method of wisdom carries this entire sort of myths, which professes only the delights of ears, out from its
own precinct and into the cradles of nurses” (hoc totum fabularum genus, quod solas aurium delicias profitetur, e
sacrario suo in nutricum cunas sapientiae tractatus eliminat; I.2.8). Earlier in this section, Macrobius specifies as
examples of this sort of myth “Menander and imitators of him” (Menander eiusue imitatores) alongside Petronius
and Apuleius—which apparently comes to his surprise, given the description “we marvel sometimes that Apuleius
plays” (Apuleium non numquam lusisse miramur). Stahl (1990) takes this to indicate that “Macrobius must have
admired Apuleius’ serious side but could hardly be expected to have any appreciation of the Golden Ass” (84n5).
Apuleius is invoked with respect in Macrobius’ Saturnalia, in a discussion of the Greek concept of a σκῶμμα
(VII.3.1-2), Eustathius emphasizes the importance of the topic to Avenius by appealing to the serious treatments of
Aristotle, Plutarch, and “your” (uester) Apuleius (I.3.24).
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between myths that are entirely fictional, such as Aesop’s fables, and those founded in truth but
clothed in fiction—mythic plots (narratio fabulosa), but not themselves myths (fabula).66 The
latter category is broad, including theological poets such as Hesiod and Orpheus, but also
Pythagorean mysticism. This division is, in turn, subdivided again into a third level of
distinctions. There are myths whose “plot” (narratio) is scandalous and morally absurd, poetry
including such outrageous examples as divine adulteries and familial violence, “of which
philosophers prefer to remain ignorant.”67 Then, there is the “examination of sacred things under
the pious cover of fictions, revealed covered in honorable deeds and clothed in names—this is
the only sort of fiction that the undertaking of philosophizing about divine affairs allows”68—the
notorious succession myth looms yet again. Plato and Cicero, Macrobius argues, strictly use this
final sort of myth, which is founded in truth and narrated through a pious screen.
In the age of Justinian, Olympiodorus even strives to draw out the educative implications
of this distinction in his commentary on the Gorgias: poetic myth has a horrifying surface that

“But from these, which were urged for the understanding of the reader toward each sort of virtues, a second
distinction results. For in one of them, the plot is founded in fiction and the very order of the narration is composed
through lies, as the myths of Aesop are, distinguished by the beauty of the fiction, but in the other, the plot at least is
established on true solidity, but this very truth is advanced through certain contrived and fictive things, and this is
indeed called mythic narrative, not myths, as the sacred things of the rituals, as what Hesiod and Orpheus say about
the geneology and acts of the gods, as the mystic thoughts of the Pythagoreans are related” (ex his autem quae ad
quandam uirtutum speciem intellectum legentis hortantur fit secunda discretio. in quibusdam enim et argumentum
ex ficto locatur et per mendacia ipse relationis ordo contexitur, ut sunt illae Aesopi fabulae elegantia fictionis
illustres, at in aliis argumentum quidem fundatur ueri soliditate sed haec ipsa ueritas per quaedam composita et
ficta profertur, et hoc iam uocatur narratio fabulosa, non fabula, ut sunt cerimoniarum sacra, ut Hesiodi et Orphei
quae de deorum progenie actuue narrantur, ut mystica Pythagoreorum sensa referuntur; I.2.9).
67
“The resulting division is separated again into another distinction: for when truth underlies the plot and only the
narrative is mythic, not just one means of relating truth through fiction is discovered. For either the composition of
the story is compiled through shameful things, unworthy of the divine and similar to the unnatural, such as
adulterous gods, Saturn cutting off the genitals of his father Sky and being forced into chains in turn by his son who
received the kingdom, that whole sort of which the philosophers prefer to remain ignorant” (sequens in aliam
rursum discretionem scissa diuiditur: nam cum ueritas argumento subest solaque fit narratio fabulosa, non unus
reperitur modus per figmentum uera referendi. aut enim contextio narrationis per turpia et indigna numinibus ac
monstro similia componitur ut di adulteri, Saturnus pudenda Caeli patris abscidens et ipse rursus a filio regni potito
in uincla coniectus, quod genus totum philosophi nescire; I.2.10-1).
68
aut sacrarum rerum notio sub pio figmentorum uelamine honestis et tecta rebus et uestita nominibus enuntiatur:
et hoc est solum figmenti genus quod cautio de diuinis rebus philosophantis admittit (I.2.11).
66
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“makes us seek a concealed truth,” but can “deceive the ears of the young;”69 philosophical myth,
on the other hand, “bear the detriment that, since their manifest surface does not harm, it often
lets us stay on the surface of them and not seek the truth.”70 Olympiodorus’ innovation, however,
is in elucidating the ethical and pedagogical utility of the earlier Neoplatonic distinction between
philosophical and poetic myth, presumably as a part of his defense of the value of pagan
philosophy and culture in an increasingly Christian world.71 It seems, however, that this idea was
already formulated by Porphyry, who is the common source of Macrobius and Proclus.
Macrobius attests to an additional ontological restriction on this sort of didactically
useful, philosophical myth: only certain encosmic objects are appropriate to it, such as souls and
some divinities and presumably the daemones between them.72 Plato only treats the higher
ontological objects, Macrobius argues, with non-mythic discourses:
But yet, when the treatment dares to elevate itself toward the highest and the principal of
all the gods—which is called to agathon, that which is the proton aition, among the
Greeks—or toward mind—which the Greeks call nous, which comprehends the original
forms of things, the so-called ideas, and which is born and perfected by the highest god
οἷον ὁ ποιητικὸς ἔχει πλεονέκτημα ὅτι τοιαῦτα λέγει ὡς καὶ τὸν τυχόντα μὴ πείθεσθαι ἀλλ’ ἔρχεσθαι ἐπὶ
κεκρυμμένην ἀλήθειαν. … ὥστε πλεονεκτεῖ μὲν ὁ ποιητικὸς μῦθος κατὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι τοιαῦτα λέγει ἃ μὴ παραδέχεται
μηδὲ τυχοῦσα ἀκοή, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὸ κεκρυμμένον ἔρχεται· ἔχει δὲ ἐλάττωμα ὅτι ἀπατᾷ νέαν ἀκοήν (In Gorg. 46.4).
70
ἔχουσι δὲ ἐλάττωμα ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῶν οὐ βλάπτει, πολλάκις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπομένομεν καὶ οὐ
ζητοῦμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν (46.6).
71
Tarrant in Jackson et al. (1998) argues that “Olympiodorus comments on a text with ethical rather than
metaphysical relevant before an audience which is itself new to Plato” (3-4), which seems to be part of his
smoothing “to a fundamentally Christian Platonism at Alexandria” (10). In light of historical context of the rule of
Justinian, Wildberg (2006) characterizes Olympiodorus as “not a pagan of a combative sort” like Simplicius, but
rather a purveyor of a “toothless Platonism” (321). Gagné (2013) defines the contexts of Proclus and Plutarch as
much more polemical: “both Plutarch and Proclus chose to make the principle of ancestral fault a central concern of
their historical, moral, and religious world-views. They defined it as an element of Hellenic identity based on
opposition: one gave it shape of a cultural principle in the context of Roman rule; the other cast it as the religious
dogma of a unified pagan faith in the context of a triumphant Christianity” (49). On the spirit of Neoplatonic
resistence to Christianity generally, cf. Hadot (2006): “The Neoplatonists wanted to protect traditional religion
against the invasion of the Christian religion, for they sincerely believed that the cult of the gods was linked to the
action of the World Soul, which preserved the universe. Nietzsche said that Christianity was a Platonism for the
people. For the Neoplatonists, pagan myths and rituals were also a Platonism for the people, or, even more precisely,
a hidden physics” (75).
72
“Yet it must be known that philosophers do not include mythic things, even permissible ones, into every
argument. Rather, they are accustomed to use these things when they discuss the soul or the powers of the air or the
aether or the other gods” (sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa uel
licita; sed his uti solent cum uel de anima uel de aeriis aetheriisue potestatibus uel de ceteris dis loquuntur; I.2.13).
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and mind; when I speak about that these things that are said about the highest god and
mind, nothing intimately mythic reaches them. But if someone should attempt to signify
anything about these things, which surpass not only human speech but even
understanding, they flee to similarities and examples.73
These highest ontological objects, Macrobius argues, would be inappropriate to describe in
myths. He further argues that Plato, when he does attempt to approximate the form of the good in
the Respublica, uses the image of the sun, rather than some sort of mythic narrative.74 But myths
are fitting for these encosmic gods, on the other hand, because they desire to be hidden in pious
images, lest they be vulgarized.75
This is where Numenius’ comparison with the mythic drama of mystery religion enters
Macrobius’ exposition. Numenius’ interpretation of the Odyssey, which Porphyry preserves in
De antro nympharum, indeed abides by this stipulation: the focus of the interpretation is of the
embodiment and disembodiment of the soul, represented by Odysseus suffering on his watery

ceterum cum ad summum et principem omnium deum, qui apud Graecos τἀγαθόν, qui πρῶτον αἴτιον nuncupatur,
tractatus se audet attollere, uel ad mentem, quem Graeci νοῦν appellant, originales rerum species, quae ἰδέαι dictae
sunt, continentem, ex summo natam et profectam deo: cum de his inquam loquuntur summo deo et mente, nihil
fabulosum penitus attingunt, sed siquid de his adsignare conantur quae non sermonem tantum modo sed
cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines et exempla confugiunt (I.2.14).
74
“Thus when Plato was roused tot speak about the good, to say what he dared not, because he knows only this
about it, that it is not possible for the sort of thing it is to be known by a man; instead, he discovered only that the
sun, of the visible things, is similar to it, and through this similarity he opened the path for his speech to elevate
itself to the incomprehensible” (sic Plato cum de τἀγαθῷ loqui esset animatus, dicere quid sit non ausus est, hoc
solum de eo sciens, quod sciri quale sit ab homine non possit, solum uero ei simillimum de uisibilibus solem
repperit, et per eius similitudinem uiam sermoni suo attollendi se ad non comprehenda patefecit; I.2.15). He goes
onto compare the lack of statues of the ancients to the good (§16). Cf. Plotinus I.7.1. Olympiodorus similarly argues,
“To start, it is neccesary to know that they (sc. the ancients) regarded it right to use myths for two subjects: nature
and our souls” (δεῖ τοίνυν εἰδέναι ὅτι εἰς δύο ταῦτα ἀποβλέψαντες μύθοις ἐχρήσαντο, εἴς τε τὴν φύσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν
ἡμετέραν ψυχήν; In Gorg. 46.2).
75
“But about the other gods, as I said, and about the soul, and they do not vainly turn themselves towards the mythic
so as to please, but because they know that the open and bare exposition of it is inamicable to nature, which removes
itself thus from the common senses of men by its varied protection and covering of things, and thus it wanted for its
secrets to be hidden by the wise through mythic things. Thus the very mysteries are covered by the secret devices of
images, lest the nature of things of this sort should reveal itself to even those who obtain these them, but only the
most eminient of men with wisdom as their guide are cognizant of the secret truth, the rest must be content with the
worship removed from baseness with the protection of images” (de dis autem [ut dixi] ceteris et de anima non
frustra se nec ut oblectent ad fabulosa conuertunt, sed quia sciunt inimicam esse naturae apertam nudamque
expositionem sui, quae sicut uulgaribus hominum sensibus intellectum sui uario rerum tegmine operimentoque
subtraxit, ita a prudentibus arcana sua uoluit per fabulosa tractari. sic ipsa mysteria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur
ne uel haec adeptis nudam rerum talium natura se praebeat, sed summatibus tantum uiris sapientia interprete ueri
arcani consciis, contenti sint reliqui ad uenerationem figuris defendentibus a uilitate secretum; I.2.17-8).
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journeys and reaching landlocked respite—nothing nearing the highest god and the cosmic
intellect.76 Although written about two centuries earlier, Cicero’s Somnium also avoids
describing ontologically higher entities than souls, which might perhaps hint at a similar spirit of
response to the Epicurean polemic against the Platonic myth of Er.77 Plutarch, however,
manifestly does not accept this extreme of an imposition on philosophical myth: in Sulla’s myth
in De facie, he incorporates the sun as the divine intellect. 78 He does not, evidently, anticipate
this particular requirement of Numenius’ piety, despite Vernière’s argument. As the next section
will show, Plutarch does not share this Neoplatonic distinction between poetic and philosophical
myth, but rather treats prose myth as a sort of poetry, all of which could convey good ethical
lessons despite their fictionality.

The ethical ramifications of fiction
Plutarch’s own response to Colotes is more scattered than the neatly concentrated
defenses in Macrobius’ and Proclus’ commentaries, but he responds to each aspect of the
Epicurean attack. His approach, moreover, differs vastly from the Neoplatonists examined in the
“For I do not think it is far off the mark from what those around Numenius think, that throughout the Odyssey, in
Homer’s eyes, Odysseus bears the image of a man proceeding successively through generation, and being returned
to those beyond everything that have no knowledge of wave and sea: ‘until you arrive to those men, who do not
know the sea and do not eat food mixed with salt.’ The sea and the wave are, according to Plato also, the substance
of materiality” (οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ Νουμήνιον ἐδόκει Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰκόνα φέρειν Ὁμήρῳ κατὰ τὴν
Ὀδύσσειαν τοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐφεξῆς γενέσεως διερχομένου καὶ οὕτως ἀποκαθισταμένου εἰς τοὺς ἔξω παντὸς κλύδωνος
καὶ θαλάσσης ἀπείρους· “εἰσόκε τοὺς ἀφίκηαι οἳ οὐκ ἴσασι θάλασσαν / ἀνέρες οὐδέ θ’ ἅλεσσι μεμιγμένον εἶδαρ
ἔουσι [Od. XI.122-3].” πόντος δὲ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ κλύδων καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἡ ὑλικὴ σύστασις; §34 = Numenius
frg. 33 des Places). Porphyry also refers to more specific aspects of Numenius’ interpretation in §10 (= frg. 30), §21
(= frg. 31), and §28 (= frg. 32).
77
Corti (2014) carefully suggests that Cicero could have known Colotes’ work either through the mediation of Zeno
of Sidon—“il quale a sua volta conosceva sicuramente il pensiero di Colote, visto che ne riprese la polemica contro
Socrate”—or Philodemus (91).
78
944e. See further infra pg. 316. The daemonic guide in the myth of De gen., however, describes his own
restriction: “For us… there is little part in the things above: for the rest belongs to the gods. But the portion of
Persephone that we conduct—one of the four portions which the Styx divides—it is possible for you to see this, if
you desire” (ἀλλ’ ἡμῖν… τῶν ἄνω μέτεστι μικρόν· ἄλλων γὰρ θεῶν ἐκεῖνα· τὴν δὲ Φερσεφόνης μοῖραν, ἣν ἡμεῖς
διέπομεν, τῶν τεττάρων μίαν οὖσαν ὡς ἡ Στὺξ ὁρίζει, βουλομένῳ σοι σκοπεῖν πάρεστιν; 591a). Yet before
describing the Styx in greater detail (591c), he sketches the entire cosmos from the monad to the moon (591b).
76
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previous section. The latter, especially through the distinction between philosophical and poetic
myth, are much more attentive to the characteristically Platonic concern of sanitizing the
ethically reprehensible actions traditionally attributed to the gods—especially the Hesiodic
succession myth. Plutarch seems surprisingly unconcerned about this aspect of the same myth in
his own narrative in De facie, which prominently includes the image of sleeping Cronus chained
and guarded by one of the Hesiodic hundred-handers79—scandalous elements of an episode that
Plato abhorred beyond all others, such that Socrates in the Respublica relegates the entire myth,
if it ever has to be disclosed at all, to after only the most elaborate and costly sacrifice.80 The
subdued father plays more of a role in Zeus’ reign in Plutarch’s rendition, given that he dreams
the thoughts of his son and passes them onto the daemones that serve him, but the violence of his
overthrow is emphasized by the monstrous guard and the chains. Although Plutarch imitates
Plato in many respects in De facie, as the next chapter examines, this need for separating the
divine from familial violence in mythic narratives is absent.
Although Plutarch never discusses Colotes’ attack on the myth of Er directly, his broader
polemic against Epicurus’ beloved student, as well as the teacher himself, make it likely that his
criticism against the myth of Er forms the background against which Plutarch composes his own
philosophical myths in the style of Plato.81 He thus attacks the individual assumptions that
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Plutarch emphasizes figure of the defeated, chained Cronus (De def. or. 419e-20a, De fac. 941f-2a), as well as
Zeus’ role is devising the punishment in the latter (τὸν γὰρ ὕπνον αὐτῷ μεμηχανῆσθαι δεσμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός; 941f).
Cf. Olympiodorus: “He indeed says that Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluton divided up the kingdom from Cronus. And
since Plato is making a philosophical myth, rather than a poetic one, he does not say, as the poets do, that by
force…” (λέγει τοίνυν ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ Κρόνου διενείμαντο τὴν βασιλείαν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων. καὶ
ἐπειδὴ ὁ Πλάτων ποιητικὸν οὐ πλάττει μῦθον ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ εἶπεν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταί, ὅτι βίᾳ…; In Gorg. 47.4).
80
Resp. II.377e-8a. See further supra pg. 22.
81
Flacelière (1959), Hershbell (1992), and Berner (2000) adduce examples of Plutarch’s general hostility toward
Epicurus and his thought. Opsomer (2017) even contrasts his unrelenting attitude toward Epicureans with his
relatively softer attitude toward Stoics, whom he expects could become Platonists. See also Boulogne (2003: 19).
Warren (2011) emphasizes a key tendency in this polemic: “Plutarch takes up Platonic arms against Epicureans in
response to their original attacks on Plato” (283). Boulogne’s treatment is more complex, and takes seriously the
“problème des motivations de la polémique de Plutarque contre les Épicuriens” (19), which he ultimately answers
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underlie the Epicurean arguments—namely, the criticism that inspiring fear in afterlife
punishments is harmful and that fictions of a mythic or a poetic sort have the potential to
mislead. Plutarch’s positions on fear of eschatological punishment, the next section will show,
form a consistent approach. Properly understood as a consequence of providential care in a just
universe, it is beneficial to fear, although amoral or arbitrary punishment must be understood as a
harmful delusion. This approach is rather different from the late Neoplatonists, just as Plutarch’s
approach to the Epicurean criticisms of poetry and fictionality more generally are also different,
as this section shows. His treatise on poetry and his depictions of characters interpreting the myth
of Er reflect a coherent approach to mythic fiction. He argues that there are details that are
extrinsic and contribute to the pleasurability of the narrative, although they should not be taken
too seriously or literally.82 Both in poetry and prose, he distinguishes the essential core of the
story from extrinsic details.83 It must be sought in mythic narratives so that it can stand scrutiny,

through reference to Plutarch’s role as “un professeur de philosophie” (36); “Parce qu’il enseignait la philosophie,
celui-ci se devait de connaitre sérieusement les théories du Jardin. Par suite, ses écrits anti-épicuriens répondent à
une exigence naturelle de la vie de son École. … La réfutation d’Épicure lui était imposée par une double nécessité:
répliquer aux attaques dont les idées auxquelles il adhérait étaient la cible de la part des Épicuriens anciens et
contemporains, et prouver, afin de mieux les propager, la supériorité de ses propres positions sur l’homme et le
monde” (37-38). See also Roskam (2011a) on latent anti-Epicureanism in De amor. prol.
82
There is a substantial body of scholarship on Plutarch’s treatise on poetry, including a few general treatments:
Barrow (1967: 79-82), Lamberton (2001: 46-51), Zadorojnyi (2002), Konstan (2004), Heath (2013: 104-11), Bowie
(2014: 183-4), Lather (2017: 323-34), and especially Hunter & Russell (2011). Schenkeveld (1982) discusses the
structure of the treatise and summarizes earlier scholarship (especially 61-3). Less is said about Plutarch’s apparent
commentary on the Hesiodic Op., but cf. Bowie (2014: 188) and Hunter (2014: 167-226). On Plutarch’s approach to
poetry and “literature” more broadly, see van der Stockt (1992). There is an abundance of scholarship on Plutarch’s
quotation of poetry, particularly on the issue of whether his source is first-hand knowledge of the texts or some kind
of sub-literary collection: cf. de Wet (1988), Lather (2017: 323n1). Shorey (1935) plausibly characterizes the treatise
as a response to Plato’s challence for “lovers of poetry” (φιλοποιηταὶ), but not poets, to defend her in Respublica
X.607d (467nd), but scholars also appeal to later Hellenistic schools: Lamberton (2001), for instance, emphasizes
the role of Stoics, especially given the praise of Chryssipus in 34b. Hunter & Russell (2011) argue for three bodies
of engagement: “Plato, the detailed critical and interpretive analysis of Homer, itself importantly indebted to
Aristotle and the Peripatetics, … and finally the Stoics” (2-3); “the result is that Plutarch “therefore replaces Plato’s
rejection of poetry with a controlled régime which puts the responsibility for correct interpretation upon the pupil
and the teacher” (8). Cf. 4n15.
83
Heath (2013) compares Plutarch’s summary of the Isis and Osiris story, which purports to have had “everything
excessively unprofitable and superfluous removed” (… τῶν ἀχρήστων σφόδρα καὶ περιττῶν ἀφαιρεθέντων; 355d).
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which might result in letting some of the details fall away.84 These defenses of Platonic myth
indicate how Plutarch’s own narratives, especially in De sera, are set up to be understood.
The treatise entitled Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat concerns the ways in
which not just poetry, but any sort of literary work, starts to become irresistably appealing for the
young once they reach a certain age: “For they are enthusiastic not just when they go through
Aesop’s little fables and poetic plays, but also Heracleides’ Abaris and Ariston’s Lycon and ideas
about souls mixed pleasurably with mythology.”85 The last category seems to hint at Platonic
myth, which suggests some common ground between Plutarch’s advice for reading poetry and
also his own myths.86 The treatise is composed as a guide for Marcus Sedatus, whose son is, like
one of Plutarch’s at the time, just coming to the age where poetry becomes inescapably
appealing.87 He rejects the idea of excluding his child from poetry entirely as potentially harmful,
as Epicurus would suggest, and offers a sort of middle-ground alternative:
Well then, are we to plug up the ears of young men with some harsh and unsoftened wax,
forcing ourselves upon an Epicurean skiff and praying to flee and row past poetry? Or is
it better to be present and to bind them with some steady reasoning, to guide and watch
their judgement closely, so that they are not brought to harm by pleasure?88

84

This sort of procedure stands in stark contrast to how e.g. Bernstein (1993) attempts to construct a Platonic
underworld that is coherent in all topographic details: “As stated in the Phaedrus, souls that are repeatedly demoted
eventually receive retribution beneath the earth. Thus a full knowledge of the earth’s interior is necessary to
understand future punishment” (54); the topography of the Phaedo myth is then discussed in detail (54-6).
85
οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Ἄβαριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου καὶ τὸν
Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμιγμένα μυθολογίᾳ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι
(14e). He uses Socrates’ versification of Aesop in the Phaedo as an example of poetry with relatively little falsehood
(16c), before listing Empedocles, Parmenides, Nicander, and Theognis.
86
On the relationship between Plutarch’s poetic and prose exegesis, see Bréchet (2010).
87
14d-e, 15a-b. Plutarch’s emphasis is on poetry as a preliminary to philosophy (e.g. 37b). Zadorojnyi (2002) is
skeptical about the addressee, but argues, based on the son’s name (“Cleandros”), that he is Greek (305); more
practically, Schenkeveld (1982) emphasizes the direct role that the recipient is understood to take in his son’s
education (71).
88
πότερον οὖν τῶν νέων ὥσπερ τῶν Ἰθακησίων σκληρῷ τινι τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ κηρῷ καταπλάττοντες
ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτοὺς τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτιον ἀραμένους ποιητικὴν φεύγειν καὶ παρεξελαύνειν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀρθῷ τινι
λογισμῷ παριστάντες καὶ καταδέοντες, τὴν κρίσιν, ὅπως μὴ παραφέρηται τῷ τέρποντι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον,
ἀπευθύνωμεν καὶ παραφυλάττωμεν; (15d). The nautical metaphor recurs in 37b. Heath (2013) views this image as
an allusion to Epicurus (Ep. Pyth., apud Diog. Laert. X.6.7), and argues that Plutarch’s position on poetry is, despite
his hostility to Epicurus, rather similar to his (112-4).

216
This play on the Homeric image exhorts Sedatus to put his son in the position of Odysseus, ears
unimpeded to enjoy the Sirens’ song but fastened safely to the mast. Sound judgment—and
particularly, ethical judgement89—is the rope, it seems, that keep the youth from harm while they
experience the aesthetic pleasure of poetry.90 Plutarch’s first lesson is to distrust poetry by
emphasizing that “the poets tell many lies.”91 Fiction has the potential to mislead, but Plutarch
advises the teacher to avoid this danger by carefully instructing the student how to grapple with
it, rather than to somehow endeavoring to flee it entirely.92 Yet Sedatus must beware one type of
fictionality in particular. Plutarch distinguishes two sorts: those fictions that are not themselves
dangerous, apparently including the fantastical geographical details about underworld
topography;93 and those are ethically troubling ones that could lead to despondency in the reader.
A central example of the latter is Elpenor, who laments when he meets Odysseus in the

89

This ethical emphasis is often met with dismissal in the scholarship, as if Plutarch is missing the point of poetry.
Zadorojnyi (2002), for instance, complains of “moralizing waffle” (297) and “a certain triviality of moral advice”
(298), but ultimately concludes that Plutarch’s educational project is faithful to Plato’s idea of “pre-philosophical”
education in the Republic and Laws (especially 302-5). See also Westaway (1922: 205-6, 185-6) and, more
neutrally, Gallo (2003: 198). Russell (1972), however, deems Plutarch “the great traditionalist and educator,” and
argues that his conception of education had a particularly “moral” emphasis (43-4). Cf. van der Stockt (1992: 13-4).
90
Lather (2017) compares the discussion of aesthetic pleasure in Non posse (344-38). Lather (2017) ultimately
argues that Plutarch’s own practice, in turn, is to mix poetry into his philosophy, so as to yield “philosophy that is a
pastime both ‘sweet’ and ‘serious’” (325). More generally, Warren (2011) traces the conception of pleasure in this
dialogue to Plato’s Resp., such as IX.585a-6b (281-2). Van der Stockt (1992) emphasizes Plutarch’s subordination
of pleasure to ethical utility (128-31).
91
“First of all, then, it is necessary to lead the young man to poems bearing nothing as carefully and presently in
mind as the old line ‘many are the lies the poets tell,’ some willingly and some unwillingly” (πρῶτον μὲν οὖν
εἰσάγειν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα δεῖ τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ πρόχειρον ὡς τὸ “πολλὰ ψεύδονται
ἀοιδοὶ” τὰ μὲν ἑκόντες τὰ δ’ ἄκοντες; 16a). In Per., for instance, Plutarch criticizes the poets for contradicting
themselves (ἁλίσκονται τοῖς αὑτῶν μυθεύμασι) by depicting the heavens as divinely calm, while imputing
disturbing passions such as hatred (δυσμενείας) and wrath (ὀργῆς) to the gods (XXXIX.3).
92
Pleasant poetry, he argues, is usually “falsehood mixed with plausibility” (μεμιγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος), like
visual arts use certain effects; hence, they are less satisfying when lacking myth and fiction (ἀμύθου καὶ ἀπλάστου;
16b-c). Cf. Plutarch in Quaest. conv. VII.8.713b-d. The dangers and potential benefit of pleasure is a major question
also in Plutarch’s treatise on listening to philosophical lectures, De aud.: e.g.“The style of speaking possesses a
certain deception, whenever it rather pleasurably applies itself to affairs with grandeur and artistry” (ἔχει δέ τι καὶ ἡ
λέξις ἀπατηλόν, ὅταν ἡδεῖα καὶ πολλὴ καὶ μετ’ ὄγκου τινὸς καὶ κατασκευῆς ἐπιφέρηται τοῖς πράγμασιν; 41c). He
allows that a young man (νέος) should nevertheless find pleasure as long as it is not the end in and of itself (τέλος),
and that the speaker should not disregard pleasure “entirely” (παντάππασιν; 42d). Refusing to hear a lecture because
it is not in pure Attic would be like refusing medicine because the cup is not the real Attic stuff (κωλιάδος; 42d).
93
“Neither Homer nor Pindar nor Sophocles have been persuaded that they think things are this way” (καὶ οὔθ’
Ὅμηρος οὔτε Πίνδαρος οὔτε Σοφοκλῆς πεπεισμένοι ταῦτ’ ἔχειν οὕτως ἔγραψαν; 17c).
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underworld that he is miserable because he is unburied.94 Plutarch does not specify why this sort
of suffering is particularly dangerous for the young to see depicted, but perhaps it is because
Elpenor’s burial after death is outside of his control, and so he suffers pitiably not because he
deserves it, but because his former companions did not notice that he fell off Circe’s roof and
died. This sort of suffering does not reflect Plutarch’s view of the providential justice of the
world.95 He later assures the reader that Homer himself even hints that it is his custom is to call
stupid and senseless men “wretched” and “pitiable”—because they suffer due to their intellectual
and, consequentially, ethical failings.96 Yet in the face of sorrow like Elpenor’s, Plutarch advises
students to see how much trouble this sort of problem creates for philosophers and not listen to
mere poets.97 Although his lack of an answer is perhaps frustrating, it befits his sense of pious

“And to be sure, so many cry out and dread and lament their death as pitiable or their lack of burial as horrendous:
‘do not go back and leave me unwept, unburied’… These are the words of men who have been persuaded and
convinced beforehand by opinion and error. They touch us and trouble us more because we are filled with the
suffering and the weakness from these they are said” (ὅσοι μέντοι τὸν θάνατον ὡς οἰκτρὸν ἢ τὴν ἀταφίαν ὡς δεινὸν
ὀλοφυρόμενοι καὶ δεδιότες φωνὰς ἐξενηνόχασι “μή μ’ ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὄπιθεν καταλείπειν” [Hom. Od.
XI.72]… αὗται πεπονθότων εἰσὶ καὶ προεαλωκότων ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ ἀπάτης. διὸ μᾶλλον ἅπτονται καὶ διαταράττουσιν
ἡμᾶς, ἀναπιμπλαμένους τοῦ πάθους καὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἀφ’ ἧς λέγονται; 17c-d).
95
Cf. Roskam (2007: 168-72). In Cons. ad Ap. 107d-8e, for instance, Plutarch heartily approves Socrates’ claim in
the Apologia that a good man has nothing to fear in death, whatever might happen: “But you, good judges, must be
hopeful about death. It is not possible for anything bad to happen to a good man, whether alive or dead: he is not
neglected by the gods” (ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο
διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ
θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα; 41c-d). Hani (1972) surveys the long and contentious issue of the authenticity of the
Cons. (27-43), but ultimately finds himself “résolument favorable à l’hypothèse de l’authencitité” (40). Boulet
(2010) imputes a similar belief to that of the Ap. to Plutarch generally (64) but argues reduces the idea of divine
punishment—and characteristic of myths generally—to “superstition,” which he argues is only used “rhetorically”
(59-63).
96
After citing Hom. Od. IV.197-8 and XXIV.526-7, he concludes: “for he does not simply say that painful life is
assigned by the gods to all men, but rather to senseless and stupid ones, whom he is accustomed to call ‘wretched’
and ‘woeful’ because they are vile and base through wickedness” (οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς εἶπε καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν
ἐπικεκλῶσθαι λυπηρὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις, οὓς δειλαίους καὶ οἰκτροὺς διὰ μοχθηρίαν ὄντας εἴωθε
“δειλοὺς” καὶ “ὀιζυροὺς” προσαγορεύειν; 22c). Plutarch, an intense moralist in the interpretation of poetry as well
as philosophy more broadly, takes Homer at his best to reflect good sensibilities, such that he recommends paying
attention to what this poet praises and blames (35a). Heath (2013) compares Leg. II.658d (110).
97
These sorts of issues, he argues, are very hard to comprehend (δυσθήρατός ἐστι καὶ δύσληπτος) such that students
see even philosophers become dizzy when dealing with them (ἐν οἷς τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἰλιγγιῶντας ὁρῶσιν); who
could care what a poet says in these circumstances (17e-f)? Plutarch’s retreat into pious skepticism on these sorts of
points is not entirely satisfying, but it is characteristic of his thought. Cf. Brenk's (1994: 17-8) interpretation of
Romulus XXVIII.7-8. Cf. Adv. Col. 1123a.
94
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skepticism to distance himself from credulity on particularly disturbing aspects of traditional
thought, such as the implicit Homeric conception of burial.98
This sort of depiction of troublesome suffering, perhaps violating Plutarch’s sense of
piety, might bring the unprepared student to despair of the goodness and justice in the world,
which might do them real harm unless properly guided.99 This eternal suffering, as what the
incurable tyrants ostensibly suffer in Plato’s myths, is the kind of fate that Epicureans like
Colotes attempt to polemically exploit. Plutarch’s treatment of the incurables in his own myth in
De sera, accordingly, is rather different than the display of tortured tyrants in the myth of Er and
the Gorgias, as the next section argues further. The poetic representation of manifestly
fantastical nature of the features of the underworld, on the other hand, do not seem to Plutarch to
present any ethical peril.
While in Quomodo adulescens Plutarch emphasizes the potential harmful ethical ideas in
poetry, the depiction in the Quaestiones convivales of Lamprias’ interpretation of the myth of Er,
the direct target of Colotes’ criticism, emphasizes the positive that can be sought in prose myth.
Lamprias nevertheless also shares a similar dichotomy to the treatise on poetry: there are clearly
fabulous parts that may playfully signify something but might not, and there is a philosophical
position—especially an ethical one—that is the core of the myth.100 This particular interpretation

Plutarch in the first of the Quaest. Plat. assumes that Plato would not have had Socrates “certainly would not use
the name of the god in jest or irony” in the Theaetetus (οὐ γὰρ εἰρωνευόμενός γε καὶ παίζων προσεχρήσατ’ ἂν τῷ
τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματι; 999c). Roskam (2011: 421-5) and especially Opsomer (1998: 127-50) analyze this Quaestio in
detail.
99
See supra pg. 77.
100
Plutarch’s interpretations have not attracted much scholarly interest, even where it might be expected—such as in
Bréchet's (2010) study of Plutarch as an exegete of both poetry and Plato—but Cürsgen (2002) mentions them
briefly (128). Teodorsson (1996), however, takes the Ajax episode to be entirely farcical: “The initial episode, with
Hylas acting in a manner similar to that of the frustrated and sullen ghost of Ajax in Hades, is a typical literary
artifice used for the sake of entertainment. This passage, if any, makes the impression of fiction… the question is a
nonsense problem, posed merely as a pastime. Ajax’ choice of the shape of a lion was the best possible, once he
wanted to be reborn as an animal” (324-5; cf. 330). On the potential difficulties of distinguishing Plutarch’s own
thought from that of his characters. see Brenk (2009).
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takes place in the conversation about why Ajax’s soul specifically received the twentieth lot in
the myth of Er. The vignette begins when an orator notices that one of the literary scholars is
downcast while the rest of the party is laughing joyfully, and attempts to lighten his mood by
comparing him to the image of Ajax downcast in the Homeric underworld.101 This attempt
backfires, and even worsens the scholar’s mood because he thinks everyone is mocking him,
which prompts him to awkwardly lament that poor Ajax got the twentieth lot in the myth of Er.102
Plutarch’s brother, Lamprias, a philosopher with a keen but often eristic sense of humor, takes
the opportunity to ridicule literary pedantry, and thus concocts a silly interpretation through
another quotation of the scene in Homer, jabbing that the question is meaningless.103 Most of the

“These things made everyone else have a better time, but the orator Sospis saw that the literary scholar Hylas
alone was silent and melancholy—this was because he did not fare very well in the exhibitions. Sospis spoke out,
‘and the soul of Ajax, son of Telamon, alone,’ addressing the rest to him and reciting, ‘come back here, lord, so that
you might hear our word and speech, master your might and your unyielding heart’” (ταῦτα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας
ἡδίους ἐποίησεν, μόνον δὲ τὸν γραμματικὸν Ὕλαν ὁ ῥήτωρ Σῶσπις ὁρῶν ἀποσιωπῶντα καὶ βαρυθυμούμενον (οὐ
πάνυ γὰρ εὐημέρησεν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιδείξεσιν) ἀνεφώνησεν, “‘οἴη δ’ Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο [Hom. Od. XI.543]·’
τὰ <δὲ> λοιπὰ μεῖζον [ἢ] φθεγγόμενος ἤδη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐπέραινεν ‘ἀλλ’ ἴθι δεῦρο, ἄναξ, ἵν’ ἔπος καὶ μῦθον
ἀκούσῃς / ἡμέτερον· δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀτειρέα θυμόν [Hom. Od. XI.561];’” IX.5.739e).
102
“But Hylas, still off-kilter from anger, responded awkwardly: he said that the soul of Ajax got the twentieth lot
and changed his nature for a lion’s in Hades, according to Plato, and often the words of the old man from comedy
are applicable to him: ‘it is better to become a work mule than to see worse men living more famously than
yourself.’ And Sospis laughed, saying ‘but as long as we are about to put on the mule-skin, teach us: if it was some
concern to Plato, by what account has he made this soul of the son of Telamon go twentieth to the choosing?’ While
Hylas cursed him (because he thought he was being mocked for his bad luck), …” (ἔτι δ’ ἀνώμαλος ὢν ὑπ’ ὀργῆς ὁ
Ὕλας ἀπεκρίνατο σκαιῶς· τὴν μὲν Αἴαντος ἔφη ψυχὴν εἰκοστὴν λαχοῦσαν ἐν Ἅιδου διαμείψασθαι κατὰ τὸν
Πλάτωνα [Resp. X.620b] φύσιν λέοντος, αὑτῷ δὲ πολλάκις παρίστασθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦ κωμικοῦ γέροντος “ὄνον
γενέσθαι κρεῖττον ἢ τοὺς χείρονας / ὁρᾶν ἑαυτοῦ ζῶντας ἐπιφανέστερον [Menand. frg. 223];” καὶ ὁ Σῶσπις γελάσας
“ἀλλ’ ἕως μέλλομεν ἐνδύεσθαι τὸ κανθήλιον, εἴ τι κήδει Πλάτωνος, δίδαξον ἡμᾶς, ᾧτινι λόγῳ τὴν τοῦ Τελαμωνίου
ψυχὴν πεποίηκεν ἀπὸ κλήρου βαδίζουσαν εἰκοστὴν ἐπὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν.” ἀποσκορακίσαντος <δὲ> τοῦ Ὕλα
(χλευάζεσθαι γὰρ ᾤετο δυσημερῶν)…; 739f).
103
“Does Ajax not always carry off the second prize of beauty and magnitude and manliness ‘after the blameless son
of Peleus’: the second ten is twenty, and ten is the mightiest among numbers, just as Achilles is among the
Achaeans?” (ὑτί οὖν… οὐ δευτερεῖα μὲν ὁ Αἴας κάλλους καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀνδρείας ἀεὶ φέρεται “μετ’ ἀμύμονα
Πηλείωνα” [Hom. Od. XI.551], τὰ δ’ εἴκοσι δευτέρα δεκάς, ἡ δὲ δεκὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς κράτιστος, ὡς ἐν τοῖς
Ἀχαιοῖς ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς;” 740a). Plutarch tends to depict Lamprias as arrogant but humorous, describing him in another
vignette as ὑβριστὴς δ’ ὢν καὶ φιλόγελως φύσει ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἡμῶν Λαμπρίας… (Quaest. conviv. VIII.6.726d-e).
There, he goes onto mock the preceding etymologizing of the names of Greek meals (726b-d) by etymologizing
Latin names through Greek concepts (e.g. κῆνα [cena] and κοινωνία): “either we must hear these things being said
without laughter, or we must not allow encroachments from names, as if they knock out parts of our wall until they
destroy it entirely” (ἢ καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀκουστέον ἀγελαστὶ λεγομένων ἢ μηδ' ἐκείνοις εὐκόπους οὕτως διὰ τῶν
ὀνομάτων ὥσπερ τριγχίων τὰ μὲν ἐκκόπτουσι μέρη τὰ δὲ καθαιροῦσιν παραδύσεις διδῶμεν; 727a). Minar in Minar
et al. (1961) understands Lamprias’ joke, but falls prey to the same scholarly impulse under mockery: “Actually,
101
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audience laughs, but Ammonius steps in to defuse the increasing hostility and restore
symposiastic harmony by forcing Lamprias to address the question seriously. 104 He begins by
allowing that Plato conveys some serious ideas playfully through wordplay—the name Er refers
to the place in the air (aer) where disembodied souls are collected, and the name of his father
Harmonius hints at the order (harmonia) that is instilled in souls—and gives a dichotomy of
what the detail twenty might mean:105
What indeed hinders the “twentieth” (eikoston) from being said not with an eye toward
the truth, but toward the likely (eikos) and the fictive part of the account, or toward the lot
as being “perchance (eikê) and according to fortune? For he always touches on three
causes, because he was the first, or at least the most prominent, to realize how it happens
that the destined is mixed with what happens by chance, and in turn what is in each of our
power is mixed and weaved together with both?106

while many pairs are cognates, the Latin are not derived from the Greek, with the possible exceptions…” (165nc). In
an earlier vignette, Lamprias is depicted as simply brash, “speaking loudly, as he was accustomed to do” (καθάπερ
εἰωθει μέγα φθεγξάμενος; I.2.617e-f). Cf. Russell (1972): “a shrewd, bluff, humorous fellow” (4); Demulder (2016):
“smart though notoriously scoffing” (207). Teodorsson (1996) describes Lamprias’ character as “playful,” but
argues that Ammonius in De E (386a) “mildly intimates that he suspects Lamprias to indulge in Pythagorean
number speculations of his own” (326).
104
“We laughed, and Ammonius said, ‘Lamprias, let these things said in mockery of Hylas be ordained for you: do
not play with us, but, since you willingly took up the argument, speak about the cause with seriousness’”
(γελασάντων δ’ ἡμῶν “ταῦτα μέν” ὁ Ἀμμώνιος εἶπεν, “ὦ Λαμπρία, κείσθω σοι πεπαιγμένα πρὸς Ὕλαν· ἡμῖν δὲ μὴ
παίζων ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς, ἐπεὶ τὸν λόγον ἑκὼν ἐξεδέξω, δίελθε περὶ τῆς αἰτίας;” 740a-b). In an earlier book of the
Quaestiones convivales, Crato describes a balance of seriousness and play as ideal for a symposium but errs on the
side of seriousness (αὐστηριόν; 620d). In the programmatic first Quaestio, the character of Plutarch relatedly warns
philosophers against arguing with “sticky and difficulty comprehended matters” (ἐν πράγμασι γλίσχροις καὶ
δυσθεωρήτοις), lest they distress the other guests (παρατυγχάνοντας ἀνιῶσιν; 614e). See also 615a-b. Plutarch
praises the pleasant acceptance of harmless jokes (σκῶμμα… ἀνύβριστον) also in De aud. 46b.
105
“So Lamprias was bewildered, then he waited for a short time and said that Plato plays with us through names in
many places: but where he mixes some myth with an account about the soul, he uses the meaning most of all. He
calls the noetic nature of the heavens ‘a winged chariot’ because of harmonious revolution of the world; and here, he
names the one carrying his own message of the things in Hades Er, of the father Harmonius, Pamphylian in race,
hinting that souls are engendered through harmonia and are harmonized together with bodies, and when they are
released they are collected from all sides into the aer and are turned from there in turn to their next births”
(θορυβηθεὶς οὖν ὁ Λαμπρίας, εἶτα χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ἐπισχὼν ἔφη πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἡμῖν τὸν Πλάτωνα προσπαίζειν διὰ
τῶν ὀνομάτων· ὅπου δὲ μῦθόν τινα τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ μίγνυσι, χρῆσθαι μάλιστα τῷ νῷ. τοῦ τε γὰρ οὐρανοῦ τὴν
νοητὴν φύσιν ἅρμα καλεῖν πτηνὸν [Phdr. 246e] <διὰ> τὴν ἐναρμόνιον τοῦ κόσμου περιφοράν, ἐνταῦθά τε τὸν
αὐτάγγελον τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου Πάμφυλον γένος Ἁρμονίου πατρὸς Ἦρα δ’ αὐτὸν ὀνομάζειν [Resp. 614b], αἰνιττόμενον
ὅτι γεννῶνται μὲν αἱ ψυχαὶ καθ’ ἁρμονίαν καὶ συναρμόττονται τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀπαλλαγεῖσαι δὲ συμφέρονται
πανταχόθεν εἰς τὸν ἀέρα κἀκεῖθεν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰς δευτέρας γενέσεις τρέπονται; 740b-c).
106
τί δὴ κωλύει καὶ τὸ ‘εἰκοστὸν’ εἰρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀληθὲς ἀλλ’ ‘εἰκὸς’ τοῦ λόγου καὶ πλαττόμενον, ἢ πρὸς τὸν
κλῆρον ὡς ‘εἰκῇ’ καὶ κατὰ τύχην γινόμενον; ἀεὶ μὲν γὰρ ἅπτεται τῶν τριῶν αἰτιῶν, ἅτε δὴ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα
συνιδών, ὅπη τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ τύχην αὖθίς τε τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἑκατέρῳ καὶ συναμφοτέροις ἐπιμίγνυσθαι καὶ
συμπλέκεσθαι πέφυκε; 740c).
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The twentieth choice could be another hint towards what Lamprias seems to take as the manifest
meaning of the setup of this part of the myth, the distinction of things in our power, mindless
chance, and the providential connection between good decisions and good outcomes. The lots
represent chance, hence Ajax’s random draw. Lamprias seems to believe this is the moral core of
the narrative. The myth of Er is especially fitting for a discussion of causation: before the souls
draw lots, the herald ends his instructions with the proclamation, “the responsibility is the
choser’s: god bears no responsibility.”107 The Latin Expositio similarly summarizes the myth of
Er as being, besides a representation of a place where evil souls are punished and good ones
honored, an exposition of the distinction between things done “by fate and necessity” and the
“something in our power.”108 Yet Lamprias’ distinction between causes seems to represent
Plutarch’s own ideas, although some quibble at the plausibility of attributing this tripartite
distinction to Plato.109 Lamprias takes this detail of Ajax’s lot to provide further indication of this

αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος (Resp. X.617e). This phrase seems to become a symbol of Platonism. According to
Adam (1902), “A bust of Plato found at Tibur and dating from the first century B.C. bears the inscription αἰτία
ἑλομένῳ (sic). θεὸς ἀθάνατος, together with ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος” (2.455). Plotinus appeals to this phrase in his
own discussion of providence (III.2.15-20).
108
“And he also writes about the underworld, he relates it as such, bearing substance, where the souls of the wicked
are punished and those of the good are held in honor. Then he grants that some things come about by fate and
necessity, but there is in turn something in our power, which is supported by good or bad reasoning about how to
live” (de inferis quoque, tamquam et sint et substantiam <habeant> et malorum animae puniantur, bonorum autem
in honore sint, exponit. denique concedit fieri aliqua fato et necessitate, rursus esse aliquid in nobis quod
sustineatur bona ratione uiuendi uel mala; §8.16-20).
109
E.g. Boys-Stones (2007): “We know for sure only that Plutarch wrote a two-volume work On Fate (Lamprias
58), and further treatises against both Epicureans and Stoics on the matter of human autonomy (to eph’ hȇmin:
Lamprias 133 and 154). But it seems fair to suppose that he agrees with a claim that he puts into Lamprias’ mouth,
that to eph’ hȇmin and fate complement each other in a complete account of the cosmos” (433n8). Hankinson (1998)
simply attributes it to Plutarch, without context or justification (348). Teodorsson (1996), however, simply claims
the attribution to Plato was made “anachronistically” (324). See further 328-9 and Minar, Sandbach, & Helmbold
(1961): “A clear exaggeration. This way of formulating a tripartition of causes (cf. Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus,
133) belongs to an age later than Plato, but a very similar division, in which ‘nature’ replaces ‘fate,’ is assumed by
Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name, 323 D, and criticized at Laws, 888 E, not so much as being false in
itself, but because the generality take a false view of ‘nature’” (245ne); Dillon (1977) more plausibly suggests
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1112a as Lamprias’ source for the formulation of the tripartite division (209). Dillon’s final
appraisal of Plutarch’s conception of providence is disappointment that he never clarifies what place is left “for
individual freedom of choice” in his broader system, but qualified: “This, I fear, we will find to be the case generally
with Middle Platonic efforts to deal with Fate and Free Will. Only Plotinus, in Enneads III 2-3, comes seriously to
grips with the problem, and he only succeeds ultimately in demonstrating its insolubility” (211). See also Hankinson
107
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central core of the myth, but he presumably would have come to the same conclusion without
it.110 The detail could, in fact, have an entirely different significance, and call attention to the
epistemic status of the myth, as merely likely (εἰκός). Rather than indicating anything deeper, the
twentieth lot might just call attention to the fictionality of the narrative and thus the possibility
that some details do not matter in the same way as the ethical core of the narrative. Ammonius,
in another vignette, similarly concludes his interpretation of the Sirens in the myth of Er—how
the beings that harmoniously sing on the cosmic spheres could possibly relate to the monsters
from Homer—by declaring a principle of only seeking out what is likely:111 the teacher
“concludes these statements with the verse of Xenophanes, as was his custom: ‘let these things
be thought similar to the truth.’”112
The resolution of the Ajax vignette, however, comes when another literary scholar
realizes that Ajax is the twentieth shade Odysseus sees in the Homeric nekyia as well, which

(1998: 350). On the interpretation of the Expositio, Stover (2016) compares Cic. Fat. frg. 1 apud Gell. VII.2.15
(149).
110
Cf. Vernière (1977): “Lamprias s’attache à expliquer de façon allégoriques un détail oiseux (la vingtième place
occupée par Ajax dans la file des candidats à une nouvelle vie), et le fait sur un ton sérieux, comme s’il s’agissait
d’une sorte de hieros logos” (288).
111
In IX.14, entitled “various conversations about the number of the muses” (περὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν Μουσῶν ὅσα
λέγεται μὴ κοινῶς; 743c), Ammonius turns the conversation to the Sirens in the segment on Necessity in the myth of
Er. While Homer’s Sirens frighten us, in Plato their song has the potential to fill “departing souls, as it seems, with a
passionate desire for heavenly and divine things and with a forgetting of mortal things,” although “the ears of most
souls are smeared and plastered over by fleshy barriers and passions and not wax” (αἵ γε μὲν δὴ Ὁμήρου Σειρῆνες
οὐ κατὰ λόγον ἡμᾶς τῷ μύθῳ φοβοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνος ὀρθῶς ᾐνίξατο τὴν τῆς μουσικῆς αὐτῶν δύναμιν οὐκ
ἀπάνθρωπον οὐδ' ὀλέθριον οὖσαν ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἐντεῦθεν ἀπιούσαις ἐκεῖ ψυχαῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ πλανωμέναις μετὰ τὴν
τελευτὴν ἔρωτα πρὸς τὰ οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα λήθην δὲ τῶν θνητῶν ἐμποιοῦσαν κατέχειν καὶ κατᾴδειν… <τὰ δ’ ὦτα
τῶν> μὲν πλείστων περιαλήλιπται καὶ καταπέπλασται σαρκίνοις ἐμφράγμασι καὶ πάθεσιν, οὐ κηρίνοις; 745d-e).
Ammonius thus situates the detail of the myth within Plato’s broader psychology. The justification for Ammonius’
speech in the context of the Quaestio is the identification of Plato’s Sirens with the Muses, which Plutarch also
assumes in De an. proc. 1029d. For Lamberton (1986), this transformation of the Homeric figures into “the
benevolent Sirens of the Pythagoreanizing myth of Er” illustrates “the central position of the dialogues of Plato in
the establishment both of the canonical versions of ‘Pythagorean’ myths and of the connections between those
myths and Homer” (37). Teodorsson (1996) similarly detects a “largely Pythagorean” conception of “astral
immortality” (363-4). Soury (1949), citing Montaigne, sees Ammonius’ speech as a sort of emblem for Plutarch’s
philosophy more broadly (326-7). On the position of Ammonius in the quaestio, Klotz (2014) compares the
structure of Plato’s Symposium (216-7).
112
τούτοις ἐπιφωνήσαντος τοῦ Ἀμμωνίου τὰ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους (frg. B35 Diels) ὥσπερ εἰώθει· “ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν
ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι” (746b).
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makes Plato’s detail a colorful and pleasurable addition to the myth.113 This makes sense with the
symposiastic frame: a literary scholar was assaulted by a philosopher, but another successfully
comes to his defense and so dissolves the eristic tension into erudite levity once more.114
Lamprias’ approaches to the detail—either tying it to the broader ethical point of the narrative, or
deeming it self-consciously superfluous—are nevertheless a good example of Plutarch’s idea of
how to seriously approach these sorts of details. This sort of ethical interpretation seems to
reflect how Plutarch expected his myths to be understood, as his Quomodo suggests. While the
Neoplatonists distinguish philosophical myth from poetic or import an idea of pious occlusion
like the mysteries, Plutarch is motivated both by the pleasure of audience as well as the potential
for mythic details to emphasize the fictionality of these philosophical narratives. Macrobius
similarly hints at this sort of idea with his etymology of fabula, his translation for μῦθος: “myths,
the name of which proclaims a declaration of the fictive.”115 But while Macrobius does not
pursue this sort of idea further, Plutarch more seriously proposes that the details in the myth call
attention to its epistemic status as a “likely account,” while the reader is meant to analyze the
core philosophical ideas that are clearly conveyed by the narrative.

113

In Quomodo adul., Plutarch similarly compares the fictive in myths to color in visual arts: both are used to bring
pleasure to the audience (16b-c).
114
Ammonius thus fulfills the role of an ideal symposiarch, as defined by Theon in an earlier episode of the
Quaestiones convivales (I.4): games should be pleasant and humorous but “free from offense” (ἀνύβριστον), offense
being what brings most symposia to shipwreck (ἐν οἷς τὰ πλεῖστα ναυαγεῖ συμπόσια μὴ τυχόντα παιδαγωγίας ὀρθῆς;
622b); a symposiast, when potentially offended by a cruel joke like Agamestor the Academic, should be able to turn
the joke around rather than let the night fall into offense (621e-2a); and the symposiarch should see to it that things
be suitable and possible for each symposiast to show off what he is best at (τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ κοσμοῦντα τὸν
δρῶντα προστάσσοντας), and so for singers to sing, orators to declaim, philosophers to solve problems (φιλοσόφοις
λῦσαί τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων), and so on (622a). Ruffi (2011) analyzes these propositions, as well as Crato’s earlier in
the episode, through the lens of medicine (144-51). Klotz (2014) connects symposiastic healing to the image of
Helen in Od. IV (212-4). Cf. Halliwell (2008) on social tension and resolution in Xen. Symp. (139-54).
115
fabulae, quarum nomen indicat falsi professionem… (I.2.7). Regali (1983: 218) and Neri (2007: 579) both cite
Varro Ling. VI.55.
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Providential care and curative punishment
The criticism that myth of Er is harmful because it includes terrifying underworld
punishments is relatively prevalent in subsequent discussions of Plato.116 Diogenes Laertius, for
instance, mentions this only as the only reason that “Plato seemed too myth-obsessed
(μυθικώτερος) for some writers.”117 Perhaps to preempt this criticism, Cicero’s Somnium
Scipionis, although in many ways reminiscent of Plato’s myth of Er, does away with its
gruesome punishments, instead dedicating central parts of the narrative to grand praises of the
rewards for good statesmen.118 The Neoplatonist Proclus is rather direct in responding to critique
of this aspect of Plato’s eschatological myths, not just in the commentary on the myth of Er, the
sixteenth essay of In Rempublicam, but also in the sixth essay, his most elaborate treatment of
Homer and poetry.119 In the tenth section, he treats Plato’s depictions of the underworld in
parallel with that of traditional poetry, hence the title, “a common defense of the Homeric and

116

In the 1827 Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio, Giacomo Leopardi has the suicidal Porphyry criticize Plato for
filling life with the fear of tortures after death: “Perciocchè per opera tua, laddove tutti gli altri animali muoiono
senza timore alcuno, la quiete e la sicurtà dell’animo sono escluse in perpetuo dall’ultima ora dell’uomo. Questo
mancava, O Platone, a tanta infelicità della specie umana” (1982: 448).
117
“And in the dialogues, he held up justice as the law of god as a more certain way of turning men toward acting
justly, so they they would not suffer punishments after death as malefactors” (ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαλόγοις καὶ τὴν
δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ νόμον ὑπελάμβανεν ὡς ἰσχυροτέραν προτρέψαι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ μετὰ θάνατον
δίκας ὑπόσχοιεν ὡς κακοῦργοι; III.79). Diogenes Laertius evidently took this to be a positive aim, concluding Plato
“thus turned them away from unjust deeds” (οὕτως ἀπέχωνται τῶν ἀδικημάτων; §80). The doxographer’s
explanation is simple: Plato wanted to deter men from wicked deeds.
118
“But thus, Scipio, as your grandfather here, as I who begot you, cultivate justice and piety, which is great among
your parents and your neighbors, and moreover the greatest in the fatherland. This life is the way to the sky and to
the company of these men, who once lived, were loosened from the body, and dwell in this place, which you see… ”
(sed sic, Scipio, ut auus hic tuus, ut ego, qui te genui, iustitiam cole et pietatem, quae cum magna in parentibus et
propinquis, tum in patria maxima est; ea uita uia est in caelum et in hunc coetum eorum, qui iam vixerunt et corpore
laxati illum incolunt locum, quem uides…; Resp. VI.15). See further VI.25. The punishment of the absolute worst,
who are carried away by pleasures and violate the laws of gods and men, is mentioned only very briefly at the end of
the myth: “the souls of these men fall out of their bodies and are rotated around the very earth; they do not return to
this place, unless after they are driven around for many generations” (eorum animi… corporibus elapsi circum
terram ipsam uolutantur nec hunc in locum nisi multis exagitati saeculis reuertuntur; VI.29). The punishment seems
to be a sort of reversal of the fate of those in Pl. Phd. who have done something heinous but are still curable—
condemned to be tossed in the Tartarus for year-long periods until whomever they wronged decides to forgive and
pardon them from punishment (113e-4b)—but Cicero’s description is much shorter and less detailed.
119
The sixth essay—and the tripartite distinction Proclus makes in it between mimetic, didactic, and symbolic
poetry—attracts a relatively vast degree of scholarly attention: e.g. Coulter (1976: 32-72), Sheppard (1980),
Lamberton (1986: 162-232), Kuisma (1996), Struck (2004: 193-213), Chlup (2012: 185-200), Lamberton (2012).
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Platonic myths, in which they speak about the places of punishment and the different allotments
in them, which souls departing from bodies bear according to the particulars of their embodied
life.”120 Proclus thus treats two of the Epicurean objections—that mythic fiction is potentially
deceptive and that fear of afterlife punishments is harmful—as elements of a single criticism.121
Plutarch’s approach to this criticism is extensive and at times vehement. His responses
are more sporadic than those of Proclus, but they are all bounded by a consistent sense of moral
probability. Hence Lamprias’ interpretation of the myth of Er connects “destiny” and
“providence” with the reward of good choices and punishment of evil.122 Punishment, if it exists,
is not arbitrary, but based on actions and character, and it is carried out for the good of the
punished, so as to cure or purify them. Contrary to developmentalist arguments surrounding De
superstitione, there is nothing to fear because the morally arbitrary punishments dreaded by the
superstitious are delusions.123 The exposition in De sera is presented as a response to Epicurean

κοινὴ ἀπολογία ὑπέρ τε τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν μύθων καὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου λέγουσι
δικαιωτηρίων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς λήξεων τῶν τῶν διαφόρων, ἃς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἐξελθοῦσαι τῶν σωμάτων ψυχαὶ κατὰ τὰ
ἰδιώματα τῆς ἐν σώματι ζωῆς (I.117.23-6). Proclus attempts to reconcile Plato’s eschatological myths in the Phaedo
and Respublic (I.118.17-9.2) with Homer, and both with Plato’s concerns in Respublic III—as Lamberton (2012)
usefully details (151n181)—such as that the guardians should not fear death (ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων
δειδισσόμεθα, μὴ ἐκ τούτων τῶν δειμάτων ⟨τὸν θάνατον⟩ ἡγήσωνται φοβερόν; I.118.15-7, accepting Lamberton’s
textual reconstruction). See also I.122.15-20.
121
Epicurean polemic looms over this section, which includes the exhortation “let us say then in either case, whether
some Epicurean should attempt to cast aspersion on myths of this sort or even someone else…” (λέγωμεν τοίνυν ἐπ’
ἀμφοτέρων, εἴτε τῶν Ἐπικουρείων τις ἐγκαλεῖν ἐπιχειροῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις μύθοις εἴτε καὶ ἄλλος τις…; I.119.2-4).
Proclus’ list of terrors in the myth of Er here, moreover, is similar to his summary of Colotes’ disparagement.
122
“Now he has marvellously hinted at that power which each bears in our affairs: he assigns the choice of lives to
what is in our power (‘for virtue and vice have no master’), but he binds to necessity of destiny that those who
choose rightly live well and those who choose the opposite live badly; the lots are scattered chaotically, and the
ways they follow introduce chance to both our upbringings and our polities…” (νῦν δὲ θαυμαστῶς, ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν
<ἐν> τοῖς ἡμετέροις πράγμασιν ἕκαστον, ὑποδεδήλωκεν, τὴν μὲν αἵρεσιν τῶν βίων τῷ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀποδιδούς (“ἀρετὴ
γὰρ ἀδέσποτον καὶ κακία [Resp. X.617e]”), τὸδ’ εὖ βιοῦν τοὺ ὀρθῶς ἑλομένους καὶ τἀναντία τοὺς κακῶς
εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκῃ συνάπτων· αἱ δὲ τῶν κλήρων ἀτάκτως διασπειρομένων ἐπιπτώσεις γὴν τύχην παρεισάγουσιν καὶ
τροφαῖς καὶ πολιτείαις…; 740c-d). In the last line of the passage, he treats ‘destiny’ and ‘providence’
interchangeably (ἔκ τινος εἱμαρμένης καὶ προνοίας). Cf. [Plut.] De fato 574b-d; Hankinson (1998): “God’s
providence is distinct from, and may on occasion override, fate by interfering in the natural order of things (this
interference may be permanent, as it is in the case of some of the heavenly bodies, notably the earthy moon…)”
(349). Eliasson (2013) finds a similar conception of “τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν” in Alcinous: “contrary to what is usually thought
to be the case, the theory does not defend that our choices alone are undetermined by Fate and that their
consequences are determined by Fate…” (60). He argues that the impetus is, similarly to Plutarch, the myth of Er.
123
See supra pg. 70.
120
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objections about the depiction of afterlife punishments, like the arguments in his treatise on
poetry were aimed against the Epicurean critique of poetic fiction. The defense against the
critique of the tyrant’s torture fittingly emphasizes the curative role of punishment. In the next
section, I argue that the mythic portion of the dialogue serves a parallel argumentative function,
depicting this salutary purpose in its portrayal of the machinery of cosmic justice.
Plutarch’s final speeches in De sera are grounded in the relationship between providence
and curative or purificatory punishment. As Plutarch presents various solutions to the questions
and objections, Olympichus eventually interrupts, and reorients the discussion:124
“You seem to suppose a substantial assumption for this account: the permanence of the
soul.”
“But you at least,” I said, “concede this—or rather, have conceded it. For the account
proceeded from the beginning until now under the assumption that god metes what is
proper for us.”125
Up to this point in the dialogue, punishments and rewards in life have been the focus, but
Plutarch shifts to immortal souls, because both sorts of punishments under discussion are
assumed to be determined by moral character and action. The divine, Plutarch continues, would
be silly (κενόσπουδος) to spend so much attention on human souls through providential care if
they were truly ephemeral like gardens of Adonis, rather than something that persists.126 For

124

Much of the scholarship simply summarizes the pre-mythic part of the dialogue—e.g. Krasovec (1993: 23-8)—
but there are more substantial treatments of the argumentation, such as Saunders (1993), Helmig (2005), Gagné
(2013), van den Berg (2014), and Opsomer (2016). For the general topic in earlier literature , see also Sewell-Rutter
(2007).
125
“ἔοικας… τῷ λόγῳ μεγάλην ὑπόθεσιν ὑποτίθεσθαι, τὴν ἐπιμονὴν τῆς ψυχῆς.” “καὶ ὑμῶν γ’” εἶπον ἐγὼ “διδόντων
μᾶλλον δὲ δεδωκότων· ὡς γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν νέμοντος ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῦρο προελήλυθε” (560a-b).
This phrase “what is proper” (κατ’ ἀξίαν) emphasizes the moral judgment that determines the fates of souls, and it
has resonances throughout the passage: for instance, a soul has boons or punishments (χάριτας ἢ τίσεις) after death
according to its ethical state (καθ’ ἑαυτὴν; 561a). Saunders (1993), however, appeals to the concept of “doubledetermination” to argue that Plutarch is “just as much concerned with the justifications and purposes of human
punishments, legal or otherwise, as Plato was” in the Leg. (73-74). Cf. Helmig (2005: 326n13, 327n15).
126
“But is the divine so small and so zealous about frivolity thus, such that… it makes so great an account, but sow
transient souls in delicate flesh, as if women nursing and caring for gardens of Adonis upon some earthen vessels”
(ἀλλὰ μικρὸς οὕτω καὶ κενόσπουδος ὁ θεός ἐστιν, ὥστε… ποιεῖσθαι λόγον τοσοῦτον, ὥσπερ αἱ τοὺς Ἀδώνιδος
κήπους ἐπ’ ὀστράκοις τισὶ τιθηνούμεναι καὶ θεραπεύουσαι γυναῖκες ἐφημέρους <σπείρων> ψυχὰς ἐν σαρκὶ
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further evidence, he invokes the authority of the Delphic oracle, which, he argues, would not
enjoin the creation of hero cults if human souls simple dissipated upon death.127 On this basis,
Plutarch further emphasizes the link between providence, the immortality of the soul, and the
existence of punishment and reward after death:
“There is, therefore, a single account (logos),” I said, “confirming both the providence of
god and the persistence of the human soul: it is not possible to destroy the one, and to
leave the other intact. It is yet more likely that rewards and punishments are rendered to
the soul after its death, for it contends in life like an athlete, but it is only when it has
contended that it obtains what is fitting.”128
Plutarch’s insistence on connection between providence and punishment, however, faces some
difficult counterexamples from broader Greek thought on divine vengeance. Much of De sera is
concerned with punishment that appears to be delayed until later in a criminal’s life, but what
about the case of inherited guilt, where punishment is delayed until subsequent generations?129
Traditional Greek ideas about divine retribution pose difficulties for the interlocutors. The
distinction between punishments in life and those in death provides Plutarch with one solution:130

τρυφερᾷ…; 560c). The image of the gardens of Adonis is drawn from Phdr. 276b. This seems like a circular
argument for the immortality of the soul, given that it assumes what the dialogue sets out to defend, but perhaps it is
fitting for a dialogue that is more of an exhortation to believing but shaken Platonists than an attempt to convince
any Epicureans. It is also reminiscent of Socrates’ initial argument for the immortality of the soul in Resp. X (608cd).
127
“And as long many things are prophesied in even our day, such as the sort they say was announced to Korax of
Naxos, it is not pious to pronounce death upon the soul” (ἄρχι <δὲ> τοῦ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα προθεσπίζεσθαι καὶ καθ’
ἡμᾶς, οἷα καὶ Κόρακι τῷ Ναξίῳ χρησθῆναι λέγουσιν, οὐχ ὅσιον ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς καταγνῶναι θάνατον; 560d). This
appeal to Delphi has led some to label De sera as a “Pythian dialogue,” as described in De E 384e, such as Frazier
(2010a). See also Ziegler (1949: 190-2).
128
“εἷς οὖν ἐστι λόγος,” ἔφην, “ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ
θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον. οὔσῃ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἔτι καὶ τιμὰς
ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τιμωρίας. ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς τὸν βίον, ὅταν δὲ διαγωνίσηται, τότε τυγχάνει τῶν
προσηκόντων” (560f-1a). Plutarch’s Theon uses the same athletic metaphor in Non posse (1105c). Sallustius’
Neoplatonic handbook, after discussing why punishments in life are delayed—to allow for displays of virtue (De
deis et mund. XIX.1)—similarly appeals to punishments after death: “they are punished when they leave the body,
some wandering here, others going into some hot or cold places of the earth, and others will thrown into disorder by
daemones—they endure everything along with their irrational part, with which they did wrong” (κολάζονται δὲ τοῦ
σώματος ἐξελθοῦσαι· αἱ μὲν ἐνταῦθα πλανώμεναι, αἱ δὲ εἴς τινας τόπους τῆς γῆς θερμοὺς ἢ ψυχρούς, αἱ δὲ ὑπὸ
δαιμόνων ταραττόμεναι· πάντα δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἀλόγου ὑπομένουσι, μεθ’ ἧσπερ καὶ ἥμαρτον; §2). Cf. Vernière (1974)
on Sall. De diis et mund. IX (105).
129
Cf. Cotta in Cic. Nat. D. III.38.90. On the structure of the arguments, see Saunders (1993: 72).
130
In Non posse, Theon uses the same metaphor more expansively (1105c-d).
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“but the punishments or rewards which the soul has for itself when it is there, these are nothing
to us as we live—they even elicit disbelief or go unnoticed; but the punishments that come
through children and famous lineages to progeny deter and draw away many of the wicked.”131
There is nothing worse than causing one’s children to suffer, he continues, and so there is no
greater disincentive from wickedness than ancestral guilt. This appeal to the deterrent effect of
punishment is rather austere, but Plutarch also more palatably argues that punishment for the
crimes of ancestors could serve the descendant’s own good, as an early correction for the seeds
of evil.
The speech that Plutarch explicitly marks off as the logos before the mythos is centered
around a medical discussion: “Bion says that god punishing the children of the wicked is even
more laughable than a doctor curing an offspring or a child for the sickness of its father and
grandfather, but these things are in a sense befitting (ἐοικότα) and similar.”132 Plutarch expands
Plato’s motif of curative punishment from a metaphor into a parallel phenomenon, arguing that
moral proclivities are passed down just like physical dispositions.133 Apparently physical

ἀλλ’ ἃς μὲν ἐκεῖ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν οὖσα κομίζεται τῶν προβεβιωμένων χάριτας ἢ τίσεις, οὐθέν εἰσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς
ζῶντας, ἀλλ’ ἀπιστοῦνται καὶ λανθάνουσιν· αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν παίδων ἰοῦσαι καὶ διὰ γένους ἐμφανεῖς τοῖς δεῦρο
γενόμεναι πολλοὺς ἀποτρέπουσι καὶ συστέλλουσι τῶν πονηρῶν (561a).
132
ὁ γὰρ Βίων τὸν θεὸν κολάζοντα τοὺς παῖδας τῶν πονηρῶν γελοιότερον εἶναί φησιν ἰατροῦ διὰ νόσον πάππου καὶ
πατρὸς ἔκγονον ἢ παῖδα φαρμακεύοντος ἔστι δὲ πῆ μὲν ἀνόμοια τὰ πράγματα πῆ δ’ ἐοικότα καὶ ὅμοια (561c = frg.
27 Kindstrand). Plutarch’s initial discussion, however, addresses the dissimilarity of medicine and punishment:
“One person being treated for an illness does not free another from it, nor would someone suffering from eye disease
or fever fare better by seeing another getting treated by anointment or poultice; but punishments of the wicked are
shown to all for this reason, that the work of justice, conducted according to reason, is to restrain some men through
the punishment of others” (νόσου μὲν γὰρ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐ παύει θεραπευόμενος, οὐδὲ βέλτιόν τις ἔσχε τῶν
ὀφθαλμιώντων ἢ πυρεττόντων ἰδὼν ἄλλον ὑπαλειφόμενον ἢ καταπλαττόμενον· αἱ δὲ τιμωρίαι τῶν πονηρῶν διὰ
τοῦτο δείκνυνται πᾶσιν, ὅτι δίκης κατὰ λόγον περαινομένης ἔργον ἐστὶν ἑτέρους δι’ ἑτέρων κολαζομένων ἐπισχεῖν;
561c). Kindstrand (1976) deems “comparisons and pictures from the field of medicine” to be “very popular both
with Bion and with the Cynics in general,” comparing Philo De prov. II.2 and Cic. Nat. D. III.38.90 (228, cf. 62).
His general assessment is, despite the tradition that connects Bion to the Academy and the Cyrenaics as well, that
“the Cynic school was of overwhelming significance” over his thought (77).
133
Cf. Xenophontos (2016): “Plutarch consistently rates environment higher than heredity and emphasizes the need
for proper training in human life… It is true that there are some scattered instances in his work where the importance
of inherited traits is attested. … However, Plutarch does not systematically reflect on this” (27). She cites parts of
De sera, but not Plutarch’s most extensive treatment of ancestral punishment, his argument against Bion.
131
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remedies, as Plutarch understands them, can help root out inherited ailments before they worsen
into serious conditions:
Bion does not understand how his comparandum is actually similar to what he sought.
Consider when a man begins to fall into a dreadful sickness that is not yet incurable, and
then gives his body over to suffering by some incontinence or softness and is destroyed:
the son does not seem to be sick, but only has a propensity for the same sickness; a doctor
or a relative or a healer or a good master notices it and hurls him into a stern lifestyle. He
takes away his meats and cakes and drinks and women; continuously applying drugs and
working them with exercises, he turns the small seed away from great suffering and
prevents it from progressing into disaster.134
Plutarch goes on to provide additional arguments and examples of inherited physical
characteristics, preempting counter-examples by suggesting that wicked characters can skip
generations.135 Moral punishments similarly prevent bad dispositions from worsening into
wickedness: “it is for the sake of doctoring that the god often punishes the inclination to adultery
or greed or injustice, removing the evil before it can overtake entirely, like epilepsy.” 136 Although
he also discusses the preventative force of this sort of punishment, Plutarch’s elucidation of the
curative effect is far more extensive and emphatic. Jan Opsomer, however, objects to the idea
that punishment of someone innocent of any wicked action could be justified on the basis of

ᾗ δὲ προσέοικε τῷ ζητουμένῳ τὸ παραβαλλόμενον [ὑπὸ τοῦ Βίωνος], ἔλαθεν αὐτόν· ἤδη γὰρ ἀνδρὸς εἰς νόσημα
μοχθηρὸν οὐ μὴν ἀνίατον ἐμπεσόντος, εἶτ’ ἀκρασίᾳ καὶ μαλακίᾳ προεμένου τῷ πάθει τὸ σῶμα καὶ διαφθαρέντος
υἱὸν οὐ δοκοῦντα νοσεῖν ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν νόσον ἰατρὸς ἢ οἰκεῖος ἢ ἀλείπτης
καταμαθὼν ἢ δεσπότης χρηστὸς ἐμβαλὼν εἰς δίαιταν αὐστηρὰν καὶ ἀφελὼν ὄψα καὶ πέμματα καὶ πότους καὶ
γύναια, φαρμακείαις δὲ χρησάμενος ἐνδελεχέσι καὶ διαπονήσας γυμνασίοις ἐσκέδασε καὶ ἀπέπεμψε μεγάλου
πάθους σπέρμα μικρόν, οὐκ ἐάσας εἰς μέγεθος προελθεῖν (561c). On Plutarch’s knowledge of medicine. See Durling
(1995). Plutarch quotes Bion on nine occasions, according to Kindstrand (1976: 304), including on another religious
topic in De superst. (168d-e).
135
Plutarch gives examples that prove “good men come from bad ones” (ἐκ κακῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ δ’ ἦσαν; 563a)
and argues that certain bodily attributes, such as black skin or a birthmark shaped like a spearhead, can lay dormant
but reappear several generations later (563a-b).
136
… [ὁ θεὸς] ἰατρείας ἕνεκα τὸν μοιχικὸν τὸν καὶ τὸν πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ ἀδικητικὸν κολόζει πολλάκις, ὥσπερ
ἐπιληψίαν τὴν κακίαν πρὶν ἢ καταλαβεῖν ἀναιρῶν (562d). Russell (1972) finds in 562b-d “the essentials of
Plutarch’s convictions about the nature of man and his capacity for improvement,” which he takes to be a “somber
but not despairing creed” (86-7). Opsomer (2016) is less positive: “Descendants are always punished for their own
shortcomings. If we take him at his word, this would mean that in fact there is no punishment of descendants for the
crimes of ancestors. Nice as this solution would be – it would dispense with the unfortunate idea of punishment of
innocents – it is not warranted by the preceding arguments” (54; cf. 47-8).
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disposition or propensity.137 Yet Plotinus also defends punishment based on disposition as a part
of the providential governance of the world.138 There is nothing incoherent in the idea of curing
anyone disposed to become wicked with a milder punishment than what would come later if they
fell into depravity. This schema of punishment for ancestral guilt as the cure for the descendant
is, of course, only likely, but its likelihood is grounded in Plutarch’s attitude of pious skepticism
about the divine governance of the world.139
This account of ancestral guilt befits the broader argument of the dialogue, where the
curative role of punishment is consistently, but not exclusively, emphasized. Early on, Plutarch
grounds the subsequent discussion with pious skepticism by a comparison between divine
punishment and medicine:
It cannot be that it is difficult for a layman to understand the reasoning of a doctor (why
he did not cut earlier but does later, why he did not burn yesterday but does today), but
2016: “Yet before he made the claim about the hereafter, he had already admitted that innocents are punished
instead of the actual criminals. He retracts the claim at the end of the dialogical section, but only half-heartedly.
Some of the arguments he made before and some of the elements in the myth contradict that retraction. Fate can be
cruel” (56). Plutarch’s argument about genetic wickedness does not seem half-hearted, partly because of his concern
to qualify it with the possibility of exceptions, but especially because it relates to the broader problem of moral luck:
as Plato describes in the myth of Er, it is easier to be a just person, at least in a non-philosophical way, in a
prosperous city (X.619c-d)—which can lead to bad results that do not seem to be the due to the fault of such a
person. It is, presumably, also easier to become just with just parents (e.g. Crat. 393e-4a), although there are famous
exceptions (e.g. Pr.t 319d-20a, Alc. I 118d-e); the added shame of good ancestors seeing a bad descendant,
moreover, is emphasized in the De Sera myth (565b). Cf. Sall. De diis et mund. XX.2. Vernière (1974) deems “les
considérations médicales” to be “entachées de bizarres superstitions” (107), suggesting that the persistence of older,
“primitive” ideas, such as “atavisme physiologique” (107-9), to explain them. On the intellectual context of modern
repugnance at the idea of ancestral guilt, see also Gagné (2013: 123-4). Cf. Froidefond (1987: 186 with n6).
138
After describing how souls might begin to deviate from the proper path, Plotinus argues: “punishment surely
follows: and it is not unjust for a man becoming such a person to suffer what is attendant to his disposition; nor must
it be demanded that these people be happy, the sort whose deeds are not worthy of happiness. Only the good are
happy” (ἐπεταί γε μὴν δίκη· καὶ οὐκ ἄδικον τοιόνδε γενόμενον ἀκόλουθα πάσχειν τῇ διαθέσει, οὐδ’ ἀπαιτητέον
τούτοις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται εὐδαιμονίας ἄξια. οἱ δ’ ἀγαθοὶ μόνοι εὐδαίμονες; III.2.4.44-8).
139
We are ignorant of which people might become wicked, “but the god is surely not ignorant of the disposition and
nature of each, since by nature he perceives more of soul than body” (ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς οὔτ’ ἀγνοεῖ δήπου τὴν ἑκάστου
διάθεσιν καὶ φύσιν ἅτε δὴ ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκώς; 562c-d); “therefore, let me use the likely
alone… Allow me to deliver the likely over to the logos: we will later, if it seems best, shake out the mythos, if it is
indeed a mythos at least” (μόνῳ οὖν χρῶμαι τῷ εἰκότι… ἐάσατ’… ἀποδοῦναί με τῷ λόγῳ τὸ εἰκός· ὕστερον δὲ τὸν
μῦθον, ἐὰν δόξῃ, κινήσομεν, εἴ γε δὴ μῦθός ἐστιν; 561b); “this is no longer within Hesiod’s authority, nor the work
of human wisdom, but of your—the overseeing and distinguishing between those with harmonious passions and
those that are otherwise, before their fall into great disharmonies through their passions” (ἐκεῖνο δ’ οὐκέτι καθ’
Ἡσίοδον οὐδ’ ἀνθρωπίνης ἔργον σοφίας ἀλλὰ θεοῦ, τὸ διορᾶν καὶ διαισθάνεσθαι τὰς ὁμοιοπαθείας καὶ τὰς
διαφοράς, πρὶν εἰς μεγάλα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐμπεσούσας ἀδικήματα γενέσθαι καταφανεῖς; 562a-b).
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for a mortal to easily or confidently say anything about the divine, other than that it
knows the right time for curing wickedness and applies the punishment to each as a drug,
one with no common measure of intensity nor for the same interval for everyone.140
He carries the comparison further, and formally defines “judgement and announcing justice, the
greatest of all the arts” as “the doctoring of the soul.”141 From these and other passages, Robbert
van den Berg concludes that “the idea of punishment as beneficial therapy is central to his entire
treatise.”142 Some scholars, however, find tensions or even direct contradictions in the
argumentation of the dialogue.143 There are, admittedly, a few parts of the dialogue where the
corrective or curative role of punishment seems conspicuously lacking, such as the collective
punishment of cities, which Hesiod attests as a part of Zeus’ justice.144 Yet this curative role
recurs throughout the dialogue and coheres with Plutarch’s broader thought about the goodness
of the providential care of the world, such as in the explicitly anti-Epicurean dialogues. In the

οὐ γὰρ ἰατροῦ μὲν ἰδιώτην ὄντα συμβαλεῖν λογισμόν, ὡς πρότερον οὐ ἔτεμεν ἀλλ’ ὕστερον οὐδ’ ἐχθὲς ἔκαυσεν
ἀλλὰ σήμερον, ἔργον ἐστί, περὶ θεῶν δὲ θνητὸν ῥᾴδιον ἢ βέβαιον εἰπεῖν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅτι τὸν καιρὸν εἰδὼς ἄριστα τῆς
περὶ τὴν κακίαν ἰατρείας ὡς φάρμακον ἑκάστῳ προσφέρει τὴν κόλασιν, οὔτε μεγέθους μέτρον κοινὸν οὔτε χρόνον
ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχουσαν (549f-50a).
141
ὅτι γὰρ ἡ περὶ ψυχὴν ἰατρεία, δίκη δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνη προσαγορευομένη, πασῶν ἐστι τεχνῶν μεγίστη… (550a).
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2014: 247. He characterizes this position as “a truly Platonic perspective on punishment” (246), unlike Proclus’.
See also Vera Muñoz (1994: 199) and Frazier (2010: 196-7). Van den Berg, however, also detects a serious
philosophical issue: “From a Platonic point of view it may seem problematic to assume that physical procreation
determines one’s self. A Platonist does after all identify one’s true self with one’s soul, which already existed before
the physical body was created out of the father” (244, comparing Ti. 86c-d). Cf. Opsomer (2016): “Plutarch tends
towards emphasising the corrective and preventive functions of punishment, possibly because he feels that they offer
a better legitimation. Yet he does not get rid of the concept of punishment as retribution” (55); Brenk (1997): “On
the surface, Plutarch in the Divine Vengeance follows the corrective penology of Plato. … However, the theme of
The Divine Vengeance is not, strictly speaking, penology or conversion, but rather divine retribution” (109-10);
Griffiths (1991): “The hand of a retaliatory providence is given pride of space and emphasis; and there is a resulting
lack of cohesion and consistency, as often in Plutarch’s work. A quite different view assigns an overriding
importance to the spiritual emphasis” (83), before discussing the medical analogy for punishment (84-5).
143
Helmig (2005) suggests that the intended audience is non-philosophical, which he takes to explain both the “ad
hominem” arguments against Epicurean arguments and the discussion of “popular views on theodicy” (330), such as
divine wrath (328). He holds that the structure, however, is coherent, and even rhetorically effective for this
audience. Cf. Opsomer (2016): “Charitable readers may want to save Plutarch’s face by claiming that any infelicities
of the arguments are attributable to ‘Plutarch’ alone, not to our author. However, we should not let Plutarch get
away with it that easily. ‘Plutarch’ is all to obviously a spokesman for Plutarch” (55).
144
558e-9a. Cf. Hes. Op.: “often even an entire city suffers because of an evil man, who transgresses and devises
wicked deeds” (πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα, / ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται;
240-1).
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Non posse, Theon argues that it is not just acceptable for the wicked to fear justified
punishments, but even beneficial.145 Fear, he argues, deters them from committing crimes:
The unjust and wicked, to start, dread punishments and vengeance and so fear to do
anything bad, and for this reason they have more leisure while living more pleasurably
(ἥδιον) and with less anxiety (ἀταρακτότερον), since Epicurus thinks that there is no
other reason to avoid wrong-doing than fear of punishments. Therefore, there is a need to
fill their minds with superstition and to force upon them the fears and terrors and chasms
and fears and suspicions from the heavens and the earth if they are about to be shocked
by them and to thus become more suitable and mild. For it is to their advantage to fear
the things after death, lest they be unjust or, if they are unjust, to carry on their life
precariously in dread.146
Theon’s assumption seems to be that only the wicked reasonably fear punishments after death,
which indicates that he understands them as penalties for wickedness. 147 The many, who are
neither too good nor too bad, do not tend to fear this sort of punishment, he argues, but have
hopes of seeing their loved ones again, while the good can even derive pleasure from anticipating

Proclus’ commentary on the myth of Er, on the other hand, defends the appropriateness of horrifying threats of
punishment, at least when they are held out only towards the most wicked: “Plato does not distance himself from
every mythology, but that which advances through shameful and lawless fictions, the sort of mythology both Homer
all Hesiod wrote, Plato does not similarly set bare these fears in the underworld, inspiring fear in souls and rendering
them fearful in the face of death, but holding these things out toward the unjust, he renders his hearers as cautious
against injustice, all but contriving the conclusion, ‘if it is preferable for you to do injustice, the most fearsome
things of the prisons are preferable for you: flee these things too with all your power. For justice must also be fled by
you’” (Πλάτων οὐ πᾶσαν ἐκποδὼν ἐποίησεν μυθολογίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἀθέσμων πλασμάτων
χωροῦσαν, οἵαν Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἐγραψάτην, καὶ οὐδὲ τὰ δείματα ταῦτα <τὰ> ἐν Ἅιδου γυμνὰ τέθεικεν, τὰς
ψυχὰς δεδιττόμενος καὶ πρὸς θάνατον περιφόρους ἀποτελῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις αὐτὰ προτείνων πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν
ἀπεργάζεται τοὺς ἀκούοντας εὐλαβεῖς, μονονουχὶ συνημμένον πλέκων ‘εἰ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ὑμῖν αἱρετόν, τὰ φρικωδέστατα
τῶν κολαστηρίων ὑμῖν ἐστιν αἱρετά· ταῦτα δὲ φεύγετε παντὶ σθένει· φευκτέον ἄρα ὑμῖν καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν’; In Remp.
II.106.23-7.5).
146
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄδικοι καὶ πονηροὶ τὰς καθ’ Ἅιδου δίκας καὶ τιμωρίας δεδιότες καὶ φοβούμενοι κακουργεῖν καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντες ἥδιον βιώσονται καὶ ἀταρακτότερον. οὐ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῆς ἀδικίας οἵεται
δεῖν ἀπείργειν ἢ φόβῳ κολάσεων. ὥστε καὶ προσεμφορητέον ἐκείνοις τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ κινητέον ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς
ἅμα τὰ ἐξ οὐρανου καὶ γῆς δείματα καὶ χάσματα καὶ φόβους καὶ ὑπονοίας εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες ὑπὸ τούτων
ἐπιεικέστερον ἔχειν καὶ πραότερον. λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον φοβουμένοις μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικοῦσιν
ἐπισφαλῶς ἐν τῷ βίῳ διάγειν καὶ περιφόβως (1104a-b). Theon argues, in line with the broader dialogue, that the
Epicurean position makes life less happy according to Epicurean metrics—pleasure and freedom from anxiety.
147
Cf. Moellering (1962): “Why help people toward or confirm them in depraved stupidity? Here Plutarch would
make a distinction between fear and reverence as well as between those who for their moral good are in need of a
thorough fright and those who for the maintenance of their human dignity need to be rescued from their quivering
dread. … Plutarch recognizes that fear results from an acceptance of the horrors of hell and impels to rites and
purgations which will assure a happy lot in the afterlife” (151).
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the potential of afterlife rewards.148 Whether or not the fear Theon attributes to the wicked is in
fact accurate, he argues that it is certainly beneficial because it deters them from wickedness,
which allows them to live not only a life that is more just and good, but also more pleasant and
less anxious. According to both Platonic and Epicurean conceptions of happiness, fear of the
proper sort of punishment, based on the ultimate moral fairness of the world, can only be good.
Plutarch’s formulation and depiction of afterlife punishment thus reflects a thorough
response to Colotes’ critique of the depiction of eschatological punishments in the myth of Er:
the depiction of curative punishments is not cruel and pointless, but rather can function as an
ethical exhortation. The next section argues that Plutarch’s own myth in De sera in fact models
such an exhortation through its depiction of the painful cures that Thespesius’ soul sees in the
journey from its body, and in his subsequent turn towards a better life. Together, the dialectical
argumentation and the mythic narrative, the logos and the mythos of Plutarch’s final speeches in
De sera, form a coherent and complementary defense against the Epicurean assault.

Cures for Plato’s incurable tyrants
While some older scholarship on the myth of De sera assumed that Plutarch was drawing
either mostly or entirely on post-Platonic sources—which was still Wolfgang Beck’s assumption
in the early nineteen-fifties—much of the scholarship emphasizes the influence of the myth of
Er.149 Some even argue that the entire structure of De sera as a whole is an imitation of the
Respublica: Thrasymachus flees the discussion of the latter, and Epicurus flees the former, for
“But for the majority, there is a hope without fear of what is in Hades beyond the stuff of myth” (τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς
καὶ ἄνευ φόβου περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου παρὰ τὸ μυθῶδες ἡ τῆς ἀιδιότητος ἐλπίς…; 1104b-c); “what do we think, then, of
the pleasures of the good and those who lived piously and justly, and who offered in addition the most beautiful and
pious of things?” (τί δῆτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἰόμεθα καὶ βεβιωκότων ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως, οἳ κακὸν μὲν οὐθὲν ἐκεῖ, τὰ δὲ
κάλλιστα καὶ θειότατα προσδοκῶσι; 1104c-d).
149
Hirzel (1895), howver, provides an early example of extensive inquiry into the relationship between the myth and
Plato (215n1).
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example.150 Recent studies have found the influence of other Platonic dialogues other than the
Respublica, such as Frederick Brenk’s analysis of ideas from the Timaeus and the Leges in the
depiction of Nero towards the end of the myth.151 Further influences are still increasingly
detected, such as by Matteo Taufer’s extensive introduction to the myth that details the broad and
varied Platonic influence, as well as that of later writers. Renaud Gagné even argues that the De
sera myth is “une refonte de toutes les catabases précédentes.”152 Claudia Wiener, however,
explains a few of Plutarch’s deviations from the myth of Er—particularly making the details
more local and less exotic, as well as decreasing the amount of time the protagonist’s soul was
outside of the body to a less incredible three days—as a response to Colotes’ polemic against
Plato.153
Although the myth of De sera clearly draws on many previous texts—various Platonic
dialogues, as well as the literary philosophy of the early Peripatetics as Gagné and others
argue—its narrative is nevertheless strikingly grounded in the myth of Er through the similarity
in their framing stories. These similarities, however, should draw even more attention to the
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See especially Helmig (2005: 324n6).
1987: 135-41. Brenk's (1977) general assement of the myth is that “the major constituent elements of the myth
reveal a great lack of originality and an exceptionally heavy dependence upon Plato” (137). According to Jones
(1916) describes comparisons between Platonic myths and the De sera narrative in Ettig’s 1891 dissertation
(43n126).
152
Taufer (1999, 2010) and Gagné (2015: 319). Taufer (2010), similarly to Gagné, but less extensively, detected
influence of “catabasi” in literature (49-50).
153
2004: “Angesichts dieser Diskussionen kann man verstehen, weshalb Plutarch bei seiner Quellenangabe und
Rahmenerzählung der Jenseitsfahrt äußerste Sorgfalt walten läßt. Jede Unwahrscheinlichkeit in der
Rahmenhandlung und jeder Hauch von Exotismus ist vermieden, die Gewährsleute sind vertrauenerweckend und
gehören zu Plutarchs Bekanntenkreis (mor. 563d). Der Held von Plutarchs Jenseitsbericht, Ardiaios bzw. Thespesios
aus Soloi, ist verwandt mit Protogenes von Tarsos, einem Gastfreund von Plutarchs Eltern in Thespiai, der Plutarchs
Gesprächspartnern und seinen Lesern aus dem Erotikos bekannt ist. Dieser Protogenes hat den Jenseitsbericht in
einem vertraulichen Gespräch unter Freunden von Thespesios selbst erfahren. Das Erlebnis, das in diesem Mann
einen auffällig positiven moralischen Wandel bewirkt hat, besteht äußerlich in einem Unfall: einem Sturz von der
Leiter und einem Schädeltrauma, das ein dreitägiges Koma verursacht. Das ist wesentlich glaubwürdiger als eine
fast zweiwöchige Bewußtlosigkeit des Pamphyliers Er. Drei Tage entsprechen dem Trauerritus, der eine Beisetzung
am dritten Tag vorsah, so daß also keine Vorgeschichte, wie der Tod auf dem Schlachtfeld, als Erklärung für die
zeitliche Verzögerung der Beisetzung konstruiert werden mußte” (60). Wiener focuses, however, on the antiEpicurean elements in the myth itself, with little reference to such polemic throughout the broader dialogue.
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underlying differences. Weiner’s approach is therefore particularly promising, especially because
of the broader orientation of the dialogue against the Epicureans and the prominence of the myth
of Er in Colotes’ anti-Platonic polemic. One particularly significant deviation from the Platonic
model, which seems motivated by Colotes’ criticisms, seems to have gone unnoticed. Scholars
have long noted the similarity between the name of Plutarch’s protagonist—Aridaeus—and the
foremost of the incurable tyrants in Plato’s myth of Er—Ardiaeus—but less attention has been
paid to the actual significance of the comparison. The Platonic figure is displayed before
approaching souls suffering gruesome—and perhaps eternal—tortures, not because they could
ever benefit him, but so as to serve as a warning to the audience.154 The Plutarchean protagonist,
on the other hand, witnesses a variety of worse but corrective punishments while he himself is
cured of his nascent descent into depravity by the vision. The depiction of painful punishments
has shifted from the conspicuous incurables in Plato towards a variety of curables in Plutarch.
In this section, I argue that Plutarch diminishes and occludes Plato’s category of
incurables in the Gorgias and the Respublica so as to present punishment as fundamentally
curative. Although all three of Plutarch’s extended myths describe divine punishments in the
course of their narratives, the descriptions of purifications before further ascent in De facie and
De genio are relatively short.155 In De sera, on the other hand, punishment is the predominant
theme and Plutarch’s adaptation of the myth of Er forms a response to Colotes’ criticism of the
torments of the tyrant Ardiaeus. Plato’s harsh display and torture of incurables left the myth of
Er open to criticism and rejection, which led some later Neoplatonists to similarly attempt to

In the myth of Er, it seems that the tortured tyrants are marked so as to show the passers-by “why they are there,
and that they were thrown into Tartarus” (ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο; X.616a);
there does not seem to be any indication of a cessation to torture in the Grg. myth either.
155
De fac. 943c and De gen. 591c.
154
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dismantle the category:156 Olympiodorus resorts to a philological argument, for instance, to
explain the idea away, lest it contradict the cyclical argument in the Phaedo, among other
motivations.157 These are serious concerns, so, by diminishing the presence of incurables,
Plutarch reinforces the arguments in the rest of the dialogue, which the last section examined, for
punishment as essentially curative—corrections carried out for the good of the punished.
The myth, however, is certainly a complex work of literature, brimming with imagstic,
varied, and arresting details: Ardiaeus’ soul “was lifted a bit and the whole seemed to breathe
and see in every direction, because the one eye of the soul was opened,” although he recognized
nothing at first but the stars;158 then he sees souls making fiery bubbles, which burst and leave a
light and ethereal material that seems to act as a sort of chariot for the immaterial souls;159 there
Bernstein (1993) notes, “Significantly, there is no further mention of the incurable in oblivion” (78). He does not,
however, draw any conclusions from this observation. Krasovec (1993), on the other hand, emphasizes the
incurables in the myth (25), based on the metaphorical use of incurable (τῶν ἀναιτίων) in the discussion of cities
(556e), and compares the theme in De sera with divine retribution in the “Hebrew Bible” (28). Betz et al. (1975)
similarly compare the “paraenetic” purpose of the myth as a whole with the scenes of incurables in the Platonic
myths. Cf. Jones (1916): Plutarch “seems to have interpreted the traditional punishment of the soul of the incurably
wicked, as taught in Plato’s Phaedo, Gorgias and Republic, but occurring [in] Plutarch’s myths only in de sera
vindicta (564Fff.), as virtual annihilation. It is hard to see, however, how, even in this form, it could have had a
place in his thought, and in view of the fact that it does not appear in the other greater myths, I should hesitate about
affirming that it formed any real part of his belief” (67). Vera Muñoz (1994) addresses the phenomenon of “Lo
incurable,” but only really in the context of 551d-e, on which much of the discussion is philological (202-3). Many
scholars do not even address the treatment of incurables: Vernière (1974), for instance, identifies the only “deux
nouveautés” as, first, the image of naked souls as “scolopendres” and the descendants berating their guilty ancestor,
and, second, the use of forging implements and imagery (118). Cf. Brenk (1994: 16).
157
He argues in a lemma on Phd. 72b that “if he means that everything living comes from the dead and the reverse,
then you have a corollary that Plato does not mean that there is eternal punishment, but that punished souls go back
again to life. If he elsewhere says, ‘the eternal punishment,’ he therefore calls an aeon some period and return back”
(εἰ βούλεται τὰ ζῶντα πάντα ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, πόρισμα ἔχεις ἐντεῦθεν ὅτι οὐ βούλεται ὁ Πλάτων
εἶναι ἀίδιον κόλασιν, ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἔρχεσθαι εἰς βίον τὰς ἀκολάστους ψυχάς. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ λέγει “αἰώνιον τὴν
κόλασιν [Grg. 525c, e],” ἀλλ’ οὖν αἰῶνα καλεῖ περίοδόν τινα καὶ ἀποκατάστασιν; 10.14). Olympiodorus goes onto
reject belief in an eternal ascent, which Damascius, attributing it to Iamblichus, also connects with eternal
punishment (In Phd. I.492, ad 107e). See further §547-8. Proclus approaches the problem less directly: commenting
on the myth of Er, he argues that Ardiaeus and the other souls are only punished “as long as they need punishment”
(ἕως ἂν δέωνται κολάσεως), supplying details from the myth in the Phd. (II.179.9-24).
158
εἶτα μικρὸν ἐξαρθεὶς ἔδοξεν ἀναπνεῖν ὅλος καὶ περιορᾶν πανταχόθεν, ὥσπερ ἑνὸς ὄμματος ἀνοιχθείσης τῆς
ψυχῆς (563e).
159
“Leaving aside most of the sights, he said that the souls of the dead go up from below and make fiery bubbles as
the air is displaced, and then the bubble calmly breaks and souls depart bearing an impression like a human but
compact in mass, and moving not similarly…” (τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῶν θεαμάτων παραλιπὼν ἔφη τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν
τελευτώντων κάτωθεν ἀνιούσας πομφόλυγα φλογοειδῆ ποεῖν ἐξισταμένου τοῦ ἀέρος, εἶτα ῥηγνυμένης ἀτρέμα τῆς
156
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is a place “similar to Bacchic glades,” called Lethe, where the souls of the inhabitants are so
filled with desire for pleasure that they return back to earth (gê)—back into gêneration;160 there
are strange oracles and the protagonist hears prophecies, including the time of his own death.161 It
is also a terrifying narrative that ends when the protagonist, abandoned by his guide, sees “a
woman taking hold of him, marvelous in form and immensity, who said ‘come now, so that you
might remember these last things more,’ brandishing some fiery rod, like a painter”—before “he
is pulled back as if by a cord” and returns to his body upon the grave.162 It might, therefore, risk
reductionism to emphasize one argumentative thread such as the curative role of punishment in
such a rich mythic narrative.163 Yet Lamprias, as discussed above, interpreted the myth of Er by
identifying an essential ethical core to the myth and by leaving the imagistic details as bolstering
or reinforcing at best. The core of the mythos in De sera seems to be that afterlife punishment
must have a curative function, which reinforces the ideas about ancestral guilt analyzed in the
logos, especially through the medical analogy. Even the most pitiable of the punished, those who

πομφόλυγος ἐκβαίνειν τύπον ἐχούσας ἀνθρωποειδῆ τὸν δ’ ὄγκον εὐσταλεῖς, κινουμένας δ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως…; 563f-4a).
See further 564d. He then describes the chaos of bad souls, and the reaction of good souls to both sorts (564a-b).
Jones (1916) argues that the “ὄχημα” is not what bursts (47n137), but, if this is the operative concept, the “cause of
the soul’s taking this form” (47-8). Wiener (2004) analyzes this aspect of Plutarch’s myth as filling an
“Informationslücke” in the myth of Er (60): this at least gives an account of how souls can recognize one another,
for instance (61-2).
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… ὀφθῆναι τοῖς βακχικοῖς ἄντροις… (565f); “and the place is called Lȇthȇ. … the yearning for the memory and
desire drag the heavy soul back into generation, which is named thus because it is an inclination (neusis) towards
earth (gē) by through its pliancy (καλεῖσθαι δὲ Λήθης τὸν τόπον. … ἐκ δὲ τῆς μνήμης ἵμερον καὶ πόθον ἕλκοντα
πρὸς γένεσιν, ἣν οὕτως ὠνομάσθαι, νεῦσιν ἐπὶ γῆν οὖσαν ὑγρότητι βαρυνομένης τῆς ψυχῆς; 566a). Jones (1916)
compares this place to the plain of Lȇthȇ in the myth of Er (44-6), suggesting that Plutarch’s adaptation is perhaps a
“symbolic account of the fall of the soul from a higher state, to be put along side of Amatorius 766B…” (45).
161
… ἀλλ’ ἤκουε παριὼν φωνὴν ὀξεῖαν γυναικὸς ἐν μέτρῳ φράζουσαν ἄλλα τινὰ καὶ χρόνον, ὡς ἔοικε, τῆς ἐκείνου
τελευτῆς. ἔλεγε δ’ ὁ δαίμων τὴν φωνὴν εἶναι Σιβύλλης… (566d).
162
γυναῖκα γὰρ αὐτοῦ λαβομένην θαυμαστὴν τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, “δεῦρο δή,” εἰπεῖν, “οὗτος, ὅπως ἕκαστα
μᾶλλον μνημονεύσῃς,” καί τι ῥαβδίον, ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, διάπυρον προσάγειν· ἑτέραν δὲ κωλύειν, αὐτὸν δ’
ὥσπερ ὑπ’ ἴυγγος ἐξαίφνης σπασθέντα πνεύματι νεανικῷ σφόδρα καὶ βιαίῳ τῷ σώματι προσπεσεῖν καὶ ἀναβλέψαι
σχεδὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μνήματος (568a). Brenk (1997) deems this “a deconstructionist note” (112).
163
E.g. compared to Frazier's (2010) identification of two dimensions: “Dans le mythos comme dans le logos
apparait ainsi une double dimension, que je dirais volontiers éthique et pythique, dans la mesure ou Delphes est un
des lieux privilégiés de ce qui reste la question essentielle pour Plutarque, quel que soit l’angle sous lequel il
l’aborde, justice de la Providence ou mantique : la relation entre hommes et dieu” (209).
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think they are through but require still further punishment, are all in the category of the curably
wicked, which is radically expanded in Plutarch’s treatment.164 The mythos is certainly a rich,
fantastically imagistic piece of literature, but some of the scholarship is so swept away by the
details that these central ethical ideas are utterly lost; they are even less often contextualized
within the broader dialogue.165 The vision, moreover, serves the role as an ethical exhortation that
is especially effective upon the myth’s protagonist, who is particularly vulnerable to many
elements he encounters in the vision. When he first perceives the ostensible pleasures of the
glades of Lehe, for instance, he rushes to join:
The guide did not allow Thespesius to spend time here (although he wanted to), but
dragged him away by force while teaching and proclaiming that the rational part is
melted away and liquified by pleasure but the irrational and corporeal part, since it is
watery and corporeal, implants the memory of the body.166
In corporeal life, the young rake’s appetite for pleasure leads him to increasing acts of depravity,
while in death, Plutarch illustrates how the same proclivity can lead souls to entrap themselves in
the cycle of reincarnation.

“He said that the most pitiable of all were those that seemed to have discharged their sentence, but were
apprehended again” (πάντων δὲ πάσχειν ἔλεγεν οἰκτρότατα τὰς ἤδη δοκούσας ἀφεῖσθαι τῆς δίκης, εἶτ’ αὖθις
συλλαμβανομένας; 567d). These are the sort whose progeny may inherit punishment: they are described as
haraunging their guilty ancestor when they arrive, further adding painful shame to the punishment (567d-e).
Similarly, 565d: “But up until this point when these things are still present, some relapses of the passions occur and
bear pulsations and throbbings: for some they are dim and quickly quenched, but for others they strain on
stubbornly. Of these, there are those who are punished again and again…” (μέχρι δ’ οὗ ταῦτ’ ἔνεστι, γίνονταί τινες
ὑποτροπαὶ τῶν παθῶν σφυγμοὺς ἔχουσαι καὶ πήδησιν, ἐνίαις μὲν ἀμυδρὰν καὶ ταχὺ κατασβεννυμένην ἐνίαις δὲ
νεανικῶς ἐντείνουσαν. ὧν αἱ μὲν πάλιν καὶ πάλιν κολασθεῖσαι…).
165
Aguilar (1996), for example, focuses almost exclusively on the traditional understanding of the names of mythic
figures (286-90). Regarding Erinys, she emphasizes that there is just one rather than the traditional three, but does
not even mention that she punishes incurables’only “quien persigue a los culpables que intentan escaper” (287).
Santamaría Álvarez (2007) has a similar approach in a sense, in seeking verbal echoes from early authors such as
Homer (879-82), but also, more briefly and speculatively, Heraclides of Pontus and Clearchus of Soli (884).
Surprisingly, he argues that Plutarch bases the protagonist on Virgil’s Palinurus in Aen. VI, as well as the Homeric
model Elpenor in Od. XI (885-6).
166
ὅθεν οὐδὲ διατρίβειν βουλόμενον εἴα τὸν Θεσπέσιον, ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖλκε βίᾳ, διδάσκων ἅμα καὶ λέγων ὡς ἐκτήκεται
καὶ ἀνυγραίνεται τὸ φρονοῦν ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὸ δ’ ἄλογον καὶ σωματοειδὲς ἀρδόμενον καὶ σαρκούμενον ἐμποιεῖ
τοῦ σώματος μνήμην (566a). Brenk (2017) takes this aspect of the scene to be general, reflecting a “lack of
conscious choice” and an “almost natural drift downward,” faced by every soul (58), but it is a particular
circumstance of the protagonist’s character that he is inclined towards it, not a feature shared by every soul.
164
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Plato’s Er and Plutarch’s Aridaeus share the basic experience of their visions, a neardeath experience leading to the soul’s journey outside the body, but their circumstances differ
greatly. The narrator of Plato’s myth seems rather neutral and generic—hence his unusually short
name (Ἤρ), more reminiscent of a noun-ending than a distinctive appellation—and his origin
from the generalized “Everytribe” (τὸ γένος Παμφύλου)—unless his temporary status as one of
the war dead elevates him to some extent.167 Aridaeus, on the other hand, is given a detailed and
moralizing narrative background. He is a previously wealthy young man who squandered his
fortune with extravagance and, after it was gone, became increasingly willing to do anything to
regain the pleasures he previously enjoyed.168 This specific moral fault, knavery in the pursuit of
profligacy and pleasure-seeking greed, runs through Plutarch’s narrative. Before the blow on the
neck that led to the vision, for instance, the protagonist sends for an oracle: “But what threw him
most into infamy was a prophecy brought back from Amphilochus. For he had sent to ask the
god how it seemed, if he would live the rest of his life better. He received that he will do better,

Earlier in the Resp., Socrates cites Hesiod’s description of the blessed golden race’s fate after death—“they are
called blessed daemones upon the earth, good, warders of evils, guardians of mortal humans” (τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες
ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι καλέονται / ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων; Op. 121-2)—to argue for a daimonic
fate for the war dead: “and so then, would we say that one of those who dying on campaign that dies esteemed is not
only one of the golden race? … but should we not be persuaded by Hesiod that whenever some of that race…” (τῶν
δὲ δὴ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ὃς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ ἆρ᾽ οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους
εἶναι; … ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ, ἐπειδάν τινες τοῦ τοιούτου γένους τελευτήσωσιν…; V.468e). Cf. Cra. 398b.
Er’s near-death among this special group elaborates the exoticism of the mythic vision he relates next to the public
pyres. On this category in Athenian religion, see Parker (1996: 136n53).
168
“I said, then, that Thespesius of Soli—who once was with us here, a neighbor and relative of Protogenes—lived
in great dissolutionment at first but quickly destroyed his fortune already in a short while and became a pauper by
necessity. He pursued wealth due to a change in mind and suffered the same misfortunate as other dissolute men,
like those who have wives but do not keep them, yet, once they let them go, unjustly attempt to be with them once
they are married to others. Then he withheld from no shame as long as it leads to pleasure or profit, and, while he
did not amass much profit, he earned the greatest reputation for knavery in a short time” (οὕτως οὖν ἔφην ὅτι ὁ
Σολεὺς Θεσπέσιος, ἀνὴρ ἐκείνου τοῦ γενομένου μεθ’ ἡμῶν ἐνταῦθα Πρωτογένους οἰκεῖος καὶ φίλος, ἐν πολλῇ
βιώσας ἀκολασίᾳ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον εἶτα ταχὺ τὴν οὐσία πονηρός καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκ μετανοίας διώκων ταὐτὸ τοῖς
ἀκολάστοις ἔπασχε πάθος, οἳ τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχοντες μὲν οὐ φυλάττουσι, προέμενοι δὲ πειρῶσιν αὖθις ἀδίκως ἑτέροις
συνούσας [διαφείρειν]. οὐδενὸς οὖν ἀπεχόμενος αἰσχροῦ φέροντος εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν ἢ κέρδος οὐσίαν μέν οὐ πολλὴν
δόξαν δὲ πονηρίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ πλείστην συνήγαγε; 563b-c). Gagné (2015) detects a reference to an earlier writer in
Plutarch’s toponym: “Sa ville d’origine, Soloi, est bien sûr un clin d’oeil à Cléarque de Soloi, l’auteur du grand récit
catabatique contenu dans le Περὶ ὕπνου, que l’on connaît à travers Proclus” (317).
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when he died.”169 The response plays on the irony between his materialistic intention and the
moral meaning behind the oracle: he surely thought it meant “do better” as returning to wealth
and prosperity, but it turns out that comes to act in a morally better way after he “dies.”170
Throughout the rest of the vision, there are a few depictions of punishment for his exact moral
failing, willingness to do evil in pursuit of greed.171 In the course of the imagistic descriptions of
punishments where daemones transfer the wicked between molten pools of gold, silver, and lead,
for instance, only applies apparently to “the souls that are wicked through avarice and greed.”172
Family, fittingly given the focus on ancestral guilt in the logos, is a key element, providing the
most arresting avenue for this vice to reemerge in the narrative. Eventually, Thespesius learns
both his father’s crimes and his fate:
Then Thespesius happened upon friends and relatives and neighbors he was not expecting
to see punished, and they lamented and called out to him as they endured terrible
sufferings and unseemly punishments and pains, but in the end he saw his own father
coming to the top of some pit, full of marks and scars. He stretches his hands towards
Thespesius and is not allowed to stay silent, but through retributions at the hands of those
who are stationed upon him he is forced to confess that he became stained by poisoning
visitors for the gold they carried, and that he managed to elude everyone there, but here
was put to shame, suffering these things and already being lead away to suffer yet more.
μάλιστα δ’ αὐτὸν διέβαλεν ἀνενεχθεῖσά τις ἐξ Ἀμφιλόχου μαντεία. πέμψας γὰρ ὡς ἔοικεν ἠρώρτα τὸν θεόν, εἰ
βέλτιον βιώσεται τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον· ὁ δ’ ἀνεῖλεν ὅτι πράξει βέλτιον, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ (563c-d). He continues, “and
not long after, this happened to him in a certain sense” (καὶ δὴ τρόπον τινὰ τοῦτο μετ’ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτῷ
συνέπεσε; 563d). On the Amphilochus oracle, cf. Wiener (2004: 60n28).
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In Simmias’ myth in De gen., there a similar sort of darkly comedic prophecy about the death of the protagonist.
After the voice refers to infernal punishments, he breaks off: “‘but these things you will know,’ he said, ‘more
clearly, young man, in three months—now go’” (“ταῦτα δὲ εἴσῃ,” φάναι, “σαφέστερον, ὦ νεανία τρίτῳ μηνί· νῦν δ’
ἄπιθι;” 592e). This better knowledge, as the reader might well expect, comes when the boy dies shortly after (592ef). This myth bears another similarity with that of De sera: Timarchus descended to the oracle of Trophonius and
“remained there below for two nights and one day, and when many were giving him up as hopeless and his relatives
were lamenting, he emerged extremely radiant at dawn” (ἐμμείνας δὲ δύο νύκτας κάτω καὶ μίαν ἡμέραν, τῶν
πολλῶν ἀπεγνωκότων αὐτὸν ἤδη καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀδυρομένων, πρωὶ μάλα φαιδρὸς ἀνῆλθε; 590a-b).
171
Brenk (1994), however, emphasizes more positive aspects of the specifics of the myth, such as the “theophanic
name” name he receives and role of the “religious shrine” in the narrative, as opposed to Er—“Plato’s is more sociopolitical in tone, Plutarch’s more theological” (11). He ignores, however, the moral differences between Er and
Aridaeus. See also Brenk's (1997: 113) and Boulet (2010): “The myth tells two stories: as a simple myth, it foretells
of the horrible punishments awaiting wrongdoers in the afterlife; as an allegory, it points to the happy ascension of
the philosophical soul in the philosopher’s earthly life. While the superstitious reading of the myth is eerie and full
of gruesome details, the allegorical reading is wonderful and uplifting” (63-4).
172
… τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δι’ ἀπληστίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν πονηρῶν (567c). On the “lakes” (λίμνας) of molten metals and
the “daemones like bronzesmiths” (δαίμονας ὥσπερ οἱ χαλκεῖς): 567b-d.
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Thespesius did not dare to either supplicate or beseech on behalf of his father because of
terror and fear, rather he wanted to turn away and flee, but he no longer saw the gentle
and familiar guide…173
Thespesius does not attempt to argue that his father’s punishment is undeserved, due to this
mechanism of compelled confession—his fears turn to himself. The father’s worst crime, killing
guests for gold, seems to explain the growing evil in Aridaeus: evidently, the son inherited this
disposition to pursue money at any cost, no matter how shameful or wicked, from his
murderously greedy father. The punishment of the father is primarily aimed at ridding himself of
these greater evils, not his son, but the painful sight also works to cure the son of the still
growing seed of evil that he inherited from the father, as if this shame is a punishment upon
Aridaeus as well.174 In De sera, Plutarch thus depicts how the fear of afterlife punishments can
cure even Plato’s worst example of depravity, before he reduces himself into incurable evil.
The myth treats the categorization of curables and incurables more systematically than
the others in Plutarch, but in a manner more similar to Plato’s Phaedo.175 In its treatment of the
incurables, however, it is substantially divergent from De sera’s most obvious Platonic model,
the myth of Er, as well as Socrates’ final speech in the Gorgias, which is another prominent

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ φίλοις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ συνήθεσιν ὁ Θεσπέσιος οὐκ ἂν προσδοκήσας κολαζομένοις ἐνετύγχανε, καὶ
δεινὰ παθήματα καὶ τιμωρίας ἀσχήμονας καὶ ἀλγεινὰς ὑπομένοντες ᾠκτίζοντο πρὸς ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀνεκλαίοντο, τέλος
δὲ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατεῖδεν ἔκ τινος βαράθρου στιγμάτων καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὸν ἀναδυόμενον, ὀρέγοντα τὰς
χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ σιωπᾶν οὐκ ἐώμενον ἀλλ’ ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστώτων ταῖς τιμωρίαις, ὅτι περὶ
ξένους τινὰς μιαρὸς γενόμενος χρυσίον ἔχοντας φαρμάκοις διαφθείρας καὶ ἐκεῖ διαλαθὼν ἅπαντας ἐνταῦθ’
ἐξελεγχθεὶς τὰ μὲν ἤδη πέπονθε τὰ δ’ ἄγεται πεισόμενος, ἱκετεύειν μὲν ἢ παραιτεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἐτόλμα
δι’ ἔκπληξιν καὶ δέος, ὑποστρέψαι δὲ καὶ φυγεῖν βουλόμενος οὐκέτι τὸν πρᾶον ἐκεῖνον ἑώρα καὶ οἰκεῖον ξεναγόν…
(566e-7a).
174
The shame of having one’s wickedness revealed to family is a prominent theme in the myth. Dike shows the
curably wicked “first to his good parents, if there are any, as despised by and unworthy of his progenitors. But if
they are worthless, he sees them being punished and he is seen being punished for a long time, purified of each of
his passions by pains and toils, which excel punishments of the flesh in magnitude and vehemence by such an
extent, as much as waking vision is more palpable than a dream” (πρῶτον ἀγαθοῖς γονεῦσιν, ἄνπερ ὦσι, καὶ
προγόνοις αὐτοῦ πρόσπτυστον ὄντα καὶ ἀνάξιον· ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλοι, κολαζομένους ἐπιδὼν ἐκείνους καὶ ὀφθεὶς
δικαιοῦται πολὺν χρόνον ἐξαιρούμενος ἕκαστον τῶν παθῶν ἀλγηδόσι καὶ πόνοις, οἳ τοσοῦτο μεγέθει καὶ
σφοδρότητι τοὺς διὰ σαρκὸς ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὅσον τὸ ὕπαρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὀνείρατος ἐναργέστερον; 565b).
175
Cf. Griffiths (1991): “the Myth [of De sera] is clearly indebted to the Myths of Plato in the Republic and the
Phaedo” (80; cf. 76-7).
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inspiration. In the latter, Zeus is faced with the problem of the powerful but wicked being
rewarded upon their deaths, which he corrects by imposing new judges to scrutinize the souls
when they are stripped of their bodies through death.176 Only then is it possible for the judge to
see whether souls are pure, or whether, as often happens with potentates and tyrants, “he sees
nothing healthy upon the soul, rather it has been scourged thoroughly and left full of scars from
perjuries and injustices—scars which each act imprinted upon his soul.”177 The De sera myth
elaborates this motif further. When Aridaeus initially sees the souls gathering, he distinguishes
them by the presence or absence of wounds and scars:
But there are those that go with one soft and entirely continuous color, as if the purest
light of the full moon, but there are others that run through with some scales and slender
bruises, and others entirely spotted and strange in appearance, like vipers branded with
black spots, and some others still bear dim lacerations. 178
The first description of afterlife punishment—Dike’s doctoring (ἰατρεία) of evil—elaborates the
image of the scars and bruises of the impure souls, with chromatic details. After describing how
Dike parades the stripped soul, Thespesius’ guiding relative exhorts:179
But look at the various colors of every sort upon the souls! The rusty brown, the varnish
or stinginess and greed; the fiery blood-red of cruelty and bitterness; where you see the
“Next, they must be judged when they are stripped of all these things—for it is necessary that they be judged
when they are dead. And the judge must be stripped too…” (ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας
γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι; 523e).
177
κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ
ἑκάστη ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν (525a).
178
ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέν, ὥσπερ ἡ καθαρωτάτη πανσέληνος, ἓν χρῶμα λεῖον καὶ συνεχὲς ὁμαλῶς ἱέντας, ἑτέρων δὲ
φολίδας τινὰς διατρεχούσας ἢ μώλωπας ἀραιούς, ἄλλους δὲ κομιδῇ ποκίλους καὶ ἀτόπους τὴν ὄψιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἔχεις
μελάσμασι κατεστιγμένους, ἄλλους δέ τινας ἀμβελίας ἀμυχὰς ἔχοντας (564d).
179
“But he who arrives from there unpunished and impure, him Dike distinguishes manifest in his soul, naked,
bearing nothing to sink into or to hide or cover his depravity; rather, she displayed him, looked upon from every side
by everyone…” (ὃς δ’ ἂν ἐκεῖθεν ἀκόλαστος ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀκάθρτος ἐξίκηται, τοῦτον ἡ Δίκη διαλαβοῦσα τῇ ψυχῂ
καταφανῆ, γυμνόν, εἰς οὐδὲν ἔχοντα καταδῦναι καὶ ἀποκρύψασθαι καὶ περιστεῖλαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ πανταχόθεν
καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων καὶ πάντα καθορώμενον ἔδειξε…; 565a-b). This idea of the naked soul is further emphasized later,
when he describes the punishment of “all those who cast a screen and a reputation of virtue upon themselves, and
live out their lives with their evil eluding notice (ὅσοι δὲ πρόσχημα καὶ δόξαν ἀρετῆς περιβαλόμενοι διεβίωσαν
κακίᾳ λανθανούσῃ): “and there are others assigned to others, forcing them to painfully and lamentably turn what is
inside of their souls to the exterior, writhing unnaturally and turning themselves inside out, like see millepedes
turning themselves inside out when they swallow a hook” (τούτους ἐπιπόνως καὶ ὀδυνηρῶς ἠνάγκαζον ἕτεροι
περιεστῶτες ἐκτρέπεσθαι τὰ ἐντὸς ἔξω τῆς ψυχῆς, ἰλυσπωμένους παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀνακαμπτομένους, ὥσπερ αἱ
θαλάττιαι σκολόπενδραι καταπιοῦσαι τὸ ἄγκιστρον ἐκτρέπουσιν ἑαυτάς; 567a-b)
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blue-gray, some weakness for pleasure has scarcely been rubbed out; the presence of
malice, with envy, spews something green and festering, like cuttlefish do their black. For
on earth, the evil of the soul, being turned by passions and turning the body in turn,
imparts these colors, and here the end of purification and punishment is for the soul,
when all of these have been smoothed out, to become luminous and monochromatic.180
Plutarch takes this idea of wickedness as scars upon the naked soul from the Gorgias and vividly
associates different sorts of vice with different colors, rather than undifferentiated viciousness
with undifferentiated scarification.181 He even connects psychic color with purity and thus health,
which further illustrates one way in which punishment acts as if a medical cure upon the soul—
the prominent argument throughout the logos and here too in the mythos.
Yet in their treatment of the incurables, Thespesius’ vision is rather different than the
myth of the Gorgias. In the latter, the categorization between curable and incurable is central to
the system of judgement and punishment: the process begins when the judge Rhadamanthus
views the stripped soul of a wicked man and “sends it into Tartarus, marking it, if it seems to be
curable or incurable.”182 The former are eventually cured by suffering the pains of punishment,
but the latter “suffer the most painful and terrifying torments for all time because of their crimes,
as examples austerely fastened upon the wall of the underworld prison, spectacles and lessons for

ὅρα δ’ τὰ ποικίλα ταῦτα καὶ παντοδαπὰ χρώματα τῶν ψυχῶν· τὸ μὲν ὄρφνιον καὶ ῥυπαρόν, ἀνελευθερίας
ἀλοιφὴν καὶ πλεονεξίας, τὸ δ’ αἱματωπὸν καὶ διάπυρον, ὠμότητος καὶ πικρίας· ὅπου δὲ τὸ γλαύκινόν ἐστιν,
ἐντεῦθεν ἀκρασία τις περὶ ἡδονὰς ἐκτέτριπται μόλις· κακόνοια δ’ ἐνοῦσα μετὰ φθόνου τουτὶ τὸ ἰῶδες καὶ ὕπουλον,
ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ μέλαν, ἀφίησιν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ [τε] κακία τῆς ψυχῆς τρεπομένης ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν καὶ τρεπούσης τὸ
σῶμα τὰς χρόας ἀναδίδωσι, ἐνταῦθα δὲ καθαρμοῦ καὶ κολάσεως πέρας ἐστὶ τούτων ἐκλεανθέντων παντάπασι τὴν
ψυχὴν αὐγοειδῆ καὶ σύγχρουν γίνεσθαι (565c-d). On the detail of cuttlefish spewing apparently defensive ink
clouds, see De soll. anim. 976a. The imagery of staining also recalls an earlier phrase in the dialectical portion of the
treatise: “… with the result that either to plaster over and flee the inborn stain of evil…” (… ὥστ’ ἢ παντάπασιν
ἐξαλεῖψαι καὶ διαφυγεῖν ἐγγενῆ κηλῖδα τῆς κακίας, …; 562b).
181
The list of sorts of vices and corresponding colors is not exhaustive, but has thematic relevance with the rest of
the myth: Thespesius’ greatest failing is greed to feed his pleasures, and his father, who even killed for wealth (more
below) could well be imagined to have partaken in greed, hatred, and envy. Cf. Jackson et al. (1998): “Despite its
length and the power of its argument, the Gorgias was not especially influential with Plutarch of Chaeronia or
Alcinous, although it was well enough known to them” (21).
182
καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε ἰάσιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι (526b).
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any of the unjust who enter.”183 In the myth of Er, the incurables are similarly—but with greater
and more brutal detail—tortured beside the road of souls coming from their lives. In both cases,
tyrants are held to be the majority of the incurables, and their tortures are manifest to all. The
treatment of incurables in these specific dialogues is significant, since both the Gorgias and
Respublica include a hostile interlocutor who, it seems, would choose to seize power as tyrants
to serve their security and pleasures if they had the means and opportunity.184
The incurables are much less prominent in the De sera myth, on the other hand. They are
only briefly mentioned in the discussion of the broadest structure of punishments. Adrasteia,
daughter of Zeus and necessity, is in charge of the punishment of the wicked—“of malefactors,
there is none so great nor so small that they could either escape her and flee, or force her
hand”185—but she has three subordinates with names from traditional myths, each of whom
handles a certain kind of wicked, and each of whom has a different manner of punishment:
Another punishment belongs to each of the three guardians and workers. For there are
those whom Poine handles straightaway, still in their bodies and through their bodies, by
a softer way and leaving aside many things that need purification. Of these, the greatest
task is the doctoring of evil, those that the daemon gives over to Dike after their death.
And there are the entirely incurable ones, whom Dike repels: the third and most savage of
the servants of Adrasteia, Erinys, pursues souls pitiably and harshly—all wandering and
fleeing, some one way and others another—and conceals them, sinking them down into
the unspeakable and the unseen.186
ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς
παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ
νουθετήματα (525c).
184
That is, Callicles in the Grg. and Thrasymachus in Resp. I. See Edmonds (2012): “Callicles’ refusal to take his
medicine, however, marks him as one of the incurables Socrates describes in the myth, who cannot benefit from the
treatment they get in the afterlife judgement, but can only serve as an example to others” (178). Socrates also
mentions Polus’ exemplary tyrant Archelaus (525d) and the wicked kings in Homer (525d-e). In the Alc. I, Socrates
thematizes the man who “can do whatever he wants” (δύναται πράττειν ὅτι ἂν βούληται; 104b) even further: he
alleges Alcibiades wants to have not only the greatest possible power (μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι) in the city of Athens,
but all Greece, and even all of Asia as well (105a-e). Cf. 134c-5b.
185
… Ἁρδάστεια μέν, Ἀνάγκης καὶ Διὸς θυγάτηρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι τιμωρὸς ἀνωτάτω τέτακται ἀδικήμασι. καὶ τῶν πονηρῶν
οὔτε μέγας <οὕτως> οὐδεὶς οὔτε μικρὸς γέγονεν ὥστ’ ἢ λαθὼν διαφυεῖν ἢ βιασάμενος (564e).
186
ἄλλῃ δ’ ἄλλη τιμωρία τριῶν οὐσῶν φύλακι καὶ χειρουργῷ προσήκει· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐν σώμασι καὶ διὰ
σωμάτων κολαζομένους μεταχειρίζεται Ποινὴ ταχεῖα, πράῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ καὶ παραλείποντι πολλὰ τῶν καθαρμοῦ
δεομένων· ὧν δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὴν κακίαν ἰατρεία, τούτους Δίκῃ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ὁ δαίμων
183
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The figure that punishes the incurable here, most savage (ἀγριωτάτη) Erinys, shares a detail with
the punishers of Plato’s myth of Er, who are described as men “fiery to look upon” and “savage”
(ἄγριοι).187 Yet her punishment is entirely unlike theirs: while they perform horrific tortures when
the mouth bellows to terrify the approaching souls and deter them from evil, a conspicuous and
public punishment, she pursues and hides the incurables forever, in such a way that no one can
ever hear or see them again.188 Plutarch’s hidden incurables stand in marked opposition to the
spectacle of tortured tyrants of the Gorgias and the Respublica. They are, moreover, much less
prominent in De sera than in the Platonic models: the text resumes with the phrase “but of the
others,” meaning the categories of punished that are not the incurables (which is where the
passage on the color of souls occurs), and the incurables are indeed not seen or heard again
throughout the myth.189 This treatment is more reminiscent of the incurables in the Phaedo,
however, than Plato’s other eschatological myths. There, the incurables are simply occluded:
But those who seem to be incurable because of the magnitudes of their crimes—who did
either many great sacrileges or unjust murders and many lawless things, or howsoever
many things that happen to be of this sort—fate properly throws them into the Tartarus,
whence they never return.190
These souls, we are left to infer, are similarly unseen and unheard as they as tossed in the
infernal river.

παραδίδωσι· τοὺς δὲ πάμπαν ἀνιάτους ἀπωσαμένης τῆς Δίκης ἡ τρίτη καὶ ἀγριωτάτη τῶν Ἀδραστείας ὑπουργῶν
Ἐρινύς, μεταθέουσα πλανωμένους καὶ περιφεύγοντας ἄλλον ἄλλως οἰκτρῶς δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἅπαντας ἠφάνισε καὶ
κατέδυσεν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ καὶ ἀόρατον (564e-f). The verb ἀφανίζειν can commonly mean kill or destroy, but
from the context it seems to literally mean “make unseen” or “hide” in the unspeakable and unseen. See also De lat.
viv. 1129f-30a. Cf. Alt (2002): “Wenn solche bösen Seelen sich aber als unheilbar erweisen, so werden sie nicht nur
gequält, sondern schließlich vernichtet” (279).
187
X.615e-6a.
188
In Plutarch’s Non posse, Theon considers the latter sort of fate—or worse, the true annihilation of the soul—as
superlatively awful (1105a-b).
189
τῶν δ’ ἄλλων” ἔφη “δικαιώσεων…” (565a).
190
οἳ δ’ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους
ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα
μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν (113e).
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This occlusion of the incurables is thus a substantial part, I argue, of Plutarch’s response
to the Epicurean argument that depictions of underworld punishments are harmful and a
substantial departure from the depiction of punishment in the eschatological myths of the
Gorgias and the Respublica. Yet one more episode seems to further contribute to the
modification in the role of incurables in this myth: the closest analogue to Plato’s tortured tyrants
would seem to be the emperor Nero towards the end. Unlike the former, however, who are
removed from the cycle of reincarnation entirely, the Roman emperor suffers a comic and
shameful change of bodies:191
… the soul of Nero appeared here already in a sorry state, pierced with incandescent
bolts. And when the workmen were producing a form of Nicander’s viper upon it too, in
which it was conceived and eats through the mother so that it might live again, he said
that a great light immediately brightened and a voice came from the light appointing that
he be transferred into another, softer species—they devised some musical animal, native
to marshes and swamps. For he gave recompense for there things he did unjustly, but he
is benefitted for some good service by him from the gods, that of all his subjects, he freed
[Greece], the best and most pious race.192

The place of reincarnation is the last that Thespesius describes: “At the extremities, he saw the souls twisted into
their next births, curved by force into all sorts of animals, altered in shape by the workers of such things. With
certain instruments and blows, they fasten and drive together some parts, tear apart others, smooth out and obscure
some entirely so that they might fit together with other lives and dispositions” (τρεπομένας ψυχὰς εἴς τε ζῷα
παντοδαπὰ καμπτομένας βίᾳ καὶ μετασχηματιζομένας ὑπὸ τῶν ταῦτα δημιουργούντων, ὀργάνοις τισὶ καὶ πληγαῖς τὰ
μὲν κολλώντων μέρη καὶ συνελαυνόντων, τὰ δ’ ἀποστρεφόντων, ἔνια δ’ ἐκλεαινόντων καὶ ἀφανιζόντων
παντάπασιν, ὅπως ἐφαρμόσειεν ἑτέροις ἤθεσι καὶ βίοις; 567d-e). Before describing the physical process of
reincarnation, Plutarch describes the impetus that leads certain souls into animal bodies: “For one through the
weakness of reason and the roughness of thought sinks towards generation by the practical part, while another is
bound by the lack of discipline in the organ and desires to sow their desires together with their pleasures and to
partake of them through a body—for here there is nothing beyond some ineffectual shadow and a dream of pleasure
which is unable to bear gratification” (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενείᾳ λόγου καὶ δι’ ἀργίαν τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἔρρεψε τῷ πρακτικῷ
πρὸς γένεσιν, ἡ δ’ ὀργάνου τῷ ἀκολάστῳ δεομένη ποθεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας συρράψαι ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι καὶ
συνεπαυρέσθαι διὰ σώματος· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ σκιά τις ἀτελὴς καὶ ὄναρ ἡδονῆς πλήρωσιν οὐκ ἐχούσης
πάρεστι; 565d-e).
192
ἐν ταύταις φανῆναι τὴν Νέρωνος, τά τ’ ἄλλα κακῶς ἔχουσαν ἤδη καὶ διαπεπαρμένην ἥλοις διαπύροις.
προκεχειρισμένων δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ τῶν δημιουργῶν Νικανδρικῆς ἐχίδνης εἶδος, ἐν ᾧ κυηθεῖσαν καὶ διαφαγοῦσαν τὴν
μητέρα βιώσεσθαι, φῶς ἔφασκεν ἐξαίφνης διαλάμψαι μέγα καὶ φωνὴν ἐκ τοῦ φωτὸς γενέσθαι προστάττουσαν εἰς
ἄλλο γένος ἡμερώτερον μεταβαλεῖν, ᾠδικόν τι μηχανησαμένους περὶ ἕλη καὶ λίμνας ζῷον· ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἠδίκησε
δεδωκέναι δίκας, ὀφείλεσθαι δέ τι καὶ χρηστὸν αὐτῷ παρὰ θεῶν, ὅτι τῶν ὑπηκόων τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ θεοφιλέστατον
γένος ἠλευθέρωσε [τὴν Ἑλλάδα] (567e-8a). The Nero episode attracts much scholarly attention: e.g. Frazer (1971),
Zadorojnyi (1997), and especially Brenk (1987); it is the only aspect of the myth discussed in the section ostensibly
dedicated to it by Segal (2004: 245-7). Santamaría Álvarez (2007) interprets the choice of the frog as an allusion to
the “catábasis literaria” in Ar. Ran. (883-4).
191

247
The initial choice of a snake boring through its mother seems to be a strike against one of Nero’s
most infamous crimes, murdering his mother. Shedding familial blood is, after all, a depravity
characteristic of tyrants, such as the horror to which the first soul to choose a life in Plato’s myth
of Er commits himself, to one day devour his own children, because he chose the tyrannical life
out of greed rather than thorough examination.193
As with the preceding dialectical argumentation, the myth depicts punishment as
deterrent, but primarily curative: the worst punishments of Plato are transformed into treatments
for the curably wicked and not just deterrents for other souls. This vision of punishments is
enough to cure Aridaeus and so turn him into Thespesius, especially when he sees his father’s
wickedness fully manifest and the painful cures that could await him in turn, if he continues
down the path of greed. This myth is unsettling for many, but it provides a good sketch for how
morally troubling cases like this function in a just world: these progenies, like young Aridaeus,
may well need to be cured by punishment themselves. While still troubling, this solution is much
more palatable than Plato’s tortured tyrants, whose punishment cannot possibly benefit them, but
only serve the good of their spectators. Plutarch’s mythos defends against the arguments that
form Colotes’ assault on the myth of Er while complementing the arguments of the logos against
Epicurus’ assaults on providence.

Conclusion
This chapter argues that Plutarch’s myth in De sera was composed against the context of
Epicurean criticism of the myth of Er, which it signals with the strong invocation of the Platonic

… τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἑλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ
λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς ἀνσκεψάμενον ἑλέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἱμαρμένην παίδων αὑτοῦ βρώσεις
καὶ ἄλλα κακά (Resp. X.619b-c).
193
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myth. Plutarch broadly responds to each of Colotes’ criticisms, in rather different ways than the
Numenian and Neoplatonic responses. The myth in the dialogue does not, contrary to much of
the scholarship, transcend the dialectic, but rather reinforces the key argument that providential
punishment is essentially curative. Plutarch meets Colotes’ argument that fiction in the manner
of poets cannot convey truth by arguing that key ethical ideas are interpreted in a different and
more serious manner than manifestly fictive elements such as the details of underworld
geography; he moreover depicts how the fear of afterlife punishment might not only be merely
acceptable, but in fact beneficial, if it is understood as moral correction.
Plutarch also, through the characters of the dialogue, meets Colotes’ third criticism, that
neither “the wise” nor “the many” are a proper audience for philosophical myth. De sera depicts
the curative effect of the vision on the protagonist, but Plutarch’s interlocutors in the dialogue
represent another sort that is particularly fitting for philosophical fiction:194 students or fellowlearners who are inclined to accept certain fundamental principles, but are unsettled and
uncertain in the face of difficult objections, not unlike Glaucon, Adeimantus, and the other
interlocuters in Plato’s Respublica.195 After Epicurus leaves in the beginning of Plutarch’s
dialogue, the remaining speakers are all friendly and congenial—literally, as Patrocleas is his
son-in-law and Timon his brother196—and all are evidently united in the same task—to “cast out

194

Ferrari (2009) similarly considers Glaucon as the targeted audience of the myth of Er within the Respublica.
Plutarch asks, “What then most disturbed you of the things he said?” (τί οὖν… μάλιστα κεκίνηκεν ὑμᾶς τῶν
εἰρημένων;), and Patrocleas describes how the discussion of the slowness of divine punishment made him feel “as if
fresh and new again in my opinion” that he felt long ago, when he was “aggravated” (ἠγανάκτουν) by a line of
Euripides (548c-d). He gives various examples of what frustrates and annoys him, including a quip from Bias (τὸ
τοῦ Βίαντος ἐνοχλεῖ…; 548e).
196
Plutarch describes Patrocleas as ὁ γαμβρὸς in Quaest. conv. II.9.642c; Timon appears as a character in two
symposiastic vignettes (I.2.615c-d, 616c-f; II.5.639b-d). In De frat. amor., Plutarch remarks, “for no one whatsoever
who knows us is ignorant that, out of all the things worthy of gratitude that fortune has brought about for me, the
love of my brother Timon has been and remains beyond absolutely all others” (ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι πολλῶν ἀξίων
χάριτος παρὰ τῆς τύχης γεγονότων, ἡ Τίμωνος εὔνοια τἀδελφοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντα τἄλλα γέγονε καὶ ἔστιν, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ
τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ἐντετυχηκότων ἡμῖν…; 487d-e). Olympiochus, however, does not appear elsewhere in the corpus.
195
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the opinion before it becomes lodged,” as Timon puts it.197 They all seem to share the basic
assumption that there is providential care over the world, which Olympichus emphasizes when
he presents the problem of delays of punishment in that they “destroy the belief in providence”
(προνοίας), which explains why Plutarch can later base his argument for the immortality of the
soul on the presumption of divine providence, as discussed above. 198 Yet they are still, evidently,
grappling with the ramifications of and objections to this assumption.
Bernard Boulet argues that Plutarch addresses categorically different audiences with
categorically different interests: “in different dialogues, he seems to be aiming more specifically
at different readers, sometimes more intent on comforting good moral souls, sometimes more
bent on putting fundamental questions to philosophical minds.”199 De sera, he argues, is
addressed either to the former sort, or an even less intellectual audience: “The dialogue is meant
for youthful ears: the students are challenging their master to prove that justice wins over
injustice… Plutarch offers his young listeners what they need to hear for the moment, and
withholds his deepest thoughts on whether or not Apollo lags.200” Yet Plutarch may not have had
a more definitive answer than the solutions he suggests in De sera, because of the difficulty of
certainty on this issue, which he pointedly emphasizes by invoking the epistemic caution
(εὐλαβείας) of the Academy in his initial speech. Plutarch’s interlocutors, moreover, are not

ἀρκεῖ δὲ αὑτοῖς πρὶν ἅψασθαι τὴν δόξαν ἂν ἐκβάλωμεν (549c).
“And there is this, Patrocleas, the delay and postponement of the divine bring such an immense absurdity, that the
slowness removes belief in providence, …” (ἐκεῖνο δέ… ὦ Πατροκλέα, πληίκον αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τοῦ θείου διατριβαὶ
καὶ μελλήσεις ἄτοπον ἔχουσιν, ὅτι τὴν πίστιν ἡ βραδυτὴς ἀφαιρεῖ τῆς προνοίας, …; 549b).
199
2008: 164: “In his different countenances, Apollo, too, offers moral speeches to good souls and rational debates
to philosophical minds. The moral readers, preferring De Sera, will see Apollo as the god of oracles who lends a
hand in punishing the wicked. The more philosophical minds will prefer the De E where Apollo is a rational god not
to be associated with the wild myths that are told and sung even in Delphi. Plutarch seems to be following the
principle that different souls need different nourishment, and this art of writing leads to inconsistencies.”
200
2008: 161. Leaving aside the prosopographical question of the ages of the interlocutors, it is strange that Boulet
sees Plutarch as demarcating ethics from metaphysics so strongly (cf. 168-169), especially in the context of De sera,
where Plutarch makes such a strong statement in the corpus that humans become virtuous through the imitation
(ἐξομοίωσιν; μιμήσει) of god insofar as possible—a way of subordinating ethics to metaphysics that is characteristic
of Middle Platonism. See supra pg. 94.
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children—or “the many,” in Colotes’ terms—and must have some philosophical attainment to
follow Plutarch’s arguments and to share the presumption of the providential care for the
world.201 The character of Boethius at the beginning of book IV of the Consolatio provides an apt
comparison. By this point, Philosophy has successfully convinced or reminded Boethius that
“there is a good ruler of the world” that “knows all, is all-powerful, and always wills only the
good,” and yet, his earlier grief reemerges at the thought that, given the divine governance of the
world, “evil can exist at all or pass by unpunished.”202 Boethius, at this point, is grounded once
again in cosmology and metaphysics, but this gives greater urgency to the disturbing ethical
problem of theodicy.
Plutarch’s interlocutors, I argue, seem to be in a similar situation. Given the weight of the
problems at stake and the difficulties raised by the Epicurean assault, there is every reason to
reinforce dialectical arguments with a myth.203 It does not transcend the dialectical portion of De
sera—or act as a pious screen to hide deeper mysteries—but it provides an ethical exhortation by
sketching out a plausible account of how the machinery of divine punishment could operate.
Plutarch gives philosophical myth a certain role for the students of Platonism; Heinrich Dörrie’s
conclusion that De sera has a “paränetisch-pädagogische Gesichtspunkt” seems valid to some
extent, although this does not mean the myth is directed at a childish or non-philosophical

De aud., on the other hand, is addressed to a Nicander, who has just come of age (τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἀνειληφὼς
ἱμάτιον; 37c). The advice is solidly focused on practical ethics, and not at all to issues like providence. Cf. 43a-c.
202
sed ea ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa maeroris, quod, cum rerum bonus rector exsistat, uel esse omnino mala
possint uel impunita praetereant; … quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia sed bona tantummodo
uolentis dei nemo satis potest nec admirari nec conqueri (IV.1.9-12, 17-9). That Boethius is now grappling with the
general problem, in contrast to his long lament of the particular circumstances of his situation in I.4, is a manifest
sign of philosophical progress.
203
Cf. Plutarch’s sketch of the multiplicity of paths philosophical progress may take in Quomodo quis 78e-f.
201

251
audience, as Boulet has it.204 Rather, it bolsters the dialectic attempts to grapple with a
notoriously difficult and distressing set of ethical problems that result from Platonic metaphysics.

1977: “Denn Plutarch hat sich in bewegten und farbigen Jenseitsschilderungen zum Sprecher der Überzeugung
gemacht, daß jede Tat ihre Vergeltung findet. Einerseits muß erklärt werden, warum die Gottheit Untaten nicht
bereits in diesem Leben bestraft. Dafür hat Plutarch mehrere Erklärungen bereit; diese laufen auf das Argument
hinaus, daß die πρόνοια kraft ihrer Weisheit und Gerechtigkeit für jeden Verbrecher die angemessene Strafe zum
angemessenen Zeitpunkt festlege. Hierzu ist festustellen, daß dieser Satz mit seiner durch viele Beispiele
bekräftigten Anwedung durch kein philosophisches Argument bewiesen wird” (77). Cf. Helmig (2005: 330-1).
204
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Chapter four. Myth as teleological account: cosmology and
anthropology in De facie
Plutarch’s De facie in orbe lunae may seem to be an odd dialogue. For roughly the first
two-thirds of the dialogue, Lamprias narrates earlier discussions of the face that appears in the
moon and the more fundamental physical problem of the composition of the moon—is it just fire
and air, as the Stoics say, or is it earthy, as Lamprias and Lucius hold?1 The discussion strikes
even modern readers as thoroughly scientific, comprised of arguments that use evidence ranging
from physical science and mathematics to optics. Yet it concludes with an imagistic myth that
describes a thoroughly otherworldly journey from the far north, beyond the shores of farthest
Britain to an island, under which Cronus is chained dreaming the thoughts of Zeus; the traveler
then describes the wondrous journeys of the soul after death, weaving an account of how each
element of the world relates to each part of the human being. This contrast between dry scientific
discourse and imagistic myth might seem disjointed, but I argue that the myth fulfills the vital
function of providing a teleological account, without which the physics of the first portion would
be worthless. That is to say, the myth serves as an account that presents an illustration not just of
how the world functions, but also of why it functions in this way.2 The result is a thoroughly
Platonic system, modelled on the myths of the Phaedo and Timaeus, which provides a sketch of
the hypothetical purpose of cosmic objects such as the moon.

Opsomer (2017b) usefully surveys the historical Stoic position and Pharnaces’ representation in the dialogue (7781); on Aristotelianism in the dialogue: 2017b: 81-2. Lamprias and Lucius seem to represent the Platonist position,
although cf. Donini (1988: 130-1). Plutarch also refers to a Lucius, student of Moderatus the Pythagorean (Quaest.
Conv. VIII.7.727b) and a “Lucius, son of Florus” (VII.4.702f), but it is unclear if the Lucius in De fac. corresponds
to either. Cf. Puech (1992: 4858). On inter-school polemics in the first portion of the dialogue, Donini (1988)
emphasizes the hostility to Stoicism. Sambursky (1956) analyzes this portion of the dialogue as “perhaps the first
work on astrophysics ever written” (205), comparing it to Aristotle and Posidonius, as well as later and even modern
theory (205-18). On discussions of lunar influences on earth in Plutarch: Pérez Jiménez (2012) and Setaioli (2015).
2
On the setting, see Hirzel (1895): “es fällt in die Zeit von Plutarchs Lehrthätigkeit und findet wohl zu Chaironeia
statt” (184, although he refers to Delphi broadly in 182n1, 184n1); on the characters: Cherniss (1957: 3-14); on the
date, based on the mention of a recent eclipse (931d): Sandbach (1929); on the history of the text: Dell’Aia (2017:
71-7).
1
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The myth is, in fact, central to the dialogue. The beginning seems to be lost, but the
extant portion opens with the Carthaginian Sulla promising his myth before giving a preliminary
request: “but if you all could remove in advance something regarding the opinions at every hand
and in every mouth about the face in the moon, I would pleasurably learn it first.”3 Sulla then
yields to Lamprias and other interlocutors, but eventually Lamprias suggests the group cease
their ambulatory discussion (περίπατον) and sit on benches to provide Sulla a suitable auditorium
for the myth.4 Sulla’s speech is divided into two parts. First, he describes his source for the story,
a stranger who had travelled to Carthage from the fantastical far reaches of the north on an island
beyond Britain, under which Cronus is chained, served by loyal daemones and faithful
celebrants. Then, he reports a speech given by the stranger, who prefaces his account of the
moon by presenting humans as divided into three separable elements:
The many correctly suppose, on the one hand, that the human is composite, but they
incorrectly suppose that it is from two parts alone. For they think that mind is a portion of
the soul, erring no less than those to whom the soul seems to be a part of the body. By as
much as the soul is better and more divine than the body, so much so the mind over the

ἀλλ’ εἰ δή τι πρὸς τὰς ἀνὰ χεῖρα ταύτας καὶ διὰ στόματος πᾶσι δόξας περὶ τοῦ προσώπου τῆς σελήνης
προανεκρούσασθε, πρῶτον ἡδέως ἄν μοι δοκῶ πυνθέσθαι (920b). A handful of older scholars deny that the
beginning is lost, such as Hirzel (1895)—“Es liegt kein genüber Grund vor anzunehmen, dass das Werk zu Anfang
versümmelt ist” (186n6)—but the evidence of the mangled beginning and the delay of identifying Lamprias as the
first-person narrator until 937d is indicative of a break. How much is lost, however, remains unclear—Cherniss
(1957) summarizes the arguments and earlier scholarship (2-3, with 2nb and 3na). Taub (2008) takes the reference
to a previous conversation to “suggest a direct parallel to the Timaeus” (75). Martin (1974) more cogently argues
that the lost preface, whatever sort of address it might have had (85-88), would have situated De fac. as the
discussion following a discussion (at which Lamprias was present) of a lecture (given by the unnamed “comrade”) at
which everyone but Sulla was present (73-5, 77-8). This sort of structure would be similar especially to the antiEpicurean dialogues: Adv. Col. is a lecture presented by Plutarch and Non posse the discussion that follows among
students, with two particularly leading the discussion. Less elegantly, the two tractates both entitled De esu carn.,
apparently composed for a Boeotian context (955e), are connected by the introduction to the second: “reason urges
us with thought and zeal to return anew to the things said yesterday against eating flesh” (ἐπὶ τὰ ἕωλα τῆς
σαρκοφαγίας προσφάτους ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος παρακαλεῖ ταῖς τε διανοίαις καὶ ταῖς προθυμίαις γενέσθαι; 996d). See also
966a, De Alex. fort. 333d. On the face in the moon, cf. De Pyth. or. 398c-d.
4
“‘We have related,’ I said, ‘as much of what was said then that has not fled from memory. But see to it and call
upon Sulla, or rather demand his narrative as payment, since he became a listener on set conditions. So, if it seems
best, let us cease our walk and sit on the benches to provide a stable auditorium to hear him’” (“ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν” ἔφην,
“ὅσα μὴ διαπέφευγε τὴν μνήμην τῶν ἐκεῖ λεχθέντων, ἀπηγγέλκαμεν· ὥρα δὲ καὶ Σύλλαν παρακαλεῖν, μᾶλλον δ’
ἀπαιτεῖν τὴν διήγησιν, οἷον ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς ἀκροατὴν γεγενημένον· ὥστε, εἰ δοκεῖ, καταπαύσαντες τὸν περίπατον καὶ
καθίσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἑδραῖον αὐτῷ παραάσχωμεν ἀκροατήριον;” 937c-d). See further Martin (1974: 85).
3
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soul. The mixture of body and soul causes the passionate, the conjunction of mind and
soul causes the rational.5
Not only does the soul depart from the body after the first death, but the mind too separates from
the soul during what the stranger calls a “second death.” In parallel to this tripartite schema, he
describes the cosmos as a being with three parts: the sun, the moon, and the earth. Each
astrological level has functions that relate to “each of these three constituent parts” of humans:6
“the earth provides the body and the moon the soul, but the sun provides the mind <for the
human> entering generation, as it also provides light to the moon.”7 After the intelligent souls of
the pure have been on the moon for a sufficient time, they are drawn by desire (ἔρωτι) for the
“image (εἰκόνος) in the sun”—apparently an image of the form of the good—and depart from
their souls.8 There are thus two sorts of processes of cosmic generation and degeneration, for
each cosmic body gives and receives an appropriate part of the human: “… in time, the moon
receives them (mindless souls) back into herself and reduces them to order. Then, when the sun
τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἱ πολλοὶ σύνθετον μὲν ὀρθῶς, ἐκ δυοῖν δὲ μόνων σύνθετον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγοῦνται. μόριον γὰρ εἶναί
πως ψυχῆς οἴονται τὸν νοῦν, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνων ἁμαρτάνοντες, οἷς ἡ ψυχὴ δοκεῖ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ σώματος. νοῦς
γὰρ ψυχῆς, ὅσῳ ψυχὴ σώματος, ἄμεινόν ἐστι καὶ θειότερον. ποιεῖ δ’ ἡ μὲν ψυχῆς <καὶ σώματος μῖξις αἴσθησιν ἡ δὲ
νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς> σύνοδος λόγον· ὧν τὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ πόνου τὸ δ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας (943a). Cherniss (1957)
prints παθητικὸν for Pohlenz (1955) αἴσθησιν, but either could be a contrast for λόγον, understood in the former
sense as the ordering element of a human, or in the latter as the cognitive element. Pérez Jiménez (2002) describes
the style as “sobrio.” The myth of De gen. presents a similar tripartite schema of body, soul, and δαίμονα (591d-e).
6
This is broadly similar to the astrological model in Pl. Ti.: “The god made the bodies of each of these things and
placed each into an orbit, each of which the orbit of difference propels, seven bodies into seven orbits—the moon
into the first around the earth, and the sun into the second above the earth” (σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας ὁ
θεὸς ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφορὰς ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος ᾔειν, ἑπτὰ οὔσας ὄντα ἑπτά, σελήνην μὲν εἰς τὸν περὶ γῆν
πρῶτον, ἥλιον δὲ εἰς τὸν δεύτερον ὑπὲρ γῆς; 38d). Cf. Burkert (1996: 22-3). Cumont (1913) emphasizes the
importance of the “chaldéen” ordering of the planets that places the sun between Venus and Mars (452), but the
system in the De fac. myth is sufficiently simple to fit any ordering. Cf. Procl. In Tim. III.65.16-26.
7
τριῶν δὲ τούτων συμπαγέντων, τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἡ γῆ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἡ σελήνη, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁ ἥλιος παρέσχεν εἰς τὴν
γένεσιν <τἀνθρώπῳ> ὥσπερ αὖ τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ φέγγος (943a). Cherniss (1957) supplies <τἀνθρώπῳ>. On the moon’s
reflection of the sun’s light, cf. Pl. Crat. 409b-c.
8
944e. Cf. De. Is. 383a, Amat. 764d, Ad princ. inerud. 780f, 781f. In Pl. Leg. X, the Athenian stranger distinguishes
between the body of the sun and its soul, suggesting three possibilities for how the immaterial might interact with
the material (898d-9a). Perhaps the image is also drawn from the form of the beautiful, since it is described in the
Phdr. as the only form that is apprehensible by sense perception (περὶ δὲ κάλλους… κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς
ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως; 250c-d). Cf. Cherniss (1957): “‘the image in the sun…’ here means the visible likeness of
the good” (213ng); Brenk (2017): “Plutarch does not explicitly say ‘God’ here, but in the light of his general theism,
a reader well acquainted with all his writing would probably think of God” (55). Cf. the role of true beauty in the
ascent to the moon after death in the Amat. (766b).
5
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sows mind back again, she receives this vital principle and makes new souls, and the earth,
thirdly, provides a body.”9 Each part of the world, according to the stranger’s account, plays a
particular role in generation and degeneration. The moon has an intermediary nature that
corresponds with the intermediary nature of the human soul, which makes it the fitting place for
disincarnate souls to return after death, as well as the fitting agent of their generation into bodies
on the earth.
Plutarch is elaborating a consistently Platonic system, although in part explicitly drawing
on Xenocrates’ interpretation of the Timaeus, to serve as a teleological account of the purpose of
the moon, the sort of account that Socrates describes and exemplifies in the final portions of the
Phaedo. To make this a “likely” account, I argue that Plutarch draws on the analogy between
microcosm and macrocosm in the Timaeus, where the creation of humanity is presented as an
imitation of the creation of the world. Plutarch, moreover, fills out his analogous anthropology
and cosmology by postulating intermediaries. By recognizing the myth’s status as both a
teleological account and an explanatory analogy between macrocosm and microcosm, however, I
illustrate its status as a hypothetical myth that is nevertheless plausible. He draws many details
from the Phaedo and Timaeus, as well as from the myth of the Phaedrus and the image of the
sun in the Respublica, but these two particularly provide the machinery of the De facie myth as
well as the broader conception of a physical world oriented towards the good.10 Socrates’ myth of
the “true earth” in the Phaedo, moreover, is a recurrent point of reference throughout the

χρόνῳ δὲ κἀκείνας κατεδέξατο εἰς αὑτὴν ἡ σελήνη καὶ κατεκόσμησεν, εἶτα τὸν νοῦν αὖθις ἐπισπείραντος τοῦ
ἡλίου τῷ ζωτικῷ δεχομένη νέας ποιεῖ ψυχάς, ἡ δὲ γῆ τρίτον σῶμα παρέσχεν (945c).
10
The dialogues are, of course, related in this respect. See especially Opsomer (2017): “Plutarch’s Platonist
interlocutors… apply the epistemological framework of Plato’s Phaedo and, above all, the Timaeus, according to
which an explanation of the world in terms of material causality can only have the status of a ‘likely account’” (8990). See also Wright (2000: 8).
9
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dialogue of De facie, more than is sometimes realized in the scholarship.11 Lamprias even
compares it to the surface of the moon, and wonders whether Socrates meant to speak
“riddlingly” of it.12 The Platonic myth, moreover, provides Plutarch not just with references and
parallels but an epistemological framework for teleological myth in scientific inquiry.13 After
relating the account, Socrates concisely describes how he wants his audience in the Athenian
prison to understand its significance:
So, to affirm entirely that these things are in fact as I said would not be fitting for a
rational man: but, nevertheless, it seems fitting and worthy to me to dare to think about
our souls and their abodes either these things or something of a similar sort—for the
daring is noble—and one must chant (ἐπᾴδειν) things of such a sort to oneself, which is
why indeed I have been relating the myth at such length. 14

11

Donini (1988), for instance, makes no mention of the myth in the Phd., but detects references to several others:
“The scenery with imaginary geographical elements calls to mind the Ti. and the Atlantis myth; the experiences
undergone away from the earth by the souls look back to the myths in the Phdr. and Resp.; and the presence of the
demons reminds one of the Symp., but even more of the demonological theories of Xenocrates” (128). Roskam
(2015) barely discusses De fac. in his chapter on Plutarch’s reception of the Phd. (cf. 111, 114-5, 121-3), and even
comments that “the works which contain lengthy eschatological myths… are not well represented” in his selection
(112). See also Giavatto (2011: 137). In the same volume as Roskam, however, Tarrant (2015) begins with a
substantial consideration of the Phd. in De fac. (134-7). Hamilton (1934) compares the epistemological claim in
Phd. 114d at one point in his conclusion (29n3) but sees the De fac. myth as “a copy in miniature” of the Ti. (29).
Cf. Teodorsson (1996: 115 with n4). Taub (2008) compares De fac. with the Ti. almost exclusively (57-60, 70-6),
although she notes that David Konstan suggested “that in the Phaedo Plato’s approach may be more similar to that
which we later encounter in Plutarch’s On the Face on the Moon” (75n51). In contrast to these scholars, however,
Opsomer (2017b) suggests that the “Phaedo may well have served as a model for De facie. In this dialogue, too, a
mythical narrative explains how the nature and the topography of a heavenly body, in casu the Earth, have a special
role for the eschatology of individual souls” (85n38). On the Phd. in the Vit., see Trapp (1999).
12
… ἐμυθολόγει… αἰττόμενος… (934f-5a). On this reference, cf. Cherniss (1957: 140na) and Russell (1972: 72).
There are many more implicit references. In Sulla’s speech at the end of De fac., certain details, such as the purity of
the air and the companionship of the divine, are echoed in the geographical frame, while as the stranger’s speech
uses language from this myth to describe “the moon itself,” such as its equipoise (ἰσόρροπον; 943e, echoing Phd.
109a; see also Plt. 270a) and its surface full of “depths and hollows” (βάθη… καὶ κοιλώματα 944c, echoing κοῖλα in
109b). Cherniss (1957) plausibly detects a reference to the Phd.’s “true earth” in the phrase “the moon itself” (αὐτῆς
σελήνης) in 943e. Plato and Plutarch both reference the inhabited world from the pillars of Hercules (Ἡρακλείων
στηλῶν) to Eastern bodies of water, the river Phasis in the former (Phd. 109a-b), the latter the Caspian and the Red
Seas (ἔξω δὲ τὸν Κάσπιον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἐρυθρὰν θάλατταν; De fac. 944b-c). Tarrant (2015) suggests further
similarities (134-7).
13
On teleology in Plato, see Johansen (2004: 69-116) and Scolnicov (2017). Cf. Frede (1987), Natali (2013). On
Plutarch’s conception of teleology, see Opsomer (1999: 425-8). Aenesidemus, a Pyrrhonic skeptic living in perhaps
the first century B.C.E.—so Polito (2014: 1n5), cf. Rist (1970: 310-1)—evidently proposed eight “modes” (τρόποι)
of “the refutation of the aetiologists” (τῆς τῶν αἰτιολογικῶν ἀνατροπῆς; Sext. Emp. Pyr. I.180). See further Barnes
(1990: 2656-68) and Polito (2014: 226-39). Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyr. I.185. Lucretius, presumably following Epicurus,
also specifically targets teleological explanation (IV.823-57).
14
τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ’
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This disjunction, it seems, is between the potentially extraneous details, such as the particular
characteristics of the “true earth” and the infernal rivers, which might well turn out to be
inaccurate, and the central idea, that the disposition of the universe serves a greater ethical
purpose as relates to us, which is worth believing. The identity of the good with the true is a
central assumption behind Plato’s teleological physics, which the myth illustrates by weaving a
hypothetical eschatological system together with this cosmological sketch. 15
This epistemological evaluation seems to apply to the myth in De facie as well as the
Phaedo. Plutarch’s Lamprias in fact echoes Socrates’ evaluation when he explains his
anticipation of hearing Sulla’s myth, drawing attention due to the difficulty of De facie’s subject:
For as those with chronic diseases renounce the common aids and the typical ways of life
as they turn toward healings and amulets and dreams, thus it is necessary in obscure and
impassable inquiries, whenever the common, well-known, and customary accounts fail to
persuade, to test the strangest things and not to dismiss contemptuously but to simply
chant (ἐπᾴδειν) to ourselves the things of old and to scrutinize the truth in everything.16
Potential aporetic frustration, Lamprias explains, prompts the recourse to more exotic and
strange avenues of inquiry. Yet he is not content to accept the myth without putting it to

ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ
πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν – καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος – καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ
ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον (114c-d). On this see Hackforth (1955: 186); Dam. In
Phd. I.187.466: “It is not all a myth, but only insofar as he concludes by saying that we must think the things in the
house of Hades are ‘these things or something like them.’ For this was the form of Platonic myths, because they
represent the truth beautifully, as he says in the Respublica” (οὐ πᾶν δὲ μῦθός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅσον συμπεραίνεται
λέγων ὡς “ταῦτα ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα” [Phd. 114d] χρὴ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἡγεῖσθαι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῶν Πλατωνικῶν
μύθων ἅτε καλῶς τὴν αλήθειαν μιμουμένων, ὡς ἐν Πολιτείᾳ φησίν [II.377d]). See further II.228.83. Before Socrates
goes onto describe the “true earth,” he preemptively emphasizes the mythic nature of this part of the narrative: “If it
is indeed a fine thing to tell a myth, it is worth listening, Simmias, to how the what sort of things there are upon the
world but under the heavens” (εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς
γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα; 110b). Simmias responds with anticipation of the pleasure (ἡδέως) of hearing the myth.
The contrast between dialectic and myth is evoked early in the Phd.: 60a-1e.
15
E.g. Dam. In Phd. I.199.526. On the identity of the good and the true, see Phdr. 246d-e. According to Aristotle,
“Plato and the Pythagoreans” identify the true with the one (πότερον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ
Πλάτων ἔλεγεν; Met. B.996a). See also Aristox. Harm. II.30-1 (= Arist. frg. 26 Rose). Cf. Altman (2012: 305-36).
16
ὡς γὰρ οἱ ἐννοσήμασι χρονίοις πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ βοηθήματα καὶ τὰς συνήθεις διαίτας ἀπειπόντες ἐπὶ καθαρμοὺς καὶ
περίαπτα καὶ ὀνείρους τρέπονται, οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν δυσθεωρήτοις καὶ ἀπόροις σκέψεσιν, ὅταν οἱ κοινοὶ καὶ
ἔνδοξοι καὶ συνήθεις λόγοι μὴ πείθωσι, πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ἀτοπωτέρων καὶ μὴ καταφρονεῖν ἀλλ’ ἐπᾴδειν ἀτεχνῶς
ἑαυτοῖς τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ διὰ πάντων τἀληθὲς ἐξελέγχειν (920b-c).
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elenchus, subjecting even myths to scrutiny just like any other part of a dialectical inquiry into
the physical world. The verb for chanting directly recalls Socrates at the end of the Phaedo,
which further draws attention to the burden that he sets for that dialogue’s myth—that one ought
to believe these things or something like them, at least about the soul and its abodes—without
vouching for all of, for instance, the details of underworld topography.17 In the stranger’s speech
in De facie, Plutarch is similarly not affirming the exact details, but the sort of schema more
generally: either this cycle of psychic generation and decay through the moon, or some other
account like it, presumably with similar conceptions of the qualities of the human soul, which
serve as the sort of core argument of the myth.
In the first section, I discuss the framing of the myth in De facie and its significance for
the epistemological status of the myth. Although this dialogue presents many difficulties, such as
the lost beginning—the text, only preserved in two manuscripts, is the most lacunose by far of
the works of Plutarch discussed at length in this study18—it is clear that the stranger’s description
of the role of the moon in the generation and degeneration of souls is meant to fulfill the
teleological requirements of the scientific inquiry that makes up the rest of the dialogue. The
fantastical, geographical frame which explains the extraordinary origin and travels of Sulla’s
stranger, I argue, emphasizes the epistemological status of the myth.19 The over-determined
exoticism of the former serves to draw attention to its fictionality and thus its epistemic status as
Cf. De exil. 602f: “he is wretched that does not constantly repeat and chant to himself the lines of Pindar” (οὗτος
ἄλθιός ἐστι μὴ προσλαλῶν ἑαυτῷ τὰ Πινδαρικὰ μηδὲ ἐπᾴδων πολλάκις).
18
The text of Cherniss, first partially printed in an article (1951) then the Loeb edition (1957), is usually preferable
to that of Pohlenz's (1955) Teubner. Cherniss is followed largely, for example, by Lernould (2013); Einarson's
(1958) praise for Cherniss is superlative (265-6), while he is very critical of Helmbold’s half of the volume (264).
Donini (2011) also provides some novel suggestions. See also the translations of Görgemanns (1968) and Vernière
(1977: 63-72). The Amat. is similarly only preserved in these lacunose manuscripts, on which see Flacelière (1952:
34-8).
19
The sections are sufficiently different that scholars often emphasize one over the other. Lamberton's (2001) praise
for the former portion, for example, is exuberant: “The tale that grounds and validates the stranger’s claim to
privileged knowledge is unforgettable. It is a story set in a fabulous geography of the limits of the world and an
account of oracular mediation as beautiful as any in the corpus of Plutarch” (177).
17
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a “likely account:” the fantastical frame discloses and emphasizes the hypothetical status of the
myth, and so limits the chance of deceiving the audience, lest they take it as literal doctrine. 20 In
the rest of the myth, moreover, Sulla’s stranger grounds his authority in sources that are common
in a variety of discourses portrayed by Plutarch, such as appealing to Homer, traditional myth
and ritual, and Xenocrates. The speech itself, in contrast to the fantastical frame, is grounded in a
particularly Hellenic tradition, perfectly familiar to the Greek and Roman gentlemen that make
up Plutarch’s world. The stranger’s speech thus distances itself further from the appeal to divine
or extraordinary authority implied by the myth’s frame. He does not, moreover, construct a clear
narrative, as we might expect from a myth. Perhaps these considerations explain why Sulla, in
his concluding remarks, describes the stranger’s speech not as a mythos, but a logos.21 The more
narrative portion of the myth, the geographic frame, however, emphasizes the hypothetical
nature of the stranger’s explanation of the psychological role of the moon in the world.
In the next two sections, I first examine Plato’s formulation of a teleological requirement
in the Phaedo, and then the formulation of the microcosm-macrocosm analogy in the teleological
account, the “likely myth,” of the Timaeus. The requirement of such an account is most clearly
illustrated in Socrates’ critique of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo, which sets the burden for the final
myth.22 On three prominent occasions where Plutarch discusses different sorts of causation, he
evokes the contrast between Socrates and Anaxagoras to distinguish between final causes and
physical causes. The myths in each of the former two both constitute potential, but only
hypothetical, sketches of the structure of the universe that explains what purposes the specific

This aspect of Plutarch’s myth is also responsive to Colotes’ argument, which the previous chapter discussed, that
it is absurd to convey truth in fiction. The myth in De fac. is especially blatant in emphasizing its fictionality.
21
“It is for you all, Lamprias, to make of the logos what you will” (ὑμιν δ’, ὦ Λαμπρία, χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ ᾗ
βούλεσθε; 945e).
22
Addressing teleology in De facie, Opsomer (2017), for instance, notes that, “For any Platonist, Phaedo 97d-98a
would be the locus classicus regarding this issue” (85).
20
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arrangement of the physical world might serve. A myth such as Socrates’ “true earth,” like
Timaeus’ carefully framed “likely myth,” is the proper form for speculation about the physical
world, about which we can only form opinions, rather than sure knowledge. Although Plutarch
does not explicitly comment on the epistemological role of this myth in De facie, he imitates the
structure of the end of the Phaedo by imbedding Sulla’s myth similarly in a discussion of
teleology. The requirement laid out in the Phaedo, moreover, is reflected in the “likely myth” of
the Timaeus, which is in many ways another important model for Sulla’s myth in De facie. I
emphasize one aspect in particular, which Plutarch takes to be at the heart of Plato’s psychology,
namely the relationship between the universe and the human microcosm, the latter of which is
described as an imitation of the former.
Then, I further examine the cosmology and anthropology of the stranger’s speech. He
fulfills Theon’s teleological requirement by illustrating how the moon could function in the
generation and degeneration of souls. The cosmic system that the myth imagines between the
sun, the moon, and the earth is explained in relation to the human mind, soul, and body. This
mythic construction seems to be a representation—not unlike Plutarch’s interpretation of the
relationship between the human soul and the world soul in the Timaeus—of the human as a
microcosm of the astral macrocosm. The idea of macrocosm and microcosm in the myth
attracted a rare early modern consideration, namely Christian August Lobeck’s in
Aglaophamus.23 John Dillon, however, notes this idea in his study of Xenocrates’ influence on
Plutarch;24 Lautaro Roig Lanzillota especially emphasizes Plutarch’s “microcosmism,” both in

23

1829: 932. His opponent, Creuzer, however, refers to the myth largely for the mystic or symbolic qualities of
Demeter and Persephone (e.g. 1843: 237-8), an approach that proves much more prominent in subsequent
scholarship. On these scholars, see further Edmonds (2013: 54-5). Préaux (1973) surveys some of the older
scholarship, much of which attempts to prove “l’inspiration orientale” (24n1). See further 44-7.
24
Dillon (1999). See also Thévenaz (1938: 84-7).
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his theory of the world soul and the cosmology of De facie.25 Finally, I address the “sources” that
lie behind the stranger’s speech. He appeals to Xenocrates for the idea of the moon as an
intermediary force, but he presents the Early Academic as founding his cosmology in Plato’s
Timaeus, a description which seems to reflect the broader myth itself as well. Although the
psychological details in the De facie myth are broadly coherent with Plutarch’s thought and also
draw on other Platonic dialogues, the affinities with the Phaedo and the Timaeus testify that the
stranger’s speech ought to be understood as a “likely account” of the purpose behind the nature
of the moon. It is not a revelation of mysterious or certain doctrine, but the only sort of account
that can be used to adequately speculate about the physical world, an unstable place of change.26
Often, however, as often in Plutarchan scholarship, it is claimed that the specifically
religious or eschatological content of the myth is held to transcend the epistemic limits or the
earlier discourse.27 Especially in this myth, however, particular emphasis has been placed on a
comparison with the mysteries, of a sort of conception that the myth grants secret knowledge that
is otherwise unobtainable. The search for “sources” hidden behind Plutarch, as I examine below,
has been particularly vigorous over the myth in De facie since the nineteenth century, when the
eschatology of the myth was claimed for various philosophical or religious systems. More recent
scholarship has attempted to explain the unintuitive epistemic role of the myth, placed as it is in
an otherwise largely dry dialogue.28 W. Hamilton takes Plutarch’s imitation of the Atlantis myth
25

2015: 188-91.
The relationship between this myth and the rest of the dialogue is, therefore, rather distinct the directly parallel
structure between mythos and logos in De sera, which the prior chapter examined.
27
E.g. Beardslee (1975): “The dialog [sic] is also important in showing how Plutarch brought science and religion
together in one dialog [sic], treating one with as rigorous argument as possible and presenting the other in the nonarguable form of myth” (286); Flacelière (1976): “Plutarque fit de même en associant étroitement science et
intuition, rationnel et irrationnel,, calculs savants et traditions religieuse” (195). See also Aguilar (1996: 285), who
considers all of the myths primarily concerned with “doctrina sobre el alma,” and thus considers the De sera myth
more complex than the De facie myth (285). Cf. Taub (2008: 75-76).
28
Despite the interest of Kepler, there is not much discussion of the myth among historians of science. Montgomery
(1999), for instance, focuses on lunar topography, to the almost total exclusion of the psychological concepts in the
26
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from the Timaeus in the first part to mean that the second part is meant to be understood as a
“likely story” (εἰκὸς μῦθος), like the main speech of the Timaeus.29 From this, Hamilton
concludes: “Plutarch meant the main point of his myth, the distinction between mind and soul
and their derivation from the sun and moon respectively, to be regarded as literal and not
symbolic.”30 Robert Lamberton, however, argues that the myth “cultivates the tension between
rational or scientific explanation on the one hand and sublime storytelling on the other, and out
of that tension emerges the richest presentation we have of Plutarch’s teleological Platonist
cosmology.” Although he argues that the “myth will take over and prevail” in a sense, he
ultimately places it on the same epistemological plane as the earlier part.31 Yet the stranger
manifestly contradicts the earlier discussion with some of his arguments about the physical
properties of the moon: Lucius had much earlier begun his argument that the earth is vastly
larger than the moon by appealing to the geometers, while the stranger argues such that “the
breadth and magnitude are not how much the geometers claim, but many times greater.”32 Harold
myth (34-5). Sambursky (1956) barely mentions the myth at all, noting only “a strange contrast between the last
chapters of the book, which discuss the mythology of the moon and particularly its function as the repository of the
souls of the dead, and the other parts which are distinguished by the clarity and acumen of their scientific reasoning
in the best tradition of the time” (205, cf. 217). Cf. Gillispie (2006 [1958]). Coones' (1983) article on the
significance of De facie for geographical science, however, aptly analyzes the structure in three parts, and finds the
significance of the myth to be “describing the function of the moon as a habitation for souls after death, thereby
establishing the purpose of the moon in the cosmos” (362).
29
“If, then, the second part of the de facie myth is meant to hold a place in the whole corresponding to that of
Timaeus’ discourse in the Timaeus, we are justified in inferring that Plutarch, who regarded that discourse as in the
main serious doctrine, must have intended the corresponding portion of his own myth to contain and equally serious
exposition of his own beliefs concerning the nature and fate of the soul” (1934: 29).
30
1934: 30. Cf. Opsomer (2017): “If one takes this literally, the souls are not only mortal, but also material. This
would be a strange doctrine for Plutarch to espouse, but, as we have seen, the myth contains quite a few odd
doctrinal elements. The quasi-material character of the soul, too, I would suggest, is an element that is not meant to
be taken as the literal truth” (84). On the role of Ti. in the broader dialogue of De fac., see Demulder (2015: 200-3).
See also (Clough 1974 [1841]): “… All the questing and the guessing / Of the soul’s own soul within” (28).
31
“There are many ways of apprehending the world and giving an account of it” (2001: 173-4); “The ‘scientific’
discussion has in any case been larded with poetic citations and arguments invoking the poets. This last one carries
the dialogue into a new realm, as mediated analytical discourse yields to mediated poetic fiction” (177).
32
εὗρος δὲ καὶ μέγεθος οὐχ ὅσον οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ μεῖζον πολλάκις ἐστί (944a); οἱ μαθηματικοὶ…
(923b; cf. Cic. Nat. d. II.40.103). Just before the latter, Lucius disclaimed his own investment in the argument—“we
say nothing ourselves that is our own, but those who hold that the moon is earth…” (ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν αὐτοὶ παρ’
αὑτῶν λέγομεν, οἱ δὲ γῆν ὑποτιθέμενοι τὴν σελήνην…; 923a)—yet he develops the argument further and invokes
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Cherniss deems this sort of contradiction a “mythical correction”—a concept that implies that the
myth carries categorically greater authority than the dialectical portion, even on issues such as
characteristics of the material world.33 Perluigi Donini, however, complicates the picture by
pointing out where the details of the myth uphold the earlier discussion, and distinguishing
between “corrections” and “contradictions:” he argues that the discrepancies ought to lead the
audience to question both the accuracy of the scientific portion and the myth.34 Jan Opsomer,
building on Donini, suggests that the discrepancy is meant “to hint at the fallibilistic nature of all
scientific reasoning.”35 Building on this last line of argument, I argue that Plutarch crafts in De
facie a thoroughly Platonic account, in its details, in its epistemological framing, and in the
mechanisms that make the myth plausible, namely the role of intermediaries and the microcosm
analogy.

Platonic teleology wrapped in Cronian garb
In the De facie myth, Plutarch weaves together a physical account of the moon with a
fantastical narrative. In this section, I argue that the latter plays a critical epistemological role for
Homer as an additional authority, as the preface to his explanation of why an earthy moon need not fall into the
earth (923a-c). Lamprias later surveys estimated measurements of the moon (932a-b).
33
1951: 152. Cherniss further argues that Plutarch “also gives a mythical explanation of the accelerated motion of
which he had spoken in 933 B.”
34
1988. He later (2010) argues that myth is latent in the scientific part of the dialogue as well, particularly in
Lamprias’ speech in 934a-935c, because Plutarch conceives of the moon as a goddess. He nevertheless emphasizes
Plutarch’s skepticism about the divine, as well as in his commentary (2011) on the De fac., e.g. in the lemma on
Sulla’s final statement (245n439). See also Donini (1992). Sambursky (1956) is much more positivistic about the
“scientific” portion of the dialogue, comparing Anaxagoras: “Only by Plutarch’s day this rationalizing process had a
foundation of scientific fact which did not exist yet in the fifth century B.C. It is likely enough that this scientific
progress aroused the same feeling of distance and objectivity with regard to celestial phenomena as marks the
beginning of the modern period” (210).
35
2017b: 83; “We may conclude that even at the end of the dialogue the exact material composition of the moon is
not something we are supposed to know with certainty or about which we are expected to express strong opinions.
The use of myth allows the author to make robust statements without having to express the reservations required for
a scientific discussion at every occasion, since everything that is being said stands under the stands under the general
proviso of being part of an imaginative tale. … The general function of the myth is to make the teleological
dimension of the treatise more explicit and encompassing” (84-85). Baldassari (1992) similarly suggests that there
are limits which are “in certo senso, ‘probabalistici’” (268). See also Tarrant (2015: 136-7).
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the myth: the over-determined exoticism of Sulla’s source for the myth, the stranger who once
served Cronus, in fact undermines the credibility of his cosmological speech—similarly to the
Atlantis myth in the Timaeus.36 Myth is a proper form for the sort of teleological physics that the
subsequent sections discuss precisely because it calls attention to its fictionality and avoids the
risk of offering a certain account, which would be impossible for a subject mired in the material
world, about which no certainty is possible. The authenticity of the stranger’s backstory is further
undermined by his superfluous sources of authority—his own philosophical and scientific
training, his discovery of sacred scrolls in Carthage, and his discourses with Cronus’
daemones—as well as the overwhelming Hellenicity of his actual speech—replete with citations
of Greek writers, myths, and cult. The stranger’s speech is nevertheless shaped as a likely
account, for the reasons elucidated in the subsequent sections, but the absurdity of the mythic
frame emphatically reminds the audience that it is only an account about the world of becoming,
not a revelation of certain truth.
This dual structure of fantastical narrative and physical account is in part an imitation, it
seems, of the myth in the Phaedo, which has the physical account of the nature of the world, as
well as a most imagistic description. The latter has many specific resonances, moreover, with the
Sulla’s myth. Socrates argues that, although we believe that we live on the surface of the earth,
we actually dwell in the hollows—just as we might imagine aquatic creatures would think that
the water comprised the whole world, including the stars they can dimly see through it.37 If

36

See supra in the Introduction.
“We do not realize that, although we think that we dwell upon the earth, we actually dwell in its depths, as if
someone dwelling in the midst of the bottom of the sea should think that he dwells upon it. He would see the sun
and the other stars through the water and think that the sea is the sky; he would never reach the heights of the sea,
because of his slowness and weakness, and he would never see it, escaping and lifting his head out of the sea and
into our realm, nor would he ever hear from another who has seen it how much purer and more beautiful it is than
their realm. Indeed, we too suffer the same: for we dwell in a hollow of the earth but think that we dwell upn it, and
we call the air the heavens, as though stars would dance through a heaven such as this” (ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς
37
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someone could grow wings and fly up to the top, he could, “if his nature would be sufficient to
behold it,” see the “true earth” (ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ) and recognize its greater purity and beauty.38 By
contrast, things here—“the earth and stones and the whole place here”—are corrupted and
corroded, presumably because of our proximity to the baleful brine of the sea.39 Because of the
distance of the surface of the “true earth” from the heavier elements such as water it, on the other
hand, is much purer than ours.40 Consequently, the creatures that dwell there live for long,
enjoying the manifest presence of the divine and the pleasure of seeing the sun, the moon, and
the stars as they really are.41 This blessed existence stands in contrast to the fate of worse souls,
who were too attached to the body in life and consequently insufficiently purified.42 The images
in the tale are thus not just added for color and pleasure, but also serve to illustrate the myth’s

κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους
οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο
οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς
εἴη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ
παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοὼς εἴη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἔν τινι
κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα
χωροῦντα; 109c-d).
38
… εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν
φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ (109e).
39
ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ
θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἅλμης (110a).
40
Our air is said to be, approximately (ἑνὶ λόγῳ), their sea, while their air is our aether (111a).
41
The colors of the “true earth,” moreover, are more vibrant—“the sea-purple, marvelous in its beauty, and the gold,
the white brighter than chalk or snow… and still a greater variety and a greater beauty of colors than all those we
have see” (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργῆ εἶναι [καὶ] θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ
χιόνος λευκοτέραν, … καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν; 110c). The watery air of the
hollows, moreover, is said to glimmer (στίλβοντα), yielding a coherent, continuous form that appears wellcomposed (ὥστε ἕν τι ταύτῃ εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι; 110d). Its plants and stones, moreover, are purer:
“our beloved gemstones (carnelians, jaspers, emeralds) are but fragments of those there” (ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια
εἷναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; 110d). The
explanation is that stones up there are not “devoured and corrupted as the ones here by decay and brine” (ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι
λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης; 110e).
42
“But those who seem to live exceptionally pious lives, they are those who are freed from these places in the earth
and released as if from prisons. They arrive into a pure dwelling above and live upon the earth (οἳ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι
διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ
ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι.; 114bc). The rest of the myth, in contrasts, describes the abodes of less pure souls, a series of underground rivers which
flow into the depths of the hollows—comprised especially of Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, Styx, and Tartarus—where
dead souls go according to the severity of the impurities they acquired in life (111c-4c).

266
eschatological schema: this “true earth” exists as the reward for purified souls, whose delight
seems to be the world’s purpose.
In De facie, Sulla offers his myth as an explanation of what purpose the composition of
the moon serves, specifically in that it is the dwelling place of disembodied souls. But before he
propounds this explanation, he reveals a learned and exotic foreigner as his source. Even in the
lost beginning of the dialogue, Sulla seems to have emphasized his reliance on this figure, given
the first extant line: “Sulla said these things, ‘for it belongs to my myth, and it is from this
source.’”43 When the Carthaginian finally interrupts Lamprias’ final speech, moreover, he
immediately emphasizes the source again by continuing the theatrical metaphor from above: “I,
then, am an actor, but first I will declare, if nothing should hinder it, that my poet began for us
with Homer.”44 The initial description of the myth and its immediate opening thus both focus on
his interlocutor; the first portion of Sulla’s speech is then dedicated to geographic descriptions of
the stranger’s origins and travels. These details, I argue, create such an over-determined
exoticism that they call attention to the myth’s fictionality, which emphasizes its status as a
“likely account” rather than a dogmatic exposition.
Sulla’s description of the stranger who relates the account to him mixes geographical and
ethnographical portions, with theological or daemonological elements woven into both—all of
which contribute to the exoticism of the myth. The Carthaginian begins with a line of Homer: “A

ὁ Σύλλας ταῦτ’ εἶπε· “τῷ γὰρ ἐμῷ μύθῳ προσήκει κἀκεῖθέν ἐστι;” (920b), accepting Cherniss’ emendation for
Pohlenz’s printing of the MSS. † Ὀαυνοσύλλας.
44
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑποκριτής εἰμι, πρότερον δ’ αὐτοῦ φράσω τὸν ποιητὴν ἡμῖν εἰ μή τι κωλύει καθ’ Ὅμηρον ἀρξάμενον
(941a). Pohlenz (1955) prints ὑμῖν for the MSS. ἡμῖν (as well as ἀρξάμενος for ἀρξάμενον) and detects a lacuna
immediately after, apparently on the assumption that Sulla should cite his source on the outset. This was corrected
by Cherniss (1951: 148), who is followed by more recent editors such as and Donini (2011: 222) and Lernould
(2013: 74). On the last phrase, Cherniss: “ἡμῖν has a special subtlety and gives special point to the apology, εἰ μὴ τι
κωλύει, for it might seem incredible that the stranger from across the Atlantic should have a line of Homer so
appropriate to his story” (149). Cf. Vernière (1977: 63).
43
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certain island, Ogygia, lies far off in the sea.”45 The mythic home of Calypso is said to be far
removed from the Mediterranean, several days voyage west of Britain, a distant-most part of the
early empire.46 The stranger’s island is even farther west, and difficult to reach due to a legendary
quality of the surrounding waters: “for the sea is slow to traverse and muddy from the magnitude
of streams, and the streams discharge much earth such that embankments form and the sea is
heavy and earthy, which is the source of its reputation for being congealed.”47 These alluvial
deposits—which W. Hamilton already in 1934 connected with a similar detail in Plato’s myth of
Atlantis48—make journey to the island difficult and long. The region’s inhabitants—whom Sulla
claims were initially “the people of Cronus,” but intermingled with Greeks that, appropriately for
an aetiological myth, were left by Hercules49—are nevertheless induced to send expeditions even
through the difficult path: “The non-Greeks mythologize that Cronus is confined in one of these
islands by Zeus and that primeval <Briareus> holds guard over these islands and the sea, which

… καθ’ Ὅμηρον (Od. VII.244) ἀρξάμενος· “Ὠγυγίη τις νῆσος ἀπόπροθεν εἰν ἁλὶ κεῖται” (941a).
“… it lies about five days west of Britain by sailing. But the other three islands are equally separated from at it
from one another, lying generally towards the summer settings of the sun. … But the great continent, by which the
sea is surrounded in a circle, is less far from the other islands, but is around five thousand miles from Ogygia by
oared ships…” (… δρόμον ἡμερῶν πέντε Βρεττανίας ἀπέχουσα πλέοντι πρὸς ἑσπέραν· ἕτεραι δὲ τρεῖς ἴσον ἐκείνης
ἀφεστῶσαι καὶ ἀλλήλων πρόκεινται μάλιστα κατὰ δυσμὰς ἡλίου θερινάς. τὴν δὲ μεγάλην ἤπειρον, ὑφ’ ἧς ἡ μεγάλη
περιέχεται κύκλῳ θάλαττα, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔλαττον ἀπέχει<ν>, τῆς δ’ Ὠγυγίας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους σταδίους
κωπήρεσι πλοίοις κομιζομένῳ…; 941a-b). Britain is so distant from the Mediterranean world that Diodorus Siculus,
for instance, supposes that it was never invaded before Julius Caesar, even by Dionysus or Hercules (V.21.2).
47
βραδύπορον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ πηλῶδες ὑπὸ πλήθους ῥευμάτων τὸ πέλαγος· τὰ δὲ ῥεύματα τὴν μεγάλην ἐξιέναι γῆν
καὶ γίνεσθαι προχώσεις ἀπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ βαρεῖαν εἶναι καὶ γεώδη τὴν θάλατταν, ᾗ καὶ πεπηγέναι δόξαν ἔσχε (941b).
On this detail, see Cherniss (1957: 182-3nd); cf. Donini (2011: 338).
48
25-6. Hamilton draws particular attention to Plato’s descriptions of the muddy water where the island of Atlantis
once was: πηλοῦ καταβραχέος ἐμποδὼν ὄντος (Tim. 25d); ἄπορον πηλὸν τοῖς ἐνθένδε ἐπλέουσιν (Criti. 108e). Clay
(2014) closes his survey of responses to the Atlantis myth with Sulla’s myth (244-5).
49
οἴεσθαι δὲ τοῖς Κρόνου λαοῖς ἀναμιχθέντας ὕστερον τοὺς μεθ’ Ἡρακλέους παραγενομένους καὶ ὑπολειφθέντας
ἤδη σβεννύμενον τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκεῖ… (941c). What follows describes a “quenched Hellenicity there, overpowered
by barbaric tongue and customs” (σβεννύμενον τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ κρατούμενον γλώττῃ τε βαρβαρικῇ καὶ
νόμοις καὶ διαίταις), which these settlers from Hercules’ expedition rekindled (οἷον ἀναζωπυρῆσαι πάλιν ἰσχυρὸν
καὶ πολὺ γενόμενον). This seems to imply an earlier Greek colonization even before this one placed far in the
mythic past. Cf. Donini (2011): “Qui la geografia antropica del mito rischia di diventare confusa. … Ci si può
domandare se ci sia un significato riposto sotto questa fantasia” (339).
45
46
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they call the Cronian sea, that are settled around him.”50 Demetrius’ parallel narration in De
defectu specifies Briareus—one of the hundred-handers from Hesiod’s Theogonia, who fought
against the Titans and subsequently guard them in the gloom of Tartarus51—and Sulla seems to
interweave this part of the traditional story into his more complex myth as well.52
In the latter, the presence of Cronus motivates an elaborate ritual of pilgrimage for priests
who will be dedicated for at least thirty years on the island. The journey requires immense
preparation and resources, which is only undertaken when a rare astrological occurrence
emerges—implying that the people of Cronus have some ability in the observation of the
heavens. 53 Not only is the journey expensive, but, from the mention of “those that are saved from
the sea” (διασωθέντας). Not all of the expeditions reach their destination, so the journey is
evidently dangerous as well. These aspects deepen the exoticism, but the journey too is full of
wonders, such as preternaturally short nights—only one hour in thirty days, and even then, only a
light and twilit night—on even the stopping point—a Greek island en route to Cronus’ island

ὧν ἐν μιᾷ τὸν Κρόνον οἱ βάρβαροι καθεῖρχθαι μυθολογοῦσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός, τὸν δ’ ὠγύγιον <Βριάρεων> ἔχοντα
φρουρὸν τῶν τε νήσων ἐκείνων καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, ἣν Κρόνιον πέλαγος ὀνομάζουσι, παρακατῳκίσθαι (941a); the
MSS reads † τὸν δ’ ὡς υἱὸν, which Pohlenz (1955) prints, for Cherniss' (1951) τὸν δ’ ὠγύγιον <Βριάρεων>.
51
“Others were begotten in turn from Gaia and Uranus, three strong and mighty children, not to be named, Cottus
and Briareus and Gyges, boastful children. A hundred adept hands jut from their shoulders and fifty heads rest upon
strong limbs from their shoulders” (ἄλλοι δ’ αὖ Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο / τρεῖς παῖδες μεγάλοι <τε> καὶ
ὄβριμοι, οὐκ ὀνομαστοί, / Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς τε Γύγης θ’, ὑπερήφανα τέκνα. / τῶν ἑκατὸν μὲν χεῖρες ἀπ’ ὤμων
ἀίσσοντο, / ἄπλαστοι, κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πεντήκοντα / ἐξ ὤμων ἐπέφυκον ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσιν; 147-52). After
the titanomachy, Posidon honors Briareus in particular by making him his step-son (γαμβρὸν) through marriage to
Cymopoleia (818-20).
52
“There is one island there, in which Kronus sleeps confined, guarded by Briareus. The sleep has been devised as
the bond, and there are many daemones around him as attendants and servants” (ἐκεῖ μέντοι μίαν εἶναι νῆσον, ἐν ᾗ
τὸν Κρόνον καθεῖρχθαι φρουρούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Βριάρεω καθεύδοντα· δεσμὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸν ὕπνον μεμηχανῆσθαι,
πολλοὺς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι δαίμονας ὀπαδοὺς καὶ θεράποντας; 420a).
53
“Whenever the star of Cronus—which we call Saturn (Phainôn), but they call the Guardian of Night—arrives in
Taurus once every thirty years, they prepare the things for a sacrifice for a long time and draw lots to send out <a
sufficient number of pilgrims for the envoy> on so many ships, loading on a great retinue and sufficient
procurement for men preparing to sail such a vast sea by oar and to live for a long time on a foreign land” (ὅταν οὖν
ὁ τοῦ Κρόνου ἀστήρ, ὃν Φαίνοντα μὲν ἡμεῖς, ἐκείνους δὲ Νυκτοῦρον ἔφη καλεῖν, εἰς Ταῦρον παραγένηται δι’ ἐτῶν
τριάκοντα, παρασκευασαμένους ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ τὰ περὶ τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὸν ἀ<πόστολον θεωροὺς ἱκανοὺς>
ἐκπέμπειν κλήρῳ λαχόντας ἐν πλοίοις τοσούτοις θεραπείαν τε πολλὴν καὶ παρασκευὴν; 941c-d, accepting Cherniss’
suggestion for the lacuna).
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where the pilgrims are considered holy men.54 The mountain that contains the titan is even more
wondrous:
For Cronus sleeps enclosed in a deep cave of rock like gold —for the sleep was devised
as his bond by Zeus—and birds fly down the peak of the rock to bring him ambrosia,
spreading a pleasant smell throughout the whole island, dispersed from the rock as if
from a spring. And there are daemones who follow and serve Cronus, who were
companions to him, indeed when he was ruling over gods and men.55
The humans who live there, it seems, are similarly dedicated to Cronus:
It is only permitted for those that serve the god for thirty years to sail back homeward, but
most, rather reasonably (ἐπιεικῶς), choose to stay there—some because of habit, others
because everything is plentifully available without work and business—to spend their
time at sacrifices and dances, or always involved in some conversations and philosophy.56
Their lives while dedicated to the god are paradisal, and share two characteristics with the
dwellers of the “true earth” in the Phaedo. In Socrates’ myth, the surrounding aether is purer
than our air and the divine is entirely manifest:
Their seasons have such a composition that they are without sickness and live for much
longer than we here, and in sight and hearing and judgement and every other thing like
this, they are superior, by as much as air is superior to water or aether to air, with respect
to purity. They have groves and shrines of the gods where the gods are true inhabitants,
and they receive portents and prophecies and visions of the gods and all sorts of

“Once they set sail, they experience different fates—as is likely—but those who are saved from the sea first arrive
at the foremost islands, which are settled by Greeks; they see the hidden for less than an hour over the course of
thirty days, and this is night, which nevertheless bears a gentle, twilight shadow, illuminated towards the west. They
spend ninety days there with honor and hospitality, being considered and addressed as holy men; then they are
carried to where they must go by the winds” (ἀναγκαίαν μέλλουσι πλεῖν πέλαγος τοσοῦτον εἰρεσίᾳ καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ
ξένης βιοτεύειν πολὺν ἐμβαλλομένους. ἀναχθέντας οὖν χρῆσθαι τύχαις, ὡς εἰκός, ἄλλους ἄλλαις, τοὺς δὲ
διασωθέντας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς προκειμένας νήσους οἰκουμένας δ’ ὑφ’ Ἑλλήνων κατίσχειν καὶ
τὸν ἥλιον ὁρᾶν κρυπτόμενον ὥρας μιᾶς ἔλαττον ἐφ’ ἡμέρας τριάκοντα· καὶ νύκτα τοῦτ’ εἶναι, σκότος ἔχουσαν
ἐλαφρὸν καὶ λυκαυγὲς ἀπὸ δυσμῶν περιλαμπόμενον. ἐκεῖ δὲ διατρίψαντας ἡμέρας ἐνενήκοντα μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ
φιλοφροσύνης, ἱεροὺς νομιζομένους καὶ προσαγορευομένους, ὑπὸ πνευμάτων οἷ δεῖ περαιοῦσθαι; 941d). Cf. Pl. Plt.
272b-d. Pohlenz (1955) prints ἤδη for Cherniss' (1957) οἷ δεῖ, but cf. Cherniss (1951: 149n91).
55
αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸν Κρόνον ἐν ἄντρῳ βαθεῖ περιέχεσθαι πέτρας χρυσειδοῦς καθεύδοντα. τὸν γὰρ ὕπνον αὐτῷ
μεμηχανῆσθαι δεσμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός, ὄρνιθας δὲ τῆς πέτρας κατὰ κορυφὴν εἰσπετομένους ἀμβροσίαν ἐπιφέρειν
αὐτῷ, καὶ τὴν νῆσον εὐωδίᾳ κατέχεσθαι πᾶσαν, ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς σκιδναμένῃ τῆς πέτρας· τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας ἐκείνους
περιέπειν καὶ θεραπεύειν τὸν Κρόνον, ἑταίρους αὐτῷ γενομένους, ὅτε δὴ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐβασίλευε (941f-2a).
56
ἐξεῖναι μὲν γὰρ ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε τοὺς τῷ θεῷ τὰ τρὶς δέκ’ ἔτη συλλατρεύσαντας, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους
ἐπιεικῶς αὐτόθι κατοικεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ συνηθείας τοὺς δ’ὅτι πόνου δίχα καὶ πραγμάτων ἄφθονα πάρεστι πάντα,
πρὸς θυσίαις καὶ χορηγίαις ἢ περὶ λόγους τινὰς ἀεὶ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβουσι (941e).
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communions between them and the divine: and indeed, the sun and moon and stars are
seen by them too as they really are, and every happiness follows these things.57
In Plutarch’s myth, “the nature of the island is marvelous, and the thinness of the surrounding
air.”58 Second, in Plato’s ‘true earth,’ “there are groves and sanctuaries to the gods among them,
in which the gods are truly inhabitants, and utterances and prophecies and visions of the gods
and things of this sort happen among them and in their presence.”59 On Plutarch’s island, the
daemones appear to the inhabitants as if intimate friends: “to some intending to sail away, a
divine warning appears to them, as if they are neighbors and friends; they do not appear in sleep
or through symbols alone, but many encounter the sights and voices of daemones even
manifestly.”60 The people on Plutarch’s island dedicated to Cronus thus live like the elevated
dwellers of the “true earth” in the Phaedo.61
As with Plato’s mythical Atlantis, Plutarch’s geographical description spurred many, as
surveyed by Harold Cherniss, to search for its real-world referent, so it must have had some
τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε,
καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ᾗπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος
ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς
θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς
αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν
τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι; 111a-c). While as the inhabitants of the “true earth” live long and healthy lives, down here
there is again the baleful influence of water, which “provides ugliness and sickness to both stones and earth and
every other creature and plant” (ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει;
110e). They dwell, however, as if on islands: “And there are many sorts of animals and humans upon it, some who
dwell inland, others who live around the air as we do the sea, and others still who populate islands which the air
flows around near the mainland…” (ζῷα δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ
οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ’ ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ
ἠπείρῳ οὔσας…; 111a). Burnet (1911): “This is an attempt to fit the old idea of the Islands of the Blest into the
mythical landscape” (110).
58
θαυμαστὴν γὰρ εἶναι τῆς τε νήσου τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν πραότητα τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος (941f).
59
καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ
αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς (111b-c).
60
ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐμποδὼν γίνεσθαι διανοηθεῖσιν ἀποπλεῖν ὥσπερ συνήθεσι καὶ φίλοις ἐπιδεικνύμενον. οὐκ
ὄναρ <γὰρ> μόνον οὐδὲ διὰ συμβόλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φανερῶς ἐντυγχάνειν πολλοὺς ὄψεσι δαιμόνων καὶ φωναῖς (941f).
The De fac. scenario differs from the Phd. myth, in that the divine beings are just daemones and not gods
themselves, and that there is a possibility of leaving while still alive (cf. Phd. 114b-c)—but the underlying idea of
the divine manifesting more clearly and intimately in a purer place in the Platonic myth is clearly evoked in the
Plutarchean.
61
These parallels are not often remarked upon in commentaries, such as by Donini (2011), who more generally
compares the myth of the Plt. (341).
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sense of plausibility; Cherniss himself concludes by deeming the elements of the description “the
usual ‘corroborative detail intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and
unconvincing narrative.’”62 A group of modern Greek scientists has recently sought to affirm
every detail, including the thirty-year cycles.63 The details, however, should stress the unreality
and implausibility of the myth and pushing the discourse beyond the limits of dry geographical
description into the realm of the exotic and the fantastical. The island of Cronus itself is,
moreover, not unique to De facie. In another of Plutarch’s dialogues, De defectu, a traveler
named Demetrius claims to have “sailed in an envoy of the emperor for the sake of inquiry and
investigation;” on this voyage, he visited the island himself, inhabited by only a few consecrated
men and Cronus enchained in sleep.64 One cosmological detail, however, only emerges in De
facie: “For Cronus dreams as many things as Zeus premeditates, and the titanic passions and
motions of his soul are straining, until sleep again restores his repose, and the kingly and divine

1957: 21-3. On Francis Bacon’s treatment of the Atlantis myth, cf. Clay (2014: 233). Kepler identifies Plutarch’s
real world referrent—“he could hardly have written in this way merely from an unfettered imagination”—with the
Americas. See Rosen (1967: 31n5). Cherniss surveys older arguments about Plutarch’s sources for the myth (23-5),
and relatedly concludes: “Anyone who without a preconceived thesis to defend reads the De Facie will recognize
that Plato was Plutarch’s inspiration throughout the dialogue but that Plutarch is himself the true author of the whole
work and that, while there is in it a distillation of his wide and varied scientific and philosophical reading, he cannot
possibly have composed it by copying out any source or combination of sources” (25). See also Hamilton (1934: 289n1-2).
63
Liritzis et al. (2018): “Despite its eclectic mixture of rational inquiry and deliberate fantasy, the particular
dialogue investigated here, which refers to the solar eclipse and details of the mysterious journey, possesses an
intrinsic unity that is essential to the evolution and presentation of its scientific conclusion, mostly verified with
current knowledge. Its inherent geographical and astronomical interest ultimately derives from the synthesis of
this descriptive narration, and the dialogue contains rich detail and fertile ideas pertinent to geography,
oceanography and archaeoastronomy” (672).
64
πλεῦσαι δὲ αὐτος ἱστορίας καὶ θέας ἕνεκα πομπῇ τοῦ βασιλέως… (419e). Euhemerus, according to Diodorus
Siculus as preserved by Euseb. (Praep. evang. II.2), similarly claimed to travel at the behest of the Hellenistic
monarch Cassander (VI.1.4). Demetrius is introduced in De def. or. as “a literary scholar (γραμματικὸς) travelling
from Britain down home to Tarsus” (410a). There is a substantial body of scholarship that treats a historical person
named Demetrius as the source for this myth, and thus the identity of Sulla’s stranger, beginning with Cumont
(1913: 476-7). Evidently two inscriptions in York testify to a Demetrius, published by Dessau (1911), although to
Flacelière's (1947) chagrin they do not include a toponym (26n1). He does not identify the stranger with Demetrius,
although Vernière (1977) does (102-103).
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royal part is, intrinsically, clean and pure.”65 Whatever other consequences this mysterious set of
details might have, for the present part of the myth they serve a specific purpose in explaining
the source of knowledge for the daemones:66 “They foretell many things from themselves
because they are prophetic, but they announce the greatest things about the greatest things as if
bringing down the dreams of Cronus.”67
Yet the stranger has other sources of knowledge. While he served Cronus on the island,
Sulla tells us, his leisure was spent in study: “The stranger was indeed conveyed there (to the
island), as he said, serving the god in leisure and bearing empirical knowledge of astrology, up to
the farthest point is it possible for one doing geometry to progress, and he bore knowledge of the
rest of philosophy, using natural science.”68 Apparently the stranger is at least as much an
astronomer himself as the characters in the initial, scientific portion of De facie69—or perhaps
Plato’s own Timaeus, an astrologer from Locri. Yet he was evidently the rare inhabitant of the
island who was both inclined to leave the island, and was not opposed by the daemones: he was
overcome by “some desire and longing to behold (γενέσθαι… θεατής) the great island, which is,
as it seems likely, what they call the part of the world we inhabit.”70 Although he has two

ὅσα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς προδιανοεῖται, ταῦτ’ ὀνειροπολεῖν τὸν Κρόνον, εἶναι δ’ ἀνάτασιν τὰ τιτανικὰ πάθη καὶ κινήματα
τῆς ψυχῆς ἕως ἂν αὐτῷ πάλιν ἀνάπαυσιν ὁ ὕπνος <καταστήσῃ> καὶ γένηται τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ θεῖον αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ
καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον (942a).
66
On the significance of this figure, cf. Bos (1989).
67
καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν μαντικοὺς ὄντας προλέγειν, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ὡς ὀνείρατα τοῦ
Κρόνου κατιόντας ἐξαγγέλλειν (942a).
68
ἐνταῦθα δὴ κομισθείς, ὡς ἔλεγεν, ὁ ξένος καὶ θεραπεύων τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ σχολῆς, ἀστρολογίας μὲν ἐφ’ ὅσον
γεωμετρήσαντι πορρωτάτω προελθεῖν δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐμπειρίαν ἔσχε, φιλοσοφίας δὲ τῆς ἄλλης τῷ φυσικῷ χρώμενος
(942b). Donini (1988) takes these two activities, as well as their taking place on a sacred island, to represent a sort of
elaborate “metaphor for a Platonic school of the first or second century A.D.,” based on “the threefold Aristotelian
division of theoretical sciences” into mathematics, physics, and theology (131-2). On the origin of this distinction,
Jaeger (1948 [1923]), however, concludes that Xenocrates (frg. 1 Heinze) had formulated a “well known division of
philosophy… which held for the later Plato too” before Aristotle (434n2).
69
Perhaps, to whatever degree his study is based on empirical observation, he is even better equipped for astronomy
on the island than the in the Mediterranean, given the thinness of the surrounding air.
70
ἐπιθυμίαν δέ τινα καὶ πόθον ἔχων γενέσθαι τῆς μεγάλης νήσου θεατής (οὕτως γὰρ ὡς ἔοικε τὴν παρ’ ἡμῖν
οἰκουμένην ὀνομάζουσιν), … (942b). Further on the geographic designation of continents and islands: 941b-c. Cf.
Bos (1989: 27).
65
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potential sources of knowledge on the island—his own geometrical study and philosophical
speculation, as well as intimacy with Cronus’ daemones—his burning desire for knowledge
spurs him to seek even more sources. Sulla relates that he indeed found many, too many to
survey for Lamprias and the rest: “what he experienced then and how many people he
encountered—he both came across holy writings and was initiated in all the rites—to go through
this would be a task greater than a single day, as he related it to us very thoroughly and brought
to memory each point.”71 The stranger’s Odyssean journey evidently allowed him to gain more
elevated and exotic sources of knowledge, particularly through these sacred writings, whatever
they might have been.
Yet Sulla specifies that one experience is particularly informative for the topic of De
facie, which he emphatically exhorts the other speakers to “hear” in particular.72 The stranger
apparently set out for Carthage, based on its shared veneration of Cronus, which is where he met
Sulla. While there, he apparently performed something like antiquarian archaeology, similarly, it
seems, to what Diodorus Siculus relates about Euhemerus’ journey to Panchaia and his discovery
of golden tablets there73—a comparison that should not imply credence, given Plutarch’s

ἃ μὲν οὖν ἔπαθε καὶ ὅσους ἀνθρώπους διῆλθεν, ἱεροῖς τε γράμμασιν ἐντυγχάνων ἐν τελεταῖς τε πάσαις
τελούμενος, οὐ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ἔργον ἐστὶ διελθεῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἡμῖν ἀπήγγελλεν εὖ μάλα καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον
ἀπομνημονεύων· ὅσα δ’ οἰκεῖα τῆς ἐνεστώσης διατριβῆς ἐστιν, ἀκούσατε (942c). Cf. Hom. Od. I.3-4: πολλῶν δ’
ἀνθρώπων… / πάθεν…
72
ὅσα δ’ οἰκεῖα τῆς ἐνεστώσης διατριβῆς ἐστιν, ἀκούσατε (942c). Cf. Cherniss (1957): “Nothing in the subsequent
account supports the frequently expressede notion that the myth is supposed to have been discovered in these
parchments” (191nc).
73
Diodorus claims that Euhemerus travelled broadly and found somewhere near Arabia “the blest” (Εὐδαίμονος) a
temple to “Zeus Triphylius” on a land he called Panchaia (VI.1.4-6): “and in that temple there is a gold engraving, in
which the most important deeds of Ouranus and Cronus and Zeus are written in Panchaian letters” (ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
ἱερῷ στήλην εἶναι χρυσῆν, ἐν ᾗ τοῖς Παγχαίοις γράμμασιν ὑπάρχειν γεγραμμένας τάς τε Οὐρανοῦ καὶ Κρόνου καὶ
Διὸς πράξεις κεφαλαιωδῶς; VI.1.7). Clay (2014) argues that Panchaia was “written in the wake of Plato’s lost
Atlantis” (234). See further 238-42. Probably not coincidentally, Diodorus attributes accounts of the gods, such as
Ouranus and his children, as great humans of the past to ancient “Atlantians” (III.56-61).
71
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sarcastic derision of the story.74 The expedition of Sulla’s also yields an incredible find of secret
writings:
He spent the most time in Carthage, certainly because Cronus bears great honors among
us, and from when the earlier city was destroyed, he discovered some sacred hides that
were carried out in secret and laid forgotten in the earth for a long while. And he also
exhorted me that, of the visible gods, it is necessary to honor the moon especially, since
she is held to be the most responsible for life <…>.75
The scrolls, it seems, must have pertained to the role of the moon in the cosmos, which, as the
next section examines, is the subject of much of the stranger’s speech. The Carthaginian scrolls,
it seems, are presented as the most immediately salient source for his extraordinary knowledge
about the cosmos, since they immediately precede his speech, although several potential sources
of authority have been established.76 Yet the conclusion of the myth specifies only one, from far
earlier in the myth: “‘These things,’ Sulla said, ‘I heard the stranger relate in detail, and the
servitors and servants of Cronus, as he said, proclaimed it to him.” 77 Many scholars are content to
straightforwardly take these figures as the ultimate surety for the myth.78 But in that case, why
Plutarch, no admirer of “the charlantry” (φενακισμοῖς) of Euhemerus (De Is. 360a), dismisses his purported
journey and discovery: “… as the things that happened long ago have been written in Panchaia in gold letters, which
neither Greek nor non-Greek has seen, but only Euhemerus , who, as it is likely, sailed to people who dwell in a land
nowhere and never existed…” (… ὡς δὴ πάλαι γεγονότων ἐν δὲ Πάγχοντι γράμασσι χρυσοῖς ἀναγγεγραμμένων, οἷς
οὔτε βάρβαρος οὐδεὶς οὔθ’ Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ μόνος Εὐήμερος, ὡς ἔοικε, πλεύσας εἰς τοὺς μηδαμόθι τῆς γεγονότας μηδ’
ὄντας …; 360a-b).
75
πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν Καρχηδόνι χρόνον διέτριψεν, ἅτε δὴ παρ’ ἡμῖν μεγάλας <τοῦ Κρόνου τιμὰς> ἔχοντος, καί τινας,
ὅθ' ἡ προτέρα πόλις ἀπώλλυτο, διφθέρας ἱερὰς ὑπεκκομισθείσας κρύφα καὶ διαλαθούσας πολὺν χρόνον ἐν γῇ
κειμένας ἐξευρών, τῶν τε φαινομένων θεῶν ἔφη χρῆναι καί μοι παρεκελεύετο τιμᾶν διαφερόντως τὴν σελήνην ὡς
τοῦ βίου κυριωτάτην οὖσαν … ἐχομένην (942c). For the lacuna, Pohlenz (1955) suggests <πλεῖστά τε μετὰ τῆς
μητρὸς ἀγαθὰ παρ>-εχομένην, while Cherniss (1957) prints <καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, τῶν Ἅιδου λειμώνων>; Vernière
(1977) similarly translates “et de la mort, ayant en partage les prairies de l’Hadès” (66).
76
Speyer (1970), however, argues that Plutarch implicitly presents the scrolls to be written by Cronus (78).
77
“ταῦτ’” εἶπεν ὁ Σύλλας “ἐγὼ μὲν ἤκουσα τοῦ ξένου διεξιόντος, ἐκείνῳ δ’ οἱ τοῦ Κρόνου κατευνασταὶ καὶ
θεράποντες, ὡς ἔλεγεν αὐτός, ἐξήγγειλαν” (945d-e).
78
Lamberton (2001), for instance, does not even mention the Carthaginian scrolls, but only the “remote servants of
Kronos who report the content of his dreams” (178); Brenk (2017): “The attendants of Kronos here… explain to the
clairvoyant narrator a doctrine which looks very much like an attempt by Plutarch to tidy up his previous thoughts
on the subject” (54). Deuse (2010) explains why, in De gen. and De sera, “the space above the moon is not really a
part of the myth; the allusions to it only serve to inform the reader of the restriction of perspective” through these
figures: “Only in De facie can the myth cover all aspects of the doctrine of the soul and thus also of cosmology, for
it is to the daimones that the stranger owes his knowledge, and the daimones can give information about the doctrine
of the soul and the hierarchy of the cosmos because it is their nature to wander between the worlds” (181). The role
74
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would Plutarch introduce the stranger’s study of natural philosophy and his discovery of
mysterious gold tablets, as well as the initiations and other sacred writings that are mentioned
without elaboration?79
Yet despite the exoticism of each of the stranger’s potential sources, his discourse is
thoroughly Hellenic. Rather than conveying Carthaginian or “Ogygian” stories about the gods,
he begins by appraising the value of Greek ones when Sulla was “marveling and asking to hear
more clearly”: “Many things… Sulla, are not said entirely well about the gods, among the
Greeks.”80 The stranger takes an imperious pose, perhaps like the priest of Saïs in Plato’s myth of
Atlantis, who deems the Greeks perpetual children when Solon presents his accounts of the
distant past.81 His explanation, however, relies on Greek etymology:
For example, they (the Greeks) call Demeter and Core by proper names, but at the same
time they improperly assign them to the same place. For the former is in earth and holds
authority over the things around earth, and the latter in moon and over things around
moon. She is called Core and Persephone, the one because she is the light-bringer, and
Core, that is the part of the eye in which the image of the onlooker shines back, just as the
light of the sun is seen in the moon—for this reason we call her Core.82
The stranger switches between third-person and first-person attributions, eventually placing
himself in the group under discussion. He describes the goddess through the physical qualities of
of the myths in De gen. and De sera, however, might also explain the focus on the soul and sublunary world: the
former is aimed at explaining the sign of Socrates, and the latter at showing the purpose of punishing the soul. On
the image of the psychic cable, see further Brenk (2017: 51n17). Opsomer (2017b), however, aptly detects greater
significance in the final attribution to the daemones: “I have used the expression ‘author of the myth’ in order to
draw attention to the narratological complexity involved. Plutarch presents the story as being told by a character,
Sulla, who has it from an unnamed stranger, who in turn claimed to have heard it from daemons. Prima facie this
creates a distance between Plutarch and the contents of the myth. Hence it is necessary to raise the question as to
what the epistemic status of the doctrines presented in the myth is supposed to be” (83). Cf. Beardslee (1975: 287).
79
Perhaps similarly, the priest of Saïs in Plato’s myth of Atlantis in the Ti. appeals to the existence of written
records (cf. 27b).
80
θαυμάζοντος δέ μου ταῦτα καὶ δεομένου σαφέστερον ἀκοῦσαι “πολλά” εἶπεν “ὦ Σύλλα, περὶ θεῶν οὐ πάντα δὲ
καλῶς λέγεται παρ’ Ἕλλησιν (942d).
81
“Solon, Solon, you Greeks are eternal children! There is not even one old Greek” (ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ
παῖδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην οὐκ ἔστιν; 22b).
82
οἷον εὐθὺς ὀρθῶς Δήμητραν καὶ Κόρην ὀνομάζοντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁμοῦ καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέρας εἶναι τόπον
νομίζουσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν γῇ καὶ κυρία τῶν περὶ γῆν ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἐν σελήνῃ καὶ τῶν περὶ σελήνην, Κόρη τε καὶ
Φερσεφόνη κέκληται, τὸ μὲν ὡς φωσφόρος οὖσα, Κόρη δ’ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος, ἐν ᾧ τὸ εἴδωλον ἀντιλάμπει τοῦ
βλέποντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἡλίου φέγγος ἐνορᾶται τῇ σελήνῃ, κόρην προσαγορεύομεν (942d).
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the moon, particularly its duality: it bears light, but, as Lucius contended earlier in the dialogue,
the moon “alone of all the objects in the heavens requires the light of another.”83 The stranger
interprets the Greek myths in a way to essentially confirm an earlier point of contention in the
dialogue, which has a further significance for the rest of the myth: the moon both receives and
gives light, a quality which represents its intermediary nature.84 The method of interpretation,
explaining the role of the gods in the cosmos by constructing etymological arguments, is a tactic
that Plutarch depicts in a variety of different sorts of discourses, particularly in De Iside et
Osiride.85 A more distinctly Stoic sort of allegory, where the gods are identified with different
elements in the physical world, which Plutarch ultimately rejects in De Iside, even appears in De
facie.86 Lamprias jeers at Theon’s inclination for poetic exegesis by predicting that, were he
speaking, he would quote a line of Alcman—“such does Dew, the daughter of Zeus and Selene,
nourish”—and explain Zeus as air that is liquified by the moon and turned into dew-drops.87 The
stranger’s invocation of Greek myth, and his etymological interpretation, would be perfectly

… τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος ὄντων μόνη φωτὸς ἀλλοτρίου δεομένη… (929a). He then quotes
Parmenides (= frg. B15 Diels), Anaxagoras, and a host of other natural philosophers. Evidently the phrase ἀλλότριον
φῶς is Parmenidean (frg. B14 = Plut. Adv. Col. 1116a).
84
The interpretation is thus not a purely physical one of the Stoic sort. Cf. Powell (2002): “By adding a
philosophical meaning, Plutarch’s physical allegory turns the myth into a vehicle for what he considers a deeper
truth” (20). In De Is., however, he introduces a category of “those who mix parts of mathematics drawn from
astrology with physical things of this sort” (οἱ δὲ τοῖσδε τοῖς φυσικοῖς καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ ἀστρολογίας μαθηματικῶν ἔνια
μιγνύντες; 367c-e). According to Griffiths (1970), this could refer either to Stoics or Egyptians (455-8). Cf.
Sallustius’ description of “Egyptian” interpretation of myth (IV.3).
85
See supra pg. 81.
86
See 376f. Plutarch is particularly wary of one-to-one identifications of gods with either basic elements or parts of
the agricultural cycle or climate: “do not reduce and sunder the divine into the winds and floods and sowings and
ploughings and incidents of the earth and changes in the seasons, such as those who make Dionysus wine and
Hephaestus fire; Persephone is said somewhere by Cleanthes to be ‘the wind borne through the crops and dying
away’” (μὴ λάθωσιν εἰς πνεύματα καὶ ῥεύματα καὶ σπόρους καὶ ἀρότους καὶ πάθη γῆς καὶ μεταβολὰς ὡρῶν
διαγράφοντες τὰ θεῖα καὶ διαλύοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον, Ἥφαιστον δὲ τὴν φλόγα· Φερσεφόνην δέ φησί
που Κλεάνθης [frg. 547] τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον πνεῦμα). Cf. De Pyth. or. 400a-c and
Lucr. II.655-60.
87
διὸ πρὸς σὲ τρέψομαι μᾶλλον, ὦ φίλε Θέων· λέγεις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐξηγούμενος ταυτὶ τὰ Ἀλκμᾶνος (frg. 48 D) “<οἷα
Διὸς> θυγάτηρ Ἔρσα τρέφει καὶ <δίας> Σελάνας,” ὅτι νῦν τὸν ἀέρα καλεῖ Δία καί φησιν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς σελήνης
καθυγραινόμενον εἰς δρόσους τρέπεσθαι (940a). The Stoic flavor of this argument is reinforced by reinforced by
Lamprias’ reference to the Stoic character in the dialogue, Pharnaces, immediately before the poetic quotation.
83
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suited to the learned conversation of Greek gentlemen earlier in the dialogue. Rather than an
exotic pronouncement, he avails himself of the same argumentative tools as the other speakers.
The stranger continues to interpret the details of the Persephone myth, namely the length
of time she is said in the myth to be separated from Demeter every year, which he takes to relate
to the lunar cycle.88 He soon appeals to the central Greek cultural authority, besides Plato at
least—the poet Homer:
It is impossible for her to leave Hades, because she is the boundary of Hades. As Homer
too says, concealing it not poorly: “but into the plain of Elysium and the limits of the
earth.” Where the encroaching shadow of the earth ceases, this is set as the limit and the
end of the earth.89
The stranger uses a line of poetry available to all to illustrate a very unintuitive cosmological
idea, extending the limit of the earth to the shadow it casts upon the moon. This allows him to
divide the moon into parts which serve different functions in the cycle of souls. He later cites the
image of Hercules from the nekyia from the Odyssey. Besides these appeals to Homer, that
corner-stone of Hellenic tradition, the stranger also appeals to the myth of Endymion, as well as
ritual realia apparently from rural Greece: rustics banging bronzeware during eclipses to ward
off baleful souls.90 He invokes Xenocrates, the second successor to Plato’s Academy, who is one
“There is some truth in the things said about their wandering and their search: for they seek after one another
although they are apart, and they often intertwine in the shadow. And that Core is in heaven and light at one point
but dark and night at another is not a lie, but it causes an error in the amount of time: it is not that we do not see her
for six months, but that we see her overtaken by the earth, as if by her mother, in shadow every six months, and
sometimes she suffers this every five months” (τοῖς τε περὶ τὴν πλάνην καὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτῶν λεγομένοις ἔνεστι
<μέν τι καὶ> ἀληθές· ἀλλήλων γὰρ ἐφίενται χωρὶς οὖσαι καὶ συμπλέκονται περὶ τὴν σκιὰν πολλάκις· τὸ δὲ νῦν μὲν
ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ φωτὶ νῦν δ’ ἐν σκότῳ καὶ νυκτὶ γενέσθαι [περὶ] τὴν Κόρην ψεῦδος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τῷ
ἀριθμῷ πλάνην παρέσχηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἓξ μῆνας ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἓξ μῆνας ὁρῶμεν αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς
τῇ σκιᾷ λαμβανομένην, ὀλιγάκις δὲ τοῦτο διὰ πέντε μηνῶν πάσχουσαν; 942e). Pohlenz also lists Bernardakis’s <ὡς
ἔοικέ τι>, but Cherniss (1957) appealing suggests <ᾐνιγμένον> τὸ, Plutarch’s characteristic verb for allegorical
encoding—cf. Hardie (1992: 4744-5), Bernabé (1999: 193-200)—for Pohlenz’s <μέν τι καὶ> (194); Vernière (1977)
similarly suggests “sous forme allégorique” (66).
89
ἐπεὶ τόν γ’ Ἅιδην ἀπολιπεῖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν αὐτήν, τοῦ Ἅιδου πέρας οὖσαν· ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπικρυψάμενος
οὐ φαύλως τοῦτ’ εἶπεν “ἀλλά <σ’> ἐς Ἠλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης” (Od. IV.563) ὅπου γὰρ ἡ σκιὰ τῆς γῆς
ἐπινεμομένη παύεται, τοῦτο τέρμα τῆς γῆς ἔθετο καὶ πέρας (942e-f).
90
“This is why the many are accustomed to beat bronzeware during eclipses, raising a din and tumult against wicked
souls: the so-called face terrifies them off whenever it comes close, because it is something fearful and terrible to
88

278
of the most frequently cited authorities throughout the Moralia. When the stranger refers to the
daemones that preside over religious cults, he refers briefly to those that serve Cronus far to the
north once more, but his other examples are closer to home for Sulla’s interlocutors: “the Idean
Dactyls in Crete or the Corybantes in Phrygia or the Trophonians settled in Boetia and many
others throughout the inhabited world.”91 Although the last are obscure to us, they certainly
would not have been to Lamprias, who was himself was a priest at the famous shrine of
Trophonius at Lebedaea.92
Yvonne Vernière, building upon a long line of French and German scholarship that seeks
aspects of non-Greek religious influence, takes the specific location of Carthage in Sulla’s myth
to indicate that “aspects du culte saturnien d’Afrique” lie behind some of the content of the
stranger’s myth—particularly, while she allows the theory of the tripartite human to have its
origin in Plato, the relationship between the sun, moon, and earth are traced to exotic, non-Greek
religion.93 Rather, the stranger’s discourse takes place mid-way between the fantastical island to
the north and the exotic shores of Carthage to the south, in the intellectual world of Imperial

look upon. Yet it is nothing of this sort” (διὸ καὶ κροτεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλείψεσιν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι χαλκώματα καὶ
ψόφον ποιεῖν καὶ πάταγον ἐπὶ τὰς φαύλας· ἐκφοβεῖ δ’ αὐτὰς καὶ τὸ καλούμενον πρόσωπον, ὅταν ἐγγὺς γένωνται,
βλοσυρόν τι καὶ φρικῶδες ὁρώμενον. ἔστι δ’ οὐ τοιοῦτον; 944b). On this sort of interpretation, see Hardie (1992:
4757-8); on Endymion: 945b.
91
ἐκ δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐκείνων οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Κρόνον ὄντες ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ πρότερον ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ τοὺς
Ἰδαίους Δακτύλους, ἔν τε Φρυγίᾳ τοὺς Κορύβαντας γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς περὶ Βοιωτίαν ἐνιδρύοντας Τροφωνιάδας καὶ
μυρίους ἄλλους πολλαχόθι τῆς οἰκουμένης (944d-e). I adopt Donini’s emendation of ἐνιδρύοντας for Pohlenz’ ἐν †
Οὐδώρα and Cherniss’ ἐν Οὐδώρᾳ. On these figures, cf. Bonnechere (2003: 123-5). That the stranger expects them
to be familiar to his audience—perhaps not just the Carthaginian Sulla—is clear: “their shrines and honors and
names persist, but their powers have fallen away to another place as they obtain the best alteration” (ὧν ἱερὰ καὶ
τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι διαμένουσιν, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις ἔνευον εἰς ἕτερον τόπον τῆς ἀρίστης ἐξαλλαγῆς τυγχανόντων;
944e).
92
De def. or. 411e-2a, 431c-d. The stranger refers, moreover, to the myth of Pytho at Delphi (945c).
93
1977: 102-5. She thus emphasizes iconography with astrological elements found in the archaeological record:
“D’où le signe très fréquent du croissant sommé parfois d’un disque ou d’une étoile. D’où cette parèdre romaine de
Saturne, Coelestis, héritiè de Tanit : car les découvertes épigraphiques effectuées dans le sanctuaire de Thinissut
‘démontrent à l’évidence l’identité absolue des groupes Baal-Tanit et Saturne-Coelestis’. Souvent d’ailleurs, Soleil
et Lune entourent le dieu, comme une sorte de commentaire théologique d’image qu’ils accompagnent” (104). See
also Opsomer (2017): “It is likely that Plutarch was in the end more convinced by the scientific arguments than by a
myth fabricated by him on the basis of foreign source material” (83).
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Rome.94 The alternative sources of knowledge for the stranger, moreover, emphasize the
fictionality of the appeal to authority inherent in the frame of the myth and therefore illustrate its
status as plausible or likely, rather than authoritative and transcendent. The stranger’s unexpected
appeals to mainstays of Plutarchean discourse—namely interpretation of traditional myth,
Homer, ritual realia, and Xenocrates—further emphasize the overdetermined and selfconsciously fictive epistemological status of the myth. Yet the speech nevertheless seems to meet
the requirement, which the next section examines, of a specific kind of provisional or
hypothetical description of the physical world, namely a teleological account.

Anaxagoras, the Phaedo, and Plutarch’s theory of causation
Sulla’s myth echoes the Phaedo in many of the details, as the previous section detailed,
but De facie more significantly draws on the theory of causation elaborated in that dialogue
through Socrates’ description of his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras’ theory of nous. The
physicist, he argues, only describes how the world is disposed and not why, the final purposes
such a disposition might have been intended to serve. Plutarch draws often on this formulation of
teleology, the search for final causes, in both the Moralia and the Vitae, as I survey below, but he
imbeds it especially in De facie, where the final myth presents an account designed to fit such a
teleological requirement. The final portion of De facie marks an explicit turn in the conversation
toward exactly this sort of causation. Before Sulla begins relating the myth, Theon, a character

Vernière, however, describes the “prêtres de Cronos, qui jouent un tel rôle dans le mythe de Sylla” through North
African iconography (105)—as if the myth had not gone to great lengths to stress the otherworldliness of the land
beyond Britain inhabited by the stranger’s former colleagues devoted to the sleeping titan. Similarly, Campbell
(1968): “In a similar type of essay devoted in large part to the religion of Kronos…” (376).
94
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marked for his enthusiasm for poetry and literary scholarship, interrupts and raises an objection
that will frame the rest of the dialogue:95
Lamprias, I desire no less than for you all to hear what will be said, but I would
pleasurably hear first about those who are said to live on the moon—not if some dwell
there, but if it is possible to dwell there. If it is not possible, it is irrational for the moon to
be earthy. It will surely seem to have no purpose and to have come about in vain if she
neither bears fruits nor provides a seat, an origin, and a means of life for some humans, at
least: we affirm, according to Plato, that it was for the sake of this that this (earth) came
about, as “our nurse, our attentive guardian and creator through day and night.”96
If Lamprias is correct that the moon is earthy, why does it matter? Theon, drawing on the
function imputed to the earth in the Timaeus, shifts the discussion from “what” the moon is to
“why,” reorienting the discussion from physics to teleology, inquiry on a particular kind of
cause. Described according to Aristotle’s systematic schema, the earlier conversation only
addressed the material cause—out of what does something exist, such as the bronze of a statue
and the silver of the bowl—without fully addressing the final cause—for the sake of what
something exists, for example health as the cause or aim of going on a stroll.97 Theon is

Lamprias appeals to Theon as an enthusiast for and expert in poetry: e.g. “but you, always embracing and
marveling at Aristarchus, do not assent to Crates’ reading: ‘Ocean, who is brought to pass as the origin of all men
and gods, flows over most of the earth’” (ἀλλὰ σύ, τὸν Ἀρίσταρχον ἀγαπῶν ἀεὶ καὶ θαυμάζων, οὐκ ἀκούεις
Κράτητος ἀναγινώσκοντος· “Ὠκεανός, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται / ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ θεοῖς, πλείστην ἐπὶ γαῖαν
ἵησιν” [Hom. Il. XIV.246]; 938d). Lamprias earlier jests that if Theon were arguing, he would cite Mimnermus,
Cydias, Archilochus, Stesichorus, and Pindar (931e).
96
ἐγώ τοι, ὦ Λαμπρία… ἐπιθυμῶ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ὑμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τὰ λεχθησόμενα, πρότερον δ’ ἂν ἡδέως
ἀκούσαιμι περὶ τῶν οἰκεῖν λεγομένων ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης, οὐκ εἰ κατοικοῦσί τινες ἀλλ’ εἰ δυνατὸν ἐκεῖ κατοικεῖν. εἰ
γὰρ οὐ δυνατόν, ἄλογον καὶ τὸ γῆν εἶναι τὴν σελήνην. δόξει γὰρ πρὸς οὐθὲν ἀλλὰ μάτην γεγονέναι μήτε καρποὺς
ἐκφέρουσα μήτ’ ἀνθρώποις τισὶν ἕδραν παρέχουσα καὶ γένεσιν καὶ δίαιταν, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταυτην γενονέναι φαμὲν
κατὰ Πλάτωνα “τροφὸν ἡμετέραν, ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἀτρεκῆ φύλακα καὶ δημιουργόν” (937d-e, paraphrasing Ti.
40b). His initial appeal (πρότερον δ’ ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι) seems to be a play on Sulla’s (πρῶτον ἡδέως ἄν μοι δοκῶ
πυνθέσθαι). Cf. Cherniss (1957): “this ‘transitional episode’ raises the philosophical question, without the answer to
which the strictly astronomical conclusion could to a Platonist or Aristotelian be no complete or satisfactory
explanation, and itself contains the metaphysical answer, of which the myth is, despite all its intrinsic interest,
essentially a poetical embellishment” (18). Many are more negative about the discussion of habitability, however,
such as Beardslee (1975: 287). Cf. Coones (1983: 364-6).
97
αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης (Ph.
II.3.194b24-6)… ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγιαίνῃ (194b31-3). See also
Metaph. 1013a24-b4.
95
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unsatisfied with the merely material or efficient causes for the moon’s earthiness and demands an
intelligent purpose.
This shift in the dialogue is strongly reminiscent of Socrates’ description of his own
disappointment as a young man with the explanations offered by natural scientists in the Phaedo.
It is especially in this scene, sometimes referred to as “Socrates’ autobiography,” that Plato most
clearly formulates his theory of teleological causation.98 He presents it as a critique of
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, famous in later literature as the teacher of Pericles and other
prominent Athenians of the Classical era.99 After explaining his perplexity at how addition or
division could be explained in a materialist paradigm—and by extension how anything “comes
to be or perishes or exists”100—he finds a potential solution:
But I heard someone reading from Anaxagoras’ book, as he said, and saying that intellect
(νοῦς) is the ordering force and the cause (αἴτιον) of everything. I was pleased with this
cause because intellect being the cause of everything seemed to me to be a good turn. I
thought if it is thus, the ordering mind orders everything and sets each thing in such a
way that might be best.101
Socrates expects Anaxagoras to be able to tell him first what shape the earth is, whether flat or
spherical, and then “to demonstrate the cause and the necessity, saying that it is better and that it

Betegh (2009) argues that teleology is a broader theme in the dialogue, including in Socrates’ Aesopic fable of
Zeus chaining together the heads of pain and pleasure (60b-c). On teleology in ancient philosophy generally, see the
essays in Rocca (2017). See also Sedley (2007).
99
Plato discusses Anaxagoras as the teacher of Pericles in the Phdr. (270a; cf. Alc. I 118c), which Plutarch quotes
approvingly in Per. (VIII.1). Diogenes Laertius also describes Euripides as his student (μαθητὴν; II.10 = frg. A1
Diels).
100
οὐδὲ γε δι’ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι’ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ
ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου… (97b). Cicero also appeals to the relationship between
Anaxagoras and Pericles in his defense of the Academy as the best school for orators, although he also cites
Demothenes as Plato’s student (Orat. IV.15, see also Brut. §44).
101
ἀλλὰ ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς
ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν
εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι
ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ (97b-c).
98
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was better for it to be such a way.”102 He has similar expectations for the position of the earth—if
Anaxagoras could prove that it is better that it is in the center of the world, Socrates “was
prepared to no longer desire any other sort of cause”103—as well as the positions, characteristics,
and motions about the sun, moon, and stars.
Yet when Socrates read Anaxagoras’ book, he found discussion of physical elements
such as air and aether—how they were arranged, rather than the reason why this was the best
way for the intellect to arrange them. He compares the absurdity of explaining why Socrates is
sitting in the Athenian prison by describing the disposition of his bones and sinews, rather than
his rational decision to abide the court’s sentence.104 These are not the salient cause of his sitting:
although his bones and sinews might be required for the fulfillment of the salient cause, doing
what he thinks is best, they are clearly not the salient causes themselves. Plato’s characterization
here, however, is not charitable: the longest fragment of Anaxagoras that discusses the cosmic
intellect describes its attributes in ways that imply intentionality.105 Plato’s position throughout
… ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι
(97e). Scolnicov (2017): “Plato is careful with his words, throughout this passage as elsewhere. In the sensible world
there is only a better, at most a best; never a good tout court” (52). The origin of this concern for what is better, if
pre-Platonic, is difficult to discern. According to Simplicius, the natural philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia
concludes a description of the role of “intelligence” (νόησις) in dividing seasons, time, and weather with a general
teleological claim: “One would discover, if he wished to consider it, that the other things too are disposed thus, as
beautifully as possible” (καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὑρίσκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα ὡς ἀνυστὸν
κάλλιστα; frg. B3 Diels). Sider (2005), for instance, characterizes Diogenes, as compared to Anaxagoras, as truly
teleological, because he provides not only many outright references to god, but also “the Panglossian notion of the
‘best of all possible worlds’ which Socrates found lacking in Anaxagoras” (130). Sedley (2007) argues that the
context of the fragment, however, reveals that it is limited to the disposition of air, such that “we can see that no
Panglossian teleology is here being formulated. And that fits with the fact that, when Diogenes later turns to
discussing physical details such as the distribution of veins in the human body, he uses a style of discourse which in
no degree whatsoever anticipates the teleological descriptions of the human body’s internal structure later pioneered
by Plato and developed further by Aristotle and Galen” (77). Rather, Sedley argues that Socrates himself, as
depicted by Xenophon (especially Mem. I.4), developed a “radically unconventional theology” that includes
teleological design (80). Cf. Mem. I.1.11-2, 16; Jaeger (1947: 167-71). Bydén (2009), however, casts doubt on the
historical assumptions that would allow these ideas in Xenophon to be attributed back to Socrates himself.
103
παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος (98a).
104
98b-9a. “It would be very strange to call such things causes” (ἀλλ’ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον;
99a).
105
It is described as “limitless and self-ruling and mixed with no thing, but it is alone itself unto itself” (νοῦς δέ
ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ’ ἐωυτοῦ ἐστιν; frg. B12 Diels). Its
102
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the corpus is ultimately, however, more sympathetic than just Socrates’ intellectual
autobiography in the Phaedo. At one point in the Philebus, as Sedley emphasizes, Socrates
divides philosophers such that he belongs to the lineage of Anaxagoras:
Is it the case, Protarchus, that we should say that the power of the irrational and the
random and the coincidental governs everything and that which is called the whole, or is
the opposite, just as those that came before us claimed, that intellect (νοῦν) and some
wonderous judgement (φρόνησίν) arrange and steer them?106
power is described partly through its purity—“for it is the lightest and purest of all things”—as well as its
knowledge of everything and superlative strength (ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ
γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πἀσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον; Β12). This knowledge, which seems tied together with its
strength, indeed extends to everything: “And Nous gave heed to all the things coming together, separating out, and
breaking up; and whatever sorts of things were to be—what were no longer, what are, and what will be—Nous put
all in order, as well as this revolution through which now revolve the stars, sun, moon, aer and aither which separate
out” καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενα τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς· καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι—
καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν ἅσσα νῦν μή ἐστι, καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι—πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην,
ἣν νῦν περιχωρέει τά τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ὁ αἰθὴς οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι (B12; trans. Sider).
The cosmogony, moreover, had a distinct beginning (ἀρχήν), when the cosmic intellect “took control of the entire
vortex” (καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν…), which in turn separates things out (Β12). See
further B13-4. On the sometimes ambiguous referent of intellect throughout the fragment: Schofield (1980: 15-22).
The cosmic intellect’s knowledge, stretching back and forth in time, implies some sort of deliberate purpose or
cogitation, but it is not clear why or to what end. Sedley (2007) argues that this intellect separates out matter in a
particular way so as to create the perfect conditions for the seeds of life to sprout, like a gardener. His argument
builds on his interpretation of multiple worlds in “with the same kind of flora and fauna as ours, including human
civilization as we know it” (17): “When intelligence creates worlds, it designedly constructs them so as to be
hospitable to agricultural civilizations like Anaxagoras’s own. It not only sets up the original hothouse conditions in
which the ubiquitous seeds will germinate, but also provides the right heavenly bodies to serve the vital agricultural
needs of the humans who will emerge from the primeval earth” (22). He argues further but more speculatively that
the human agriculture in B4 is a microcosm. Because nous “regards humans as, among all living creatures, the best
vehicles for nous itself to occupy,” it “constructs and, as it were, farms worlds primarily in order to generate human
beings” (24). But even if this is so, Anaxagoras is only arguing descriptively about how the intellect orders, and not
explicitly why this sort of world is the preferable than a world where the intellect had ordered things differently.
Similarly, Marmodoro (2017): “I submit the good is part of Anaxagoras’s ontology through the presence and
operation of the nous, but its modus operandi is less explicit than in subsequent teleological systems, such as e.g.,
Plato’s or Aristotle’s” (144-5). Cf. Jaeger (1947): “The concept of telos, to be sure, belongs primarily to
Socraticism; but that which Socraticism seeks in everything—the good, the intelligible, and the perfect—is already
virtually present in Anaxagoras’ diakosmeisis and the idea of order which it involves” (164). The scholarship on the
specifics of Anaxagoras’ system, however, is sharply divided on basic issues, such as what the basic things in the
system are or how they relate. Teodorsson (1996), for instance, surveys many opinions on “the role of the σπέρματα
in the system” (45-64). The paucity of fragments—helpfully commented on at length by Sider (2005)—make
speculation rather difficult, and what does pertain to νοῦς (B11-4) leaves open various questions, including whether
it is material—e.g. Cleve (1973: 38-9)—or immaterial—cf. Teodorsson (1982: 90-1), Sedley (2007: 12). Sedley and
Marmodoro both take the “seeds” in B4a-b to be biological, following, among others, Schofield (1980), who argues
that they are “like the seed of an animal or plant, a germ which contains a variety of substances (flesh, hair, blood)
each of which gradually manifests itself as the organism develops” (123). On Anaxagoras’ famous dictum “in
everything there is a share of everything” (ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν), cf. Porph. Sent. X.
106
πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ
δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν
συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν (28d); Sedley (2007: 1n2, 8n27). On this, see Sedley (2003: 92, 118). This lineage
seems reflected in the ordering of book II of Diogenes Laertius: Anaxagoras and his student Archelaus precede
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Socrates and his companion heartily affirm their agreement with their forbearers (τοῖς
ἔμπροσθεν) on this broad-level issue, it would seem with Anaxagoras among them. Yet Plato’s
criticism for the Anaxagorean system despite this broader agreement is nevertheless substantial.
In the Leges, Plato refers approvingly to “some who even then dared to posit this very thing, that
intellect (νοῦς) is what has ordered everything that is in the heavens,” although the Athenian
Stranger still charges him with misunderstanding the nature of the soul and consequently filling
the heavens with soulless things like stones “to distribute the causes of the whole world.”107 It is
evidently this notion, along with his explanations of phenomena such as meteorites and
earthquakes, that left him open to the charge of atheism or impiety in Athenian public
discourse.108 Plato, nevertheless, favored the impetus behind Anaxagoras’ notion of intelligence
as the cause of the disposition of the world, but finds his mechanical explanations to be ethically

Socrates and his student Xenophon. At one point in book I, he argues that philosophy was born with Anaxagoras’
adaptation of Linus (§4, cf. 12-4). In what would be a simultaneously development, Betegh (2014) distinguishes the
Dervini papyrus from Philolaus by the exact issue of teleology: “The main character in the Derveni author’s
cosmogony is the demiurgic divine Mind: it is Mind who forms the sun, thereby organizing the cosmos in a
teleological way, and who purposefully bridles the heat of fire and demarcates individual entities” (165).
107
καί τινες ἐτόλμων τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ παρακινδυνεύειν καὶ τοτέ, λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ’ ὅσα
κατ’ οὐρανόν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως… τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν φερόμενα μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων καὶ
γῆς καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς κόσμου (XII.967b-c). He explains this as
the cause of charges of atheism and the slanders (λοιδορήσεις) of the poets. Further on allusions to Anaxagoras in
the Leg., see Yunis (1988: 36n16). Cf. Plut. Per.: “Anaxagoras, whom men once called Nous, either because they
marveled at his great and manifestly remarkable intelligence for natural philosophy or because he was the first to
establish not chance or necessity as the principle of ordering the entire world, but nous, pure and unmixed…” (ὃν οἱ
τότ’ ἄνθρωποι Νοῦν προσηγόρευον, εἴτε τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ μεγάλην εἰς φυσιολογίαν καὶ περιττὴν διαφανεῖσαν
θαυμάσαντες, εἴθ’ ὅτι τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην οὐδ’ ἀνάγκην διακοσμήσεως ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε
καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον…; IV.6).
108
Thus in Pl. Ap., when Meletus accuses Socrates of “saying that the sun is a stone and the moon is earth,” he
responds, “Do you think you are charging Anaxagoras, dear Meletus?” (“μὰ δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν
ἥλιον λίθον φηςὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.” “Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε;” 26d). He
emphatically concludes, “… the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these accounts” (τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου
βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; 26d). Anaxagoras seems to have been formally accused of
impiety (asebeia), although the sources are not clear about the details—Diogenes Laertius surveys the accounts of
four historians (II.12-4). Yunis (1988), however, argues that there is insufficient evidence that Anaxagoras was
actually tried, but perhaps only threatened (66-8). Cf. Plut. De superst. 169f, Teodorsson (1982: 7n2).
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insufficient for his sense of teleology.109 In the language of the Timaeus, “it is necessary to
distinguish two sorts of causes, necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) and divine (θεῖον).”110
Plutarch similarly depicts an evolution in the ability to explain causes that begins with
Anaxagoras and culminates in Plato.111 This approach to natural causation arises frequently in
discussions of reactions to eclipses in the Vitae.112 In the Nicias, he explains that the doomed
leader’s frenzied and superstitious reaction to an eclipse could have been averted through the sort
of philosophical understanding of what is happening that, as Plutarch describes in another Vita,
Plato gave to Dion.113 Eclipses were strange and difficult to comprehend, at least before the
advent of natural philosophy:
The first to most clearly and bravely set an account of the bright shining and shadow of
the moon into writing was Anaxagoras—but he was neither ancient nor was his account
popular, so it proceeded as a secret still, through only a few and with some caution rather
than trust. But they would not suffer the natural philosophers and star-gazers, as they
Plato’s specific complaint in the Leg. is that the soul is made to be posterior (νεώτερον) to body, rather than soul
prior (πρεσβύτερον) to body (XII.967c). Part of Plotinus’ criticism is that Anaxagoras did not “make intellect prior
to matter, but simultaneous” (νοῦν… ποιῶν οὐδὲ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης ἀλλ’ ἅμα; II.6.7), which makes more sense as a
criticism of e.g. frg. B1 than Plato’s in the Leg., if it is indeed aimed at Anaxagoras and not another thinker.
110
διὸ δὴ χρὴ δύ’ αἰτίας εἴδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον (68e). Cf. Natali (2013: 43n15).
111
On Anaxagoras in Plutarch generally, see Hershbell (1982). Cf. Porter (2010): “But Plutarch’s criticisms are far
gentler than Plato’s” (80n11).
112
When an eclipse occurred as Dion was sailing to drive out Dionysius from Syracuse, in contrast, he was able to
sail on undisturbed (οὐδὲν διαταραχθεὶς ἀνήχθη) and accomplish his purpose (§6). Plutarch describes the episode in
more detail in Dion XXIII-XXX. In Conj. prae., part of Plutarch’s advice for women to be philosophically educated
is so that, if a woman hears someone claim the ability to draw down the moon, her knowledge of astronomy will
cause her to “laugh at the ignorance and stupidity of women who believe such things” (ἂν δέ τις ἐπαγγέλληται
καθαιρεῖν τὴν σελήνην, γελάσεται τὴν ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὴν ἀβελτερίαν τῶν ταῦτα πειθομένων γυναικῶν; 145c-d). See
also Cleom. 208.3-6. Further on eclipses: Brenk (1977: 45-47), Brenk (2017: 24). Given the persistent (ancient and
modern) popularity of Aristotle’s fourfold distinction of causation, it might be surprising the Plutarch omits any
mention of him here, but this reflects his characteristic approach of interpreting Plato through Plato. Cicero also
plays with the idea in his Resp., where Laelius initially rebukes the men for speculating on the portent of a alter sol
appearing in the sky—“are our affairs, what pertains to our homes and to our republic, already sufficiently
understood, since you strive for what is conducted in the heavens?” (iam explorata nobis sunt ea, quae ad domos
nostras quaeque ad rem publicam pertineant, siquidem, quid agatur in caelo, quaerimus; I.13.19). See also Xen.,
Mem. I.1.12). Scipio offers a positive example of how using knowledge from an Archimedean globe (I.14.22), Gaius
Sulpicius Gallus freed soldiers in Macedonia from empty superstition and fear (inanem religionem timoremque;
I.15.23-4). Scipio also appeals to the example of Anaxagoras and Pericles (I.16.25).
113
“… the moon was eclipsed in the night, and a great fear came to Nicias and to the rest of those struck by
ignorance or superstition at these things” (ἐξέλιπεν ἡ σελήνη τῆς νυκτός, μέγα δέος τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ὑπ’
ἀπειρίας ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκπεπληγμένοις τὰ τοιαῦτα; XXIII.1). Thucydides describes Nicias as “disposed”
(προσκείμενος) to “excessive superstition” (ἄγαν θειασμῷ; VII.50.4), which Plutarch quotes in Nic. IV.1; he is even
harsher in De Superst. (169a-b), but gentler in De malign. Hdt. (855b). Cf. Brenk (1977: 42-5).
109
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were then called, because they wear down the divine into irrational causes and powers
outside of providence and constrictive states.114
Anaxagoras could provide at least some explanation of phenomena like eclipses, but his teaching
did not pass far beyond a few such as Pericles. Rather, Plutarch continues, he incurred the wrath
of the common people to such an extent that his friend could only just save him; Protagoras
suffered the threat of trial from the animosity, and “Socrates, who took part in none of these
things, nevertheless died for the sake of philosophy.”115 But then: “At long last, the reputation of
Plato shines forth through the life of the man, and, because he subjected physical necessities to
divine and more authoritative powers, he removed the criticism of these accounts and granted the
path to everyone through his teachings.”116 While as Anaxagoras had only reached a small
audience, Plato laid open the nature of causation for all to potentially understand. Plutarch
implicitly accepts the criticism of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo and emphasizes the mechanistic
perception of his explanations.117 Plato did not do away with these sorts of causes, but rather
subordinated them to higher—meaning divine, intelligent, and providential—causes.
An anecdote about Anaxagoras, in the course of the description of Pericles’ teachers in
his biography, further illustrates what Plutarch sees as the relationship between these sorts of

ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφέστατόν τε πάντων καὶ θαρραλεώτατον περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς λόγον εἰς
γραφὴν καταθέμενος Ἀναξαγόρας οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιὸς οὔθ’ ὁ λόγος ἔνδοξος, ἀλλ’ ἀπόρρητος ἔτι καὶ δι’ ὀλίγων
καὶ μετ’ εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ πίστεως βαδίζων. οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε
καλουμένους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον, …
(XXIII.3-4).
115
καὶ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν γε τοιούτων προσῆκον, ὅμος ἀπώλετο διὰ φιλοσοφίαν (XXIII.4).
116
ὀψὲ δ’ ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐκλάμψασα δόξα διὰ τόν βίον τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ ὅτι ταῖς θείαις καὶ κυριωτέραις ἀρχαῖς ὑπέταξε
τὰς φυσικὰς ἀνάγκας, ἀφεῖλε τὴν τῶν λόγων τούτων διαβολὴν καὶ τοῖς μαθήμασιν εἰς ἅπαντας ὁδὸν ἐνέδωκεν
(XXIII.5).
117
Proclus similarly adopts Plato’s depiction of Anaxagoras in the Phd. (In Tim. I.2.11-5). Hermias argues that
Socrates criticizes certain myth rationalizers in Phdr. 229c-e for this same reason (In Phdr. 30.9-1.2 Couvreur): “For
this is the same interpretation as those wise men present, namely those who toil away on physical things, and it is
precarious and probabilistic: for they do not turn toward what is actually existent, but elements of nature and winds
and airs and whirlpools, as he says in the Phd. (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ἀνάπτυξις ὡς ἀναπτύσσουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ, τουτέστιν οἱ περὶ
τὰ φυσικὰ διατρίψαντες, γλίσχρος ἐστὶ καὶ εἰκοτολογία· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ἀνατρέχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ φύσεις
καὶ πνεύματα καὶ <ἀέρας> καὶ δίνας, ὡς ἐν <Φαίδωνι> ἔφη; 30.20-3).
114
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causes. 118 Although the statesman had several teachers, the man from Clazomenae “accompanied
Pericles the most and most conferred dignity and a mind weightier than demagoguery, and
helped to raise the honor of his character to the heavens.”119 The effect of the philosopher’s
influence that Plutarch emphasizes most was to remove superstitious fear in favor of “piety”
through explanations of the “causes of things.”120 He further illustrates what sort of physical
explanations they are through a story (λέγεται δέ ποτε) of a conflict over the interpretation of a
portent, a one-horned ram, that was brought to Pericles.121 A prominent seer, Lampon, interpreted
it to mean that which of the two prominent politicians in the city, Pericles and Thucydides, that
received the sign would be the one to receive sole power; Anaxagoras, on the other hand, cut the

Plutarch’s Per. ascribes several teachers to the great statesman, such as Damon, whose talents were either in
music or dangerous sophistry, and Zeno the Eleactic, who studied both nature and practiced a sort of art of refutation
(ἐλεγκτικὴν) through contradiction (διὰ ἀντιλογίας; IV.1-5). Plutarch claims that Damon “slinked away and hid
under the name of music” (καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικὴς ὄνομα; §2) but was eventually found out and
“ostracized for his ambition and desire for tyranny” (μεγαλοπράγμων καὶ φιλοτύραννος ἐξωστρακίσθη; §3). Cf. §1
(= Arist. frg. 401 Rose). Despite the role of these teachers in Pericles’ education—scientific, rhetorical, and
ethical—Xenophontos (2016), whose monograph is dedicated largely to “ethical education” in the Vitae, omits any
discussion of Pericles’ teachers.
119
ὁ δὲ πλεῖστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος καὶ μάλιστα περιθεὶς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον,
ὅλως τε μετωρίας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἤθους, Ἀναξαγόρας *ἦν ὁ Κλαζομένοις, … (IV.6). Pericles’ “proud
mind and lofty speech” (φρόνημα σοβαρὸν καὶ τὸν λόγον ὑψηλὸν) is described as the result of admiring and being
filled with Anaxagoras’ “meteorology” (μετεωρολογίας καὶ μεταρσιολεσχίας; V.1). Plutarch later addresses the
disparity between Anaxagoras’ asceticism and Pericles’ wealthy household by distinguishing “the life of theoretical
philosophy and the life of politics” (θεωρητικοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτικοῦ βίος; XVI.6).
120
“Pericles enjoyed the companionship of Anaxagoras not only in these respects, but he also seems to have become
superior to superstition, which terror in the face of the things above produces in those who do not know the causes
of these things, who are maddened about the divine, and terrified through their ignorance. The physical account
removes this fear, and produces stable piety with good expectations in the place of fearful, swelling superstition” (οὐ
μόνον δὲ ταῦτα τῆς Ἀναξαγόρου συνουσίας ἀπέλαυσε Περικλῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας δοκεῖ γενέσθαι
καθυπέρτερος, ἣν τὸ πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα θάμβος ἐνεργάζεται τοῖς αὐτῶν τε τούτων τὰς αἰτίας ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ περὶ τὰ
θεῖα δαιμονῶσι καὶ ταραττομένοις δι’ ἀπειρίαν αὐτῶν, ἣν ὁ φυσικὸς λόγος ἀπαλλάττων ἀντὶ τῆς φοβερᾶς καὶ
φλεγμαινούσης δεισιδαιμονίας τὴν ἀσφαλῆ μετ’ ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εὐσέβειαν ἐνεργάζεται; VI.1). Anaxagoras
predicted, for instance, that meteorites, as pieces of fiery rock that break off from celestial bodies, could fall to earth
shortly before one actually did at Aegospotami: Diog. Laert. II.10; Plut. Lys. 12.2-4.
121
Historians tend to dismiss this passage. Holden (1894), for instance, disdainfully deems the details “trifling
events” (xliii). Similarly, Yunis (1988): “if there is no kernel of truth in the patently fictitious elaboration, the story
may have been invented to explain a conflict between the two” (69). Cf. Flower (2008: 119). Stadter (1989),
however, emphasizes the importance of teleology (86). Jacobs (2018) clarifies the connection to Pericles’ attempt to
calm his men during an eclipse (XXXV.1-2): “to calm his steersman, Pericles holds his cloak over the man’s eyes
and convinces him that the darkness is simply caused by something larger… As elsewhere in the Lives, the eclipse
foreshadows an important reversal—in this case, the upcoming plague and actions to remove Pericles from office
and find him” (136n26).
118
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skull open and showed that there was a deformity in the brain that explained the single horn.122
Plutarch concludes by distinguishing the sort of cause each was identifying:
But nothing was preventing it from being the case, I think, that both the natural
philosopher and the seer hit the mark: but the former understood the cause (αἰτίαν), while
the latter beautifully understood the end (τέλος). For it is proper for the former to
contemplate from what it comes and how is it disposed by nature, while it is proper for
the latter to proclaim for what purpose it comes about and what it signifies.123
Divine causation in the world of becoming, such as what is at play in divination, does not act
through purely immaterial causes, but rather rely on the same sorts of material causation as
anything else in this world. Rather than disproving the divine causation, Anaxagoras simply
explains the manner in which it manifests.124 The two sorts of explanation, the physical cause and
the final cause, can evidently function complementarily, as Plutarch similarly argues in the
biography of Dion.125
In De defectu, Lamprias further emphasizes the role of not just final causes, but also
physical ones. He had earlier proposed exhalations from beneath the earth, an idea he attributes
VI.2. According to Plutarch, Pericles sent Lampon as one of the colonists of Thurii (Λάμπωνα δὲ Θουρίων
οἰκιστὴν ἐξέπεμψεν; Prae. ger. reip. 812d). Aristophanes uses the term Θουριομάντεις in a list of comic synonyms
for charlatan in Nub. (332) and the scholia explains that of the ten colonists, “Lampon the seer was going to be the
exegete for the foundation of the city” (ὧν καὶ Λάμπων ἦν ὁ μάντις ἐξηγητὴς ἐσόμενος τῆς κτίσεως τῆς πόλεως;
332aα). See further Dillery (2005: 195-8), Flower (2008: 122-4), Dillon (2017: 104-5), and Foster (2017: 136-7).
123
ἐκώλυε δ’ οὐδὲν, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν ἐπιτυγχάνειν καὶ τὸν μάντιν, τοῦ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος καλῶς
ἐκλαμβάνοντος. ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τῷ μέν, ἐκ τίνων γέγονε καὶ πῶς πέφυκε θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δέ, πρὸς τί γέγονε καὶ τί
σημαίνει προειπεῖν (VI.4). Although Anaxagoras was met with immediate awe, Plutarch writes, Lampon overtook
him once the prediction was fulfilled and Thucydides fell from power (VI.3). Hardie (1992) compares the Stoic
“theologia tripertitia” (4760).
124
Plutarch argues this general principle by comparing sorts of indirect human signification: “Those who say that
the discovery of the cause is the removal of the sign are not aware that, along with the divine signs, they are
removing artificial ones as well—the sounds of gongs, the lights of torches, the shadows cast upon sun-dials. Each
of these has been made a sign of something by some cause and construction. But perhaps these are matters for
another treatise” (οἱ δὲ τῆς αἰτίας τὴν εὕρεσιν ἀναίρεσιν εἶναι σημείου λέγοντες οὐκ ἐπινοοῦσιν ἅμα τοῖς θείοις καὶ
τὰ τεχνητὰ τῶν συμβόλων ἀθετοῦντες, ψόφους τε δίσκων καὶ φῶτα πυρσῶν καὶ γνωμόνων ἀποσκιασμούς· ὧν
ἕκαστον αἰτίᾳ τινὶ καὶ κατασκευῇ σημεῖον εἶναί τινος πεποίηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἑτέρας ἐστὶ πραγματείας;
VI.5).
125
Dion and his circle were unfazed by the occurrence of an eclipse (θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν), because they reasoned
through (λογιζομένοις) the regular, astronomical cause (XXIV.1); but the men were terrified, so a seer (μάντις),
Miltas, bade them to realize that the divine (τὸ δαιμόνιον) was signaling (σημαίνειν) the eclipse of another shining
thing (§2): Dionysius’ tyranny (§3). Cf. §4-10. In another Vita, Plutarch describes Aemilius Paulus as “not entirely
unaware or ignorance of the irregularities of eclipses” (οὐκ ἦν μὲν ἀνήκοος οὐδ' ἄπειρος παντάπασι τῶν ἐκλειπτικῶν
ἀνωμαλιῶν; XVII.9), but his love of sacrifice and prophetic ability (φιλοθύτης ὢν καὶ μαντικός) guide him (§10-13).
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to the Peripatetics, as the source of “mantic vapors” that inspire the Pythia’s ability for prophecy,
but Ammonius objects that it seems strange (δεινὸν) to attribute this to “what is set down by
chance and automatically” rather than “to god and providence.”126 Lamprias replies by evoking
Plato as his “witness and advocate” (μάρτυρα καὶ σύνδικον), alluding to the Phaedo:
That man faulted Anaxagoras of old for being excessively entangled in the physical
causes and always pursues and seeking what is accomplished by the incidents of bodies
according to necessity; but he removed the questions “for what end?” and “by whom?,”
which are better causes and principles.127
Lamprias echoes Plutarch’s inherited criticism, but he also alleges fault against the other sort of
thinker, represented by “the very old theologians and poets,” who “choose to only pay attention
to the greater cause… no longer heeding necessary and physical causes.”128 This incompleteness
on each side remains until Plato combines each sort of causation in one schema:
He [Plato] himself was the first to fully carry out both, or the greatest of the philosophers
to do so: he assigns the source of things disposed according to reason to the god, but he
does not strip the matter from the necessary causes in the face of generation. Rather, he
realizes that the entire sensible world, even arranged in a certain sort of way, is neither
pure nor unmixed, but it takes its generation from matter plaited together with reason.129
περὶ μαντικῶν πνευμάτων… (434b); δεινὸν ἡγοῦμαι μὴ θεῷ καὶ προνοίᾳ τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ τῷ
κατὰ τύχην καὶ αὐτομάτως ἀνατίθεσθαι (436d-e). Lamprias presents his response as a pious search for probability:
“It has not just roused me, Philip but also confounded me, if I should seem, in the presence of you all, so many men
of such an age, to pride myself on the plausible in my argument inappropriately for my age, while removing and
shaking up what has been thought truthfully and piously about the divine” (ἐμὲ δ’… οὐ κεκίνηκεν, ὦ Φίλιππε, μόνον
ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκέχυκεν, εἰ ἐν τοσούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοι οὖσιν ὑμῖν δοκῶ παρ’ ἡλικίαν τῷ πιθανῷ τοῦ λόγου
καλλωπιζόμενος ἀναιρεῖν τι καὶ κινεῖν τῶν ἀληθῶς καὶ ὁσίως περὶ τοῦ θείου νενομισμένων; 436e). He argues
further that exhalations (ἀναθυμίασιν) are not stable but wax and wane, which explains the variability in the shrine
(434b-c, 437c). In Cic. Div., Quintus proposes a similar phenomenon (diuino afflatu; I.19.38), but Marcus replies
incredulously (II.67.117-8).
127
ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ Ἀναξαγόραν μὲν ἐμέμψατο τὸν παλαιόν, ὅτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἄγαν ἐνδεδεμένος αἰτίαις καὶ τὸ
κατ’ ἀνάγκην τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων ἀποτελούμενον πάθεσι μετιὼν ἀεὶ καὶ διώκων, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὑφ’ οὗ, βελτίονας
αἰτίας οὔσας καὶ ἀρχάς, ἀφῆκεν (435e-f).
128
οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ τῇ κρείττονι μόνῃ τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχον… ταῖς δ’ ἀναγκαίαις καὶ
φυσικαῖς οὐκέτι προσῄεσαν αἰτίαις (436d). Lamprias characterizes this group as applying a line of Orphica (frg.
21a.2 Kern = OF 31 Bernabé) as common to all things (τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι πᾶσι πράγμασι): “Zeus
is the beginning, Zeus is the middle, all things from Zeus” (Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ’ ἐκ πάντα πέλονται).
Lamprias presents the younger natural scientists (νεώτεροι… φυσικοὶ) as a sort of overcorrection, such that each
side was “deficient in what is proper” (ἀμφοτέροις ὁ λόγος ἐνδεὴς τοῦ προσήκοντός ἐστι; 436e).
129
αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀμφοτέρας ἐπεξῆλθε, τῷ μὲν θεῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀποδιδοὺς τῶν κατὰ
λόγον ἐχόντων, οὐκ ἀποστερῶν δὲ τὴν ὕλην τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον αἰτιῶν, ἀλλὰ συνορῶν, ὅτι τῇδέ πη
καὶ τὸ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν διακεκοσμημένον οὐ καθαρὸν οὐδ’ ἀμιγές ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὕλης συμπλεκομένης τῷ λόγῳ
λαμβάνει τὴν γένεσιν (435f-6a). See further 436e-7a. Lamprias also uses an extended comparison with
craftsmanship (436a-d).
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A complete account of any phenomenon in the physical world, Lamprias argues, must address
both the arrangement of material itself and the reason for which it is arranged in such a way. 130 In
all of these discussions of causation, Plutarch treats Plato as the first philosopher to identify what
a complete account would require, evidently in Socrates’ critique of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo.
This conception of teleological explanation is also the crux of the epistemology of De
facie. Theon forces the group to grapple with a more general but more substantial question: what
does it matter what the moon is made out of, what purpose does its material allow it serve in the
machinery of the world? The assumption is that the world—especially at the highest level of
earth, moon, and stars—is ordered by a cosmic intelligence whose plan is the final cause. 131 As a
result, it would be unbefitting if the moon’s earthiness, if that does describe its material
composition accurately, served no greater purpose. Theon thus objects that the earthy moon most
have a purpose, such as to provide habitation and sustenance, like the earth (or Socrates’ “true
earth”). Lamprias takes the objection seriously and responds with a two-fold argument: if any
given place is inhabitable, it can still serve a variety of purposes;132 and it is possible that the
moon is in fact habitable, despite Theon’s mockery of some questionable possibilities for its

Cf. Oakensmith (1902): “The blank between the Creator and His creatures is occupied, therefore, partly by
natural causes, partly by the Daemons, whose existence and mode of operation are now involved in the working of
natural causes regarded as under their superintendence, and now appear as supernatural agencies vaguely dependent
upon the will of the Supreme Power” (162).
131
The Pyrrhonic sceptic Sextus Empiricus opposed this kind of causation in particular, and instead proposed that
the dogmatist should be asked the cause of the antecedent cause, such as to throw them in a state of infinite regress
(εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται; Pyr. I.186). Cf. Diog. Laert. IX.99; Barnes (1990: 2654); Arist. Met. α.
132
“I said, … ‘To start straight-away then, it is not necessary, if humans do not dwell on the moon, that it came
about in vain and for no purpose. For we see that the entire earth is not productive of occupied either, but just a
small part is productive of animals and plants, as if in some points or peninsulas rising from the depths, but of the
others, there are parts that are desolate and fruitless due to winters and droughts, but most have sunk under the sea”
(… ἔφην, … “εὐθὺς οὖν τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ κατοικοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι τὴν σελήνην, μάτην
γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς μηθέν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τήνδε τὴν γῆν δι’ ὅλης ἐνεργὸν οὐδὲ προσοικουμένην ὁρῶμεν, ἀλλὰ μικρὸν
αὐτῆς μέρος ὥσπερ ἄκροις τισὶν ἢ χερρονήσοις ἀνέχουσιν ἐκ βυθοῦ γόνιμόν ἐστι ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων τὰ
μὲν ἔρημα καὶ ἄκαρπα χειμῶσι καὶ αὐχμοῖς, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα κατὰ τῆς μεγάλης δέδυκε θαλάσσης; 938c-d).
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inhabitants.133 In both cases, Lamprias is insistent that his earthy moon has a significant role in
the cosmos. His final argument for the moon as a place of habitation, however, appeals to
skepticism by adapting an image from Socrates’ myth in the Phaedo:
But we do not see these things, nor that another place, nature, or climate is fitting for
them. As if, then, we were unable to approach the sea and to touch it, but only beholding
the sight of it from afar and learning that it is bitter, undrinkable, and briny water:
someone might say how ‘it rears many great creatures in all sorts of shapes through the
depths, and that it is full of creatures that use water as we use air,’ and it would seem that
they give discourses similar to myths and wonders, thus we might liken the same thing to
also hold about the moon, that some men here do not believe it is inhabited.134
Similarly, from the moon, Lamprias continues, it would seem fantastical that anything could live
here in the moisture and heat of the earth.135 Lamprias’ allusion to the Phaedo prompts Sulla to
jump in with an entreaty: “Leave off… and put an end to your speech, before you run the myth
aground and mix up my play, which has another scene and another plot.”136 This sudden
interruption might seem surprising, since the myth will explain the moon as the place between

“Since nothing that has been said at least, dear Theon, shows that the so-called inhabitation of it is impossible”
(ἐπεὶ τῶν γ’ εἰρημένων οὐδὲν, ὦ φίλε Θέων, ἀδύνατον δείκνυσι τὴν λεγομένην ἐπ’ αὐτῆς οἴκησιν; 938f). In the
Quaest. Rom., Plut. attributes the habitability of the moon to a certain Castor (LXXVI.282a) In Cicero’s Somn.,
Africanus stresses the smallness of the inhabited world to contrast the grandeur of the heavens (VI.19.20).
134
ἀλλ’ οὔτε ταῦτα συνορῶμεν οὔθ’ ὅτι καὶ χώρα καὶ φύσις καὶ κρᾶσις ἄλλη πρόσφορός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ
τῇ θαλάττῃ μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν προσελθεῖν μηδ’ ἅψασθαι, μόνον δὲ τὴν θέαν αὐτῆς πόρρωθεν ἀφορώντων καὶ
πυνθανομένων ὅτι πικρὸν καὶ ἄποτον καὶ ἁλμυρὸν ὕδωρ ἐστίν, ἔλεγέ τις ὡς ‘ζῷα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ
ταῖς μορφαῖς τρέφει κατὰ βυθοῦ καὶ θηρίων ἐστὶ πλήρης ὕδατι χρωμένων ὅσαπερ ἡμεῖς ἀέρι,’ μύθοις ἂν ὅμοια καὶ
τέρασιν ἐδόκει περαίνειν, οὕτως ἐοίκαμεν ἔχειν καὶ ταὐτὸ πάσχειν πρὸς τὴν σελήνην, ἀπιστοῦντες ἐκεῖ τινας
ἀνθρώπους κατοικεῖν (940d-e). Bos (1989) deems this passage a “‘reversal of perspective’ linked to a ‘reversal of
values’” (22).
135
“But I think that those there would all the more marvel looking down upon the earth how the sediment and slime
of everything shines through the wetness and mists and clouds a dim and low and motionless place, if it should
sprout and nourish animals partaking in motion, breath, and heat. And if they should come to hear from somewhere
the Homeric lines, ‘terrible and dank, the places the gods too hate’ and, ‘Hades is so far below, as heaven is above
earth’ they would say simply about this place that what is called Hades and Tartarus is settled here far away, and
moon is the one earth, since the things above are equally far from the things below” (ἐκείνους δ’ ἂν οἴομαι πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἀποθαυμάσαι τὴν γῆν ἀφορῶντας οἷον ὑποστάθμην καὶ ἰλὺν τοῦ παντὸς ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ ὁμίχλαις καὶ νέφεσι
διαφαινομένην ἀλαμπὲς καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀκίνητον χωρίον, εἰ ζῷα φύει καὶ τρέφει μετέχοντα κινήσεως ἀναπνοῆς
θερμότητος· κἂν εἴ ποθεν αὐτοῖς ἐγγένοιτο τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν τούτων ἀκοῦαι “σπερδαλέ’, εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι
θεοί περ [Il. XX.65],” καὶ “τόσσον ἔνερθ’ Ἀίδαο, ὅσον οὐρανὸς ἔστ’ ἀπὸ γαίης [Il. VIII.16],” ταῦτα φήσουσιν
ἀτεχνῶς περὶ τοῦ χωρίου τούτου λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν Ἅιδην ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸν Τάρταρον ἀπῳκίσθαι, γῆν δὲ μίαν εἶναι
τὴν σελήνην, ἴσον ἐκείνων τῶν ἄνω καὶ τῶν κάτω τούτων ἀπέχουσαν; 940e-f).
136
ἔτι δὲ μου σχεδὸν λέγοντος ὁ Σύλλας ὑπολαβών “ἐπίσχες” εἶπεν “ὦ Λαμπρία, καὶ παραβαλοῦ τὸν θυρίον τοῦ
λόγου, μὴ λάθῃς τὸν μῦθον ὥσπερ εἰς γῆν ἐξοκείλας καὶ συγχέῃς τὸ δρᾶμα τοὐμὸν ἑτέραν ἔχον σκηνὴν καὶ
διάθεσιν” (940f). The beginning of Sulla’s appeal is almost equivalent to Soclarus’ in De soll. an. (965b).
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the sun and the earth, inhabited by souls and daemones. They are rather unlike the embodied
beings that Theon proposed, but this adaptation of the myth of the Phaedo begins to move the
discussion from meandering geography to teleology.137 Yet what form does Plutarch’s Theon or
Plato’s Socrates expect such a teleological account to take?

The Timaeus as a teleological account of humanity and the universe
The burden for a fully explanatory account of the physical world that Socrates articulates
in the Phaedo is weighty and difficult to comprehend in its totality, but scholars such as David
Sedley have argued that the final myth within the dialogue offers a model for what that might
entail.138 Socrates claims to been persuaded by someone else about “how the earth is disposed
and how immense it is,” and couches the details of the myth in disclaimers such as “it is said,”
but he vouches with relative certainty that souls receive proper punishments and rewards. 139 The

Theon goes onto discuss mouthless men in India, fed by inhalations (τῆ ὀσμῇ), whom he attributes to a certain
Megasthenes—these too, he argues, cannot exist on the moon if it does not rain there (938b-c).
138
1991: 359-61. See also Betegh (2009: 98-9).
139
“There are many wonderous places of the earth, and those accustomed to speak about the earth do not fathom
either how it is nor how great, as I have been persuaded by someone” (εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι,
καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι; 108c). On the
uncertain identity of the indefinite persuader, see already Burnet (1911: 127). Sedley (1991) suggests Parmenides
(374n31). Socrates also describes how “it is said” (λέγεται; cf. Dam. In Phd. I.189.476, II.230.93) that each of the
dead has a daimon, which was alloted in life and attempts to guide the dead to their proper place: “for the path is not
as Aeschylus’ Telephus says—that the way into the house of Hades is simple, but it is neither simple nor does it
seem to me that there is one way” (ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· … ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν
εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ’ οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι; 107e-8a). Each sort of soul—those obsessed with the
body (ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος), the most heinous of criminals and parricides, and those who lived with
temperance and purity (καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως)—is assigned to a fitting place, so Aeschylus’ simple path could not
suffice: the somatic soul flits around the visible world (ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον), but its daimon
eventually leads it away with great force and difficulty (βίαι καὶ μόγις; 108a-b); the wicked soul is said to be “borne
away by necessity to their proper place” (ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν; 108c); the pure and
temperate soul, in contrast, “meets with gods as their companions and guides, and settles in the place that is proper
to itself” (συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστῃ τόπον προσήκοντα; 108c). When
Simmias eventually encourages Socrates to go on, he demurs once more: “But it seems to me, Simmias, that not
even the art of Glaucus is enough to relate what it is; truly, it even appears too difficult for the art of Glaucus. … But
nothing hinders me from describing the places that comprise the sort of form I have been persuaded that the earth
takes” (ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ’ ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ,
χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην… τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἵαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς
τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν; 108d-e). See also Resp. X.615a.
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earth is posited to be a spherical mass, equipoised in the exact center of the heavens, which has a
surface with many hollows.140 These physical details correspond exactly to the questions that
Socrates earlier described as the topics of which he desired to hear a proper account from the
natural philosophers such as Anaxagoras. The frame of the myth, moreover, clearly distinguishes
the description of the “true earth” and the underground rivers from these more basic physical
questions: the latter are attributed to someone, while Socrates describes the former on his own
authority and demarcates it as mythic. This split structure seems to subordinate the physical
prerequisites to the structure that underlies the eschatological system of purification and
punishment. The teleological purpose of the former is only implicit, but must be that the
eschatological system is good, which means that the physical arrangement of the world that
allows it is good. The sphericity and centrality are presented as instrumental goods that allow a
final good, which seems to be a mechanism of the providential care of the world.141
This interpretation of the last portion of the Phaedo, however, relies almost entirely on
ideas that are implicit in the structure, yielding a dissatisfying example in the final analysis. It
also simply pushes the basic teleological argument back: if the purpose of the earth’s physical
qualities is to allow an eschatological system, one might ask, why is it better that there be an
eschatological system at all?142 This question perhaps remains insoluble, although the Timaeus

“I am persuaded, then, … that if (the earth) is spherical in the heavens…” (πέπεισμαι τοίνυν… εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ
τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα; 108e). See also 110b; 109b: “for (I am persuaded that) there are many hollows around
the world, of all kinds and shapes and magnitudes…” (εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ
καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη). Socrates demarcates the first argument as what “I was persuaded” of (πρῶτον μὲν
τοίνυν… τοῦτο πέπεισμαι; 109a). He further distances himself from the authority of technical science by glossing
“the heavens which contain the stars” (τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα) as “that which many of those accustomed
to speak about such things call the aether” (ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων
λέγειν; 109b).
141
οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν
τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν (30b-c).
142
Betegh (2009), however, argues that Socrates’ “myth cannot be an alternative to what Socrates expected to hear
from Anaxagoras”: “A complete teleological explanation, for Plato, needs to refer to agency and the practical
reasoning of the agent” (99). See further 93.
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offers a much clearer example of Plato’s conception of a teleological account that could better
meet the burden set out by the Phaedo.143 While in the second chapter I discussed one of the most
metaphysically difficult parts of the teleological account comprised by the “likely myth,” the
composition of the soul that animates the world, this section argues that Plutarch found the idea
that the human is a microcosm of the world in the Timaeus. This idea, which Plato constructs
using the idea of imitation, is part of what contributes likelihood to Timaeus’ “likely myth.”
Although some scholars, following Karl Reinhardt, argue that Plutarch is drawing this aspect of
his own myth in De facie from the idea of Stoic sympathy, I argue that he is elaborating a system
distinctively grounded in Platonism: his macrocosm-microcosm system is built upon the idea in
the Timaeus that the parts correspond to one another because the latter is an imitation of the
former, while both are imitations of the eternal world gazed upon by the demiurge. The causation
on both levels is paradigmatic (αἰτία παραδειγματικὴ), as coined by subsequent Platonists, not
sympathetic. In the sections that follow, I argue that Plutarch incorporates this idea from the
Timaeus into his own myth in De facie as a mechanism to make the system more probable, along
with Xenocrates’ elaboration of Platonic intermediaries.
When later Platonists discuss Platonic causation, they often distinguish the Aristotelian
term telos from the ultimate paradigmatic cause—a term that Proclus attributes to Xenocrates.144

E.g. Wright (2000): “The Timaeus is Plato’s own answer to the objections he raised in the Phaedo against his
predecessors’ approach to cosmology” (10); “The Timaeus has close ties… with the Phaedo in providing the
teleology that was wanting in previous accounts of the natural science, and in the use of myth for the unverifiable”
(11); Betegh (2009): “We are not surprised that [Timaeus] describes his narrative as both a logos and a muthos – as
we should not be surprised that what Socrates expects to read but does not find in Anaxagoras’ book is also a muthos
that can be taken seriously” (100).
144
αἰτία παραδειγματικὴ (frg. 30 Heinze = In Parm. 888-9). Damascius explains the spherical shape of the true earth
in the Phd. by reference to different sorts of causality: ἀπὸ τῆς τελικῆς αἰτίας… ἀπὸ τῆς παραδειγματικῆς… ἀπὸ τῆς
ποιητικῆς (II.235.177). Olympiodorus identifies six (In Gorg. pref.5). The Anon. Proleg. credits Plato with
“discovering theology” (θεολογικὰ εὗρεν) by formulating the “paradigmatic cause” (ἐν τῷ παραδειγματικῷ) as
opposed to Pythagoras’ and Aristotle’s efficient cause (ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ; V.36-46); this text also compares
Anaxagoras and the other Ionians (VIII.1-14) and Peripatetics generally (XIX.29-34). Proclus, however, deriving a
tripartite schema of causation (τὰς δὲ κυρίως αἰτίας) from the Ti. in the beginning of his commentary, distinguishes
“the productive, the paradigmatic, and the final” (τὸ ποιητικόν, τὸ παραδειγματικόν, τὸ τελικόν; I.2.7-9).
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This cause is rooted in the narrative of the Timaeus: the demiurge, being a good god, desired to
create a beautiful world, so he fashioned it according to the best model, the unchanging and
eternal forms.145 Seneca, relating a discussion with Platonists and Aristotelians, describes Plato’s
theory of causation as the addition of a fifth sort of cause onto the Aristotelian four—“a
paradigm (exemplar), which he calls an ‘idea’ (idean),” evidently detecting a pun between the
demiurge’s gazing upon the ideas and the Greek verb ἰδεῖν.146 The final cause of everything in the
demiurge’s creation, it seems, is that it bears this mimetic relationship somehow to the eternal
and unchanging model.147 Yet the demiurge’s attitude differs between the one “living creature”—
the world, single in imitation of the singularity of the eternal model—and the many intelligent
creatures that comprise that world—namely humans.148 The demiurge composes the world soul
and creates the bodies of the stars, but he only provides one element to humanity, as he discloses
in his address to the younger gods whose task is the creation of the rest:
“And, to the extent that it is fitting to name part of them immortal, the part that is called
divine and obeying in them, at least those who desire to be just and follow us, I will sow
and be the first to render them; the rest is yours, harmonizing mortal to immortal…”149
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See supra pg. 40.
his quintam Plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse “idean” vocat; hoc est enim ad quod respiciens artifex id quod
destinabat effecit (Ep. LXV.7). Dillon (1977) compares passages from Philo and Varro, arguing that this “Middle
Platonic scholastic formulation” could either have come from Eudorus of Alexandria, as evidenced by the former, or
Antiochus, as by the latter (135-9).
147
Why is the world spherical, for instance? It is because the demiurge “thought that something similar was far more
beautiful than something dissimilar” (νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοίου; 33b). See also, for instance, the
description of time as the imitation or image of eternity (εἰκὼ… αἰῶνος; 37c-e).
148
τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν—ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ’ ἂν γένοιτο
καλόν—οὗ δ’ ἔστιν τἆλλα ζῷα καθ’ ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, τούτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθῶμεν. τὰ γὰρ
δὴ νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα
συνέστηκεν ὁρατά (30c-d).
149
καὶ καθ’ ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει, θεῖον λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀεὶ
δίκῃ καὶ ὑμῖν ἐθελόντων ἕπεσθαι, σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν
προσυφαίνοντες (41c).
146
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Timaeus then describes the demiurge as “sowing” divine intellects into the planets.150 The work
of the younger gods is eventually described as an imitation of the demiurge’s creation—an
imitation of an imitation, as it were. While the demiurge uses the eternal, unchanging things as a
model for the cosmic soul, the ordering of the human soul is described after the demiurge creates
the elements:
He himself became the demiurge of the gods but enjoined the generation of mortal things
from those born from himself. They, imitating him in turn, received the immortal origin
of the soul and then shaped a mortal body around it. They gave the entire body a vehicle,
and built in addition another, mortal form of soul in it, one bearing fearsome and
constrained sufferings in itself, first pleasure, the greatest bait of evil, …151
Because of this imitative relationship, the body and soul of humans are causally related to the
material cosmos and the world soul.152 This causal relationship gives the microcosm-macrocosm
analogy its explanatory power: the human is like the world because it is made in imitation of the
world, which means that their parts and attributes are also similar.
Similarly to the myth of the Phaedo, Timaeus’ description of the physical world
distinguishes between secondary causes and the ultimate cause, the form of the good, such as in

“He composed the whole and divided souls in equal number to the stars and distributed each of them to each,
mounting them as onto a chariot he showed them the nature of the world and told them the fated laws…” (συστήσας
δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις, ἔνειμέν θ’ ἑκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν
τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς…; 41d).
151
καὶ τῶν μὲν θείων αὐτὸς γίγνεται δημιουργός, τῶν δὲ θνητῶν τὴν γένεσιν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ γεννήμασιν δημιουργεῖν
προσέταξεν. οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ
περιετόρνευσαν ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδοσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ
ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ… (69c-d). See also 42e: “and he
[the demiurge] arranged everything and was remaining in his own habit according to his character; when he was
remaining, his children were understanding his arrangement and were obeying it, and taking the immortal beginning
of the living mortal, and imitating their own demiurge…” (καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ
κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει· μένοντος δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν ἐπείθοντο αὐτῇ, καὶ λαβόντες ἀθάνατον
ἀρχὴν θνητοῦ ζῴου, μιμούμενοι τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν…). Cornford (1937) refers to details such as these as “the
machinery of the myth” (146). See also Phlb. 30a.
152
The scholarship on the Timaeus is divided on what qualities distinguish the two sorts of soul. For instance,
Cornford (1937: 142-143): “The human soul, no less than the World-Soul, must be so composed as to be like the
objects it is to know … Human souls are inferior, because they can do wrong of their own wills;” Thévenaz (1938:
84): “elles [l’âmes individuelles] ont une certaine similitude d’essence avec l’âme du monde, mais n’en émanent
pas.”
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the discussion of human vision.153 The greater cause (αἰτία) of vision is so that humans can see
the orderly motion of the heavens, gain knowledge of the demiurge’s intelligent ordering of the
visible divine, and consequently become philosophers.154 This quality is central to the dialogue’s
depiction of the divine: because the demiurge “is good, there is never envy in him about
anything, and because this is outside of him, he wants more of all that everything should become
like to himself.”155 He does not begrudge knowledge of the universe’s order either, it seems, and
discussions of divination later in the dialogue further build on this idea that a fundamental part of
the divine ordering of a world is a sort of self-revelation, almost as if it wanted to be sought after
and discovered, insofar as possible, by intelligent humans.156 This amounts to a teleological
explanation, but it is grounded in the relationship between model and imitation, macrocosm and
microcosm.
The scholarship that exists, however, on this sort of teleological macrocosm-microcosm
analogy tends to associate it most closely with Stoicism. 157 Karl Reinhardt, in his later work,

“There are all in the class of auxiliary causes, which god uses to fulfill, insofar as is possible, the form of the
excellent” (ταῦτ᾽ οὖν πάντα ἔστιν τῶν συναιτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσιν χρῆται τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν
ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν; 46c-d). On this passage, see Sedley (1991: 375-7).
154
“By my account, vision came as the cause of the greatest aid to us, because none of the accounts that have now
been formulated about the world would never have been formulated without seeing the stars or the sun or the
heavens. … From these things we bring about the class of philosophy, than which no greater good has ever or will
ever come about as a gift from the gods to the mortal race” (ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης
ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἐρρήθη μήτε ἄστρα μήτε ἥλιον
μήτε οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων… ἐξ ὧν ἐπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ᾽ ἦλθεν οὔτε ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ
θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν; 47a-b). See further 46b-e, 90b-d.
155
ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ᾽ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα
ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ (29e). In the Phdr., Socrates applies this characteristic to all the gods:
φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται (247a).
156
71a-2d. See Struck (2014: 25-34). Plutarch’s Simmias in De gen., however, argues that some men, such as
Socrates, are more receptive to divine signs because of the purity of their souls (588d-9e). Cf. [Pl.] Epin. 975d.
157
Lobeck (1829), however, treats the cosmological system in De fac. as as an elaboration of a “publica olim
persuasio” (947), rather than an idea originating outside of Greece, specifically in the context of “mathematici” and
Pythagorean geometry (929-32). The survey in Concer (1922) emphasizes the prominence of Plato (1-10), although
he sees Philo as the first writer to make it “clearly explicit,” perhaps due to “the infusion of Babylonian or Egyptian”
elements (27-8). See also Arist. Phys. VIII.2.252b. Moreau (1939) attributes the Stoic “l’analogie du macrocosme et
du microcosme” to “ll’idéalisme platonicien,” although he finds the “système astrobiologique” to be “originaire de
la Chaldée,” although transmitted to Zeno through Heraclitus and the Timaeus (188).
153
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attributed the entirety of this teleological paradigm to Posidonius, deeming the relevant sections
of Plutarch’s De facie beholden to “Poseidonischen Gedanken… gegen den mechanischen
Naturbegriff der Epikureer.”158 The idea of cosmic sympathy, linked generally to the Stoics, is
seen as Plutarch’s mechanism for this relationship.159 Herwig Görgemanns presents a more
nuanced argument, but nevertheless concludes that Plutarch “bietet nur eine stoisierende Fassung
der alten Lehre,” particularly basing his argument on the concept of “cohesion.”160 Claire Préaux,
writing at nearly the same time, however, argues for a Pythagorean origin with an emphasis on
the concept of “harmonie… sur un modèle musicale.”161 Rather, I argue, Plutarch is clearly
drawing on the Timaeus to construct an argument against the world entailed by the Stoic
conception of providence. Lamprias implicitly explains the form of the world through the
assumption that it is a macrocosm of a human, which is an idea that Sulla’s stranger will
elaborate further in the myth. There is some evidence that Posidonius also made use of the
analogy between microcosm and macrocosm—such as Diogenes Laertius’ claim that he
understood “the heavens as the rational part of the world”162—yet far less than Reinhardt holds.

158

1926: 331, 321. In his earlier monograph (1921: 343-5), Reinhardt builds his conception of Posidonian
“Mikrokosmos” theory upon Jaeger's (1914) attribution of the entirety of Nemesius’ De nat. hom., including “der
Lehre vom Makrokosmos und Mikrokosmos” back to Posidonius (126). He further postulates a shared source with
Cic. Nat. D. II.60-1.152-3)—despite the frequent discussions of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, such as in even the
initial doxography (1.1-151). Cf. Shorey (1915). This argument is circular as there are no explicit attributions of the
idea taken to such an extent as we find in De facie to Posidonius. Pohlenz, however, broadly follows Reinhardt,
implicitly adopting his attributions in his monograph (1947) and citing him often as the only authority in his
Teubner edition (1955: 84-8). Préaux (1973), however, praises Reinhardt’s chapter on De fac. as “un précieux
recueil de sources sur la croyance au séjour des âmes dans la lune” (142n2), but rejects his conclusions “Mais un
analyse plus prudente de ce mythe, οù Posidonius n’est d’ailleurs pas cité, alors que Plutarque cite d’autres sources,
interdit, semble-t-il, pareille reconstruction” (142-3).
159
See e.g. Vernière (1986): “De là à conclure à une affinité réelle entre ces deux êtres, l’âmes et la lune, du fait de
leur commun caractère de moyenne proportionnelle, il n’y a qu’un pas pour une pensée encore imprégnée de la
notion de sympathie cosmique qui glisse de la ressemblance à la parenté” (104). Cf. Opsomer (1999) on Plutarch’s
conception of ἀντιπερίστασις and ἀπόρροιαι (423-4).
160
1970: 108n66.
161
1973: 28-33.
162
… Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον (VII.139
= frg. 23 Edelstein & Kidd). This claim, however, is little more developed than the first plausible articulation of the
principle by Anaximenes: “just as our soul, he said, being our air has control over us, so too does spirit and air
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The clearest explicitly Stoic example seems to come from Seneca, as George Concer argues.
After explaining that Stoics, unlike Plato and Aristotle, only claim two causes, god and matter,
he argues: “God, that which acts, is more powerful and more precious than matter, which is
passive to god. God’s place in this world is that of the soul in a man. There is matter in the
world, which corresponds to the body in us: both inferior things serve superior things.”163
Seneca’s analogy between god to soul and matter to body is a clearer example of the
macrocosmic-microcosmic relationship, but it is perhaps significant that this formulation occurs
in the same letter in which he earlier discussed causation in Plato’s Timaeus. Both Platonists and
Stoics, moreover, interpreted this dialogue, which seems therefore to be a common inspiration
for the idea.164
Plutarch explicitly grounds his conception of the relationship of microcosm to
macrocosm on the relationship between the world soul and the human soul in the Timaeus. In the
treatise De virtute morali begins with a doxography distinguishing various Stoics and their
conception of a unitary soul from the composite soul of Plato.165 He argues that, because the
world soul in the Timaeus is compounded through competing elements, such as the cycles of
sameness and difference, our soul too is a compound of opposing elements, one rational and the
other irrational:
However, Plato manifestly, steadfastly, and incontrovertibly testified both that the
ensouled part of the world is neither simple nor uncompounded nor unitary; rather, it has
encompass the entire world” (οἶον ἡ ψυχή, φησίν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον
πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει; frg. B2 Diels). See also Concer (1922: 2).
163
potentius autem est ac pretiosius, quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei. quem in hoc mundo locum
deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus. quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est; seruiant ergo deteriora
melioribus (Ep. LXV.23-4).
164
… φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος… (Sext. Emp. Math. VII.93 = frg. 85 Edelstein &
Kidd). See also Plut. De an. proc. 1023b-d = frg. 141a. On the long scholarly quest for Posidonius as a “source” for
Plutarch, see further below. Cf. Reydams-Schils (1999); the first chapter, supra 107, further discusses the
relationship between Platonism and Stoicism.
165
441a-42b. On the philosophical alignment of the dialogue, see Babut (1969: 2-6, 71-80). He affirms that the work
should be viewed as original, rather than Posidonian or Aristotelian, but as a “platonicien” (76) or in the “tradition
académicienne” (79). On the anti-Stoic polemic in the treatise, see Ingenkamp (1999).
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been mixed from the powers of sameness and difference… and that the human soul is a
portion or imitation of that of the world, also harmonized through ratios and numbers
befitting them; it is neither simple nor affected in the same way, but it bears one
intellectual and rational part, to which leading and ruling over a human are fitting by
nature, and another part passionate and irrational and much wandering and disorderly,
needing an external ruler.166
Plutarch identifies a parallel and mimetic relationship between the world soul and the human
soul that is thoroughly grounded in the Timaeus. Through reasoning by analogy, he attributes
properties on one psychic level to the other.167 While more is said in recent scholarship about the
macrocosm-microcosm relationship of city to individual in Plato’s Respublica, the analogy of
world to human in the Timaeus provided Plutarch with a powerful tool for both anthropology and
cosmology.168 Nor does he only analogize the world soul and the human soul, but their bodies as

ἐμφανῶς μέντοι καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως Πλάτων συνεῖδεν, ὅτι τούτου τε τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἔμψυχον οὐχ
ἁπλοῦν οὐδ’ ἀσύνθετον οὐδὲ μονοειδές ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου μεμιγμένον δυνάμεως, … ἥ τ’
ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ μέρος ἢ μίμημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα καὶ συνηρμοσμένη κατὰ λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἐοικότας
ἐκείνοις οὐχ ἁπλῆ τίς ἐστιν οὐδ’ ὁμοιοπαθής, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, ᾧ κρατεῖν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄρχειν προσῆκόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ πολυπλανὲς καὶ ἄτακτον
ἐξεταστοῦ δεόμενον (441e-2b). Plutarch proceeds to distinguish two elements in the irrational part in the human
soul, but Cacciatore (2016) finds a further distinction, in regard to the cosmic soul: “In the irrational part (the
precosmic soul) we may distinguish a dyadic and intermediary part… that corresponds to an irrational principle”
(60). Opsomer (2012), however, argues that “there is no tripartition in the world soul” (324n70).
167
E.g. De an. proc. 1023d-e: καὶ μὴν οὐ μόνον αἱ τῶν θνητῶν ψυχαὶ … ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου…; Opsomer
(2012): “harmony enters into the very composition of the world-soul, and hence the human soul as well” (329-30).
Thévenaz (1937), however, criticizes Plutarch on the grounds that “il ne cherche même pas à caracteriser les
differences qui opposent l'âme du monde à l’âme humaine… une sorte d’érudition superficielle” (85). He concludes
that “toute sa théorie métaphysique des deux âmes” is ethically motivated and metaphysically vacuous: “Comme
dans le stoicisme, la physique, la métaphysique et la logique n’ont pas de but en elles-mêmes: elles contribuent
seulement à fonder la morale sur des bases solides” (87). More recent scholarship has been more favorable to
Plutarch’s approach, such as Roig Lanzillotta (2015): “Plutarch is no exception to the ancient view that sees the
human being in the light of the cosmological framework. The Universe and human being are so closely related to
one another that they are conceived of as macrocosmos and microcosmos, large and small examples of the same
order” (180). See also Brenk (1977: 132-3), Opsomer (1994); Opsomer (2012): “for Plutarch… world soul and
human soul are structurally identical as far as the relation between an irrational part reason is concerned. In other
words, the part added by the lesser gods is structurally the same as the ‘divisible and being’ used by the demiurge”
(314). This sort of argument based on the mimetic relationship between cosmic and human soul appears also in
Macrobius’ explanation of why “irrational animals” (animalia ratione carentia) could be swayed by Orpheus’
music: just as the soul of the world is composed “musically” (i.e. from harmonies), so too are theirs (Comm. II.3.8).
He also describes the corpus mundi as being made ad imaginem contextionis animae (II.3.15). Macrobius is
commenting on Cicero’s treatment of the music of the spheres in this section, but later in the text of the Somnium,
Scipio compares the primary god’s moderation of cosmic motion with the human soul’s of bodily passion (with a
coordinating quam… tam clause, Resp. VI.24.30).
168
E.g. Pender (2000: 206-13, 254-6), Smith (2001), Williams (2001). Grube (1935: 142-4) is a rare exception. Plato
formulates the idea most clearly in book II: “perhaps there would be more justice in the bigger and it would be easier
166
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well. Earlier in De facie, Lamprias concludes a series of arguments against Stoic cosmology by
taking up the idea from the Timaeus that the world is a “creature.”169 The arrangement of the
parts of a human body, such as the heart and the eyes, cannot be explained by the elements
separating out to their natural positions.170 Nor too would it be rational to this explain the
positions of the stars and the moon through this idea of natural elemental position, as the Stoic
Pharnaces had argued earlier in the dialogue.171 Rather things must be, Lamprias argues, arranged
by reason (λόγῳ διακεκοσμημένον):

to learn. If you want, therefore, we could first examine what sort of thing is is in cities. Then let us thus investigate it
in each, examining the similarity of the greater in the form of the smaller” (ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ
μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν· ἔπειτα οὕτως
ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες; 368e-9a).
This sort of comparison is even more explicit in [Arist.] Mund.: οὕτως ὑποληπτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος πόλεως,
λέγω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου (400b27-28); See also Cic. Leg. I.7.23. The universe as the most extensive polity, shared by all
rational beings (οἰκείωσις), becomes a common topic in Imperial Stoicism, such as in e.g. Sen. Otio: “There are two
countries are comprehended by the soul, the one great and true country which contains gods and men… (duas res
publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et uere publicam qua di atque homines continentur…; IV.1). This
trope is especially common in discussions of exile, such as in Muson. XI: “is the world not the common fatherland
of all humanity, as Socrates thought?” (οὐχὶ κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἠξίου
Σωκράτης; 12-3). See also Boethius Cons. I.p.V. Plut. invokes Empedocles (frg. B115.59 Diels) for the idea that
embodied man is an “exile and wanderer from heaven” (φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης; 607c-d).
169
“It is thus likely that the world too, if it is indeed a creature…” (ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἔχειν καὶ τὸν κόσμον, εἴ γε δὴ ζῷόν
ἐστι…; 928a). Plato uses this term several times in the Ti., e.g.: “So he arranged all these things first, then the world
was composed from them, one living thing bearing all the living things in itself, both mortal and immortal” (ἀλλὰ
πάντα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεκόσμησεν, ἔπειτ’ ἐκ τούτων πᾶν τόδε συνεστήσατο, ζῷον ἓν ζῷα ἔχον τὰ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ
θνητὰ ἀθάνατά τε; 69b-c).
170
“For the eye of this body is not pushed out by its lightness, nor does the heart fall and sink down into the chest
because of its heaviness, but rather because it was better for each to be arranged thus” (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς ἐνταῦθα
τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὑπὸ κουφότητος ἐκπιεσθείς, οὐδ’ ἡ καρδία τῷ βάρει ὀλισθοῦσα πέπτωκεν εἰς τὸ στῆθος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι
βέλτιον ἦν οὕτως ἑκάτερον τετάχθαι; 928a-b).
171
Evidently this was also the position of Metrodorus of Chios: “Nor, accordingly, do we think that of the parts of
the world, the earth lies here because it sinks through its weight, nor that the sun, as Metrodorus of Chios thought,
has been squeezed out into the upper place in the manner of a wineskin, nor have the other stars come into the places
where they reside by falling through the difference of weight, as if on a scale” (μὴ τοίνυν μηδὲ τῶν τοῦ κόσμου
μερῶν νομίζωμεν μήτε γῆν ἐνταῦθα κεῖσθαι συμπεσοῦσαν διὰ βάρος, μήτε τὸν ἥλιον, ὡς ᾤετο Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος,
εἰς τὴν ἄνω χώραν ἀσκοῦ δίκην ὑπὸ κουφότητος ἐκτεθλῖφθαι, μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας ὥσπερ ἐν ζυγῷ σταθμοῦ
διαφορᾷ ῥέψαντας ἐν οἷς εἰσι γεγονέναι τόποις; 928b). Earlier in the dialogue, the Stoic position is represented as
similar. Lucius, Lamprias’ comrade, for instance imputes to Pharnaces the fear that the moon would fall (ὅμως ὑπὲρ
τῆς σελήνης μὴ πέσῃ) if it were earthy rather than fiery (923b), but responds: “And indeed, the moon is bolstered
from falling by its very motion and rapid whirling, just as things placed in slings are prevented from falling by the
circular whirling motion. For there is a natural motion in everything, unless it is diverted by something else.
Therefore, it is not weight that directs the moon, because weight is repulsed by the orbit” (καίτοι τῇ μὲν σελήνῃ
βοήθεια πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν ἡ κίνησις αὐτὴ καὶ τὸ ῥοιζῶδες τῆς περιαγωγῆς, ὥσπερ ὅσα ταῖς σφενδόναις ἐντεθέντα
τῆς καταφορᾶς κώλυσιν ἴσχει τὴν κύκλῳ περιδίνησιν· ἄγει γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις, ἂν ὑπ’ ἄλλου
μηδενὸς ἀποστρέφηται. διὸ τὴν σελήνην οὐκ ἄγει τὸ βάρος, ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς τὴν ῥοπὴν ἐκκρουόμενον; 923c-d).
On the theory of theory of “natural position,” see Chroust (1977).
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Rather, because it is governed according to reason (τοῦ κατὰ λόγον κρατοῦντος), they
revolve “bound in” the face of the world as the “light-bearing eyes,” and the sun bears the
power of the heart since it spreads and disperses pneuma and heat and light from itself,
and the world uses earth and sea through nature, just as an animal uses bowels and
bladder. But moon, between sun and earth, as the the liver or some other soft viscera
lying between the heart and the bowels, conveys warmth from above to here and sends up
exhalations from here, rarifying them by ripening and purification around herself.172
Lamprias establishes an analogous relationship between the body of the world and of a human so
that he can describe the qualities of the former, which are more difficult to directly observe, by
the qualities of the latter. The liver is evidently conceived of here as an intermediary organ that
breaks down food and extracts nutrients.173 By extension, the moon is explained as an
intermediary between the air that surrounds the earth and the higher heavens. The question of
final causation, however, is raised but only unsatisfactorily addressed: “If the earthiness and
firmness of the moon meets some fitting need or other ends, it is unclear to us.”174 He vouches
that “the better” (τὸ βέλτιον) prevails in everything but does not yet attempt to suggest what
possibilities it might be.
The comparison between the two bodies creates a probable paradigm so that one can
reason from one level to the other, hence why Lamprias asks what “probability” (τί… τὸ εἰκός)
one can find in what the Stoics hold. Herwig Görgemanns emphasizes the significance of

ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον κρατοῦντος οἱ μὲν ὥσπερ “ὄμματα φωσφόρα” τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ παντὸς “ἐνδεδεμένοι”
περιπολοῦσιν, ἥλιος δὲ καρδίας ἔχων δύναμιν ὥσπερ αἷμα καὶ πνεῦμα διαπέμπει καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
θερμότητα καὶ φῶς, γῇ δὲ καὶ θαλάσσῃ χρῆται κατὰ φύσιν ὁ κόσμος, ὅσα κοιλίᾳ καὶ κύστει ζῷον. σελήνη δ’ ἡλίου
μεταξὺ καὶ γῆς ὥσπερ καρδίας καὶ κοιλίας ἧπαρ ἤ τι μαλθακὸν ἄλλο σπλάγχνον ἐγκειμένη τήν τ’ ἄνωθεν ἀλέαν
ἐνταῦθα διαπέμπει καὶ τὰς ἐντεῦθεν ἀναθυμιάσεις πέψει τινὶ καὶ καθάρσει λεπτύνουσα περὶ ἑαυτὴν ἀναδίδωσιν
(928b-c). Vernière (1986) deems this passage “très étrange” (104).
173
Although the comparison of the heart and the sun is relatively common, that between the moon and the liver is
not. See Jones (1932: 121-6) and Cherniss (1957: 94-5nb).
174
εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τὸ γεῶδες αὐτῆς καὶ στερέμνιον ἔχει τινὰ πρόσφορον χρείαν, ἄδηλον ἡμῖν (928c). See further
Donini (1988: 135). Cf. Görgemanns (1970): “Damit ist eine Brücke geschlagen vom Zentrum des
wissenschaftlichen Teils zum mythischen: in beiden wird die teleologische Frage behandelt, doch kann der Mythos
etwas aussagen, was die Wissenschaft als ‘für uns unbekannt’ erklären muß” (79). The historian of science,
Montgomery (1999), however, completely misses the importance of teleology for the dialogue: “Instead of the
typical philosophical or moral subject, a wholly visual, visible object stands at the center of the discussion. … It
would have been easy for the party to look up and observe the lunar face directly overhead—Aristotle would almost
certainly have advised as much” (36).
172
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telological explanation in the whole of De facie in both Lamprias’ account and Sulla’s speech.175
The latter, he argues, stands at odds with an earlier teleological line of argument, insofar as it is
anthropocentric in a manner more reminiscent of the Stoics than the Plutarch of De sollertia
animalium or the other “tierpsychologischen Schriften.”176 This is reminiscent, however, of the
structure also of Socrates’ myth in the Phaedo: the explanation for the position of the earth in the
cosmos, not explicitly concerned with human habitation, is a preface for the explanation of how
the various places within the earth serve as habitations for human souls. 177 Similarly, here the
explanation of the stability of the moon is a preface for the more distinctively “anthropocentric”
arguments about the generation and degeneration of souls: without the latter, the former does not
meet the sort of teleological burden set by Socrates in the Phaedo and Theon in De facie. In both
Lamprias’ argument and Sulla’s myth, however, the central mechanism that seems to make each
likely is the imitative relationship between the human and the world. There is nothing
specifically Stoic about this argument, despite the appeals in the scholarship to “sympathy” or
Posidonius.178 Plutarch grounds it explicitly in the Timaeus. The next sections examine the

175

Cf. Préaux (1973: 151).
1970: 80-2. Insofar as Plutarch allows for the reincarnation of human souls into animals, although he demures
from using it as an argument for vegetarianism in De esu, the role of the moon in generation and degeneration of
souls is central to all living creatures, and not just humans—especially if Plutarch truly does belief that animals, no
less than humans, possess reason, as Autobulus argues in De soll. an. (e.g. 960a). Cf. Roig Lanzillotta's (2015)
argument that Plutarch is more fundamentally “anthropocentric than cosmocentric” (191-3).
177
Cf. Sedley (1991: 364-70) on the earth’s stability. He concludes: “It seems more realistic to say that the perfectly
coherent surface reading of the myth is indeed non-teleological, and that the teleological reading is contrived to lie
below the surface” (370). This requires a “two-tiered” reading to integrate the physical (ostensibly mechanistic)
details into a teleological system: “It is easy enough to agree with those who judge the opening passage on the
earth's equilibrium more ‘scientific’ than the description of the True Earth which follows… The didactic function of
the myth has relatively little to do with its literal truth or falsity. The lessons buried in it about cosmic justice and the
proper character of teleological explanations are the same lessons whether or not the earth is structured in the way
described” (383).
178
E.g. Vernière (1986): “De là à conclure à une affinité réelle entre ces deux êtres, l’âmes et la lune, du fait de leur
commun caractère de moyenne proportionnelle, il n’y a qu’un pas pour une pensée encore imprégnée de la notion de
sympathie cosmique qui glisse de la ressemblance à la parenté” (104). She takes this part of the myth to be See also
Préaux (1973: 24), Görgemanns (1970: passim). The Stoic formulation of sympathy, in contrast to Plutarch’s use of
analogy, sees things on earth as influenced by things in the heavens in a more straightforward way. Epictetus offers
an example in the miniature dialogue entitled “that the divine oversees all things” (ὅτι πάντας ἐφορᾷ τὸ θεῖον; Arr.
176
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cosmological and psychological content of the stranger’s myth, which becomes a likely account
in part by imbedding this explanatory analogy between microcosm and macrocosm into the core
of the stranger’s speech, where both the macrocosm and the microcosm are explained as systems
of three parts with intermediary elements—namely, the cosmic moon and the human soul.

The human soul as a microcosm of the cosmic moon
Sulla’s stranger transitions from his mythic exegesis of Demeter and Persephone through
the mention of a “second death:”179 the first death, that of the body, takes place on the earth,
identified with Demeter, while the second one, that of the soul, takes place on the moon,
identified with Persephone.180 Yet the moon has a sort of dual eschatological role, represented by
the two gates that characterize its topography:

Epict. diss. I.14.1-2): “When someone asked him how someone could be persuaded that everything that he does is
overseen by god, he said, ‘doesn’t it seem to you that all is unified?… Why then? Don’t the things upon the earth
seem to you to sympathize with the heavens?’” (πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἂν τις πεισθείη, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ
πραττομένων ἐφορᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, “οὐ δοκεῖ σοι,” ἔφη, “ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα… τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς
οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;”). Stoic sympathy does play a role in Neoplatonism, however, as Meijer (2007) argues with
regard to Plotinus (86).
179
After introducing the plain of Elysium by reference to Homer, the stranger declares: “Into here, no paltry or
impure person rises, but the good are conveyed here after death and thus have an easy life, but not a blessed or holy
one until they pass their second death” (εἰς δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλος μὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἀκάθαρτος ἄνεισιν, οἱ δὲ χρηστοὶ μετὰ
τὴν τελευτὴν κομισθέντες αὐτόθι ῥᾷστον μὲν οὕτως βίον, οὐ μὴν μακάριον οὐδὲ θεῖον ἔχοντες ἄχρι τοῦ δευτέρου
θανάτου διατελοῦσι; 942f).
180
“That death which we die, one makes the human two from three and the other one from two. And the former is in
the <earth> and belongs to Demeter—<wherefore to end life is said> to be a service to her and the Athenians long
ago named the dead Demeterians—but the latter is in the moon and belongs to Persephone. And Hermes of the earth
is companion of the former, and Hermes of the heavens the companion of the latter. But Demeter quickly and with
force dissolves the soul from the body, while Persephone gently and over much time dissolves the mind from the
soul—hence why she is called ‘the single-born,’ since only the best part of a human becomes separate from the
soul” (ὃν δ’ ἀποθνήσκομεν θάνατον, ὁ μὲν ἐκ τριῶν δύο ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ δ’ ἓν ἐκ δυοῖν, καὶ ὁ μέν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ
<γῇ> τῆς Δήμητρος, <διὸ τελευτᾶν λέγεται τὸν βί>ον αὐτῇ τελεῖν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς Ἀθηναῖοι Δημητρείους
ὠνόμαζον τὸ παλαιόν· <ὁ> δ’ ἐν τῇ σελήνῃ τῆς Φερσεφόνης· καὶ σύνοικός ἐστι τῆς μὲν χθόνιος ὁ Ἑρμῆς τῆς δ’
οὐράνιος. λύει δ’ αὕτη μὲν ταχὺ καὶ μετὰ βίας τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ Φερσεφόνη πράως καὶ χρόνῳ
πολλῷ τὸν νοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μονογενὴς κέκληται· μόνον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ βέλτιστον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
διακρινόμενον αὐτῆς; 943a-b). Immediately before this explanation, following the first mention of the phrase
“second death,” the discourse is reoriented with a direct address: “what is this, Sulla? Do not ask about these things,
for I myself will explain” (τίς δ’ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σύλλα; μὴ περὶ τούτων ἔρῃ. μέλλω γὰρ αὐτὸς διηγεῖσθαι; 943a).
This is how Cherniss (1957), at least, renders the punctuation, taking all the statements to be spoken by the stranger.
Pohlenz (1955), however, separates the first question, which he takes to be “non est ‘quaestio rhetorica’… sed vera
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Just as our earth has deep and wide hollows, one flowing out from the Pillars of Hercules
and into our land then out towards the Caspian and those dwelling near the Red Sea, just
so there are depths and hollows in the moon. They call most immense the recess of
Hecate—where souls give and receive penalties for what they suffer or do once they have
become daemones—and there are two immense Gates: for souls pass through them, both
into the parts of the moon that face the heavens and down again to the parts facing the
earth. The parts of the moon facing the heavens are called the Elysian plain, while those
facing here are called the house of Persephone, she who faces the earth.181
The moon is the home of disembodied souls who become daemones, but it is also an
intermediary point between the upper heavens and the earth. Minds that are drawn out from the
soul and towards the sun leave evidently through the Elysian plain, while souls, either those
visiting earth as daemones drawn to earth or drawn into reincarnation, travel through the shadow
cast by the earth.182
This duality is the fundamental characteristic of the moon in the stranger’s account, as in
Lamprias’ earlier characterization of the moon as a sort of cosmic liver. This idea of the “second
death,” the separation of the mind from the soul, might be suggested by the cryptic hint in the
myth of the Phaedo that there are some dwellers of the “true earth” that “sufficiently purify
themselves through philosophy to live entirely without bodies for all time, those men arrive into

quaestio Lampriae” (82), from the following sentences, which he takes to be Sulla’s response. Cf. Cherniss (1951):
“If τίς… ὦ Σύλλα; here were an interruption by Lamprias, all the rest of the myth would be Sulla’s own statement
given on his own authority… which is impossible, as the unannounced shift of speakers implied by the
punctuation… is improbable” (151). Donini (2011) follows Cherniss (232), while Lernould (2013) separates the
speakers, both without comment.
181
ὥσπερ ἡ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἔχει γῆ κόλπους βαθεῖς καὶ μεγάλους, ἕνα μὲν ἐνταῦθα διὰ στηλῶν Ἡρακλείων ἀναχεόμενον
εἴσω πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἔξω δὲ τὸν Κάσπιον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἐρυθρὰν θάλατταν, οὕτως βάθη ταῦτα τῆς σελήνης ἐστὶ καὶ
κοιλώματα. καλοῦσι δ’ αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον Ἑκάτης μυχόν, ὅπου καὶ δίκας διδόασιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν
ὧν ἂν ἤδη γεγενημέναι δαίμονες ἢ πάθωσιν ἢ δράσωσι, τὰς δὲ δύο μακρὰ <τὰς Πύλας>· περαιοῦνται γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ
δι’ αὐτῶν, νῦν μὲν εἰς τὰ πρὸς οὐρανὸν τῆς σελήνης, νῦν δὲ πάλιν εἰς τὰ πρὸς γῆν· ὀνομάζεσθαι δὲ τὰ μὲν πρὸς
οὐρανὸν τῆς σελήνης Ἠλύσιον πεδίον, τὰ δ’ ἐνταῦθα Φερσεφόνης οἶκος ἀντίχθονος (944b-c). The emendations are
taken from Cherniss; Pohlenz prints θερμ<ότητος, ᾗ κατ>επείγει and τῶν ἀγαθῶν <τὰς ψυχὰς>, as well as τὰς δὲ
δύο Μακράς and Φερσεφόνης † οὐκ ἀντίχθονος.
182
The souls of the good can also become subsumed in the shadow of the earth (i.e. during an eclipse), according to
the stranger. They cry out and hasten the moon quickly onward “because in the shadow they can no longer hear the
harmony of the heavens” (οὐκέτι γὰρ ἐξακούουσιν ἐν τῇ σκιᾷ γενόμεναι τῆς περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίας; 944a).
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dwellings still more beautiful than these, which would be difficult to explain;”183 but this central
idea of the moon’s intermediacy is explicitly credited to Xenocrates: 184
Xenocrates says that the stars and the sun are comprised of fire and first density, then the
moon from second density and its own air, and the earth from water and the third of the
densities. Nothing that is entirely dense in itself nor thin is able to receive soul. These
things are true about the essence of the moon.185
The moon’s intermediate density between that of the sun and the earth serves the fundamental
purpose of suitability for soul, which is described as a sort of intermediary between mind and
body. The sun, moon, and earth all have properties that correspond to the parts of the human that
pertain to their domain, meaning that the soul is a microcosm of the moon.186 The moon too, as
the stranger describes, is itself ensouled.187 The stranger’s speech ends, moreover, with a
comparison between the moon and the soul that explicates their connection in intermediacy:
τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον,
καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι (114b). Socrates concludes with
dramatic irony: “nor is there time left at the present” (οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι).
184
Dillon 2003a does not attribute the other attribute, however, to Xenocrates as well: “he allows the Stranger to
reveal a triadic division of the individual human being, which, although it shows no signs of being influenced by
Xenocrates, provides a microcosmic analogue to this division of the universe” (308). Similarly, Dillon (1977): “The
threefold division of the individual has its equivalent on the cosmic level, in the form of a threefold division of the
universe. … An essentially solar theology has taken over, perhaps already a development of that of Xenocrates’”
(214, 216). There is evidence that Xenocrates postulated a sort of literary microcosm, however, in the shield of
Agamemnon in Il. XI: “Xenocrates says that it is an imitation of the world” (ταύτην δὲ Ξενοκράτης μίμημα τοῦ
κόμου φησὶν εἶναι; frg. 55 Heinze). On the text and attribution, cf. Dillon (1977: 38n1). On the metaphysical debates
within the Early Academy, see especially Tarán (1981: 12-29).
185
ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης (frg. 56 Heinze) τὰ μὲν ἄστρα καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκ πυρός φησι καὶ τοῦ πρώτου πυκνοῦ συγκεῖσθαι,
τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου πυκνοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀέρος, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν πυκνῶν· ὅλως
δὲ μήτε τὸ πυκνὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μήτε τὸ μανὸν εἶναι ψυχῆς δεκτικόν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ οὐσίας σελήνης (943f4a). The text of the passage describing the construction of the earth presents problems. Heinze (1892) prints γῆν ἐξ
ὕδατος καὶ πυρὸς, while Pohlenz (1955) prints ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος. Cf. Cherniss (1951: 152). See also De Is. 370f.
186
After initially assigning the generation of the mind to the sun, the soul to the moon, and the body to the earth, the
stranger quips: “it is thus fitting to the nature of each” (συντυγχάνει δ’ οὕτως κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερον; 943a).
187
“First, they see the magnitude, beauty, and nature of the moon itself: it is neither simple nor unmixed, but a
mixture, that is to say, of star and earth. For as the earth, mixed with air and <moisture>, becomes soft and blood,
mixed with flesh, provides sense-perception, thus they say that the moon mixed with aether down to its depths is
ensouled and fertile, just as it is in equipoise and has symmetry between lightness and heaviness. Indeed, the world
itself thus has been made in harmony between the things borne above and below, freed entirely from motion
regarding place.” (ἐφορῶσι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῆς σελήνης τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἁπλῆν οὐδ’
ἄμικτον, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἄστρου σύγκραμα καὶ γῆς οὖσαν. ὡς γὰρ ἡ γῆ πνεύματι μεμιγμένη καὶ ὑγρό<τητι> μαλακὴ
γέγονε καὶ τὸ αἷμα τῇ σαρκὶ παρέχει τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐγκεκραμένον, οὕτως τῷ αἰθέρι λέγουσι τὴν σελήνην
ἀνακεκραμένην διὰ βάθους ἅμα μὲν ἔμψυχον εἶναι καὶ γόνιμον, ἅμα δ’ ἰσόρροπον ἔχειν τὴν πρὸς τὸ βαρὺ
συμμετρίαν τῆς κουφότητος. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν οὕτως τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τῶν ἄνω καὶ τῶν κάτω φύσει φερομένων
183
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What is soulless is itself powerless and susceptible to other things, while the mind is
impassive and autonomous. But the soul is mixed and intermediate, just as the moon
comes to be at the hands of the god as a mixture and combination of things above and
below, bearing a relationship towards the sun as the earth does towards the moon.188
According to this account, the soul, as a microcosm of the moon, shares in its qualities, such as
an intermediate position between physical materiality and immaterial intelligence. They are
described as aetherial like the material around the moon and, like the moon in Lamprias’
cosmology, are said to receive exhalations from the earth.189
In De virtute morali, Plutarch argued that the Platonic soul was divided between a
rational and an irrational part.190 The stranger’s speech similarly depicts the human soul as
essentially bipartite. The stranger declares that all souls spend some amount of time between the
earth and the moon, because they all seem to require some degree of purification, but some of
them, depending on the state of the irrational part of the soul, finally ascend to the moon:191

συνηρμοσμένον ἀπηλλάχθαι παντάπασι τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως (943e-f). Although the De facie is not organized
as a clear narrative, unlike Plutarch’s other myths, the stranger describes the moon through the perspective of souls
rising to her.
188
τὸ γὰρ ἄψυχον ἄκυρον αὐτὸ καὶ παθητὸν ὑπ’ ἄλλων, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀπαθὴς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ, μικτὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον ἡ
ψυχὴ καθάπερ ἡ σελήνη τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω σύμμιγμα καὶ μετακέρασμα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονε, τοῦτον ἄρα πρὸς ἥλιον
ἔχουσα τὸν λόγον ὃν ἔχει γῆ πρὸς σελήνην (945c-d).
189
“Then they appear in sight to be like a ray, but, accordingly with their nature, being light in the aether around the
moon as here, they bear tension and strength from it, as much as tempered things bear an edge, because what is thin
and dispersed becomes strengthened and stable and translucent, such that they are nourished by whatever
exhalations come. For Heraclitus said beautifully that ‘souls have the sense of smell in Hades’” (δεύτερον <δ’>
ἀκτῖνι τὴν ὄψιν ἐοικυῖαι, περὶ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἄνω κουφιζομένην ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα, τῷ περὶ τὴν σελήνην αἰθέρι καὶ
τόνον ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ δύναμιν, οἷον τὰ στομούμενα βαφήν, ἴσχουσι· τὸ γὰρ ἀραιὸν ἔτι καὶ διακεχυμένον ῥώννυται
καὶ γίνεται σταθερὸν καὶ διαυγές, ὥσθ’ ὑπὸ τῆς τυχούσης ἀναθυμιάσεως τρέφεσθαι· καὶ καλῶς Ἡράκλειτος εἶπεν
[B98 Diels] ὅτι “αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ’ Ἅιδην” (943c-e). For Pohlenz’s πυρὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, I adopt Sandbach’s
περὶ δὲ τὴν φύσιν, which is followed by Cherniss (1957) and Donini (2011); cf. Lernould (2013). Scholars tend to
identify this passage in particular as Stoic.
190
Cf. Teodorsson (1994).
191
“Every soul, both lacking mind and possessing it, is fated to spend time wandering in the space between the earth
and the moon when it falls out of the body—but not an equal amount of time. Unjust and unrepentant souls pay the
penalties for their unjust deeds, while noble souls—to the extent that they purify their impurities from the body, as if
airing out a foul stench—they must dwell for some appointed time in the gentlest part of the air, which they call the
meadows of Hades. When they return back here, as coming home from exile abroad, they taste joy, just what
initiates experience—great confusion and tumolt mixed with sweet hope” (πᾶσαν ψυχήν, ἄνουν τε καὶ σὺν νῷ,
σώματος ἐκπεσοῦσαν εἱμαρμένον ἐστὶν <ἐν> τῷ μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ σελήνης χωρίῳ πλανηθῆναι χρόνον—οὐκ ἴσον,
ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν ἄδικοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι δίκας τῶν ἀδικημάτων τίνουσι, τὰς δ’ ἐπιεικεῖς, ὅσον ἀφαγνεῦσαι καὶ ἀποπνεῦσαι
<τοὺς> ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ ἀτμοῦ πονηροῦ μιασμούς, ἐν τῷ πραοτάτῳ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὃν λειμῶνας Ἅιδου καλοῦσι,
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For she repels and drives back many of those that strive for the moon, and they see some
of those there turning downward and sinking down, as if into a pit. But those who arrive
with sure footing rise up at first, like athletes, binding themselves with feathery wreaths,
so to speak, for their constancy, because they rendered in life the irrational and passionate
part of their soul suitably ordered and obedient to reason.192
The soul’s intermediary function between the mind and the body, it seems, requires that it have
two aspects, like the moon—one involved in matter, the other in intelligence. Yet reaching the
moon is not the end of its trials. While the mind is still present in the soul, they serve as
daemones, “descending here to take care over oracles, they stand beside and celebrate the
mysteries together with those above, and they become punishers and bulwarks against injustice
and shine as saviors both in war and on the sea.”193 If they execute their tasks badly, letting
themselves be overcome by passions such as envy and desire for pleasure, they are forced back
into another body;194 but if they execute their tasks well, eventually the mind might be drawn to
the sun by longing for the image of the form of the good. With the mind, the soul seems to be
deprived of its rational part as well, leaving only the irrational. The mind, however, is said to
leave a sort of ghostly shape on the soul that is left on the moon, however, like the image or

δεῖ γίνεσθαι χρόνον τινὰ τεταγμένον. <ἔνθ’> οἷον ἐξ ἀποδημίας ἀνακομιζόμεναι φυγαδικῆς εἰς πατρίδα γεύονται
χαρᾶς, οἵαν οἱ τελούμενοι μάλιστα θορύβῳ καὶ πτοήσει συγκεκραμένην μετ’ ἐλπίδος ἡδείας ἔχουσι; 943c). Vernière
(1977) prefers the MSS ἰδίας over Xylander’s ἡδείας (68n1). The punishments are said to take place in the “hollows
and depths of the moon” (βάθη ταῦατα τῆς σελήνης ἐστὶ καὶ κοιώματα), of which the greatest is the “pit of Hecate”
(Ἑκάτης μυχόν; 944c); people on earth are said to hear the wails of punished souls during eclipses (944b).
192
πολλὰς γὰρ ἐξωθεῖ καὶ ἀποκυματίζει γλιχομένας ἤδη τῆς σελήνης, ἐνίας δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ περικάτω τρεπομένας
οἷον εἰς βυθὸν αὖθις ὁρῶσι καταδυομένας. αἱ δ’ ἄνω γενόμεναι καὶ βεβαίως ἱδρυθεῖσαι πρῶτον μέν, ὥσπερ οἱ
νικηφόροι, περιίασιν ἀναδούμεναι στεφάνοις πτερῶν εὐσταθείας λεγομένοις, ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ
παθητικὸν εὐήνιον ἐπιεικῶς τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐν τῷ βίῳ παρέσχοντο (943c-d). The stranger also mentions
a “unstable and easily affected part” (τὸ ἄστατον καὶ τὸ εὐπαθὲς) that can drag the ghostly soul, bereft of both body
and mind, back into generation. Although the moon attempts to prevent it through incantations (καταθέλγει), he
explains monsters such as Typhon as this sort of soul “devoid of reason and under the sway of the enflamed
passions” (ἐρήμων λόγου καὶ τύφῳ πλανηθέντι τῷ παθητικῷ χρησαμένων; 945c). On the pun on Typhon, cf. Pl.
Phdr. 230a.
193
οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ διατρίβουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν οἱ δαίμονες, ἀλλὰ χρηστηρίων δεῦρο κατίασιν ἐπιμελησόμενοι, καὶ ταῖς
ἀνωτάτω συμπάρεισι καὶ συνοργιάζουσι τῶν τελετῶν, κολασταί τε γίνονται καὶ φύλακες ἀδικημάτων καὶ σωτῆρες
ἔν τε πολέμοις καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπιλάμπουσιν (944c-d).
194
“But if they should not perform their duties nobly but are rather overcome by anger or unjust desire for pleasure
or envy, they incur a penalty: they are shoved back here to earth and confined inside human bodies” (ὅ τι δ’ ἂν μὴ
καλῶς περὶ ταῦτα πράξωσιν ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ὀργῆς ἢ πρὸς ἄδικον χάριν ἢ φθόνῳ, δίκην τίνουσιν· ὠθοῦντα γὰρ αὖθις ἐπὶ
γῆν συνειργνύμενοι σώμασιν ἀνθρωπίνοις; 944d).
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ghost of Heracles in Odysseus’ nekyia.195 The soul is like the body in this regard—a corpse also
resembles the living person it used to belong to—and the mindless soul also eventually dissolves
back into the moon:
The moon is the element of souls, as has been said. Just as the bodies of the dead are
dissolved into the earth, so are souls are dissolved into her. The temperate, who desired
the philosophical life of leisure separated from public affairs, are dissolved quickly,
because they no longer experience their passions once they are released by the mind. But
the souls of those who love honor and public affairs and passions and desires for bodily
things continue on, experiencing the memories of their life as if dreams in sleep, such as
the soul of Endymion.196
The eschatological distinction here is reminiscent of the central myth of the Phaedrus, where
Socrates divides good souls into two classes: philosophers who can control their appetites
entirely and abstain from sexual desire, such that their souls regain the wings they lost through
incarnation, and those who are not philosophical but nevertheless honor-loving (φιλοτίμῳ δὲ
χρήσωνται), who might give into sexual desire occasionally but do not judge it to be entirely

“The nature of the soul is left upon the moon, maintaining some traces of life as if dreams. It has been said
correctly that ‘the soul flutters and takes flight like a dream.’ But it does not experience this not immediately once
the soul is removed from the body, but later when the soul becomes alone and destitute of the mind. Homer seems to
speak of this with the greatest of inspiration regarding the things in Hades: ‘after him I saw the life-force of
Hercules, a ghost—the man himself is among the deathless gods.’ For each of us is neither spirit nor fear nor desire,
just as it is not flesh nor humors, but that by which we think and reason. For each of us is neither spirit nor fear nor
desire, just as it is not flesh nor humors, but that by which we think and reason. The soul receives an impression
from the mind and impresses upon the body, enfolding it from every side and molding its form. Consequently,
whenever the soul comes apart from each, it maintains its similarity and impress for much time, rightly called a
ghost” (λείπεται δ’ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἐπὶ τὴν σελήνην, οἷον ἴχνη τινὰ βίου καὶ ὀνείρατα διαφυλάττουσα· καὶ περὶ
ταύτης ὀρθῶς ἡγοῦ λελέχθαι τό “ψυχὴ δ’ ἠύτ’ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται” (Hom. Od. XI.222). οὐδὲ γὰρ εὐθὺς
οὐδὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσα τοῦτο πέπονθεν ἀλλ’ ὕστερον, ὅταν ἔρημος καὶ μόνη τοῦ νοῦ ἀπαλλαττομέν
γένηται. καὶ Ὅμηρος ὧν εἶπε πάντων μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ θεὸν εἰπεῖν ἔοικε περὶ τῶν καθ’ Ἅιδου (Hom. Od. XI.601-2)
“τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληείην, / εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν.” αὐτός τε γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν
οὐ θυμός ἐστιν οὐδὲ φόβος οὐδ’ ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ οὐδὲ σάρκες οὐδ’ ὑγρότητες, ἀλλ’ ᾧ διανοούμεθα καὶ
φρονοῦμεν, ἥ τε ψυχὴ τυπουμένη μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ τυποῦσα δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περιπτύσσουσα πανταχόθεν ἐκμάττεται
τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε κἂν χωρὶς ἑκατέρου γένηται, πολὺν χρόνον διατηροῦσα τὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ τὸν τύπον εἴδωλον ὀρθῶς
ὀνομάζεται; 944e-5a).
196
τούτων δ’ ἡ σελήνη, καθάπερ εἴρηται, στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν. ἀναλύονται γὰρ εἰς ταύτην, ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν γῆν τὰ σώματα
τῶν νεκρῶν, ταχὺ μὲν αἱ σώφρονες, μετὰ σχολῆς ἀπράγμονα καὶ φιλόσοφον στέρξασαι βίον (ἀφεθεῖσαι γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ
νοῦ καὶ πρὸς οὐθὲν ἔτι χρώμεναι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀπομαραίνονται)· τῶν δὲ φιλοτίμων καὶ πρακτικῶν ἐρωτικῶν τε περὶ
σώματα καὶ θυμοειδῶν αἱ μὲν οἷον ἐν ὕπνῳ ταῖς τοῦ βίου μνημοσύναις ὀνείρασι χρώμεναι διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἡ
τοῦ Ἐνδυμίωνος (945a-b). The reference to the dream of Endymion is apparently obscure, but Bos (1989)
characteristically detects a reference to Aristotle.
195
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good, whose wings have at least begun to grow back.197 In Sulla’s myth, both the ideal
philosopher and the noble statesman, a sort of second best, may obtain the same fate, although
the relatively disorderly impression of the latter sort constitutes a source of peril.198
The myth is much less explicit, however, about the fate of the ascendant mind.199 If
Socrates’ myth in the Phaedo meant the better place as an escape from the world of becoming
entirely, perhaps that is what Plutarch means as well.200 Could it also mean that the sun reabsorbs
the material of the mind, such that its material will be reused again eventually, but to create a
new mind?201 Scholars are generally insistent that the mind is meaningfully immortal for
Plutarch, yet Theon, in another dialogue, distinguishes two opinions about the fate of the soul
after death, each of which would be superior to the Epicurean opinion:202
In time, they consider many noble, weighty, and divine things and think that souls are
indestructible and imperishable, or that there are long cycles of time journeying around
the earth and the heavens until they are dissipated into the universe, consumed in the
intellectual fire with sun and moon.203

197

256a-d; cf. 248c-9a.
In Max. cum princ., Plutarch describes the recipient as “loving what is noble, politically-minded, and loving
humanity” (φιλοκάλων ἐστὶ καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ φιλανθρώπων; 776b).
199
Cf. Del Corno (1991): “Un incessante processo di ricambio si svolge fra sole, luna, e terra; e una continua
vicenda produce e riassorbe l’intelletto, l’anima e il corpo dell’individuo, nei modi e secondo le prerogative che a
ciascuna parte sono pertinenti” (24).
200
Hamilton (1934) finds in the “the return of mind to the sun in the de facie” a correspondence to the “promise that
those who live well shall return each to his own star” in the Ti. See also Roig Lanzillotta (2015): “… the moon is the
most appealing subject, not only for its influence on the processes of generation and corruption in the sublunary
region, but also and especially due to it being a turning point in the destiny of the intellect, either finally freed from
the accretions of soul and body or forced to return to an earthly existence” (192). This befits what he takes to be
Plutarch’s “contempt” for the body (184); Brenk (2017): “Suddenly we drift upwards in a sea of Middle Platonic
transcendentalism, as spiritual voyeurs of a universe of lunar souls and nous stripped of psyche. Even Plato of the
Timaios would be embarrassed. But having reached the top of the visible world and learned of the separation of the
soul through love of the ‘Desirable, Beautiful, Divine, and Blessed,’ for us the myth… suddenly rolls backwards to a
vision, not of the few entering into glory but to the pessimistic spectacle of the cycle of rebirth beginning again for
the multitude” (65); Helmig (2008: 251-2). Flacelière (1976) deems this ascent “ce qui équivaut à un déification”
(193).
201
This seems to be what Lamberton (2001) means with the argument that souls “ascend as pure mind to union with
the sun, into which they are absorbed” (178). See also Jones (1932: 120) contra Reinhardt (1926).
202
E.g. Donini (1988): “Obviously, Plutarch does not at all intend to abandon the Platonic doctrine of the
immortality of the soul. For in addition to a body and a mortal soul, man has nous or intelligence” (142).
203
ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ θεῖα προσδοκῶσιν οἱ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνωλέθρους εἶναι διανοούμενοι καὶ
ἀφθάρτους ἢ μακράς τινας χρόνων περιόδους νῦν μὲν ἐν γῇ νῦν δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ περιπολούσας, ἄχρι οὗ συνδιαλυθῶσι
τῷ κόσμῳ, μετὰ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης εἰς πῦρ νοερὸν ἀναφθεῖσαι (1107b).
198

311
Plutarch would presumably agree with Theon that the Stoic option would be better than the
Epicurean, but would the De facie myth allow this as an interpretation? When the stranger
describes the sun’s role in the return—characteristically, in a threefold comparison of the earth,
moon, sun, and their respective human parts—neither option seems to fit the text:
The [earth] gives nothing after death in giving back what she takes for generation, but the
sun takes nothing in taking back the mind that it gives, while the moon takes and gives
and compounds and divides in virtue of each power—the one named Ilithyia compounds
and Artemis divides.204
The earth, it seems, absorbs bodies back into itself entirely, and only gives in the sense that it
will be ensouled again: nothing else is left. “Giving back,” then, seems to mean “taking,” or at
least entering a state with the potential to “take” again whenever it accepts the next soul. The
sun, conversely, does not seem to absorb minds back into itself, since its characteristic action is
giving. “Taking back,” then, seems to mean “giving,” or at least entering a state of being able to
“give” the next time it is fitting to instill a mind into moon-stuff.205 The moon fittingly does both.
It seems that the mind, then, neither perishes nor transcends, but maintains its individuality and
remains until its next descent into a soul. The mind is immortal and, evidently, subject to a
continuous cycle of ensoulment and the possibility of reincarnation, not unlike how the
Amatorius’ Plutarch describes the fate of good, beauty-loving souls.206

οὐδὲν γὰρ αὕτη δίδωσι μετὰ θάνατον ὅσα λαμβάνει πρὸς γένεσιν <ἀποδιδοῦσα,> ἥλιος δὲ λαμβάνει μὲν οὐδὲν
ἀπολαμβάνει δὲ τὸν νοῦν διδούς, σελήνη δὲ καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ δίδωσι καὶ συντίθησι καὶ διαιρεῖ [καὶ] κατ’ ἄλλην καὶ
ἄλλην δύναμιν, ὧν Εἰλείθυια μὲν ἣ συντίθησιν Ἄρτεμις δ’ ἣ διαιρεῖ καλεῖται (945c). I follow Cherniss’ translation
closely on this passage. Donini reads <ἀλλ’ ἀποδίδωσιν> immediately following δίδωσι.
205
To break it down further, if there is a binary of opposition of x and y, the logic of the passage seems to be that
ἀπο-x indicates y. The LSJ includes a relevant entry for ἀπο- (D.6): “almost = ἀ- priv.; sts. with Verbs… more freq.
with Adjectives.” The passage does not usually receive much comment, except for the reason for identifying one
side of the moon’s power with each goddess, such as Cherniss (1957: 220na) and Lernould (2013: 87n468).
206
“The true lover reaches the world there and joins beautiful things in a pious way… until he goes again to the
meadows of Selene and Aphrodite, sleeps, and begins another process of generation” (ὁ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρωτικὸς
ἐκεῖ γενόμενος καὶ τοῖς καλοῖς ὁμιλήσας ᾗ θέμις… ἄχρι οὗ πάλιν εἰς τοὺς Σελήνης καὶ Ἀφροδίτης λειμῶνας ἐλθὼν
καὶ καταδαρθὼν ἑτέρας ἄρχηται γενέσεως; 766b).
204
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Perhaps a non-mythic account, such as Lamprias’, could have fulfilled Theon’s
teleological requirement, as Sulla’s interruption seems to imply. In this case, however, the myth
does serve to fulfill this role through sketching a vision of the cosmos—not just the moon, but
the sun and the earth as well—that explains the various parts in relation to cosmic ascent and
descent. This, like the eschatological systems sketched in Plutarch’s other myths, as well as
Plato’s, illustrates how the universe is ordered toward an essentially ethical end, a cosmic cycle
of descent and ascent. W. Hamilton argued that Plutarch means the cosmologicalanthropological content of the myth to be understood literally. The stranger’s speech does not
make it clear to what extent this could be true, but some critical details seem to hint that this is
not the case. Surely it is not the image of the good in the sun that our minds are truly drawn
towards, but the good itself beyond the physical world. In De Pythiae oraculis, the main speaker
Philinus argues, perhaps as a correction to traditional Greek thought, that Apollo differs from the
sun “just as the moon from the sun.”207 This leads him to distinguish the moon, which does not
draw attention away from the sun, and the solar body: “the sun has made many ignorant in some
respect of Apollo by diverting the intelligence, through sense-perception, from the really existent
to the apparent.”208 There is a similar danger that the image of the sense-perceptible sun in De
facie should divert the reader’s intelligence away from the truly existent form of the good. The
myth as a whole, it seems, is an imitation, an image based on but separated from reality. The
literal interpretation of its details should not be insisted upon as if it is revelation of doctrine.

“σὺ γὰ… οὐχ οὕτω νομίζεις, ἀλλ’ οἴει τὸν ἥλιιον διαφέρειν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος;” “ἔγωγ’… ὡς τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν
σελήνην” (400d). Cf. De E 386e.
208
ὁ δ’ ἥλιος ὁμοῦ τι πάντας ἀγνοεῖν τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα πεποίηκεν ἀποστρέφων τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τοῦ
ὄντος ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον (400d). The dialogue shifts immediately after this remark back to the artefacts of Delphi.
Cf. Quaest. Rom. LXXVII: “it is necessary to not simply think that they are icons of these things, but that Zeus is the
sun in material, and that Hera is the moon in material” (282c).
207

313
Nevertheless, the cosmological system that Sulla’s stranger lays out in the myth of De
facie is apparently broadly coherent with similar passages elsewhere in the Plutarchan corpus.
Many of its details, for instance, cohere with the broad cosmological sketch at the beginning of
the De genio myth:209
There are four principles of all things: the first is of life, the second of motion, the third of
becoming, the final of decay. The monad binds the first to the second at the invisible,
mind binds the second to the third at the sun, nature binds the third to the last at the
moon. There is a Fate, a daughter of Necessity, placed as a keyholder with charge of each
of the links: Atropos of the first, Clotho of the second, and Lachesis over the bond in the
moon, around which is the turning point of generation.210
The system in Simmias’ myth is more complicated than Sulla’s, in that it extends beyond the
world of becoming, but the latter includes the same three fates in the same exact order as those of
the three connections here—Atropos to the sun, Clotho to the moon, and Lachesis to the earth.211
Broad but important details such as in the descent of souls from the moon, moreover, appear

209

In the dialogue De genio Socratis the philosophical issues entailed in communication with the divine is
interwoven into a tyrannicide narrative. In a weighty speech, Simmias includes a myth cosmic journey and
daemonic revelation to the extraordinary experience of a young man. Timarchus desires to understand “from whence
Socrates bears this daemonian power” and so visits the oracle of Trophonius, an antique and strange oracle of the
dead: “He therefore desired to learn what power the daimonion of Socrates holds, because he was a boy not ignoble
and just had his first taste of philosophy, he confided in me and Kebes alone, and went down to the shrine of
Trophonius and doing the things accustomed for the oracle” (οὗτος οὖν ποθῶν γνῶναι τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον ἣν
ἔχει δύναμιν, ἅτε δὴ νέος οὐκ ἀγεννὴς ἄρτι γεγευμένος φιλοσοφίας, ἐμοὶ καὶ Κέβητι κοινωσάμενος μόνοις εἰς
Τροφωνίου κατῆλθε δράσας τὰ νομιζόμενα περὶ τὸ μαντεῖον; 590a). Aguilar (1996), however, considers the frame
of this myth “más simple en su planteamiento” compared to the others, although she only mentions the “extranjero
de Cartago” and none of the intricate details about his origins (286).
210
τέσσαρες δ’ εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πάντων, ζωῆς μὲν ἡ πρώτη κινήσεως δ’ ἡ δευτέρα γενέσεως δ’ ἡ τρίτη φθορᾶς δ’ ἡ
τελευταία· συνδεῖ δὲ τῇ μὲν δευτέρᾳ τὴν πρώτην Μονὰς κατὰ τὸ ἀόρατον, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν τῇ τρίτῃ Νοῦς καθ’
ἥλιον, τὴν δὲ τρίτην πρὸς τετάρτην Φύσις κατὰ σελήνην. τῶν δὲ συνδέσμων ἑκάστου Μοῖρα κλειδοῦχος Ἀνάγκης
θυγάτηρ κάθηται, τοῦ μὲν πρώτου Ἄτροπος τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου Κλωθώ, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς σελήνην Λάχεσις, περὶ ἣν ἡ
καμπὴ τῆς γενέσεως (591b). The names of the divinities harken back to the myth of Er. Cf. Pl. Leg. XII.960c-d.
Russell in Nesselrath (2010) suggests Phd. 72b as the inspiration for the “turning point” image (95). Dörrie (1954)
detects a sort of foreshadowing of the Plotinian hypostases in this passage (332-3).
211
καὶ τριῶν Μοιρῶν ἡ μὲν Ἄτροπος περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἱδρυμένη τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσι τῆς γενέσεως, ἡ δὲ Κλωθὼ περὶ
τὴν σελήνην φερομένη συνδεῖ καὶ μίγνυσιν, ἐσχάτη δὲ συνεφάπτεται περὶ γῆν ἡ Λάχεσις ᾗ πλεῖστον τύχης μέτεστι
(945c). The order is different than that of the myth of Er (X.617c), although, as Cherniss (1957) points out, the
opposite does appear in Leg. XII.960c-d. Cf. Xenocrates frg. 5 Heinze. On the relationship between the systems,
Dillon (1977): “In its firm separation of Mind and Soul, which are connected with the Sun and Moon respectively,
this scheme is in accord with that of the De Facie. The three Fates also play analogous roles in both myths… What
is new is the level of ‘Life,’ and the Monad which links it (syndei) to the level of motion” (215). Cf. Deuse (2010:
194-7).
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elsewhere in Plutarch’s corpus, such as in the conclusion of De exilio.212 Plutarch’s dialogues,
however, present divergent and contradictory positions on the nature of daemones, a topic which
spurs much of the interest in his philosophy.213 At times they are conceived of as intermediate
beings between the divine and the human, drawing on Diotima’s speech in the Symposium; but at
other times it is the highest part of a human, identified with the mind, like at the end of the
Timaeus. Yet in De defectu, Cleombrotus raises the possibility of evil daemones to explain the
recipients of horrific sacrifices.214 In Theanor’s speech in De genio, they seem to be the spirits of
the dead. But above all, whether conceived of as a dead human or not, Plutarch associates them
with divination and the mysteries, communication with the divine and temporary participation in
it. This myth bears some tensions with the others, such as in the claim that “every soul partakes
in mind, and no soul is unintelligent or mindless”—Sulla’s myth includes a dichotomy of souls
with mind and mindless souls.215 Each myth, however, is only a “likely account,” so it should not
be surprising if they differ even in important details, because they serve different functions in
different dialogues.216 The elaborate frame and the affinities with the Phaedo and the Timaeus

“It leaves not Sardis for Athens, nor Corinth for Lemnos or Scyros, but rather exchanges the heavens and the
moon for earth and life upon earth” (μεθέστηκεν, οὐ Σάρδεων Ἀθήνας, οὐδὲ Κορίνθου Λῆμνον ἢ Σκῦρος, ἀλλ’
οὐρανοῦ καὶ σελήνης γῆν ἀμειψαμένη καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς βίον; 607e). Slightly earlier, Plutarch invokes Empedocles for
the idea that the body is “earthborn and mortal” (γηγενὲς καὶ θνητόν; 607d).
213
Deuse (2010) points out various contradicting details, such as the identification of the daemon with the intellect
in De gen. and of daemones with souls in the De fac.(182), and eventually concludes: “the myths must not be taken
as doctrinal treatises; they are a play of the philosophical and theological imagination, but at the same time a
proclamation of the effort and seriousness of inquiry and research” (182). Lamberton (2010) seems to delight in this
aporia: “As Montaigne, perhaps the most sensitive and appreciative of Plutarch’s readers, emphasized, the scholar
of Chaeronea provides models of the ‘inquiring style,’ rather than the dogmatic.” Roig Lanzillotta (2015), on the
other hand, seems to see the assumption of potential contradiction as perversion compared to the “decades of
confidence that a consistent body of thought or system would be found behind the multifarious themes dealt with in
Plutarch’s abundant literary production” (179). Cf. Russell (1972): “It must, I think, be wrong to attribute any firm
system of ‘demonology’ to Plutarch. Literary and philosophical tradition, the wisdom of the East, the popular beliefs
of Hellas, were all known to him. They provided material for conjecture and adaptation. If he ever came to a definite
approval or rejection, it was on the ground of moral ‘probabilities’” (78).
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417c-e.
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ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετέσχεν, ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἄνους οὐκ ἔστιν (591d); πᾶσαν ψυχήν, ἄνουν τε καὶ σὺν νῷ (943c).
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Neither contradicts Plutarch’s most deeply held principles—neither attributes evil to divine providence, for
instance—but they nevertheless are different sorts of inquiries.
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emphasizes this status by undercuting the verisimilitude of the De facie myth and emphasize the
hypothetical status of the stranger’s teleological explanation: this or something like it might well
be true, but about the physical world there can be no certainty. This form of myth, as well as
elements such as the over-exoticism of the frame, emphasizes this critical epistemological
distance.

Platonic models and the search for “sources” behind Sulla’s myth
In the previous sections, I argued that the formulation of a teleological account and the
construction of the human as a microcosm are both drawn essentially from Plato. In this section,
I argue that Plutarch considers the Xenocratean use of intermediaries also essentially Platonic,
and that other details in the De facie myth are drawn from elsewhere in Plato. Sulla’s stranger
describes the embodied human as composed of three parts, with each part corresponding to a
different part of the cosmos. The sun is the origin of the mind, and the agent that sows reason
into soul-stuff on the moon; the moon in turn ensouls bodies made of earth. The latter two
reabsorb the material after death, while the mind, when it sheds the soul, desires to return to the
image of the good in the sun. There are aspects of this system that seem clearly taken from the
Timaeus. As W. Hamilton already argued, this includes the division of humans into three parts:
Timaeus describes the demiurge “reasoning and discovering that of the things that are visible by
nature nothing mindless will be a more beautiful work than something with a mind, and in turn
that it is impossible for mind to belong to anything, apart from a soul.”217 Towards the end of the
dialogue, moreover, Timaeus describes this part, a dispensation from the demiurge, as a daemon,

λογισάμενος οὖν ηὕρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον
ἔσεσθαί ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῳ (30b). See also Thévenaz (1938: 70-1).
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something divine that has authority over the rest of the soul.218 The sun and moon of the De facie
myth, however, are rather different from the Timaeus, where they are differentiated neither from
each other nor from the other planets: human souls are sown into each of these and the
eschatological schema rewards the souls of men who live well with the ability to return to their
“native star.”219
These divergences from Plato have attracted a surprisingly vast body of scholarship that
seeks out the ultimate “sources” behind the stranger’s speech.220 Although Johannes Muhl
already identified Sulla as a “Platoniker” in 1885, the Stoic Posidonius has proven to be a
particularly popular candidate for the source lying behind the myth.221 Maximilian Adler, for
example, painstakingly attempts to connect every part of the myth to Posidonius, even when he
must argue based on something as vague as Posidonius’ proclivity for geography.222 Through this
attribution, Franz Cumont argues that the myth contains the essential core of the “théologie

“It is necessary to think about the most authoritative part of our souls in this sort of way, that god gave it to each
as a daemon. We say that this dwells in the higheset part of your body and raises us—as if a plant, not of earth but of
the heavens—from earth towards the kindred in the heavens” (τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ’ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους
διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε, ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν, τοῦτο ὃ δή φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ τῷ
σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον; 90a).
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… πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου… (42b). Cf. Cornford (1937): “If we were right in
supposing that the annual motion of the Sun actually is the motion of the Different, unmodified in the sun’s case and
variously retarded or accelerated by the other planets, Aristotle’s explanation fits Plato’s scheme” (141).
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See also the survey in Bos (1989: 55-70). Some more recent scholars vaguely point to ‘eclectic’ sources: e.g. Del
Corno (1991): “… e pure nel consueto rimpasto eclettico di altri fonti” (23); Russell (1972): “The elements of this
fantasy come from many places. They include Platonic reminiscences, traces of astrology, much literary as well as
popular tradition. The synthesis is Plutarch’s; he did not find the scheme as it is in earlier writers” (74). Plutarch’s
system differs also, however, from the formulations of Hellenistic astrology, e.g. Vettius Valens: “sun signifies the
things of the soul, while moon those of the body” (ἀπὸ Ἡλίου, ὃς δηλοῖ τὰ ψυχικά· ἀπὸ Σελήνης, ἣ δηλοῖ τὰ
σωματικὰ…; 205.26-7). Macrobius attributes a similar distinction to “the Egyptians”: Aegyptii protendunt… sol,
auctor spiritus… luna corporum (Sat. I.19.17). Cf. Cumont (1913): “Quand on distinguait dans l’âme diverses
facultés ou parties, on rapportait à lui l’origine de la plus élevée, de celle qui gouverne notre être comme l’astre-roi
règne sur le inonde” (463). The astrologers he cites (463n1-3), however, only ascribe authority over souls to the sun
and over bodies to the moon, not an origin or a source. Cf. Martianus Capella’s epithets, cited by Cumont (1913:
463n3): fomes sensificus, mentis fons, lucis origo (II.185).
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Muhl (1885: 36). Cf. Hirzel (1895: 185n4). Hirzel further distinguishes Lamprias, whom he also sees as an
adherent of “die akademische Skepsis,” from Plutarch by his “angeborenen Uebermuthe” and his adherence to
Lebadaea, “welcher Ort für ihn bedeutete was für Plutarch Delphi” (185).
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1910. Cf. Jones (1916: 54-6). Against Adler’s attribution of the geographical portion to Posidonius: Hamilton
(1934: 24-5n1). On the history of Posidonian scholarship, see Edelstein (1936: 286-8).
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solaire” which he argues to be the secret doctrine revealed in the Mithraic and other “mystères
exotiques.”223 Although initially aporetic about Posidonius’ eschatology, Karl Reinhardt shifts to
attribute the entirety of the myth in De facie to the shadowy Stoic.224 There has also been a search
for Pythagorean sources, particularly through Xenocrates—who is cited during at length
stranger’s speech but is accredited with far more of it. Richard Heinze argued in his 1892
collection of the Early Academic’s fragments that the De facie myth is, in fact, from both
sources: only part of the speech is Xenocratic, while part has been interpolated from Posidonius,

1913: 476-8. Cumont sees solar religion as the final stage in ancient worship of nature—“l’aboutissement logique
du paganisme… divinisant la nature” (448)—which, in his view, developed alongside “les progrès de la
connaissance” in natural sciences (450). He summarizes the eschatological schema of De facie (464), attributes it to
to Posidonius (464n3, 473-4)—a crucial link in the argument because of his association with the Syrian city of
Apamea (hence he speaks of “un Syrien comme Posidonius, Jamblique de Chalcis;” 477)—and finally describes it
as the advancement of old ‘oriental’ ideas: “luminaires célestes le séjour des défunts avaient été transformées et
systématisées par les théologiens” (464-5). Cf. Campbell (1898: 368-9). Plutarch does not, in his account, draw
directly on Posidonius, however, but received the myth through “le clergé païen,” who kept the Stoic doctrine alive
for the intervening century and a half (475). This development, evidently, paves the way for Christianity: “La même
race sémitique qui a provoqué la chute du paganisme est aussi celle qui fit l'effort le plus puissant pour le sauver”
(479). Cf. Brenk (1977: 142-3n33). Cumont has a long legacy among historians of religion, however. Bousset
(1960) for instance analyzes the sources of the De fac. myth based a reconstruction of Iranian religion that Cumont
created out of the De fac. myth (71-2). Campbell's (1968) reconstruction of the “ideology” behind certain aspects of
Mithraic eschatology, such as the “threefold genesis,” is still based almost entirely on the myths of Plato and
Plutarch (374-6). Jaeger (1948 [1923]) more sensibly attributes the creation of “cosmic” or “stellar” religion to
Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic forms in the dialogue De philosophia, although allowing a simultaneous
derivation by “that other pupil of Plato’s, Philip of Opus, in the Epinomis” (138).
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1921: “Man pflegt gleichwohl Poseidonios als die Quelle beinahe aller späteren Eschatologien zu betrachten.
Man findet ihn bei Cicero im Somnium Scipionis, bei Plutarch z. B. In der schrift ‘Über das Gesicht im Monde,’ …
Aber irgendetwas wahrhaft Wesentliches an diesen so mancherlei, unterreinander wieder so ganz und gar
verschiedenen Gebilden ausfindig zu machen, woraus eine bestimmte, so beschaffene Lehre oder Schrift sich
abziehen ließe, ist uns nicht gelungen, möchten auch nicht wünschen, daß es gelänge” (473-4). He even warns that
one could mistakenly “die gesamte Dämonologie und Eschatologie Plutarchs dem Poseidonios zuzuschreiben”
(201n3). Scarcely half a decade later, he attributes most of De fac. to Posidonius (1926: 313-53), on the assumption
that it must have a pre-Plutarchan source: “und wenn man noch immer leugnen will, daß dies die Eschatologie des
Poseidonios sei, so frage ich, von wem ist sie sonst?” (353). He does, however, allow for some “Platon-Imitation”
and “Platonstil,” such as with the fates (317). Jones (1932) responds point-by-point to his later arguments,
particularly emphasizing that the separation of mind from soul in De fac. contradicts Posidonius’ position, explicitly
cited by Galen (De plac. Hippoc. Et Pl. VI.2 = frg. 146 Edelstein & Kidd), that the mind if a faculty (δυνάμεις)
rather than a part (εἴδη μὲν ἢ μέρη) of the soul (as for Aristotle)—and so certainly not a distinct, separable entity
within a human (118). See also Hamilton (1934: 28n1); Edelstein (1936: 297n45). Reinhardt is, nevertheless,
supported by Boyancé (1963: 104 with n2). Babut (2003 [1969]) considers this line of argument in his systematic
treatment of Plutarch’s relationship with Stoicism (140-50), but concludes: “E poichè, d’altro canto, non c’è ragione
di sottrargli questi meriti a beneficio di Posidonio o di qualche altra fonte congetturata per il dialogo – visto che
l’originalità di Plutarco, almeno nella concezione dell’opera e nella sistemazione degli argomenti, pare
incontestabile – bisogna concludere che il De facie, ancora più del De Stoicorum repugnantiis o anche del De
communibus notitiis, deve spingerci a rivedere il giudizio sfavorevole troppo spesso formulato contro gli scritti
antistoici dei Moralia” (150). Cf. Froidefond (1987: 200-1).
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whom Heinze takes to be Plutarch’s ultimate source for Xenocrates as well.225 Roger Miller
Jones, however, attacks the attributions to both Xenocrates and Posidonius at length and in
multiple works, but nevertheless concludes, modifying Heinze’s position, that there is a tension
between a “thoroughly” Stoic part and the surrounding “Platonic” part.226 Harold Cherniss
similarly identifies specifically Stoic technical language in the same section—what Heinze
argued to be the Posidonian interpolation—and notes Aristotelian ideas, such as the yearning of
all things for the divine—but defends the claim that “Plato was Plutarch’s inspiration throughout
the dialogue.”227 Abraham Bos wildly expands the claim of Aristotelian influence in De facie,
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1892. He argues, among other contentions (123-4), that the moon and earth are initially said to desire one another
(as the “ersehnte Vereinigung von Mutter und Tochter”) in 942e, while the moon passes through the shadow of the
earth as quickly as possible (“der offenbar als Ort des Schreckens gedacht ist”) in 944a (124). He postulates an
interpolation starting in 943a and continuing onto 944c; the rest, he argues, goes back to Xenocrates. This division,
interestingly, requires him to explain the only part explicitly citing Xenocrates (943f-4a) as a quotation from
Posidonius. Cf. Von Arnim (1921: 1, 24-6). Heinze’s attributions to Xenocrates are taken up again by Jensen (1966):
“Xenocrates explicitly states that there is a second death, which liberates the νοῦς from the ψυχή. … the doctrine of
the ‘second death’ and the existence of evil demons are both demonstrably Xenocratic teaching… It is only
reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Xenocrates’s teachings on the nature of the demons comprised both aspects
of the demonology found in Plutarchus” (106-7). While Posidonius is often seen as a source of Near-Eastern
thought, Xenocrates is associated with Greek Pythagoreanism. E.g. Zeller (1889): “Mit Speusippus theilt Xenokrates
die Vorliebe für den Pythagoreïsmus und die Ueberschätzung der Mathematik; auch er verfolgte die Richtung,
welche Plato in seinem höheren Alter genommen hatte, noch weiter, als dieser ” (1010-1). Similarly, on Plutarch,
Zeller (1881): “Schon der ursprüngliche Platonismus hatte sich vielfach an alt pythagoreische Vorstellungen
angeschlossen” (159). He traces Plutarch’s daemonology onto both Xenocrates and Posidonius (1955: 309); see also
Jaeger (1948 [1923]: 459n1). Cf. Bousset (1960): “vielleicht aus Xenokrates und Posidonius” (60).
226
Jones (1916) responded, “passing the fact that it assumes a method of composition decidedly improbable,” that
Heinze’s division attributes onto Posidonius distinctively Platonistic ideas that contradict his secure testimonies
elsewhere, and that the attributions onto Xenocrates are based on “inconclusive” evidence (53-4). Against the
attributions to Posidonius, he argued more extensively later: “to assume that Posidonius was the only channel
through which the commonplaces of poets and philosophers flowed down to later antiquity is preposterous. Further,
we find that those who have busied themselves with compiling lists of these commonplaces have frequently paid
little attention to the immediate contexts in which they occur” (1926: 98). On the attribution of 943d-e to Stoic
thought, see also Cherniss (1957: 203ne). The position of Préaux (1973) is similar: “Plusieurs de ces pistes se
rejoignent précisément dans l’ésclectisme de Plutarque et se confondent dans une inspiration fondamentalement
mais non exclusivement platonicienne” (144). She identifies elements such as “la dissolution de l’âme” as Stoic
(150).
227
1957: 25; “… the notion that all nature strives towards the good and the term ἐφετόν itself are drawn from
Aristotle” (213ng); “These last sentences of chapter 28 show several definitely Stoic traits, especially the conception
of ‘tension,’ nourishment of the soul by the exhalations, and the use of the quotation from Heraclitus. It has long
been customary to compare…” (203ne). Cheniss’ general conclusion, however, is that “while Plutarch combined
various eschatological notions which were current and some of which were probably held in common by different
philosophers, his myth is in the main an interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus” (24). See also Thévenaz (1938). The
choice of the term eros for the desire that leads minds to the sun, however, is thoroughly Platonic.
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particularly citing fragments of Aristotle’s lost dialogues such as the Eudemus.228 Yvonne
Vernière presents a more complicated account and finds different parts of the myth to be drawn
from different sources: she allows that the tripartition of the human into mind, soul, and body is
taken from the Timaeus, claims Stoic sympathy for the nature of the moon as an intermediary,
and emphasizes what she finds to be the “Iranian” character of the “eschatology,” drawing
especially on Cumont.229 Like many French scholars, she is also influenced by Guy Soury, who
claims that Plutarch is influenced by Plato, but that both were influenced by the Eleusinian
mysteries.230 One could add Heraclides Ponticus—a fourth century B.C.E. figure associated with
1989. The crux of Bos’ argument is Tertullian’s mention of a “dreaming Cronus” in Aristotle (1-4). See further
71-82. Cf. Michalewski (2014: 88n109). In that the Eudemus, Aristotle evidently argues for the immortality of the
mind in particular. According to Themistius (In De an. 106.29-7.4 = frg. 38 Rose), Aristotle clarifies in the Eudemus
(τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξειργασμένων ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ) that Plato also understood the mind as immortal (καὶ
Πλάτων τὸν νοῦν ἀθάνατον μόνον ὑπολαμβάνει), while Aristotle distinguishes a mortal, passive mind (φθαρτὰ δὲ τὰ
πάθη καὶ τὸν τούτοις ἐνόντα λόγον, ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης παθητικὸν νοῦν ὀνομάζει). The other fragments just mention
the soul (frg. 39-41, 45-6), but Themstius’ testimony does cohere with Aristotle’s description of the active intellect
in De an. III.5: “and it is this alone that is separated just as it is, and it alone is immortal and invisible—although we
do not remember because it is impassive, while the passive intellect is destructible—and without it nothing thinks”
(χωρισθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀίδιον (οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν
ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός)· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ). Roig Lanzillotta (2015) takes this to be the
source for the tripartition in the De fac. myth (180n9, cf. 182 with n24). Vernière (1977) considers this poision, with
Xenocrates as a mediating source (130), but ultimately concludes that Posidonius is “le chaîon essential entre le
Timée et le mythe du De facie” (131). Chroust (1977) detects polemic against the lost Aristotelian dialogue De
philosophia in Plut.’s polemic against the Stoic theory of “natural location.”
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1986: 104 (Plato and Stoicism); 1977: 158 (Iranian religion). Cf. 1977: “Ansi malgré sa fidélité à Platon souvent
et sincèrement proclamée, Plutarque offre fréquemment dans ses mythes l’ébauche de doctrines qui trouveront chez
les penseurs postérieurs un développement plus hardi” (267). There are also claims of a Hermetic source for the
content of the De fac. myth, such as Bull (2018): “This teaching of Plutarch, who it will be recalled knew books of
Hermes, lends some support to the possibility that the soul during the Hermetic rebirth is thought to ascend to the
level of the moon, where it encounters the divine powers descending from above” (328-9, citing De Is. 375f). Cf.
Vernière (1977: 267). See also Bos (1989: 29-41). Beardslee (1975) broadly compares Gnosticism.
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1940. Soury fittingly focuses on the description of Demeter and Persephone (943c-d) and finds parallel elements
in the fragments of Plut.’s De anima, such as meadows (53-4). His argument is especially based, however, on what
he takes to be an explicit reference to initiation in 943b, a very fragmentary sentence that is supposed to explain why
the first death takes place in Demeter (καὶ ὁ μέν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ <γῇ> τῆς Δήμητρος): <διὸ τελευτᾶν λέγεται τὸν βί>ον
αὐτῇ τελεῖν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς Ἀθηναῖοι Δημητρείους ὠνόμαζον τὸ παλαιόν. Regardless of the specifics of Cherniss’
reconstruction, the issue is how τελεῖν is to be understood: Soury takes it to be a reference to the mysteries, “initier”
(53), but, as Cherniss (1951) points out, “τελεῖν in the ritual sense is active only, ‘to initiate,’ not passive, and that…
θελευτᾶν could be equated only with τελεῖσθαι” (151). I would translate, following Cherniss, “And the former is in
the <earth> and belongs to Demeter—<wherefore to end life is said> to be a service to her and the Athenians long
ago named the dead Demeterians.” The urge to defend Soury’s reading is such, however, that Lernould (2013)
adopts Cherniss’ suggestion for the lacuna but emends τελεῖσθαι for τελεῖν (80n403). Soury takes the main Platonic
parallel to be the Phdr., but argues this reflects the same ultimate source: “Les Mystères n’y perdent rien et leur
influence se renforce plutôt de celle qu'ils exercèrent déjà sur Platon, ce qui rend parfois le départ assez délicat”
228
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both Plato and Aristotle—for the idea that the material of souls is light or aether, as well as
whatever details may have been in his lost dialogues that evidently included narratives of the
soul’s journey through the heavens.231
Perluigi Donini, however, emphasizes the predominance of Plato in the stranger’s speech,
and argues that whatever Stoic or Aristotelian elements Plutarch may have drawn upon are
ultimately subordinated to a Platonic purpose.232 In this vein, I argue that Plutarch is drawing not
only many details from Platonic images and myths, but more significantly adopting a model he
finds in the Timaeus, although he adopts Xenocrates’ elaboration of the theory of intermediates,
as discussed in the previous section.233 Plutarch presents Xenocrates, however, as elaborating a
central conception from the Timaeus:
Xenocrates seems to have had these things in mind also, through some divine reasoning,
but taking his start from Plato. For Plato is the one who declared that each of the stars has
been harmonized from earth and fire through the natures bound by proportion in the
two—nothing becomes sense-perceptible unless there is something of earth and light
mixed into it.234
(58). He (1949) explains some other elements, such as the shared material between moon and soul, by reference to
Posidonius, however (324-325). See also Pérez Jiménez (2010).
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“Heraclitus calls (the soul) a fiery substance (πυρώδη), Heraclides a substance of light (φωτοειδῆ)” (frg. 98
Wehrli); “there are those who have said that it is an aetherial body, that is to say ‘heavenly,’ such as Heraclides
Ponticus” (οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασιν αἰθέριον εἶναι σῶμα, ταὐτὸν δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν οὐράνιον, ὥσπερ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός;
frg. 99). See further Dillon (2003: 212-5). Plutarch mentions the former view in De lat. viv. but does not specifically
name Heraclides: “there are some philosophers who think that soul is, in its essence, light” (ψυχὴν ἔνιοι τῶν
φιλοσόφων φῶς εἶναι τῇ οὐσίᾳ νομίζουσιν 1130b = frg. 100). Hirzel (1895) compares the style of Heraclides’
dialogues (187).
232
2011: “l’inspiratore fondamentale è Platone e tutto ciò che Plutarco eventualmente prenda dagli Stoici è sempre
piegato e subordinato a una significazione platonica” (350).
233
E.g. Lincoln (1999): “Plutarch spelled out a set of eschatological ideas, following Plato…” (166). The search for
the ultimate source of Plato’s myths, however, constitutes another mass of scholarship. Bousset (1960), for instance,
finds in the myth of Er “eranischen Eschatologie” (66). Relatively recently, West (1971) renews the argument for
Eastern sources, specifically the “magi” (242), for fundamental Platonic ideas, by way of Heraclitus and Pythagoras
(161-2). Jaeger (1948 [1923]) emphasizes three elements: “the Academy’s admiration for Chaldaean and ‘Syrian’
astronomy,” “the religious dualism of the Parsees,” and a sort of antiquarian interest in Zoroaster (132)—“The
Academy’s enthusiasm for Zarathustra amounted to intoxication, like the rediscovery of Indian philosophy through
Schopenhauer” (133-4). Cf. Arist. frg. 6 Rose (= Diog. Laert. I.8).
234
ταῦτα δὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτης (frg. 56 Heinze) ἔοικεν ἐννοῆσαι θείῳ τινὶ λογισμῷ, τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβὼν παρὰ Πλάτωνος.
Πλάτων γάρ ἐστιν ὁ καὶ τῶν ἀστέρων ἕκαστον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς συνηρμόσθαι διὰ τῶν <δυοῖν> μεταξὺ φύσεων
ἀναλογίᾳ δεθεισῶν ἀποφηνάμενος· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰς αἴσθησιν ἐξικνεῖσθαι, ᾧ μή τι γῆς ἐμμέμικται καὶ φωτός (943f).
Cf. Dillon (2003): “there seems little enough in the dialogues to justify this triad level of reality, with its three
degrees of pyknon. And yet, with a little imagination, the impulse to such a scheme might be discerned in certain
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Xenocrates evidently went beyond Plato in postulating three densities and distinguishing the
moon from the sun and the other stars, but his consequent cosmological system is presented as an
elaboration of the account in the Timaeus. The stars are visible and consequently, according to
Plato’s argument, must partake in some amount of earth: “Nothing would be able to be bodily or
visible without fire, nor tangible nor solid without earth, so god composed the body of the world
in the beginning from fire and earth, but two things are not able to be beautifully composed
without a third: so there was a need for some bond that is uniting to both.”235 Xenocrates, it
seems, is not just expanding this conception of an intermediate, but drawing out density as a
requirement of corporeality and visibility, even for the sun.
This sort of postulation of intermediaries, moreover, is characteristic of Xenocrates
broader thought, including his conception of daemones, as Plutarch elsewhere preserves. John
Dillon plausibly suggests that there he is applying Diotima’s theory of daemones in the
Symposium.236 Because Eros moves toward something external, it must lack things, she argues,
and therefore not be a god.237 Rather, it is “something between mortal and immortal… a great

hints dropped by Plato in the Timaeus” (127). On θείῳ τινὶ λογισμῷ, see Dillon (1999: 308). See also Dancy (2017):
“he appears to have been at least as concerned to carry on the thought of Plato as to promulgate ideas of his own.”
Cf. Isnardi Parente & Dorandi (2012: 12-33). Proclus similarly depicts Xenocrates as a faithful interpreter
formulating a conception of Plato’s idea “in agreement with the founder” (ὡς ἀρέσκοντα τῷ καθηγεμόνι τὸν ὅρον
τῆς ἰδέας ἀνέγραψε; frg. 30 Heinze = In Parm. 889).
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σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁρατὸν ἁπτόν τε δεῖ τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι, χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε ὁρατὸν
γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἁπτὸν ἄνευ τινὸς στερεοῦ, στερεὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ γῆς· ὅθεν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχόμενος
συνιστάναι σῶμα ὁ θεὸς ἐποίει. δύο δὲ μόνω καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν· δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ
τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι (31b-c). See further 31c-2c.
236
Dillon (1999) deems it “mathematical expression” of the explanation of daemones in Symp. 202d-e. He contends,
“… the theme of triadic division of the universe, since that appears to be the salient feature of Xenocrates’
philosophy which attracted Plutarch, and for which he is, in consequence, our chief witness” (311). See also
Plutarch’s summary in De Is. 361b-c.
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“But you conceded that Eros, through a lack of good and beautiful things, desires that which it lacks.” “I
conceded it.” “How, then, can a god lack a share in beautiful and good things?” (“ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἔρωτά γε ὡμολόγηκας
δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν.” “ὠμολόγηκα γάρ.” “πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς
εἴη ὅ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος;” 202d).
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daemon, Socrates: everything daemonian is between both god and mortal.”238 Xenocrates, we
learn from the speech Plutarch assigns to Cleombrotus in De defectu oraculorum, further
systematized this conception of a daemon as intermediary by comparing different sorts of souls
to triangles:
Xenocrates, the companion of Plato, used the relationship of triangles as an example of
this sort of relationship, likening the equilateral to the divine, the scalene to the mortal,
and the isosceles to the daemonic. For the first is equal in every sense and the second is
unequal in every sense, while as the last is in one sense equal and in one sense unequal,
just as the nature of daemones possesses both the passivity of a mortal and the power of a
god.239
Xenocrates interprets Plato’s daemones as bridging a gulf between the divine and the mortal by
partaking in both of their natures. This interpretive move, positing intermediaries to explain
metaphysical connections, could evidently be applied to explain other aspects of the world, such
as the astrological bodies.240 Cleombrotus, in fact, goes onto characterize the moon precisely as a
“mixed body and daemonic imitation,” because it shares some characteristics with the heavens
and some with the earth.241
Plato’s Symposium, however, also offers a more direct formulation of the idea that the
moon is an intermediary, which Christian Lobeck contrasts with Aristophanes’ myth of ancient
humanity. He describes a race of circular people that rolled instead of walked, composed to two
conjoined humans, who were later split as punishment for their hubristic attack on Olympus.

μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. … δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ
θνητοῦ (202d-e). Much of Diotima’s speech plays in intermediates, such as true belief (τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν) as the
intermediate between ignorance and wisdom (μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; 202a). See also Plut. De Is. 361c.
239
παράδειγμα δὲ τῷ λόγῳ Ξενοκράτης μὲν ὁ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖρος ἐποιήσατο τὸ τῶν τριγώνων, θείῳ μὲν ἀπεικάσας
τὸ ἰσόπλευρον θνητῷ δὲ τὸ σκαληνὸν τὸ δ’ ἰσοσκελὲς δαιμονίῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον πάντῃ τὸ δ’ ἄνισον πάντῃ, τὸ δὲ πῆ
μὲν ἴσον πῆ δ’ ἄνισον, ὥσπερ ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος θνητοῦ καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν (416c-d = frg. 23
Heinze). On Xenocrates’ theory of daemones, see also frgs. 24-5 Heinze (= Plut. De Is. 360d-e, 361b). Cf. Reinhardt
(1926: 320n2).
240
This sort of interpretation, the appeal to intermediary, proved extremely influential on later Neoplatonism: e.g.
Proc. In Alc. 30.18-1.2.
241
μεικτὸν δὲ σῶμα καὶ μίμημα δαιμόνιον ὄντως τὴν σελήνην (416e). His examples include the cycles of the moon
and the consequences of discarding either the daemon or the moon as intermediaries (416e-f). Cf. Sym. 202e.
238
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Each of the two parts of a circle-person is said to be either male or female, which leaves three
possibilities: a combination of two men, of two women, or of one man and one woman.
Aristophanes describes this schema through a comparison with astrology: “There were three
types of such sorts because of this, that the male was, in the beginning, the offspring of the sun,
and the female of the earth, and the one partaking of both of the moon, because the moon
partakes in both sorts.”242 Whether Plutarch applied this sort of move to intermediaries, as
Xenocrates did, or drew directly from Plato, Sulla’s myth presents a thoroughly Platonic system
that takes its start from the Timaeus.
In that dialogue, however, human souls are sown into a variety of astral bodies and not
just the moon, as in Plutarch. But the central importance of the sun is more reminiscent of the
image of the sun in the Respublica, where it is Socrates’ example of what sort of thing the form
of the good might be—just as things are visible insofar as they partake of the light of the sun, so
too are they intelligible insofar as they partake in the form of the good.243 In the eighth of the
Quaestiones Platonicae, Plutarch indeed asks why the sun is treated in such a superlative manner
in the latter but only as an “organ of time” in the Timaeus:
Someone might mistrust that the sun, improbably and strangely, is said to come into
being with the moon and the planets for the demarcation of time. For it is accorded
especially great honor by Plato in the Respublica, designated as the king and lord of the
perceptible world, as the good is of the intelligible: for the sun is said to be the child of
ἦν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα τρία τὰ γένη καὶ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν ἦν τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔκγονον, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ τῆς γῆς,
τὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον τῆς σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ σελήνη ἀμφοτέρων μετέχει (190b). Cf. Préaux (1973: 187).
Evidently the Orphic hymn to Selene also attributes both genders to the moon (θῆλύς τε καὶ ἄρσην; IX.4).
243
“This is what I’m saying by calling it the child of the good, that which the good begot by analogy to itself: by just
as much as the good relates to mind and what is known is in the intelligible realm, by that much is it (the sun) to
sight and the seen in the visible realm” (τοῦτον τοίνυν… φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν
ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ
ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα; VI.508b-c). Von Arnim (1921) suggests that this is Plutarch’s source for the
sun in De fac (57). Cf. Reinhardt (1926: 318). In the Amat., the character of Plutarch draws an analogy between
Eros’ impact on the soul and the sun’s on bodies (764b-d). Plutarch seems to have also had this image from the
Resp. in mind also in De lat. viv. 1129e-30b—see Roskam (2007: 138-9)—where he argues that “life itself—to be at
all and to partake in generation—is given to a man by god so that he might be known” (τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ καὶ ὅλως τὸ
φῦναι καὶ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ γενέσεως εἰς γνῶσιν ὑπὸ θεοῦ δοθῆναι; 1129e-f).
242
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the good, providing the possibility to come to be through being shown to the visible
things, just as through the other it is possible for intelligible things to be understood.244
It seems that the stranger’s myth adjusts the schema in the Timaeus into a cosmic hierarchy to
facilitate the status of the sun in the famous image from the Respublica. This corresponds to the
hierarchical nature of humans, who are in the De facie myth, as in the Timaeus, composed of
mind, soul, and body, while adopting the idea that the sun is the “child” of the form of the good,
making it the source of order in the world of becoming.245 While the standard accounts try to
draw direct correspondences between single Platonic models and single Plutarchean myths, the
reality is more complex—Plutarch draws from a variety of Platonic influences in each. In the De
facie myth, for example, there are perhaps reminiscences of the palinode of the Phaedrus—such
as the detail that the souls that rise to the moon “like athletes, bind themselves with feathery
wreaths, so to speak, for their constancy,” recalling the Platonic wing imagery246—as well as the
other dialogues cited in this chapter. This bricolage can be seen in these echoes of details, but

ἐκεῖνο δὲ μᾶλλον ἄν τις ὑπίδοιτο, μὴ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἀτόπως λέγεται μετὰ τῆς σέληνης καὶ τῶν
πλανήτων εἰς διορισμὸν χρόνου γεγονέναι. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως μέγα τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν
Πολιτείᾳ βασιλεὺς ἀνηγόρευται παντὸς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κύριος, ὥσπερ τοῦ νοητοῦ τἀγαθόν· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἔκγονος
λέγεται, παρέχων τοῖς ὁρατοῖς μετὰ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὸ γίγνεσθαι, καθάπερ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι
τοῖς νοητοῖς ὑπάρχει (1006f-7a). The initial question is: “how is it that Timaeus says that souls are sown into the
earth and the moon and all the other organs of time?” (πῶς λέγει τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ Τίμαιος εἴς τε γῆν καὶ σελήνην καὶ
τἆλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου σπαρῆναι; 1006b, paraphrasing Ti. 42d).
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In the eighth of the Quaestiones Platonicae, he takes eventually argues that “time is not an accident or an
attribute of motion but the cause and power and source of the symmetry and order encompassing everything in a
state of becoming, through which the nature of all, being ensouled, moves” (οὐ γὰρ πάθος οὐδὲ συμμβεβηκὸς ἧς
ἔτυχε κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστίν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς πάντα συνεχούσης τὰ γιγνόμενα συμμετρίας καὶ
τάξεψς, ἣν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις ἔμψυχος οὖσα κινεῖταιl; 1007b). As a result, the role of the sun is held to be a source of
order, insofar as it gives time its order and intervals: “the sun, because it is the overseer and guardian, delimits and
presides and displays and reveals changes and seasons, which Heraclitus says bring everything about; it is the
fellow-worker of the chief and first god, not in paltry or small things, but in the greatest and most authoritative”
(ἥλιος ἐπιστάτης ὢν καὶ σκοπὸς ὁρίζειν καὶ βραβεύειν καὶ ἀναδεικνύναι καὶ ἀναφαίνειν μεταβολὰς καὶ ὥρας “αἳ
πάντα φέρουσι” καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον [frg. B100], οὐ φαύλων οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων τῷ
ἡγεμόνι καὶ πρώτῳ θεῷ γίγνεται συνεργός; 1007d-e). This is a very different attitude towards the sun than
Posidonius’, who does not seem to have differentiated it from other moving astral bodies: Edelstein (1936: 297-8).
Cf. [Pl.] Epin. 978c-9b.
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ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι, περιίασιν ἀναδούμεναι στεφάνοις πτερῶν εὐσταθείας λεγομένοις (943d). Cf. e.g. Phdr.
256b; Flacelière (1976: 195n18). The use of the term “obedient to the rein” (εὐήνιον; 943d) to describe the irrational
part of the soul also clearly recalls the image of the soul chariot. Plut. also quotes Phdr. 250c—the soul is in the
body “like an oyster” (ὀστρέου τρόπον)—in De exil. 607e.
244
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also in the similarity in overall structure: the myth De facie presents the human as a microcosm
of the universe and shows how the moon fulfills a greater purpose in the manner required by
Socrates in the Phaedo—namely through its role in both the ensoulment of bodies and the
purification of disembodied souls.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I identified four significant points of similarity between the myths of
Plutarch’s De facie and, particularly, Plato’s Phaedo and Timaeus. The over-determined
exoticism of the frame of Sulla’s story calls attention to the hypothetical status of the discourse,
it fulfills the requirements of a teleological account as laid out by Socrates in the Phaedo, it gains
its plausibility by utilizing the analogy of macrocosm and microcosm as exemplified by the
Timaeus, and it explains the parts of both humans and the world through identifying part as an
intermediary to build a sort of hierarchy, as evidently Xenocrates proposed, himself building
upon the Timaeus. These attributes each contribute to the framing Sulla’s myth as a “likely
account” about the physical world, namely the nature of the moon and the teleological
significance of its nature: just as the soul is an intermediary between mind and body, the moon is
an intermediary between sun and earth, receiving mind from the sun and ensouling a body on the
earth. This account is not certain, because it concerns the world of becoming, about which we
cannot be certain. Rather, it explains how such an arrangement, if true, fulfills some greater
purpose in the providential care of the world. In so doing, Plutarch, like Plato, subordinates
physical inquiry to metaphysics, which perhaps gives it a greater sort of ethical significance: by
studying the world, we learn about its intelligent arrangement and functioning, and so can order
ourselves accordingly in pursuit of that Middle Platonic ideal, the imitation of god.
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While in Sulla’s myth the moon is the primary macrocosm for the human soul, the next
chapter centers on Plutarch’s interpretation of the Platonic world soul in his explicitly exegetical
treatises, particularly De animae procreatione. The description of the human soul in Sulla’s myth
evidently shares salient qualities with the world soul, which suits the macrocosmic-microcosmic
analogy identified in the Timaeus. In Sulla’s myth, particularly pure minds eventually stop caring
for the soul at all and travel to the sun, leaving the souls on the moon to maintain a sort of
imprint left by the mind for a time, before either they disintegrate into the moon or the irrational
part of the soul overpowers the rational. In Plutarch’s exegesis of Plato’s Politicus, the cosmic
intellect does not always govern the world soul with the same degree of attention, but
periodically exerts less control: at first the soul maintains its orderly motion, but eventually the
irrational part of the world soul overpowers the rational part and makes its chaotic nature felt as a
cosmic upheaval, before the intellect regains control and governs the world soul. The latter idea
could, perhaps, illuminate a particularly strange part of Sulla’s myth, the image of Cronus bound
under Ogygia:
For Cronus dreams as many things as Zeus premeditates: the titanic passions and motions
of his soul rouse him, <until> sleep once again <restores> his repose, and the kingly and
divine royal part is, intrinsically, clean and pure.247
The image is strange, but it seems that Zeus represents the active intellect, while as Cronus’
dreaming state is a passive one, like a sort of conduit.248 His soul is pure during this sleeping
state, but it is evidently liable to the same kinds of overwhelming passions as the world soul in

ὅσα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς προδιανοεῖται, ταῦτ’ ὀνειροπολεῖν τὸν Κρόνον, εἶναι δ’ ἀνάτασιν τὰ τιτανικὰ πάθη καὶ κινήματα
τῆς ψυχῆς <ἕως> ἂν αὐτῷ πάλιν ἀνάπαυσιν ὁ ὕπνος <καταστήσῃ> καὶ γένηται τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ θεῖον αὐτὸ καθ’
ἑαυτὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον (942a). Evidently there is a lacuna of 11 letters after Κρόνον; Pohlenz (1955) prints
ἐπειδὰν στασιάσαντα, while Donini (2011) suggests ἔχειν δ’ οὕτως ἵνα.
248
In the myth of Plato’s Plt., Cronus and Zeus are both governors of the universe, but here they seem to be reduced
into a hierarchy, not unlike the sun and the moon later in the myth.
247
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Plutarch’s exegesis.249 The image is reversed, however: that sleep is what weakens the reason in
the latter, while it is what quells the passions in this passage of De facie.250 Should this detail
perhaps subtly suggest that the world soul is liable to disorder like human souls, or is it an
extrinsic detail meant only to explain the prophetic power of the daemones?251

Bos (2004) also interprets Cronus in the De fac. myth as representing the “World Soul”—although in an
‘Aristotelian’ guise of the “World Archon,” rather than as a recognizably Platonic world soul (186)—but he does not
explain the titanic passions interrupting sleep (although he mentions it in 175-6), this very detail which distinguishes
this version of the myth from the other dialogue.
250
Donini (2011), however, argues that there is not “un’alternanza di princìpi diversi alla guida dell’universo” in
Plutarch’s “interpretazione della cosmologia platonica” based on De def. or., De Is., and “forse” De an. proc. (343).
This consideration leads him to insert <μή> between Κρόνον and εἶναι (343-4), taking the latter from Cherniss.
251
In the stranger’s speech, the world soul could be thought of, in a sense, as embodied in the moon, in the guise of
Persephone. The demiurge’s creation in the Timaeus is deemed a “single-borne world” (μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς; 31b),
and Persephone in the stranger’s myth is called by the same epithet (943b). In the Hesiodic Theog., the epithet is
applied to Hecate (427), which offers an identification that proves extremely influential in later Middle and
Neoplatonism through the Oracula Chaldaica.
249
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Summary. Myth, interpretation, and Platonism
In this study, I have argued that Platonic interpretation and mythmaking are parallel
forms of discourse, through which Plutarch builds a meticulously Platonic philosophy. Myth is
for Plutarch, as for Plato, a way of forming images about the world that, although distinct from
their models, can help the student of philosophy to at least grasp after the truth. Rather than a sort
of hieros logos like that of the mysteries, each discourse allows him to create “likely accounts,”
as Plato described them in the Timaeus, that provide sketches of how the cosmic governance of
the divine might function. Myths, however, must be interpreted. The first chapter examined how
Plutarch derives his central theological conceptions from the Platonic corpus. The definition of
piety as an intermediary position between superstition and atheism seems to provide him with his
central definition in both De superstitione and De Iside et Osiride. He approached traditional
myths and rituals with care, but was not afraid to interpret them, sometimes with constrictive
allegories, to reflect back on philosophical truths. He drew his definition of the aim (telos) of the
good life, as many Platonists would, from the image of imitating god, insofar as possible for a
human. Plutarch, both in his own grappling with tradition and in his polemic with the other
schools, especially the Epicureans and Stoics, was a thorough-going Platonist. In the second
chapter, I argued that Plutarch interprets Plato through consistent hermeneutical principles, in
both interpretive works in prima persona and in his dialogical depictions of interpretive
conversations. Just as the myths of tradition must be interpreted, so too those of Plato,
particularly in the case of the difficult likely myth of the Timaeus. Plutarch assumes that Plato is
consistent with himself, such that it is best to interpret a given difficulty through appealing to
other parts of the corpus, rather than invoking competing figures such as Aristotle. As a result, he
could take certain ideas or images from elsewhere in the corpus—such as the cosmic cycles of
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the Politicus myth—and use them to explain the composition of the world soul in the Timaeus.
He attempts to maintain the temporal distinctions implicit in the narrative ordering of Platonic
myths, however, rather than recourse to the sort of allegorical interpretation he found among the
Early Academics. This discourse of dialectical interpretation likewise enables Plutarch to form
accounts about the world that are at least likely, although he does not always venture to speculate
which meaning was actually intended by Plato, as long as each is plausible and coherent with
what he takes to be Plato’s central assumptions.
In the third and fourth chapters, I examined how Plutarch’s myths serve functions
particular to their form, however, such as the ethical exhortation inherent in the myth of De sera
numinis vindicta and the teleological account of De facie in orbe lunae. In the former case, the
philosophical myth allows Plutarch a second way of approaching Epicurus’ assault on
providence and so to reinforce the central ethical ideas of the dialogue. The myth complements
the dialectic. It does not meaningfully transcend it. In Sulla’s myth, however, Plutarch weaves
together a teleological account with an ostentatiously fictive narrative of an exoticized expert
from the far north, who had various divine and mundane sources. This fictive prelude, I argue,
functions not unlike the pairing of the Atlantis myth with the likely myth of the Timaeus: it calls
attention to the speech’s status as hypothetical. Like religious and Platonic interpretation,
Plutarch draws widely on Platonic models for his myths, such as afterlife punishments in the
Gorgias and imagistic details from the “true world” in the Phaedo. This discourse of
mythmaking provides another avenue of likely accounts for Plutarch, which complement those
of his more straight-forwardly logical dialectics. The truth is difficult, if even possible for a
human, to obtain, so Plutarch takes multiple tactics. Myth is a particularly useful avenue because
it does not allow its careful reader to forget that it is only an image of the good in the sun.
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